

## Constructivism about Moral Values

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### Abstract

In this article, by examining moral judgments about the good from the viewpoint of Korsgaard's constructivism, I consider how constructivists explain the normativity of moral values, and how they present a possible means of resolving the controversy between realism and non-cognitivism concerning moral values. First, I specify what it is to be a constructivist (sec. 2). Second, by examining a constructivist criticism of realism (sec. 3-4) and the rationalist theory about the good which constructivism advocates (sec. 5), I show that an important feature of the constructivist account of the normativity of moral values lies in emphasizing the procedure of making moral judgments in the light of our multiple agency. Third, I define what it is to be a reason — a concept which constructivism presupposes (sec. 6). Last, I reply to some objections to constructivism (sec. 7). In this article, I particularly consider G. E. Moore's realism and investigate constructivism's explanation of normativity in contrast to this.

Keywords: Constructivism, Realism, C. M. Korsgaard, Moral Values, Reasons

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## 1. Introduction

It is thought that values, particularly moral values (good and evil, right and wrong), have normativity and exist in a peculiar way in the world. Considering the nature of moral values, two opposing theories have been predominant in moral philosophy: realism and non-cognitivism. Realists emphasize that moral values are a non-natural fact which we can perceive through our intuition, and they insist that our moral judgments express a belief about the normativity that such a fact has. On the other hand, non-cognitivists argue that there are no moral values and that our moral judgments do not refer to normative facts but instead express our conative attitude (therefore, they are action-guiding). Even if one view has taken precedence over the other temporarily, the confrontation between these two theories has not been resolved. But, recently “constructivism” appears to be one of the most powerful moral theories that has the possibility of resolving this confrontation.

In this article, by examining moral judgments about the good from the viewpoint of constructivism (especially that of C. M. Korsgaard), I consider how constructivists explain the normativity of moral values, and how they present a possible means of resolving the controversy between realism and non-cognitivism regarding moral values. First, I specify what it is to be a constructivist (sec. 2). Second, by examining a constructivist criticism of realism (sec. 3-4) and the rationalist theory about the good which constructivism advocates (sec. 5), I show that an important feature of the constructivist account of the normativity of moral values lies in emphasizing the *procedure* of making moral judgments in light of our multiple agency.<sup>1</sup> Third, I define what it is to be a reason — a concept which constructivism presupposes (sec. 6). Last, I reply to some objections to constructivism (sec. 7). In this article, I particularly consider G. E. Moore’s realism and investigate constructivism’s explanation of normativity in contrast to this.

1. In this article, “agency” means constituent elements such as desires, needs, consciousness, intentions, and reasoning, which make us agents.

## 2. Constructivism

Constructivism can be seen as an argument concerning normativity. It denies not only that normativity is a constraint based on a fact which is prior to and independent of our mind (realism), but also that it is a mere causation originating in our conative attitudes (non-cognitivism). It considers normativity to be a requirement which is derived from our rational choices and which is constructed through our practical reason. According to this constructivist view, it becomes clear that normativity is the constitutive character of *a rational agent who makes choices and judgments on the basis of reasons*.<sup>2</sup>

In order to examine the features of constructivism, let us consider an example. Ryan, who is a heavy smoker, says, “I have a conclusive reason to aim at getting healthy (X) because I have a small child. I know that quitting smoking is an effective and indispensable means for getting healthy. However, I have no reason to quit smoking.” How should we interpret such a statement? According to the constructivist viewpoint, although he seems to express a normative judgment on the basis of reason (he has a conclusive reason to aim at getting healthy), in fact he does not make such a judgment. This is because in order to have a conclusive *reason* to aim at X (getting healthy), he also has a conclusive reason to do what he himself recognizes as the indispensable means to achieve X (Y, quitting smoking). Having a conclusive reason to do Y is constitutive of a normative judgment about X and constitutes such a reason-statement (see Street 2008). In order to have a reason to aim at X, he also should be able to have a reason to do Y, which is the indispensable way to aim at X and thus is constitutive of aiming at X. Otherwise, his reason-judgment about X cannot be formed.<sup>3</sup> In other

2. In constructivism (particularly in Kantian constructivism), the term “rational” refers to the German *vernünftig* (see Rawls 2000, 164f). Therefore this notion of the “rational” includes not only means-end thinking but also other-regarding thinking (reasonability). By right, we always need to write the following: rational and reasonable agent or rational and reasonable choice. However, because it is prolix to write in such a way, I only use the term “rational” in this article to represent these two meanings.

3. As a simpler example, if there is a person who says, “I am a parent,” and at the same time, “but I have no child,” he is open to criticism for not understanding what *being a parent* is. The judgment “I have a child” is constitutive of the judgment “I am a parent.” Therefore, a parent who has no child is not a parent. In constructivism, this analogy is applicable to normative judgments.

words, if he cannot have a reason to do *Y*, then he cannot have a reason to do *X*. This impossibility is conceptual, and this normativity is inherently involved in a judgment based on reasons. It is this normativity that characterizes reason-judgments as normative judgments.

In this way, unlike realism and non-cognitivism, constructivism can explain the normativity of means-end judgments based on instrumental reasons as conceptual truths. However, when the normativity of moral values is considered from such a standpoint, the following questions must arise: What is to be the object we value as the end of our action? What is the source of the normativity that these matters (we think of as valuable) possess? How can our value judgments be justified? To answer these questions, we must consider what a normative judgment is: a reason-judgment that finds value in a certain object, and a judgment that regards a certain object as good as an end.

Of course, for constructivism, even in the case of the judgment “taking a certain object as good as an end,” its normativity is constructed from the rational judgment and the choice themselves. In this respect, the normativity of this judgment does not differ from that of the means-end judgment on the basis of instrumental reasons. However, for the former, what *procedure* it is based on is important since it is the procedure that distinguishes this judgment from other normative judgments (means-end judgments and judgments about future-directed intention, etc.).<sup>4</sup>

In considering what procedure it is, I pay attention to the *agency* of the judging subject. The reason why I attend to agency is that normativity constrains our actions and attitudes in one way or another. Consequently, normativity must be connected with the desires and intentions of the judging person. Moreover, the judgment concerning what to do or what action is good is a *practical* deliberation from the viewpoint of the first-person. For these reasons, the *agency* of the judging person must be expressed in his normative judgment in one way or another. Constructivism presents the unique procedure which allows for expressing agency in such a judgment

4. In this article, “procedure” means a series of steps of practical reasoning taken to accomplish an end. The procedure varies depending on what end we aim at. In constructivism, if we seek a sufficient reason for action, this procedure will be the one to let us consider that my reason for action is justifiable for all rational beings.

appropriately. In contrast, both realism and non-cognitivism can only give insufficient accounts.<sup>5</sup> In the following, I examine the realist explanation of normativity.

### 3. Moral Realism

According to Korsgaard, who is a leading constructivist, realism can only provide an insufficient answer for the question of normativity. According to realism, “moral claims are normative if they are true, and true if there are intrinsically normative entities or facts which they correctly describe” (Korsgaard 1996a, 19). Realists try to establish the normativity of ethics by arguing that values, obligations, or reasons really exist in this world. However, such an argument seems not to answer the question of normativity. This is because the question of normativity is not “does a reason for action exist?” but “if we know that there is such a reason, why should we care about it or why should we perform an action based on it?”

Realists think that reasons for action are independent of our mind as well as independent of other facts. According to realists, “there are facts, which exist independently of the person’s mind, about what there is reason to do” (Korsgaard 1997, 240). Realists ascribe the relation between such a reason and us to our perception. The motivation “ought to do” is caused

5. In this article, I define realism as a view that takes moral facts as objects that are prior to and independent of our mental state. I do not consider a constructivist criticism against non-cognitivism here. A problem with both emotivism and prescriptivism is that it seems quite possible for someone to make an ethical judgment but to lack the feelings or intentions that, according to these theories, ethical judgments express. In other words, while someone may judge that “this action is good,” it is also possible for him not to hold the positive attitude that this judgment expresses (e.g., he is tired or bored). It seems possible for this person to distinguish between the reaction he actually has to something, and the reaction he *should* have (he should have a positive reaction to something, but in fact he does not) (Darwall 1998, 73f). As for norm-expressivism, the judgment “this action is good” expresses the acceptance of a norm that warrants taking a positive attitude for such an action; however, it is uncertain that this acceptance can motivate a judging person to do it, for the following reasons: (1) what his judgment expresses is not a conative attitude but an acceptance of a norm; (2) the judgment of moral good and evil is a judgment that supports only the motivation for feelings like guilt and anger and does not support the motivation for the action itself (Gibbard 1990, 40-8). Thus, the relation between the moral judgment and the motivation for action that non-cognitivism insists upon is less certain than generally thought. It seems that while non-cognitivism develops in semantics to deal with the Frege-Geach problem, it retreats in regards to motivation in this process. I would like to discuss the contrast between norm-expressivism and constructivism in another paper.

in us for the right action because we are necessarily motivated to do it by *intuiting* the bindingness that it has. But instead of explaining how this is possible, realists simply insist that it is possible (Korsgaard 1996b, 52).

For realists, it is self-evident that there are objective values, so it is unnecessary to prove that it is true. However, the realists' metaphysical view that there are normative entities and properties in themselves is only supported by their confidence that they really do have obligations. It is because realists are so confident that obligation is real that they are prepared to believe in the existence of some sort of objective values (Korsgaard 1996a, 40). However, in light of the realists' logical composition, the appeal to the existence of objective values cannot be used to support their confidence because such an appeal falls into a circular argument. Moreover, the normative question naturally arises when such confidence has been shaken (*ibid.*). For these reasons, realists cannot answer the normative question appropriately.

#### 4. Explanation of Good

Then, what solution can constructivism offer to the problem of normativity that realism faces? In the following, I would like to clarify the features of constructivism concerning the relation between "the good" and "human beings" by examining the constructivists' criticism of Moore's argument about the good.

The explanation of the good that constructivism supports, for instance, the explanation of the goodness of the ends that we choose, is called the "rationalist" account. This is the view that "an object or state of affairs is good if there are sufficient practical reasons for realizing it or bringing it about" (Korsgaard 1996b, 226). The typical example is Kant's theory of morality (which is interpreted as constructivist). His moral theory argues that the goodness of a certain object is not recognized by intuitive perception, but judged by our practical reasoning. The appeal of this view is made apparent by comparing it with the "subjectivism" and "objectivism" in the explanation of the goodness of the ends.<sup>6</sup>

6. As will be made clear from the explanation below, "subjectivism" is connected to non-cog-

According to Korsgaard (Korsgaard 1996b, 225), subjectivism identifies the goodness of the ends with or by reference to some psychological state. It includes the various forms of hedonism as well as theories which state that what is good is any object of interest or desire. Objectivism may be represented by one of G. E. Moore's main theories. According to Moore, to judge that something is good as an end is to attribute a property, an intrinsic property, to it (Moore 1903, ch.1). Intrinsic goodness is an objective, nonrelational property of the object, the value a thing has independently of anyone's desires, interests, or pleasures (Korsgaard 1996b, 225). If we find ourselves attracted to the subjectivist view, one reason is because it acknowledges "the connection of the good to human interests and desires" (ibid.). In this view, most things that seem to be good, in fact, are good because of the interest human beings have in them, an interest that can be explained in terms of the physiological and psychological constitutions of human beings and other conditions of human life (e.g., desirability for the existence of human beings).

On the other hand, objectivism is the view that reverses this relation between goodness and human interest. Instead of saying that what we are interested in is therefore good, the objectivist says that "the goodness is in the object, and we ought therefore to be interested in it" (Korsgaard 1996b, 225). The advantage of objectivism is the following. We believe that people sometimes fail to care about what is good and sometimes have interests in or desires for things that are not good. Yet according to subjectivist theories, it seems as if anything one enjoys or desires is good, other things being equal, and anything one does not enjoy or desire is not good. The objectivist theory of intrinsic values allows us to understand our commonsense beliefs, for example, that something may be good as an end even though a person gets no pleasure from it, or that a malicious pleasure may be intrinsically bad (Korsgaard 1996b, 226). This is because we find some attraction in the objectivist theory of good.

Then, what view is expressed in the constructivist's rationalist theory? This view may be seen as an attempt to combine these advantages of objec-

nitivism and "objectivism" is connected to realism. Constructivism is "intersubjectivism," in the sense that if our desire or interest is sharable with other rational persons, it is good as an end.

tivism and objectivism (ibid.). The *prima facie* reason for choosing an object will be, as in subjectivist accounts, a reason springing from our nature, conditions, needs, and desires. However, the rationalist theory provides a *procedure* that can examine whether this reason qualifies as a sufficient reason.<sup>7</sup> This is an important point because not every *prima facie* reason will be a sufficient reason that can justify the choice based on it, and not every interest or pleasure will establish the goodness of its object. Therefore, the rationalist theory can explain the commonsense beliefs that make objectivism attractive to us in a different way. The objectivist accounts for our failure to give appropriate attachment to the good by cutting the tie between natural interest and the good. On the other hand, the rationalist accounts for these failures by appealing to the imperfect rationality of human beings. Because our rationality—especially, in this case, our practical rationality—is incomplete, we sometimes fail to be motivated by reasons that are available to us and therefore do not want what is good, and sometimes we are motivated by insufficient reasons and therefore want what is not good (ibid.).

From the viewpoint of constructivism, what is the drawback of a form of objectivism such as Moore's? To begin with, according to Moore, it is argued that the good is the predicate that can be attributed to the state of affairs, and our duty is to produce the good in the "state of affairs as a whole."<sup>8</sup> Therefore, for Moore, a good action means *an action that produces a good state of affairs*. Moore thinks that there are only instrumental values in an action by itself in that it produces a good state of affairs. The normative question ("what should 'I' do?") is originally related to the agent-relative reasons; however, Moore considers this question by reducing it to the agent-neutral reasons, that is, "what state of affairs should be produced?" But, this account does not show the practical reasons that should motivate a person making a judgment to perform an action that produces a valuable state of affairs. For Moore, such a normative question does not arise

7. Such a procedure includes the *categorical imperative*, the *original position* (Rawls 1971), the *categorical imperative procedure* (Rawls 1999, ch23; see note 7), and the *principle of reasonable rejection* (Scanlon 1998).

8. In Moore's term, "the state of affairs as a whole" means "the Universe" or "the whole world" (see Moore 1903, sec.89).



because he believes that if we merely perceive the intrinsic value in a state of affairs, then we must regard this value as an end of our action. However, if Moore's intrinsic value also has normativity, and furthermore, if "brute ought" does not exist in morality, the value must be related to the agency of the person making a judgment in some way (Darwall 2003, 482). But, in Moore's account, because the intrinsic value that can be comprehended by intuition is the unexplained property, he sets aside these questions: How does it relate to our agency? What reasons for action does it provide us?

### 5. Rationalist Account

Then, what "thing" does the rationalist account (that constructivists endorse) judge as the good as an end? Furthermore, how do constructivists conceive the relation between this judgment and our agency? According to the Kantian account that is regarded as a model for the rationalist account, in contrast with realism, "the things that we want, need, care for, are good so long as certain conditions of rational choice are met" (Korsgaard 1996b, 272). I will try to examine this assertion in this section.

According to Kant, the self-understanding that beings which have rational nature regard themselves with as an end in itself is "a *subjective* principle of human actions" (Kant IV, 429).<sup>9</sup> By considering ourselves in this way, we can assume that the end that we choose is "the good" and is worthwhile to seek. The reason why is that by regarding ourselves as an end in itself, "we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice" (Korsgaard 1996b, 260). This principle is not only subjective but also objective because we "represent that every other rational being thinks of his existence [as an end in itself] by the same rational ground which holds also for me" (Kant IV, 429).

Based on this interpretation of Kant, constructivists insist that "the ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature, take on the status of objective goods" (Korsgaard 1996b, 260f). A certain reversion is deployed here. Realists think that if a certain end is

9. In this article, citations of Kant's works refer to the volume and page number in the Academy Edition (Kant's *gesammelte Schriften*. Hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften).

an objective good, choosing it is rational. On the other hand, Korsgaard argues that it is the reasoning that goes into the choice itself — “the *procedure* of full justification” (ibid. 261, italics mine) based on the categorical imperative — that determines the rationality of the choice and therefore certifies the goodness of its object. Thus the goodness of rationally chosen ends is not a matter of ontology but a matter of “practical necessity” (Kant IV, 412), that is, a matter of what practical reason demands.

Then, how is the end that we should desire or care about determined? For example, it can be said that drinking and eating are good when we possess the condition of hunger. That is, under the physiological and psychological condition where nutritional support is necessary and comfortable for human beings, drinking and eating become good. It is not that—as realists assume—by perceiving intuitively the intrinsic value in the state of affairs that the act of drinking and eating causes, we choose it, but that because of the conditions of our lives which make eating and drinking valuable to us, we choose it. In consequence, what we call the values of an end are the *features* of the thing that, given our constitution and situation, we find appealing or interesting or satisfying to our needs. Therefore, constructivists can insist that “it remains just as true to say that the thing is good because we desire it as to say that we desire it because it is good” (Korsgaard 1996b, 267).<sup>10</sup>

This means the following point matters. The value of an end is relative to our desire, or, more precisely, to the conditions that give rise to those desires. As Kant argues (Kant IV, 428), however, the inclinations or desires themselves are not sufficient reasons to make what they seek the good thing. The criterion that reasons must be universalizable restricts the role of desires in our valuation. But, desirability itself is not a sufficient condition of goodness. It is still the initial condition of the goodness of many good things, and so it is a main source of the goodness of those things (Korsgaard 1996b, 268). However, a merely desirable thing is only subjectively valuable; it needs to be justified by *something else* further in order to become objectively valuable. This *something else* is the rational choice that

10. D. Wiggins expresses a similar view on the relation between the value and the judging person (Wiggins 1998, ch.3; ch.5).

human beings make, that is, the procedure by which we can reflectively endorse the objects of our desires and needs.

Therefore, even if eating and drinking are desirable matters when one possesses the condition of hunger, they are merely a subjective and conditional good. They are not considered to be an objective and unconditional good. In order for them to be so, what their *mode* is becomes important. Their *mode* must be one that every rational being can acknowledge and consider justifiable for him. For instance, having a meal without paying for it, intemperance, and eating somebody else's food without permission are not the *modes* of eating and drinking that can be justifiable for every rational being. The rational choice is the process that examines, reflectively endorses, and justifies the *mode* of the matter that is, given only our desires, a *prima facie* good. The normativity of the matter that is the good is constructed by this rational choice.

As a result, the desirability of an end depends on desires that are relative to the condition we are in; it is wholly justified by our rational choice. Therefore, the relation between good things and us is an interdependent one, so constructivists, in contrast to realists, say that "the things that we want, need, care for, are good so long as certain conditions of rational choice are met."

## 6. The Substratum of Reason-Judgments

So far, based on the concept of *reasons*, I have explained the features of constructivism concerning the problem of normativity. Now, what are the reason-judgments of taking or regarding something as reasons in the first place? In order to understand these judgments, we already have conceived what it means for something to be a reason. So, what in the world is a *reason*?

To answer this question, T. Scanlon replies that a reason is primitive, and the idea that "something is a reason for the other" cannot be reduced to the other non-normative term. According to him, the reason used in the statement "there is a reason for doing *X*" is a consideration that counts in favor of *X*. But, Scanlon says, if asked "counts in favor how?" then "by providing a reason for it" seems to be the only answer (Scanlon 1998, 17). The

idea of a reason does not seem to him to be a problematic one that stands in need of explanation. And, a dispositional or expressivist explanation of this notion strikes him as unsatisfactory. Scanlon expounds his own doctrine by assuming the notion of reasons; however, why can he assume this in such a way?

To answer this question, I would like to propose the following interpretations of reasons. First, a certain everyday experience exists as a basis in the substratum of reason-judgments. For instance, when we see a drowning child in a river, if we hold a certain consciousness (“save him!”), we experience that it is *prescribed or required* for us to respond to that situation if we are rational. Such an experience can be called, so to speak, a “normative experience,” which cannot be appropriately described without using normative notions (Street 2008, 240). Our understanding of the idea that there is a reason for doing *X* is given by our knowledge of normative experience that something is prescribed or required. Because we have already understood such a normative experience as a reason, we understand what the reason-judgments are. According to this interpretation, because we have already regarded a normative experience as a reason in an everyday occurrence, we can view a primitive concept of reason as a consideration that counts in favor of something and grasp the reason-judgments by this notion.<sup>11</sup>

## 7. Objections to Constructivism

As seen above, by explaining the good with our physiological and psychological constitutions and rational capacity, constructivists correlate the good and our agency, and so expound the normativity of the good. Articulated further, that which is the good-making property is our desires and inclinations; however, the property of goodness is the universalizability based on reason or the justifiability to rational beings. In this section, to defend constructivism, I will try to respond to some of the objections to this argument.

11. By introducing this interpretation of reason into the relation between rationality and normativity, we seem to be able to understand this relationship in constructivism appropriately.

D. Regan, who is a Moorean, criticizes the rationalist account of the good. He argues that there must be independent standards that determine what the good is because one's conferring value by his rational choice becomes simple subjectivism in the absence of these independent standards (Regan 2002). If independent standards of an agent's choice do not exist, he chooses in accordance with empirical and arbitrary desires because he can make any choice at will.

I think that Regan's criticism misses the point. It is true that our desires are an initial foundation of choice in constructivist theory, but only desires that are based on the proper conditions of human life are able to be such a foundation. These desires are not arbitrary but are relative to individual situations. And, because the moment of universalizability that is based on reason can make the choice based on them objective, our rational choice does not fall into simple subjectivism. According to the Kantian and rationalist account, our rational choice has the function that converts *what is only means-end rational for us to do* into *what we morally ought to do*. Our rational choice has the function that *develops* (not *reduces* as in Moore) our agent-relative reasons (desires or *prima facie* reasons) into agent-neutral reasons (good reasons).<sup>12</sup> This function is derived from the following fact: Our rationality constitutes our humanity, and our humanity is universal to us.

Now, while our rational choice can confer value on something, do constructivists argue that we have value in ourselves (Martin 2006)? If it could

12. J. Rawls, who is a constructivist, presents the *categorical imperative procedure* as an interpretation of the categorical imperative. We are able to understand this procedure as one that develops our agent-relative reason (maxim) into agent-neutral reason (moral law). This procedure consists of four steps, in which it is determined whether one's rational maxim for action from the viewpoint of himself can pass the categorical imperative test (the formula of natural law) (Rawls 1999, 499). For instance, the question "Should I do X?" is examined as follows. In the first step, our maxim is identified ("I am to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y"). In the second step, it is generalized ("Everyone is to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y"). In the third step, we are to transform the general precept in the second step into a law of nature ("Everyone always does X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y"). In the fourth step, we need to adjoin the law of nature in the third step to the existing laws of nature and then calculate what new order of nature comes into effect (ibid. 499f). Rawls calls this new order of nature the "perturbed social world" (ibid. 500). By considering this social world with the maxim in the first step, we can determine whether our maxim can be valid as a universalizable law. If we are able to have the will to realize this social world and are able to intend to act from the maxim as a member of it, we are justified to act on it because it is established that our maxim is also the moral law.

be interpreted that what is an end in itself is not our humanity or rational nature (rational capacity of choice) but *a rational being itself*, such a doubt does not arise. But if it is so interpreted, does a rational being have an intrinsic value in a realist way?

Korsgaard used to think, as a sort of realist, that human beings simply have unconditional or intrinsic value. But now, her views have changed. She now thinks that “we must confer value even upon ourselves” (Korsgaard 1996b, 407). This conversion in her thought is from the unilateral consideration that “I have a value in myself as the being with humanity (rational nature), so I also must think that others have the same value” to the bilateral one that “by valuing each other, with others having valuable humanity, a value is conferred upon myself.”

How is such a reciprocal value-conferring done? I think this value-conferring must meet three conditions. First, the value-conferring performed upon myself must not fall into mere egoism. Second, this value-conferring needs to be not only a subjective but also an objective principle. Third, our self-understanding as an end in itself needs to produce a substantial effect within others and ourselves. To meet these conditions, what are we required to do with others?

Regarding this reciprocal form of value-conferring, Kant argues that we must regard the ends of others — which are chosen by rational beings like us — as far as possible as also being “my ends” (Kant IV, 430). In other words, it is not until we regard the end that others choose rationally as our own and also *others* regard the end that we choose rationally as their own that our value as an end in itself can be justified. It is not until the reciprocal recognition of an end or sharing an end between others and ourselves becomes possible that it can be said that *we ourselves* have a value. The most important thing in the reciprocal recognition of the end is “the ends of his own that each may set himself” (Kant IV, 433), that is, my reason for action (*maxim*). In this process, this individual reason is recognized as *our* reason, and it is accepted in each other as a *moral* reason (moral law) on which we act with others. This is the Kantian idea of the Realm of Ends.

We are not rational beings by birth, but become such beings through our development in the human community. In this process of development, we learn what end is *sharable* with others. The important matter in this

development is this reciprocal recognition: we should confer value on each other's existence and on each other's reason for action with each other. Our rationality becomes complete through such an intersubjective and bilateral interaction. It is not until we are acknowledged as an important being by others and establish a moral relationship between them and ourselves that we are able to take on the value as an end in itself.

## 8. Conclusion

Constructivists take the normativity of reason-judgments as constitutive in the judgment of rational beings itself. They pay attention to the roles that our desires and reason play respectively in conferring value. They present the view that while *desires* discover a valuable thing, the procedure based on *reason* justifies the achievement of it and motivates us to perform it. By establishing the dual relationship between our agency and value, constructivists show that it is possible to explain the normativity of moral values without being biased by either emotion or reason. Thus, constructivism indicates a possible means of resolving the controversy between realism and non-cognitivism concerning moral values.

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