

## *My Tears when Listening to Music*

— *In case of "Erbarne dich" (in the "Mathew's Passion")* —

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Is there any person who is not moved by "Erbarne dich, mein Gott"? I am also deeply moved and could not help having tears in my eyes. But what are these tears? Do they stand in my eyes because of my sentimental disposition? Or because of my aesthetic emotion? Or because of my sympathy with Peter? Nor is it so clear whether this sorrowful and deep feeling belongs to the work "Mathew's passion" or to me.

If it is *my* feeling, why do I become to this state of mind in my relation to the work, not to others? We must explain the effect of the object as a *Gegenstand* on me as long as I keep relations with the work and don't fall into day dreams.

On the other hand, when we insist that it is not mine but the work's, that is, that the work has a kind of feeling as a mental state or of life, we must suppose the existence of a subject in work which is subhuman but at the same time similar to the human being as a bearer of feeling.

In this short article we consider the quality and the structure of my feeling with tears which is evoked by listening to music.

### I Methodological preparations

#### 1 Character

At first we must confirm with M. Geiger<sup>1)</sup> the independence of a tone character from my or other person's experience. When a tone is said "cheerful", it is not so because I feel myself cheerful, but because it has a cheerful character as a kind of its attribute. It becomes clear when I hear a cheerful tone in a state of gloom. The contrast between my gloom and its cheerfulness has the ability to strengthen my feeling of gloom. Even if I became cheerful, my cheerfulness can be discriminated from that of the tone, although I am influenced by it. Without the independency of the character I cannot have a support and an end by which and to which I change my mental state.

But what is the essential quality of the feeling? M. Geiger insists the I-quality (*Ichqualität*).<sup>2)</sup> "To me it seems in fact not doubtful at all that I experience my sadness immediately as my experience, and that my sadness is given to me immediately as mine."<sup>2)</sup>

On the other hand, the tone which I now hear is not experienced immediately as

my tone but something different from me or something standing toward me (*gegenstehendes*), although this quality, that is, die *Gegenständlichkeit* is weaker at the tone than, for example, at the color because of the reason mentioned in the future.<sup>3)</sup>

The *Gegenständlichkeit* is another important *merkmal* to show the subjectivity of the feeling. "In my experience of my joy I don't observe or look at the joy—I live in it and with it, just like I live my anger or my passion in my acts of volition".<sup>4)</sup> But when I see some joy in an event or I enjoy a picture, I have my joy on it, I look at or regard it at a distance. In a word, "it exists objectively (*gegenständlich*) for me".<sup>4)</sup>

Thus, according to M. Geiger, the conscience is divided into the "object side" and the "subject or experience side". Like everything in which I live, the feeling don't stand toward me as an object as a *Gegenstand* of my observation. Feelings are not objects (*Gegenstände*) of my attention—not observable nor graspable in the same meaning as at the object side. On the contrary, the cheerfulness of a color or a tone, when I pay attention to it, does not disappear as an immediate experience, but the more I take it as an object of my attention, the more clearly it takes shape.<sup>5)</sup>

## 2 The relation between character and feeling

We insist the independency of the character from the feeling in the precedent chapter. Then isn't there any relation between character and feeling? According to M. Geiger some key or ground must be found to relate the character with the feeling. Because, if characters were real objects of experience which didn't have any relations with feelings at all, there remains as a mystery the reason why they bear the same names with feelings and moods (*Stimmungen*), why we talk about cheerful or gloomy colors (or tones) as well as about cheerful or gloomy moods.<sup>5)</sup>

The key to relate them is obtained through the recollecting experience. When I remember my hometown where I lost my friend, I do with sorrow and remorse. But it is clear that I can discriminate the sorrowful and remorseful feeling from the hometown or the lost friend on which my mind concentrates. It means, so Geiger says, that there are also two sides, the *experience side* and the *object side* in what is called "feeling".<sup>6)</sup> The experience side of the feeling is the proper subjective feeling. The object side imprints on the object some coloring or remark which is classified according to the characters of each feeling. "On the object, ranking with the proper feeling experience, is found the objective constituent of feeling, that is, coloring which forms a clear contrast to the subjective feeling experience."<sup>6)</sup> Geiger calls this objective constituent of feeling the "feeling tone" (*Gefühlston*).<sup>7)</sup>

The separation of the feeling tone gives us the key to build a bridge between feeling and character. Because now the difference between them doesn't consist in the quality but in their place to the object. Concerning the latter the cheerful feeling as a subjective experience is essentially different from the cheerful character of tone or of color. But the feeling tone, so says Geiger, throws on objects with which it now relates a certain conditioned "light" (*Licht*). And this light can also appear on objects

without an accompanying mood (*Stimmung*)—they can irradiate it to me just like they do so in case that I find the mood in me.<sup>8)</sup> Geiger insists that something common to both the feeling tone and the character exists in the experience itself.

From our standpoint, however, the demand of the commonness should be left as an open question. Because it is quite probable that it is constructed by the human identification.<sup>9)</sup> If it were not so, why does this commonness change according to cultures and histories? But at the same time it is also quite important to point at the rightness of his insistency that it has the objectivity although a relative one.

Needless to say, a thing has many characters. And only few of them are now discussed in relation to the feeling. (In this sense these characters are called “*feeling characters*” and other characters which have no relations “*object characters*”.<sup>10)</sup> When a character of the thing is once identified with a kind of feeling, it always show the feeling character or the “light” because of the permanence of the character. Whenever I perceive the latter, I also admit the former. In this sense the feeling character has the objectivity without dependence upon my subjective association or attitude.

At the last of this chapter we must touch the problem in what case the objective constituent of the feeling prevails. From Geiger’s experiment we can safely say that it happens when some feeling links itself to something perceivable and that, on the contrary, the subjective constituent prevails when the feeling links itself to circumstances or moods.<sup>11)</sup> In other words, the predominance of the objectivity is in proportion to the possibility of the identification of what my attention turns to. It becomes clear when we think such an extreme case in which the object as a bearer of the feeling is not identical with the object of the feeling. For example, when I remember my hometown which a lady whom I loved left, it is quite natural to say that the town is the object to which my attention turns as a bearer of my sorrowful and remorseful feeling. But it is not the true object (*Gegenstand*) of the feeling. The true object is the fact that she left me and the town. To my sincere regret, it cannot be designated or identified by anything in the usual meaning of the word because of its pastness. This proportion of the objectivity to the identification plays an essential role when we discuss the lack of the object as an *Objekt* in music.

### 3 Five attitudes in which we face the object

In this chapter we summarize the analysis of M. Geiger concerning the types of attitude how we face the object, that is, the problem how many cases there are in which man relates to the object. At the first level the attitude is divided into the observing and the assimilating one.

0. The observing attitude: it keeps a distance between my proper experience and the content of the mood. The content faces me as something foreign and opposite.

1. The assimilating attitude: it is important especially in the aesthetic experience but doesn’t exclude other cases. Now we don’t simply look at nor observe a feeling

character but become absorbed into it. We participate internally in it; we try to receive it in me as if there were no partition wall between feeling character and us. The feeling character arrives in some way or other at the inside of our subjective experience. It is no more a simple object of observation.<sup>12)</sup>

This attitude is divided into the four subclasses according to the passivity of the attitude and the importance of the individuality of each object which constitutes a part of the whole; ( $\alpha$ ) the objective type, ( $\beta$ ) the taking-my-position (stellungsnehmende) type, ( $\gamma$ ) the sentimental type and ( $\delta$ ) the sympathetic (einfühlende) type.

( $\alpha$ ): Even in case that man stands completely opposite to the mood of, for example, a landscape and observes each of all objects as it is, he can approach internally to its feeling character. He opens his mind wide to let the feeling character have influence on him.

Concerning the first merkmal, that is, the passivity of the attitude, we can say that in this case I act completely *passively* to receive in me everything which irradiates from the object.<sup>13)</sup> In this sense breaks off the absolute wall which separates between feeling character and experience.<sup>14)</sup>

Concerning the second, that is, the individuality of each object, although the irradiation is just like a fluidum which spread out from the object into me, I myself exist as someone who purely appreciates the object—here am I and there is the object.<sup>15)</sup> To say the same thing keeping close to the object side, the independency of each object is not disturbed at all along with its feeling character although each feeling character is synthesized into the character or the mood of the whole.<sup>15)</sup>

( $\beta$ ): This attitude is common to  $\alpha$  concerning the second merkmal. Each object appears prevalingly as an individual according to its position and the feeling character of each object is grasped. But  $\beta$  is different from  $\alpha$  at the first merkmal. In contrast with the purely passive  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$  is active at the taking-my-position way of the observation. Toward each object I hold a certain attitude which is acquired at the first glance from the character of the whole, for example, of a landscape. Each object is observed in this attitude and it must comply with the character of the whole even if it were not to come from the whole. So there is an interaction between objects and me. The character of the whole stimulates me to take a determinately oriented attitude toward objects and these objects control on their turn the character of the whole. Thus in case of  $\beta$  there is no more the sharp separation between feeling character and my experience, although the feeling character is grasped as something objective.<sup>16)</sup> The object obtains the stronger I-nearness than in the precedent cases (0 and 1-( $\alpha$ )).

( $\gamma$ ): This type of the attitude does not have any interests with each object. The problem is now no more to grasp a landscape as an object (Gegenstand) but to let its mood-content echo in me. Man tries to grow the mood of the landscape in my proper conscience as far as possible. Of course it is not possible without attention to each object but now the chief point is not its observation but my proper mood which comes into being at the first glance from the landscape.

Concerning the first *merkmal*, in  $\gamma$  the separating wall between feeling character and my experience becomes more transparent than both in  $\alpha$  and in  $\beta$ .<sup>18)</sup> According to Geiger the feeling character and my experience flow over mutually and the objectivity of the feeling character is absorbed in the subjectivity of my mood.<sup>18)</sup> In other words the object is only a starting and a supporting point for my mood.<sup>18)</sup>

Thus  $\gamma$  is common to  $\beta$  concerning the emphasis of the mood of the whole and different from  $\beta$  and common to  $\alpha$  concerning the passivity of the conscience. And  $\gamma$  is different from both  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  at the point that the object is not grasped as a bearer of a certain feeling character but as a moment to set free a certain mood.<sup>19)</sup>

( $\delta$ ): In this attitude I am absorbed into objects and project myself to them. We can even say that "I become one with the object" or that "my *I* is transported to it and filled with its mood-content".<sup>20)</sup>

But concerning the oneness or unity of *I* with the object, Geiger makes an important remark. My *I* and the object don't become literally one, nor am I transported to it. In my conscience the contrast between *I* and non-*I* is a general and stable relation.<sup>20)</sup>

Under this restraint we see that in both  $\gamma$  and  $\delta$  the weight is not put on the objectness (*Gegenständlichkeit*) but on the experience side or the mood. But here the object is no more as in  $\gamma$  a relative and indifferent starting point of the mood. The object appears as the fixed and *I* as someone who tries to stroll, that is, to expand myself to or to *strive for* the object and to be disintegrated into it.<sup>20)</sup>

The essential *merkmal* in  $\delta$  is the tendency to live after (*nachleben*) the mood which is evoked in me by a certain feeling character of the object and which is lived by me as is coming from the object. It is also important that this tendency grows spontaneously from me. Thus in this case there is the strongest moment of approach between *I* and object. Atmospheres or moods coming from the object and those from me are the same ones and fused into one experience. In other words the same mood comes from two different terms (the object and the spontaneous *I*) and makes a circle. At the same time there exists always a conscience of the activity to live after the object-mood. It is necessary for me to have impulses incessantly renewed for the spontaneous growth of the object mood in me.<sup>21)</sup>

#### 4 The absence of the object (Objekt) in music

In the work of art there exist generally six factors; material, elements, object (Objekt), form, content, style and expression.<sup>22)</sup> And being compared with other arts, the most conspicuous character of music is the lack of the object as an Objekt.<sup>23)</sup> The lack of the object as a bearer of form and content forces music to depend upon the unique way in which musical elements are developed up into form and content. As an *Energetiker* H. Mersmann doesn't use the word "way" but "Kraft" (energy) and says, "The sum of these energies which exist under the form of implication in the development of elements up to form and content can be understood best of all under the concept 'Tektonik' (tectonics)".<sup>23)</sup> In other words these tectonic elements (intervals, harmonies, rhythms, etc.) are the energies and the immediate bearers of

content values, too.<sup>24)</sup> As a result the extramusical (subjective and objective) relations are never such real energies as tectonic elements which are formed directly out of musical materials, but are always the unreal sources. Their expression or remote effect is obtained through the mediation of the creator's formative energy. It is a reflection or glimmer through the area of tectonic elements but not a real one.<sup>25)</sup>

## II The analysis of my tears

Now we arrive at the stage to analyze my tears by listening to "Erbarme dich".

My tears are in a sense very much like those of O. K. Bouwsma's Cassie who is now "quite absorbed in what she reads".<sup>26)</sup> "Her eyes fill with tears and the words on the page swim in the pool. It's so warm and so sweet and so sad! . . . She reads on . . . She does sob once, and quite loud, so that she is startled by it. She doesn't want to be heard sobbing over her book."<sup>27)</sup> But "five minutes later she lays her book aside, and in a playful mood, twits her cast".<sup>28)</sup> Just like the case of Cassie, when I pick up the needle from the player, music disappears and my sorrowful and deep feeling, too. In this fact we admit the following three important aspects; the momentariness, the arbitrariness and the unreality.

### 5 The mechanics to make man weep

From the psychological standpoint, my tears should be regarded as a result of an emotion.<sup>28)</sup> Because it is defined as follows; an emotion is a variety of affective process distinguished from others (for example, simple sensory feelings, affects, sentiments and temperaments) as an acute (brief and intense) affective disturbance.<sup>29)</sup> My sorrowful and deep feeling is acute, that is, intense but brief, so it is an emotion.

But what about the disturbance? According to P. Th. Young, F. H. Lund has done a splendid analysis.<sup>30)</sup> "Weeping occurs in a conflict situation rather than one of pure dejection and loss."<sup>31)</sup> "The discharge of tears occurs typically when a depressing situation gains a redeeming feature, when the tension of an unpleasant situation is somewhat relieved or alleviated".<sup>32)</sup> Cassie's eyes fill with tears because what she reads is not only *sad* but also *warm* and *sweet*! There exists a disturbance or conflict. It is also true of my tears. The aria "Erbarme dich" is sung just after the third denial of Peter and his weeping outdoors. Besides, as you know, the recitative voice imitates the weeping voice quite exceptionally and this weeping melody is also imitated by the aria. So in this aria the depressing situation of Peter's denial and his deep sorrow which is expressed by the melodic imitation is relieved not only by feeling characters (the soft and tender alto voice and the celestial and elegant high pitch tone of the accompanying violin) but also by the consolatory content of the aria's text. Adding to these, the precedent imitating recitative voice plays a role of invitation. In a word, on this point of the "Mathew's passion" the mechanics to make man weep is perfect in the exact sense of the word. I cannot believe there were any persons who were not moved here! At the same time we can see here one of

the best examples of the confirmation in chapter I that these feeling characters have the objectivity. In this case we must also add to it that the objectivity of the feeling of sorrow is guaranteed by the fact that the recitative's words, "weinete bitterlich" are sung quite exceptionally and that this melody is clearly imitated by the aria. The sorrowfulness of the feeling of sorrow is designated by words. And these objectivities support the contrast or conflict between sorrow and tenderness without our subjective associations.

## 6 The arbitrariness or insincerity

We mean by "arbitrary" such a dreamy situation as follows; I am really deeply moved. It is an undoubted fact. But when I pick up the needle, music disappears and my emotion, too. Besides, when I put down the needle, music appears again and, along with my absorption into music, the emotion reappears . . . . In everyday life such an occurrence doesn't exist. Depressing situations are not dreamy but real ones for nobody but me myself. They aren't changed by such an arbitrary act as picking up the needle.

In this arbitrariness exist two important aspects.

1) When man becomes sad, usually there is the cause which makes him sad and the object to which he projects his feeling. And when either of them is unclear or lacked there exists the tendency to fill its absence. But when a musical work is sad, especially as an instrumental one, it is quite difficult to say why it is sad and what its feeling orients itself to. What we can say with certainty is "it is sad" and that's all. So when we become sad by listening to music, it is quite similar to the situation of the feeling infection without reasonable grounds. This first aspect is, as you know, related closely with the lack of the object as an Objekt.

2) We don't "sympathize with music literally without reasons. The moment of understanding is also necessary for music as long as we become sad by *listening to music* . . . . But another important aspect consists just in the fact of becoming sad. It is essentially different from the real sympathy. When we see someone's eyes filled with sorrowful tears, it is natural for us to wonder the reason why he is sad and to sympathize with him. But by the true sympathy it is meant that we not only understand him as a human being and his situation but also feel pity on him. It is not necessary for us to become sad. When we take the fact into account that, when I am sad, it is nobody but I myself that is sad, my "sympathy" with music cannot be said the true ethical sympathy but is transformed into the auto-pathy or self-passion. Even if my act of sympathy keeps the direction to the work as long as I listen to music, usually I don't feel pity on it.

Judging from the "Kroitzner Sonata", Tolstoi is much troubled with this insincerity or arbitrariness of music. But it has a merit. In music we *can* weep not only as long as possible but also at any time we want. In everyday life, on the contrary, we must depress our tears. In this sense, as V. Jankélévitch says, music is a tender, secret "jardin clos" where we console our mind.<sup>33)</sup>

## 7 The unreality and the purification of the feeling i

In the chapter III we have confirmed that the separation between I and object as a Gegenstand depends upon my attention to the individuality of objects. And in the chapter IV the lack of the object as an Objekt. The unreality of the feeling in music is explained by the combination of these two confirmations. The essential point is the relation between object as a Gegenstand and object as an Objekt. In other arts there exists a clear undoubtful relation between them. Words always designate something and, strange enough, when a picture loses Gegenstände which have some relations with Objekts, it becomes musical (Whistler<sup>34</sup>). On the contrary, tectonic elements which construct musical Gegenstände don't have any direct relations with extramusical objects. So the musical object (Gegenstand) cannot have the same objectness (Gegenständlichkeit) as other kinds of art objects (Kunstgegenstände). It means, so we think, the lack of the individuality of musical objects compared with that of other arts'. For example, a motive must have some individuality but its individuality cannot be compared directly with extramusical objects. Thus it is quite natural for us to take not the attitude  $\gamma$  but such a sympathetic attitude  $\delta$  as long as we *listen to* music and not fall in day dreams. Paradoxical enough, we are often recommended not to take such an attitude but a cool objective one (0 or 1-( $\alpha$ )) if we want to listen to music rightly. It shows our instinctive tendency toward  $\delta$  in listening to music.

One of the most important moments of  $\delta$  is, as above mentioned, the feeling of striving for the object as a Gegenstand. As being suggested in the above lines, this tendency exists always in music. When we try to grasp quite a short part of the musical work, we must revive the *past* tones and synthesize them with a now sounding tone into the momentary whole. This process continues until the end. (On this point we should pay attention to the moment of *grasping the past*.) It is quite an interesting phenomenon that this process is usually doubled or confirmed in various ways especially in art music. For example, as L. B. Meyer says, a melody in total music sets up a momentary goal or end to which it drives itself. With the lack of the proper object, composers must create the objectness (Gegenständlichkeit) to which our attention is paid out of the musical relations (in the Mersmann's terminology, out of the "Linien"). But the more they confirm the objectness, the more they confirm also the non-object character of the objectness, so the feeling of striving for. Music always emphasizes the feeling of striving for an object which doesn't literally exist, the feeling of striving for  $x$ .<sup>35</sup> It is also important that this feeling is clearly different from both the now expressed feeling "sorrow" and *my* feeling which corresponds to the sorrow.

What is the appropriate name of this unique feeling in music? L. B. Meyer answers that it is an expectation—expectation is a tendency which becomes conscious by a kind of disturbance, "deviation"—.<sup>36</sup> Professor Mamoru Watanabe calls it the "fundamental feeling of music"<sup>37</sup> and, relating it with Meyer's concept



"expectation", he also emphasizes the importance of its role played in the temporal and dynamic commonness between tone and feeling. It is quite an important remark in the aesthetics of music, but few attentions are paid to the direction of the feeling. It seems to be fixed in the direction of the future. On the other hand, L. B. Meyer does separate the retrospective direction of the conscience, especially in the definition of the "evident meaning" but doesn't succeed in combining it in his expectation theory.<sup>88)</sup> Why does such an inconsistency happen? We answer to this question that the striving-for feeling can strive for not only in the direction of the future but also of the past and that the inconsistency arises from the compulsion of the conscience in the fixed direction of the future. Thus we call the feeling, along with M. Geiger, that of "nostalgia" (Sehnsucht).<sup>89)</sup> Of course "nostos" must be here understood as what we earnestly long for in the most general meaning of the word. Nostalgia longs for x both in the past and in the future.

Now we can tell about the positivity of the unreality of the feeling in music. The sorrowful feeling is always aired or alleviated by the feeling of nostalgia. It is not real compared with the real, crammed and muddy sorrow in everyday life where no relief is found. And when man loses a word in his sorrow, he begins to sing a song—quite interesting enough, a sorrowful song in most cases—. Why? Because the act of singing a song itself gives him a bit of relief even if he did not consciously recognize it. We say, the feeling expressed in music is somehow purified or alleviated, so couldn't help taking an unreal shape.

Along with this line we can also explain the expressiveness of an inexpressive music. What the inexpressive or pure music expresses is nothing but the feeling of nostalgia. Music, in this sense, expresses always even if what is now expressed could not be identified or designated. And it is also important that this type of expression doesn't depend upon the genre of music nor upon the cultural and historical conditions. When a musical sound sounds, it expresses the feeling of nostalgia without exception. And however trivial a sound may be, it has a pretty competence of music because of its non-object character. It always invites us to an unknown place x. When we perceive the invitation, it means that we perceive the sound as a musical one and that we already have the feeling of nostalgia.

Music always tries to obtain its proper tones, its proper "musical tones" which are consciously discriminated from sounds in everyday life. The tendency is also explained by the emphasis of the non-object character of sounds. The separation from an everyday life gives composers the powerful ability to express the inexpressive expression. So they gain their liberty not to express something which is identified or designated in the usual meaning of the word. At this point tone has an exceptional merit compared with other materials of art and music is the most *nostalgic* or romantic art of all the arts.

## 8 The unreality and the purification of the feeling ii

Up to now we avoid the essential problem of the initiation of the attitude  $\delta$ . What

does invite man to take such an attitude? Should we seek it in the object side or in the subject side? It is a very difficult and intricate problem. Within our scope we can at best draw the sketch of it and must leave the inclusive discussion in the future.

When we seek it in the object side, we must recognize that it cannot be found in the non-object character of the tone or sound. Of course, just above mentioned, any sound is already somewhat musical as long as it is a sound and, in this sense, has a bit of beauty. And we insist that its musicality should be sought in its non-object character. Then it seems quite natural and logical that the non-object character makes a sound musical and so then beautiful. But it is only a half truth. We must admit the fact that what is beautiful does not necessarily be felt nostalgic. It means that we must discriminate the sense of beauty from the feeling of nostalgia. Then should we say that it is nothing but the beauty which evokes the feeling of nostalgia in man, or that, when the beauty loses its substantiality which is necessary for the perception, it becomes a kind of nostalgia?, in other words, the true shape of beauty is nostalgia? We now give up the perfect clarification of their relation and must be satisfied with the remark that the less substantial the beauty becomes, the more nostalgic it does. "It is precisely in the musical forms of picture, for example, by Claude Lorrain or by Corot, that the nostalgic 'rêverie' and the call of the remote land *poetize* most intensively the landscape."<sup>40)</sup> In any way or other, as V. Jankélévitch says, the sense of beauty and the feeling of nostalgia are combined into the unique form of "charme" in music.<sup>41)</sup>

When we seek in the subject side, we also face the ambiguity concerning the spontaneity of man. Does he have the ability of initiation? No and Yes, too.

No, because "here the object is no more as a relative and indifferent starting point of the mood. The object appears as the *fixed* and I as someone who tries to stroll".<sup>42)</sup> At first the object as a *Gegenstand* must exist and not as an indifferent but as a charming or beautiful one. The power to initiate belongs to the object as a work of art. And this attractive power not only charms our mind but also give a drive to strive for.

Yes, because in the spontaneity of man must exist the ability to sense the beauty. If we cannot perceive it, who does feel its attractive power? It is possible in this sense to say that our mind already has a bit of beauty or charm.

One way or the other, through the discrimination of the sense of beauty from the musical feeling we can say the purification of the sorrowful feeling by the activation of the sense of beauty.

### Conclusion

When I listen to music with tears in my eyes, I am deeply moved. And my feeling has at least the following four dimensions.<sup>43)</sup>

1. The feeling which is transported by the feeling character of tone.
2. The feeling of sorrow which explicitly expressed in music. It has a semantic

aspect by the imitation of the weeping voice.

3. The feeling of nostalgia which is generally expressed in music.
4. The sense of beauty (in music, 3 and 4 are combined into "charme").

My sorrow felt in music is purified trebly through tone as a musical material, nostalgia and beauty. So when my eyes fill with tears, I am not only sad but also purified and celestial at the expense of the reality and under the restraint that it is not permitted for me to be in such a state for a fleeting moment when I *now* listen to music. But after the disappearance of the work remains yet the memory of the fact of my deep emotion and it invites me to consider the situation of Peter as a human being compared with mine and also the belief of Christianity in Europe. It is just what J. S. Bach wanted, isn't it?

### Notes

- 1) M. GEIGER, Zum Problem der Stimmungseinführung, in: *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, Bd. 6, 1911, S. 1-42.
- 2) *ibd.*, S. 12.
- 3) GEIGER discriminates attentively the activity sympathy (Tätigkeitseinführung) from the mood sympathy (Stimmungseinführung) and limits his scope to the latter. So the melody and, as a logical consequence, music are excluded out of his consideration. The most important reason, we think, comes from the difficulty of the fixation of the object as a Gegenstand, in other words, of the objectivity of the objectness. In music the moment of the activity is superior to that of the materiality. But what can be said about the color can be also said about the tone or sound. Such a position is supported by the experiments of the psychological aesthetics. cf. R. FRANCÈS, *La perception de la musique*, Vrin, Paris, 1958, <sup>2</sup>1972, p. 254.
- 4) M. GEIGER, a. a. O., S. 13.
- 5) *ibd.*, S. 14.
- 6) *ibd.*, S. 16.
- 7) *ibd.*, S. 18.
- 8) *ibd.*, S. 20.
- 9) From a logical point of view N. Goodman criticizes the loose concept of the "commonness" or "analogy" and proposes a new concept "metaphorical exemplification" based upon the identification of a certain character. cf. *The languages of art*, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, pp. 91-93. From a standpoint of the experimental aesthetics R. Francès emphasizes the socio-cultural aspects. cf. *op. cit.*
- 10) M. GEIGER, a. a. O., S. 21.
- 11) *ibd.*, S. 18.
- 12) *ibd.*, S. 27.
- 13) *ibd.*, S. 28.
- 14) *ibd.*, S. 35.
- 15) *ibd.*, S. 29.
- 16) *ibd.*, S. 31.
- 17) *ibd.*, S. 35.
- 18) *ibd.*, S. 33.
- 19) *ibd.*, S. 34.
- 20) *ibd.*, S. 36.
- 21) *ibd.*, S. 37.
- 22) H. MERSMANN, Versuch einer Phänomenologie der Musik, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,

- Darmstadt, 1973, Reihe Libelli, Bd. CCCXXXIV, Unveränderter reprografischer Nachdruck aus: *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft*, 5(1922/23), S. 226–269.
- 23) *ibid.*, S. 3.
  - 24) *ibid.*, S. 23.
  - 25) *ibid.*, S. 25.
  - 26) O. K. BOUWSMA, The Expression Theory of Art, in: *The Artistic Expression*, ed. by J. Hospers, Meredith Co., New York 1971, p. 231.
  - 27) *ibid.*, p. 232.
  - 28) In the "Emotion in Man and Animals" (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1943, 1950, p. 25) P. Th. Young quotes J. A. Murray's "A new English dictionary on historical principles", founded mainly on the materials collected by the Philosophical Society (Oxford & New York, Macmillan, 1888) and shows three main meaning mutations on the word "emotion". Originally it meant "moving out of one place into another in the sense of migration"; "The divers emotions of that people (the Turks)" (1603); "Some accidental Emotion. . . of the Center of Gravity" (1695). Then it came to mean "moving, stirring, agitation, perturbation in a strictly physical sense; "Thunder . . . caused so great an emotion in the air" (1708); "The waters continuing in the caverns . . . caused the émotion or earthquake" (1758). This physical meaning was transferred to political and social agitation (tumult, popular disturbance); "There were . . . great stirres and emotions in Lombardye" (1759); "Accounts of Public Emotions, occasioned by the Want of Corn" (1709). And at last it comes to mean "any agitated, vehement, or excited mental state of the individual".
  - 29) P. Th. YONG, *Motivation and Emotion*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1961, p. 352.
  - 30) *ibid.*, p. 548, cf. F. H. LUND, Why do we weep?, *J. Soc. Psychol.*, 1930, I. pp. 136–151.
  - 31) *ibid.*, p. 549.
  - 32) *ibid.*, p. 548. In this sense Young is strongly interested in O. Hebb's concepts in the physio-psychological area; "cue function" and "arousal function" (*ibid.*, p. 102). The former plays a role of guiding or steering of behavior and the latter can be said "drive", that is, "energizing" or "energizer" (Young's interpretation). The most interesting point is the existence of the feedback mechanism between them. Without a foundation of arousal, the cue function cannot exist. Drive on its turn gives impetus to behavior but always related to the cue (directive) function. This physio-psychological hypothesis supports our position that there is a special musical feeling which is aroused by the non-object character of music.
  - 33) V. JANKÉLÉVITCH, *La musique et l'ineffable*, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1961, p. 168.
  - 34) M. GEIGER, a. a. O., S. 34. Whistler is quoted as an example which requires especially the attitude  $\gamma$ .
  - 35) V. Jankélévitch says, "La musique signifie donc quelque chose en général sans jamais rein vouloir dire en particulier" (*op. cit.*, p. 75.) (We can see here the influence of Shopenhauer. cf. *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Cotta. Insel, Bd. I. S. 364.) We have independently described such a state as the activation of the signification without the fixation of sens or meaning (cf. Yoshio TOZAWA, Meaning and Form in Music—rethinking MEYER, in: *A Library of the History of Aesthetics*, IV, ed. by Professor Doctor Tomonobu IMAMICHI, The Institute of Aesthetics and Science of Arts, the Faculty of Letters, Tokyo University, 1978, pp. 81–107.
  - 36) L. B. MEYER, *Emotion and Meaning in Music*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1956, 1968, pp. 22–32 (The Theory of Emotions Related to Musical Experience).
  - 37) Mamoru WATANABE, *The Structure of the Musical Beauty*, Ongaku-no Tomo-sha Co., Tokyo, 1969, p. 243 (in Japanese). Professor Watanabe discriminates three kinds of feeling; (1) the feeling or sense of beauty, (2) the particular feeling which is expressed according to the situation in music (joy, sorrow, gloom, etc.), (3) the fundamental feeling in music.
  - 38) The "evident meaning" is defined as follows; "evident meanings are those which are attributed to the *antecedent* gesture (musical event) when the consequent becomes a physico-psychic fact and when the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent is perceived (*op. cit.*, p. 37). It does not at least arouse during the act of expectation. And the retrospective direction implied

- in the definition takes a clear shape in the "Explaining Music" (University of California Press, Berkely, Los Angeles, London, 1973, Chap. V and the footnote (1) in Chap. VI, pp. 109–114), where the word "expectation" is replaced by that of "implication" at the object side of the musical work and at the subject side the conscience is divided into the two types, "prospective" and "retrospective" attitude. It supports our position.
- 39) M. GEIGER, a. a. O., S. 37. He says, "From the feeling to strive for the object becomes also clear another character which links itself to this sympathetic attitude  $\delta$ : Sehnsucht". We interpret the word as nostalgia. Because he also says, "It is quite easy to understand that whenever the feeling "striving for" is present, it is strengthened to become nostalgia without any difficulties."
- 40) V. JANKÉLÉVITCH, *L'irréversible et la nostalgie*, Flammarion, Paris, 1974, p. 305.
- 41) V. JANKÉLÉVITCH, *Gabriel Fauré, ses Mélodies, son Esthétique*, Librairie Plon, Paris, 1938, pp. 319–343. cf. *op. cit.*, 1974, p. 305.
- 42) cf. p. 113 in this article.
- 43) This result exactly corresponds to that of Professor Watanabe, cf. 37). If we could insist a bit of originality, there exists the following three points:
1. The concrete analysis of my tears when listening to music through the use of my experience of "Erbarne dich" and the clarification of the weeping mechanics.
  2. The discrimination of the sympathetic tears from those which come from my aesthetic emotion.
  3. Along with the research of the positive moments of the unreality of the feeling in music, we can introduce the new concept "charme" of V. Jankélévitch. It gives us the possibility to build a bridge between the phenomenological analysis of the feeling and the metaphysical consideration of the time, although the real construction is left in the future.

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