博士論文（要約）

Military Threat Perception in Postwar Japan: the Soviet Union, China and North Korea

（戦後日本における軍事脅威認識：ソ連、中国、北朝鮮）

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論文の内容の要旨

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Threat perceptions are of crucial importance to international security yet they remain understudied both generally among political scientists and particularly among Japan scholars. The few studies that did tackle the phenomenon of Japan's perceptions of threat as a dependent variable suffer from weaknesses such as poor conceptualization of 'threat-perception' as well as limited methodology and data. This study aims to fill this gap by employing an eclectic approach which combines different methods and analyzes both macro and micro data. I examined postwar perceptions of military threats associated with the Soviet Union, China and North Korea across five decades and four units of analysis: the defense and political establishments, the media and the general public. The empirical findings of this study indicate that contrary to earlier findings, both the Soviet Union and China were perceived by some domestic actors in Japan as significant military threats during the postwar period (1950 - 1991), although with fluctuations over time, context, intensity and distribution. This study also finds that while both the Soviet Union and China were not fully securitized as military threats among the general public and the mainstream political leadership in the postwar period, North Korea was securitized successfully as a military threat in the late 1990s. Based on the evaluation of the empirical record, I argue that the

observer's *pre-existing* attitude toward security shapes to a large extent the process of threat-assessment. I further identify two "interpretive-codes" which informed how Japanese actors perceived threat in the postwar period, thus contributing to the literature about Japan's postwar security and to the theorizing of the phenomenon of threat perception in general.

Keywords Threat perception, Japanese Studies, Security Studies**,** Securitization, National security, Security Attitudes

Dedication

I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Tokyo, professor Tanaka Akihiko, for his guidance and support throughout the past five years. I would also like to thank my sub-advisor, professor Sonoda Shigeto and professor Matsuda Yasuhiro - both at the University of Tokyo - for their advices and substantial feedback. In addition, I would like to thank professor Harada Shiro at the University of Tokyo and professor Ueki Chikako at Waseda University for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of the thesis. Finally, on a more personal level, I would like to thank my parents who enabled me to explore the world.

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ASDF: Air Self Defense Force
AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System
BMD: Ballistic Missile Defense
BPND: Basic Policy on National Defense
COCOM: Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Area
CS: Copenhagen School
DG: Director General (of the Japan Defense Agency)
DOD: Department of Defense
DSP: Democratic Socialist Party
FM: Foreign Minister
GOJ: Government of Japan
GSDF: Ground Self Defense Force
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM: Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
ISS: International Security Studies
JCP: Japan Communist Party
JDA: Japan Defense Agency
JSP: Japan Socialist Party
KAL: Korean Air Lines
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party
MTDP: Mid Term Defense Program
MOD: Ministry of Defense
MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSDF: Maritime Self Defense Force
NDPO: National Defense Program Outline
NPR: National Police Reserve
NPT: Non Perceived Threat
PTBT: Partial Test Ban Treaty
PIDG: Peace Issues Discussion Group
PM: Prime Minister
SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLOC: Sea Lanes of Communication
ST: Securitization Theory
US: United States
USFJ: United States Forces-Command Japan

1. Introduction

How actors in the international system infer military threats? For decades, the mainstream view among IR scholars and practitioners posed that threats are a result of estimated capabilities and estimated intentions of a certain entity.[1] Associated with the work of David Singer (1958), this conceptualization of threats as capabilities multiplied intentions is problematic because even if we accept the assumption that states have intentions in the first place as if they were organic entities, it is often impossible to identify state's intentions. While scholars have identified various tools actors use to infer the intentions of an adversary, such as material capabilities, identity, signaling, credibility, behavior, public statements, ideologies, regime types, and military doctrines, many of these analytical tools are ambiguous and can be interpreted in strikingly different ways depending on the observer involved. In addition, these analytical tools focus on the adversary while disregarding the observer, the *perceiver* of threat. [2]

Since the 1970s, Japanese decision makers have followed the conventional understanding of threat as the multiplication of capabilities and intentions.[3] What military threats did Japanese perceive in the postwar era (1950 - 2000)? Specifically, how did they think of the threat posed by

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[1] Other scholars doubt whether state's capability or intent can be objectively assessed (Moravcsik 1997).

[2] Some scholars bring the perceiver into the table and explore how impressions of foreign decision makers and pre-existing beliefs and theories affect perceptions of threat. I explore these studies in section 1.3.4

[3] In an interview he gave in 2004, former defense minister Ishiba Shigeru stated that, "Threat is a function of the multiplication of capabilities and hostile intentions toward Japan...for example, although the US has great capabilities, since it has zero intention to invade Japan a multiplication of this would result in zero [threat]" (*Jieitai Shiraresaru Henyō* 2005, 235). Similarly, PM Nakasone stated in the Diet in 1983 that, "whereas a dangerous situation involves both the capability and intent to invade, the Soviet Union does not fall under this category at the moment." As we will see, defense officials conceptualized threats in terms of capabilities and intentions as earl as the 1970s.

the Soviet Union, China and North Korea? "During most of the postwar era", asserted Olsen (1985, 58) in the mid 1980s in what seems to be the mainstream opinion in American political and defense circles, "Japan has been very unrealistic" concerning its threat perception, suggesting that Japanese political elites underestimated the threats from the Soviet Union and North Korea.[4] Ishiba Shigeru argued that, "strangely, although the Soviet Union was extremely strong, it was not perceived as a threat [to Japan]." [5] Similar to No-Perceived-Threat proposition (hereafter, the NPT proposition) about the Soviet Union, scholars have argued that China was not perceived to be posing a serious threat to Japan during the 1960s (Buckely 1992, 109; Johnson 1998, 154; Schaller 1998, 137-177; Welfield 1988, 175-177). As Ogata Sadako (1965, 389) observed, "not many Japanese regard Communist China as a 'Cold War' enemy, nor do they accept the 'China-communism-enemy' equation that is so widely held in the United States." And so, both opinion-leaders and Japan specialists assert that during the early postwar period, the USSR, China and North Korea were not *perceived* by the Japanese to be military threats. How should we explain the NPT proposition?

As I demonstrate throughout this study, the NPT proposition regarding both the Soviet and Chinese threats is simplistic and at times incorrect when considering specific units of analysis. This is because a war scenario involving the Soviet Union in the form of either a conventional war, a "limited-scale war"or a "surprise attack" was the implicit working

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[4] Okamura Minoru argues the opposite: that the Soviet Union was perceived to be a greater military threat to Japan than the US. In his analysis of the US-Japan alliance between 1972 and 1985, Okamura applied economic theory of defense demand to evaluate the impact of a Soviet threat on the military spending of both countries. His conclusion was that Japan was, "more sensitive to the Soviet Union's threat than the United States" (Okamura 1991, 200).

[5] An Interview with Ishiba Shigeru (December 2004) in *Jieitai Shiraresaru Henyō* 2005, 235. Ishiba has served in various defense roles among them the Administrative Vice Minister in the JDA in 2001; Director-General between 2002 and 2004, and the Minister of Defense between 2007 and 2008.

assumption of all four defense plans (1958-1976) and of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NIDS 2012, 45).[6] As the analysis of oral-history testimonies with former defense personnel will show, people in the defense establishment certainly perceived the Soviet Union to be a military-security threat throughout the postwar period (albeit with various degrees and with fluctuations over time). Alert attitudes toward the Soviet Union were not confined to the defense establishment either and were communicated by political figures including the highest officials of the state, as private statements made by PM Tanaka in 1973 and 1974 reveal.[7] Implicit threats made by the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels as early as 1960 have raised concerns among Japanese decision makers.[8] During the 1980s, Japan's largest newspaper, the *Yomiuri Shinbun,* increasingly framed the Soviet Union as a military threat in its editorials. And so, as chapters 2-5 will demonstrate, defense personnel, politicians, media outlets and the general

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[6] The perceived military peril associated with the Soviet Union was even stronger during the early 1980s.

[7] During a summit meeting between PM Tanaka and President Nixon the former had emphasized to Nixon the growing presence of the Soviet Naval force in the Indian Ocean (Komine 2014, 114). During a summit meeting with US President Ford on November 20, 1974, stated PM Tanaka that whereas "Japan does not assess China as a major threat to Japan's security... the Soviet military forces deployed in Siberia along the Chinese border may at the same also be viewed as a threat to Japan. Therefore Japan is most sensitive to the Soviet military build-up in Siberia." See: National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Memorandum of Conversation, November 20, 1974. Accessed December 30, 2013, from http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/guides/findingaid/Memoranda_of_Conversations.asp#Box14 ;

[8] On January 27, 1960, a week after Japan had signed a revised security treaty with the US, sent Khrushchev an aide-memoire to the Japanese government. The memoire concluded that "the revision of the security treaty...would increase the chances of Japan's being directly involved in military conflict" (Hasegawa 1998, 136). To Japan's response that stipulated that any sovereign state had the right to determine its security policy, the USSR replied on February 26 that, "the new treaty not only will not guarantee the security of Japan, but, on the contrary, can bring the country to catastrophe, which might inevitably involve Japan in a new war" (Hasegawa 1998, 137)

public entertained different judgements in different periods about the military threat posed by the Soviet Union.

The NPT proposition makes more sense when considering the Japanese political establishment, media and public *at large* and during the early decades of the postwar period, namely the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. As this thesis finds, while the Soviet Union was securitized during the 1980s in a limited manner, neither the Soviet Union nor China nor North Korea was fully securitized as military threats during the early and late postwar periods. The interesting question is why; What factors *hindered* the perception of military threats during the early postwar period? What factors *enabled* the limited securitization discourse of the Soviet threat during the 1980s and the full securitization of the North Korean issue in the late 1990s?

The literature about Japan's national security can provide some explanations to the empirical puzzle concerning Japanese perceptions of threat.[9] A realist explanation would stipulate that neither the Soviet Union nor China was perceived to be a military threat because of the American commitment to defend Japan and the relative superiority of US military power over the Soviet forces, at least until the early 1980s. Soeya Yoshihide (1998, 201) for example has argued that although the Soviet threat and the volatile situation on the Korean peninsula did concern Japan's decision makers, the US-Japan security structure and American determination to counter the Soviet threat without a Japanese military involvement served as a *shield* protecting the Japanese public from perceiving these security threats. "The public", claims Soeya, "did not necessarily regard traditional security threats as posing imminent danger to the survival of Japan or to its territorial integrity." Similar arguments were made by other scholars in relation to both Japanese perception of threat and its security behavior (Cha 1999, 57; Dian 2014, 60). While this

[9] I discern these potential explanations to Japanese threat-perceptions along the lines of realist, constructivist, and radical-constructivist theories.

study confirms an *overall* Japanese tendency to avoid military security threats in the early postwar period, it rejects the argument that US security guarantees alone insulated Japanese actors from perceiving threat during the early postwar period. This is because defense officials were uncertain that the US would assist Japan in case of external attack, as various accounts of former defense personnel suggest. [10] Such uncertainty was not confined to defense personnel either; Japanese Prime Ministers have repeatedly asked US Presidents in their private meetings to confirm the American commitment to defend Japan against nuclear weapons during the 1960s and 1970s.[11] As US security commitment to defend Japan was far from certain, it is difficult to argue that it served to protect the Japanese pubic (or decision-makers, for that matter) from *perceiving* a threat. Moreover, some Japanese actors such as the political left and the peace activists perceived the security relationship with the US *itself* as a source of anxiety as it increased the likelihood Japan would be involved in a war with the Soviet Union. Fear of entrapment in US-led war was not confined to the political left either, and mainstream Japanese politicians sustained it too.

A second realist explanation would consider Japan's attitudes toward security threats during the postwar period in terms of a well-thought, well-executed strategy designed to minimize financial burden and maximize security based on the alliance with the US and on the need to hedge against entrapment in conflict. Japanese decision-makers, the argument would

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[10] Horie Masao, who served in numerous defense and operational-planning positions in the GSDF between the years 1955 and 1962, and later as GSDF Chief of Staff, Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman, and a House of Councillors member of the LDP (Tanaka faction) recalls differences between the GSDF and the MSDF about the credibility of the American commitment to Japan's defense. Whereas GSDF personnel had serious doubts whether the US will come to Japan's aid in case of contingency, MSDF commanders were more positive about the American security guarantee. See: NIDS 2012, 266.

[11] For the discussion of these private conversation based on declassified memorandum of conversation, see chapter 8.

have it, wisely "played" military-security threat-perceptions, sometimes emphasizing threats to American counterparts (as evident in PM Satō Eisaku's private conversations with US presidents during the mid 1960s in which he emphasized the threat of China's nuclear weapons) and sometimes downplaying them (as evident in high-level meeting during the late 1970s and early 1980s when Japanese policy makers tried to disassociate Japan's security policy and evaluation of the Soviet threat from the Carter administration's strategy against the Soviet Union).[12] This explanation, too, is not without faults. First, it assumes a unitary actor formulating a coherent national security strategy throughout the postwar, while in reality as we shall see, Japan's official assessment of threats was a source of intense disagreements among the major actors involved. Second, by suggesting that to the Japan's leadership threat-perception is only a device, this explanation deprives Japanese leaders of the natural capacity to feel danger from military-security threats. But as the case study about China will suggest, Japan's PM Satō was genuinely concerned about a nuclear China to the point where he contemplated a Japanese nuclear-weapons program at the price of his own political career. Third, Japan's enhanced security cooperation with the US before and during the second Cold War (first half of the 1980s) can also be considered unwise as it situated Japan on a riskier path of entrapment in a regional conflict with the Soviet Union.[13]

The realist explanations mentioned above fail to specify the unit of analysis they deal with and to address the *sources* of Japanese threat perceptions in a structured manner. The emphasis on the state as a rational, unitary actor downplays the differences among Japanese

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[12] I would like to thank Professor Tanaka Akihiko for pointing out such a potential explanation.

[13] During the same period, West Germany for example had taken a very different path from Japan, enhancing its neutral position in the superpower rivalry rather than seeking closer cooperation with the US.

domestic actors in their perceptions of threat. Likewise, realist explanations neglect the importance of non-material factors, a task taken by constructivists.

Constructivist accounts aiming to explain Japan's security attitudes and behavior focus on Japan's domestic circumstances, that is, on Japan's anti-militaristic identity, institutions, beliefs and norms. Unlike realists, who tie Japanese perceptions of security with international-systemic factors or strategic calculations, constructivists explain the lack of securitization of military issues in early postwar Japan by pointing to Japan's culture of *anti-militarism*. Strong aversion to military symbols thus hindered perceptions of military threat. Constructivist take one step forward from realist explanations, insofar as they incorporate domestic politics and non-material elements into their analysis. Thomas Berger's (1998) study of Japan's "culture of anti-militarism" examines the sub-state level of analysis, exploring the effects of Japan's political-military culture on elite opinion, public-opinion, civil-military relations, military doctrine, force-structure and alliance-politics.[14] Glen Hook (1996, 181) explores the key elements in Japanese attitudes of anti-nuclearism and anti-militarism, including the widely-held objection to participate in aggressive wars, to make any use of nuclear weapons, or to normalize the SDF and its function to settle international issues by force. But both studies are mostly interested in explaining Japan's security *behavior* and neither deals with perceptions of threat nor with the mechanism by which these unique attitudes and culture actually shape these perceptions of threat.

Constructivist accounts fail to weigh in psychological factors: how exactly Japan's political-military culture and anti-militaristic attitudes have hindered the securitization of military threats in postwar Japan is not clear. Constructivists may have difficulties to explain why,

[14] Under the term "culture" in the constructivist literature one can find different themes such as institutions, beliefs, ideas, sentiments and emotions "that are held by a specific group and transmitted from one generation to the next through mechanisms of socialization" (Berger 1998, 8).

although Japanese aversion to military symbols has remained rather strong in the post Cold-War period, perceptions of military threats among the Japanese have been on the rise since the mid 1990s.

Finally, "radical constructivist" explanations draw attention to the inter-subjective dimension of the socio-political world and specifically, the securitizing actors and their ability to persuade relevant audiences that actual threats are "near". Sasaki Tomoyuki (2015, 139) for example asserts that, "[Prior to the end of the 1970, the] Japanese society did not immerse itself in the fear of a Soviet invasion." Beginning in the end of the 1970s, he argues, former SDF military personnel and civilian military experts initiated a fear-mongering campaign about a Soviet threat from the North. Sasaki (2015, 139-55) further positions this threat discourse in a broader political and economic context, which consisted of economic frictions and political tensions caused by Japan's trade surplus vis-à-vis the US on the one hand, and the Japanese government's attempt to legitimize the SDF as a military organization in order to impede the leftist idea of unarmed neutrality on the other. Sasaki (2015, 155) concludes that the attempt to securitize the Soviet military threat emphasized the vulnerable position of Hokkaido, calling for autonomous defense efforts. "The government in Tokyo fully capitalized on this campaign, viewing it as an opportunity to further advance the heavy militarization of Hokkaido.[15] Such a campaign, observed Sakamoto (1988, 92), was indeed successful as it created a "sense of crisis" among the Japanese.

The radical-constructivist attempt to explain the shift in Japan's security discourse in the late 1970s and early 1980s by focusing on the securitizing actors and their message as well as the

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[15] The motivation for the government actions in this respect were, according to Sasaki, "a right-wing turn in national politics", including the desire to to enhance Japan's military capability. See: Sasaki 2015, 146-150.

socio-political *context* is noteworthy as it draws attention to both domestic actors and international circumstances. But as mentioned before, this type of account downplays the capacity of Japanese actors to sincerely *worry about* a Soviet Union military threat, or other military-security issues for that matter. The securitization of the Soviet military threat thus becomes a mere device, a campaign designed to reap political or diplomatic benefits. In addition, radical-constructivist explanations have a tendency to reduce audiences of securitization moves to passive consumers of the government's political messages. The reality, however, is often more complex; the general public plays an active role in shaping the national discourse about threats. Finally, these accounts also fail to explain why the Soviet Union was not perceived to be a direct military threat by Japan's decision-makers.

The current study finds strong evidence that during the postwar period both the Soviet Union and China were perceived to be a military threat by domestic actors in Japan, although with fluctuations over *time*, *context, intensity* and *distribution*. In an attempt to settle this apparent anomaly between the NPT proposition and the empirical findings, I highlight the following points. First, perception of threat is context-dependent. While Japan's state leadership perceived communism as an existential political threat during the 1950s, it did not think of the Soviet Union as a direct military threat but rather as an indirect, "latent" one. In the case of China, terminology of existential political threat was employed in the 1950s, and state leadership did perceive a direct Chinese *military* threat in the second half of the 1960s (although it did not clearly communicate it as such). Second, the *distribution* of individual perceptions of threat among the society changes with *time*. While Japan's mainstream leadership perceived the Soviet military threat in the early postwar period to be indirect, during the first half of the 1980s a growing number of people in elite circles and among the larger Japanese society had come to

view it as a direct threat. Third, the *intensity* of the perceived threat is not binary in nature and is better conceptualized on a spectrum with no-threat, indirect, direct, and existential levels of perceived threat identified for analytical purposes. I suggest that these four elements should be considered when considering the topic of threat-perception.

To conclude the introduction part, we can now re-evaluate the NPT proposition concerning the Soviet Union and China. Neither the Soviet Union nor China was perceived in the early postwar period to be *less* of a military threat than North Korea was in the post Cold-War period (as Ishiba had suggested); instead, they were *less perceived* so. In other words, during the Cold-War the distribution of individual danger-judgements pertaining to a direct Soviet/Chinese military threat was limited when compared to the distribution of danger-judgements regarding a North Korean threat in the post Cold-War era (1991-2000). This conclusion indicates that psychological changes in the attitudes underlying perceptions of military security threats were taking place in postwar Japan. Early postwar avoidance of the language of military threats was gradually replaced by a more open-conversation about threats in the late postwar period (1976 -1991). Beginning in the early 1980s, forces from both sides of the political spectrum increasingly invoked the language of threat. While members of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP) used terminology of threat to put pressure on the ruling party in an attempt to curtail policy measures, groups of like-minded politicians and former military personnel sought to break the taboo on military threat and communicate their concerns about Japan's national security. The situation in the post Cold War period has been starkly different: an "emotional turn" in Japanese attitudes toward security can be traced roughly to the year 1998, and the future course of such a tendency may have far reaching implications to Japan's risk-measures and security environment.

1.1 Research Questions and Structure of the Thesis

This study examines "Threat Perceptions" in the context of postwar Japanese military security. It explores the following set of research questions:

1. What were the military threat perceptions in postwar Japan? Specifically,

1a. What were the main 'traditional' security threats in postwar Japan ? How were these threats framed ? By Whom?

1b. Were these threats "securitized" in Copenhagen School (CS) language? What factors determined the *intensity* and *distribution* of threat-perceptions and their securitization?

1c. Are there long-term patterns in postwar Japan's national discourse about military-security threats?

The main body of this thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for the study of threat perceptions. It introduces the key concepts that provide the context for the inquiry and suggests how to conceptualize them. Chapter 2 briefly introduces the chronology of the bilateral relationship between Japan and the USSR. It further examines military-threat perceptions among Japan's defense and political establishments during the early postwar period (roughly between 1950-1975) by using macro and micro data. The chapter finds that negative sentiment toward the Soviet Union was a necessary but not sufficient condition to the securitization of the Soviet military threat in postwar Japan. It also finds that during the early postwar period, Japan's national conversation about security eschewed direct references to a 'Soviet threat' and that Japanese high state officials consistently avoided framing the Soviet Union as an enemy or military threat in public. But, the chapter also identifies other types of

securitization moves which co-occurred during this period: pragmatist political elites securitized communism as an existential political threat and Japan's peace activists and left-wing politicians securitized nuclear war as an existential threat-scenario.

Chapter 3 explores how defense and political elites framed the Soviet Union military threat in the late postwar period (1976-1991) by using both macro and micro data. It finds that during the 1980s, the Soviet threat was securitized in a military context albeit in a limited manner. I argue that rising concerns among some Japanese actors vis-à-vis the Soviet Union were not merely a product of external stimuli related to the Soviet Union but a result of international and domestic circumstances and - not less importantly - of attitudinal changes. The chapter also finds that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Japan's national conversation about military threats intensified dramatically, not only in the Diet, but also among the society as a whole.

Chapter 4 provides a longitudinal analysis of one component of the potential Soviet military threat: its submarines. It examines the political communication about Soviet submarines in the Diet between 1951 and 2000 by applying content analysis, and substantiates the main argument regarding a psychological "avoidance" of components of Soviet military prior to the 1980s. The chapter also sheds light on the political discourse about military threats and the pivotal role of the opposition members in this discourse.

Chapter 5 examines how the *Yomiuri Shinbun* - one of Japan's leading media outlets - framed the Soviet military threat throughout the postwar period. The chapter analyzes editorials containing a combination of the words "the Soviet Union" and "threat" in the period between 1946 and 1990, and finds that although prior to the 1980s *Yomiuri* editorials depicted the Soviet Union as a source of insecurity (albeit in an abstract way and in moderate terms), consecutive

editorials resisted inflating a Soviet threat until about 1982-1983. Once the perception of the Soviet Union as a threat had solidified, *Yomiuri* editorials kept to it even when faced with mounting evidence of alleviating tensions and reports about growing global perceptions of reduced Soviet threat.

Chapters 6 and 7 provide two comparative case studies to the Soviet Union military threat: the first examines perceptions of a "China threat" in the mid-1960, and the second examines perceptions of a "North Korea threat" in the 1990s. While North Korea was successfully securitized in Japan during the end of the 1990s, China, I argue, was covertly securitized behind the scenes by Japan's state leadership.

Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings of the study and integrates them into a coherent account of Japanese perceptions of military threat. In addition, the chapter makes a case for the theoretical implications of the study's findings.

Chapter 9 concludes the study and highlights questions for future research. Following these nine chapters, appendices 1-3 provide the full analysis of *Yomiuri* editorials analyzed in chapters 5-7 and references are listed.

1.2 Ontology and Epistemology

If ontology is concerned with the 'being' or existence of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with how we can generate such knowledge. In ontological terms, this research shares the foundationalist position, claiming that there is a world 'out there', which exist independently of our knowledge of it. But since humans experience this 'real world' through the mind, our view of the world is conditioned by cognitive biases, mental shortcuts, and abstract concepts; consequently, it is the perception of the real world which is of interest in this study.

This study also diverges with the foundationalist position on three crucial points. First, there is no one, objective, 'true view' of the world out there: our knowledge of the world is liable to err. In this respect, the generation of theories provide us with mere models that represent *some* part of the world in *some* way (as opposed to the relativist theory, these representations are still of something, e.g., of the world). Accordingly, there is no specific theoretical framework that can be applied to every instance, one that can entirely explain events and processes in the international arena.[16] Different paradigms might provide us with advantageous insights, depending on the questions being asked. Second, following from the first point, the main requirement for a good explanation is only that we come to better understand the world. Finally, I reject the idea of researchers' objectivity, 'valued-free' research. As Huntington (1996, 30) has observed, "for in the back of our minds are hidden assumptions, biases, and prejudices that determine how we perceive reality."

In epistemological terms, this study is laden in the critical realist stance in philosophy (for an overview of this school see Mingers 2006, chapter 2). According to the critical realist position, while social phenomena may have causal mechanisms and therefore we can make causal statements about them, not all social phenomena - and the relationships between them - are directly observable. Perception of threat is one such example and so rather than examining it in positivist-like tools, I aim to explore "the why and how" of the phenomenon (I elaborate on this point in the methodology section).

Personal Biases

[16] As Kuhn has noted, "to be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted" (1962,17-18). This stands in opposition to the positivist stance, according to which theories should be perfectly general and perfectly true at all times.

To reflect on my own biases in doing this research then, after living a few years in Japan I do feel that in its contemporary form, the Japanese society is pre-occupied with dangers to a surprising degree. Apparent in many aspects of life is a great alarm to the likelihood of harm. Signs pertaining to danger (*kiken*), risk (*osore*), dangerous or hazardous (*abunai*) are ubiquitous, and generally speaking, Japanese tend to be educated and react to external stimulus with caution, risk-aversion and anticipation of harm. The challenge, therefore, was how to deal with this personal bias in a manner conductive to this study and not to let it interfere with the way in which I interpret the data.

A second bias is related to the country of my origin, Israel. Having lived in a conflict zone for most of my life, I have *experienced* the feeling of "existential threat" (from terror organizations or state actors). Somewhat surprisingly, since I arrived in Japan the subjective feeling of an objective threat to my home country has diminished. Threats that I once took for granted are now a source of scrutiny for me. More or less at the same time, "security" became a word loaded with negative connotations while "peace" became loaded with positive ones. The challenge was therefore to examine the issue of threat perception without rejecting the possibility that 'threats' can exist out-there; to remind myself that not all threats are simply socially-constructed and some threats are rather real, as some people and organizations do entertain malign intention and plan to inflict damage on other actors.

Relatedly, as I am not Japanese in my identity, it was a challenge to interpret the manner in which Japanese people subjectively experienced threats in the postwar period, such as the threat associated with North Korea. To tackle this issue, I pay attention to language in all its forms, as it offers a window into the subjective understandings of the outside reality as

experienced by Japanese people. To continue laying the ground work of this study, the next section introduces the basic premises and key concepts underlying this study.

1.3 Basic Premises and Key Concepts

1.3.1 Basic Premises of the Study

The argument of this study is based on three core premises: ontological, social, and epistemological. Ontologically, I argue that since humans have the capacity to be hostile to others as well as the capacity to perceive threat, threats can exist both inside and outside the mind. Thus, while threats are experienced subjectively, their perceptions can also point to a "real" danger which is not depended on the mind for existence. The point, however, is that it is often impossible to measure threats objectively. As Wolfers had argued, while it is sometimes possible to measure - in retrospect - how far subjective assessments of security deviated from a rational response to the objective state of danger existing at a specific time, it is never possible to measure security "objectively" in that subjective evaluations play an inevitable part in states' assessments. Accordingly, I choose to remain *agnostic*[17] vis-à-vis the objective reality of the phenomenon of threat, focusing instead on the perceptions of military security threats as held by Japanese actors.

The second premise is that socially, people tend to organize in groups which, in turn, tend to identify and react to threats in order to survive or avoid loss. Culturally embedded and serving social functions in the community, perceptions of threat thus also exist *between* minds. Subsequently, an important aspect of threat-perception is not only its intensity as perceived by individuals but also its distribution: how many individuals in the community view a certain issue or entity in similar intensity.

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[17] I would like to thank Professor Tanaka Akihiko for this comment.

Third, since threats are perceived subjectively and are communicated inter-subjectively, then epistemologically, we ought to study perception of threat with the same tools we experience the phenomenon: through language. Language, as Pinker (2007) notes, provides a window to the human's mind. Thus, speeches, statements, editorials, memorandum of conversations, catchphrases, and documents become the main tools in the inquiry into perceptions of threats. Below, I tackle the key concepts used in the study.

1.3.2 Security

Security can be defined in various ways, but these definitions are essentially about threats, values, and (risk)-measures.[18] At the most basic level, "security is about constituting something that needs to be secured" (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 10). A thorough evaluation of threat-perception in the context of International Security Studies (ISS) should thus pay attention to security "interests", "values", or "referent objects", as they are interchangeably mentioned in the literature. Once referent objects are constituted, they become susceptible to harm vis-à-vis certain danger: actors may be inclined then to perceive a certain internal weakness vis-à-vis a certain threat or threat-scenario.

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[18] I would like to thank professor Tanaka Akihiko for pointing this out. 'Security' bears an inherent epistemological tension between objective and subjective meanings (Art 1993, 820-22; Wolfers 1962 Buzan 1991, 36-7). To Wolfers (1962), security denotes objectively the absence of threats to acquired values, and subjectively, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. To Lippmann (1943, 51), "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if its wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war." In order to converse with recent developments in IR and Security Studies, this study uses different terms for two out of three of these core pillars of security: threats, referent objects (instead of values), and risk-measures (instead of simply measures). For a discussion of the concept of security and the comprehensive security approach from a Japanese point of view, see Kumon (1980).

The concept of 'security' is fluid and changes with time. Originated in Latin, the word '*securus*' connoted "without worry". Security during the Roman era was considered to be a subjective, negative state-of-mind, while in mainstream, contemporary understanding, to be 'secure' - unconcerned - is appraised as a positive thing.[19] In the modern state-era, 'security' has maintained an interdependent link with the concept of 'national interest' (Wolfers 1952). After WWI, points Wolfers (1952, 481-2), security came to be associated with issues of welfare and economics. Yet according to the dominant realist usage of the term in ISS through much of the Cold-War period, 'security' implied an "[objective] ability of a nation to deter an attack, or defeat it" [20]. The scope was then of *national* security, pertaining to the territorial defense of the nation by military means, usually vis-à-vis external threats. "Security", continued Wolfers (1952, 483), "is a value...of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure." The more security, this logic seems to dictates, the better.

It was not before the 1980s that once again, the conceptual boundaries of the term 'security' had been contested and a call to cover more than military-strategic issues was made (Buzan and Hansen 2009, xix). A growing attention to the interdependence of military and economic issues culminated in a basic distinction between military, economic and ecological threats while maintaining the state as the main unit of analysis (Buzan 1983; Ullman 1983). [21] Later on with the demise of the Cold-War system, the concept of security has taken even more

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[19] Ole Waever quotes Emma Rothschild (1995: 61-4).

[20] Wolfers summarized Walter Lippmann's definition of the concept. See: Wolfers, 1962:150.

[21] While military threats referred to seizure of territory, invasion, occupation, damage or coercion caused by military measures, economic threats pertained to export practices, import restrictions, price manipulations, default on debt or currency controls and, ecological threats were conceived of those threats that may damage the physical base of the state. Buzan (1983:88). In Japan, the "comprehensive security" approach was developed in the 1970s. See: Tanaka 2013.

diverse interpretations. In its reductionist form, security is still mainly about "the study of threat, use and control of military force" (Walt 1991, 212). For constructivists such as Wendt (1992; 1999), security was about "what states makes of it", an "outcome of a social and political interaction where social values and norms, collective identities and cultural traditions are essential" (Brauch 2011, 61).

Security is conceptualized by some as an intersubjective process: for the so-called wideners of the concept, security can be either about "survival" of particular referent object , or about "freedom from fear" or "freedom from wants". Subsequently, the referent object of security is no longer limited to state's components alone, as it can be the individual, social group, or humankind as a whole; a river, a forest, or a specie; a language, a custom, or a belief-system. Some of these "new" schools of thought (namely Peace Research and the Copenhagen School) go further and re-shuffle the understanding of security altogether. Invoking the oppositional concept of peace, or a-security, these disciplines challenge the positive, realist logic of security ("the more the better"). They highlight the paradox of security by pointing out that, "state can never attain the end of absolute security, but relative security is never enough (Buzan 1991, 330-1).[22] This study integrates the latter insight into the analysis: I later suggest that people have different attitudes toward their safety - and how they wish to protect their assets - and that these attitudes can be discerned along a spectrum, with a *rationality of peace* and a *rationality of security* at both end-points. While peace rationality emphasizes cooperation and trust among actors in the international system, aspiring to a situation of a-security, the security rationality

[22] Such paradox, however, was not new. Karl Deutsch (1957) and Wolfers (1952) have pointed out, there exist a paradox in the relationship between power and insecurity, whereas a nation's feeling of insecurity expands with its power. Wolfers tried to untangle this paradox by dissecting security into an objective and subjective dimensions and by differentiating this concept from the concept of power. Security in a Wolferian sense, is a two dimensional phenomenon - stretching on a continuum from insecurity on the one side to security on the other.

emphasizes competition and distrust among actors in the system, and discards the notion of peace as unrealistic. The important proposition is that the type of rationality - one's attitude toward security - determines to a large extent the perception of threat (I return to this point later in the chapter).

1.3.3 Threat Perception

Perception, according to the New Oxford American Dictionary, is the process through which we become aware of and interpret external stimuli.[23] Individuals experience perception as, "The process of apprehending by means of the sense and recognizing and interpreting what is processed; a distinct unified awareness derived from sensory events when a stimulus is present (Meyer 2009). What are the main factors that determine, first, the selection of stimuli and, second, the interpretation of sensory events as either benign or threatening?

Underlying the phenomenon of threat-perception is a more persistent mental evaluative process which may be represented as an *attitude*. An attitude is "the general and enduring evaluative perception of some person, object, or issue" (Cacioppo et al 1994, 261). Vaughan and Hogg elaborate and define attitude as, "a relatively enduring organization of *beliefs*, *feelings*, and *behavioral tendencies* toward socially significant objects, groups, events or symbols" (Vaughan and Hogg 2005, 150; italics mine). In the context of this study, an attitude is those beliefs,

[23] The concept of 'perception' can be studied at the individual level and at the collective level. Although the collective process of perception - by which understandings are shared and communicated to create a general mood - are more difficult to identify (Stein 2013, 3), it is possible to identify these perceptions since, "threats are socially constructed within and among private and public conversations of experts, political leaders, and publics" (Meyer 2009). How to measure perceptions of military threat - both subjectively and inter-subjectively - is a methodological challenge that will be taken up in the methodology section.

feelings, and behavioral tendencies which relate to the concept of security as defined earlier with its three main pillars: referent objects, threats, and (risk)measures.

To illustrate how attitudes toward security may look like, I summarize the referent objects, threats and measures as advocated by three political actors in postwar Japan in Table 1.[24] The first actor - the "nationalists" - consisted of those who sought autonomy and prestige by eliminating the security alliance with the US and by developing independent military capabilities. The nationalists advocated *military* risk-measures and often viewed threats as *external* to Japan. The second actor, the "pragmatists", consisted of those who sought prestige and autonomy by aligning with the West, and by maintaining both a security alliance with the US and a limited military capability for self-defense. The pragmatists advocated a mix of diplomatic, economic and military tools, and viewed threats as both internal (such as communist agents) and external (Soviet threat to a lesser degree). This group may be referred to as the followers of the "Yoshida doctrine."

Table 1: Attitudes Toward Security Among Political Actors in Postwar Japan

Political Actor	Referent Object	Threat	Risk-Measures
Nationalists (Political Right)	Autonomy and Prestige (Sovereignty, Prosperity)	External	Military Strength
Pragmatists (Political Center)	Prestige and Autonomy (Prosperity and Sovereignty)	Internal & External Threats (Communist agents, Global instability)	Diplomacy and Military (Political alignment with the West, Defense Relationship with the US; Self-defense force

[24] The table draws on Richard Samuels's analysis of the different groups participating in the discourse about Japan's strategic choices (2007b), as well as on the empirical analysis conducted by the author.

Table 1: Attitudes Toward Security Among Political Actors in Postwar Japan			
Political Actor	**Referent Object**	**Threat**	**Risk-Measures**
Internationalists (Political Left)	Autonomy and Prestige (Sovereignty, Prosperity)	Internal (Resurgence of pre-war militarism)	Diplomacy (Unarmed neutrality)

The third actor - the "internationalists" - consisted of those who sought autonomy and prestige by maintaing a neutral, unarmed position in the international system. The internationalists excluded military risk-measures in order to maintain Japan's security in the world: they advocated the use of diplomacy and considered the resurgence of Japanese militarism as the gravest (internal) threat.

Before I move on to discuss how these security attitudes may translate into perceptions of threat, it is necessary to introduce another piece in the puzzle: the ABC model. The model, introduced by Spooncer (1992) is simply made to describe attitudes (and not to explain them!). The model represents attitudes with three components: affect (A), behavioral tendency (B), and cognitive belief (C) and is summarized in Table 2.[25]

[25] The example in this table is based on McLeod, 2014. All three psychological components are inter-related and scholars have paid growing attention to these links.

The first component of the model is 'affect'.[26] It denotes the individual's feelings about an attitude object such as the Soviet Union or war.[27] In the current study, I focus on the affect of 'like' or 'dislike' (hostility) and to a lesser extent on the emotion of 'fear'.

The second component of the model is 'behavioral tendency', denoting the individual's intention vis-à-vis an attitude object. For example, "I will not *resist* a Soviet attack" is a possible behavioral tendency. Other possible tendencies may include deterring a threat, avoiding it, befriending it, and defending against it. This component is determined to a large extent by past behaviors or experiences concerning the attitude object (Is this behavior likely to bring positive consequences?) as well as one's subjective norms (Is this behavior appropriate? How will other actors evaluate this behavior?). To be sure, behavioral tendency is different from actual behavior as it only denotes an *inclination* to act in a certain way.

The third component of the model is 'cognitive belief(s)'. It involves individual beliefs about an attitude object. For example: "I believe that the Soviet Union is dangerous" is one example; "I believe that the Soviet Union military will not attack Japan" is another. Here,

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[26] Scholars tend to differentiate between 'emotion' 'affect', 'feeling', and 'mood'. Stein for example distinguishes between these concepts in the following manner: 'emotion' refers to the experience of a certain state-of-mind (think of fear for example) and the awareness to the physiological response that occurs in one's body to it. 'Affect' is a subjective response to an attitude object in terms of positive or negative appraisal. A 'feeling' denotes a conscious awareness of an emotion toward an attitude object at a specific moment in time, and 'mood' denotes a more general state-of-mind which is less focused on an attitude object. See: Stein 2013, 26-27. In this study, I do not distinguish between 'affect' and 'feeling' and 'emotion' and combine their meanings as suggested by Stein together.

[27] Although researchers disagree about the typology of emotions and the methods to measure them, most studies take 'fear', 'humiliation' , 'anger' and 'anxiety' as crucial in shaping threat perceptions. Thus for example, the socio-political atmosphere in post 9/11 US has been described by scholars in terms of an emerging culture of *fear* of terrorism, in which repeated practice and institutionalization as well as a situation of "fear conditioning" has over-lived the threat itself (Crawford 2009; Meyer and Miskimmon 2009).

information and knowledge an actor has about the attitude object are important as they inform these beliefs to some extent. [28]

Table 2: Attitudinal Components Underlying Rationalities (The ABC Model)			
Affect	**Behavioral Tendency**	**Cognition**	**Rationality**
I *dislike* the Soviet Union	I will *deter* a Soviet military invasion and resist it were it to happen	*I believe that the Soviet Union is dangerous* (it is hostile, has high propensity to use force, would not hesitate to use it against us)	*Security Rationality* (Nationalist)
Dislike for both the Soviet Union and War	I will try to *avoid* a war with the Soviet Union but were it to happen, I would *resist* it	*I believe that the Soviet Union is moderately dangerous*	*Pragmatist Rationality* (Pragmatist)
I *dislike* war	I will *maintain* friendly relations with the Soviet Union; will *not resist* Soviet invasion were it to happen	*I believe that by itself*, the Soviet Union is not dangerous; but in the context of the East-West conflict, it might well be	*Peace Rationality* (Internationalist)

In the context of this study, I identify three sets of cognitive beliefs that affect how actors both select and interpret stimuli in the international system:

(1)What is the nature of international politics? here, any of the theories put forward by IR theorists and their main propositions may be used to denote this belief. Questions such as 'Is the system predominantly characterized by competition or cooperation among actors' and 'Is military

[28] Although in many cases, new information is being rejected if it does not fit a pre-existing belief (Jervis 1976). ,

force efficient in settling international disputes‘ may illuminate this point.

(2) What are the prospects for (2a) global stability and for (2b) regional stability? Was the world/ region becoming more or less stable?

(3) How dangerous is a certain actor (vis-à-vis the observer)? (3a) how hostile it is; (3b) how high is its propensity to use force, and (3c) would it use it against the observer. [29]

The values assigned to each of these cognitive beliefs - as well as to the other two components of attitude, ‘affect’ and ‘behavioral tendency’ produce a certain rationality through which observers both select and interpret stimuli in the external environment. I illustrate this point by discussing two of the political actors identified in Table 1. First, consider the nationalists who assumed that Japan would be secured by means of its own military force. Since the use of military force was the primary risk-measure advocated by the nationalists, it would be only logical to expect they would assume that other actors in the international system will adopt similar measures of securing their own interests. Subsequently, the nationalists would be prone to perceive the international system as competitive and dangerous and to think of other actors as hostile (hence the focus on threats from the outside). Having only limited trust in other actors in the system, they would be inclined to select and interpret stimuli following the positivist logic of security (“the more the better”); in other words, their ultimate goal would be to deter a potential enemy rather than making peace with it. Second, let us consider the internationalists who

[29] Two comments in this respect. First, the third belief is closely related to the evaluation of the observer’s own risk-measures: its capacity to mitigate the risks associated with the threatening actor. A perceived lack of such a capacity may lead to a certain *vulnerability* vis-à-vis that actor. I return to this point in Chapter 2. Second, belief (3) as presented here is suitable for the security rationality. It can also be presented in terms of peace rationality in the following manner: (3) whether a *threat-scenario* was becoming less/more dangerous to the observer, meaning that it was perceived to be more or less (3a) likely; (3b) had the potential to cause minor or major consequences, and (3) had the ability to gain access to observer in a direct way. These three sets of cognitive beliefs corresponds to some extent with the literature on “strategic culture”. For a good discussion of the “strategic culture” see Johnston 1995.

assumed that Japan would be secured by stripping itself of arms, forever renouncing war. According to their logic, since Japan would be neutral and unarmed, no external actor would attack it; such an assumption may only be logical if one assumes that other actors in the system are not inherently hostile and that cooperation - rather than competition - is a viable option. Accordingly, the internationalists would focus on internal threats rather than external, and would interpret stimuli in the external environment based on a logic of peace. A situation of a-security (befriending a potential enemy rather than deterring it) thus becomes the goal to which internationalists aspire; theirs is a *peace rationality*. [30]

The ABC model assumes that any of the three components may have bigger impact over a specific attitude. Moreover, attitudes based on direct experience are more strongly held and influence behavior more than attitudes formed indirectly (for example, through hear-say, reading or watching television). I return to this point in chapter 3.

Summarizing the use of the concepts 'perception' and 'attitude', I suggest that they are interrelated (see Figure 1). The perception of an external cue as a sign of threat may lead to a negative evaluation of an attitude object with some degree of disfavor, fear, or conviction that it is dangerous. Similarly, negative attitude toward a certain entity may have an impact over the attention given to stimuli associated with that entity, as well as on how an actor encodes stimuli and judges the level of danger concerning that entity. When an observer judges a certain entity as a threat, that is, when it associates danger with that entity, it is no longer a perception; it becomes an *attitude* (toward a threat) and therefore, more resistant to change.

But 'perception' and 'attitude' are not one and the same. To discern these two concepts, I suggest to view 'threat perception' as the process of becoming aware of stimulus, interpreting it,

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[30] I present both rationalities as typologies.

and arriving at a conclusion about its source.[31] An 'attitude' is a more persisting mental disposition by which humans view their security in the world, and specifically their referent objects, threats, and risk-measures.[32] Figure 1 displays the conceptual framework underlying this study, and the colored rounded rectangles detail each of the ABC components: affect (red), behavioral tendency (green), and cognitive beliefs (blue).

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[31] I elaborate on the third stage of threat-perception (judgement) in section 1.5.5

[32] Two important questions emerge in this context: how do attitudes form and how do they change. However, an inquiry into these questions falls outside the scope of this study. Various approaches tackling these question exist of course (for a good overview, see: Cacioppo et al. 1994).

Figure 1: Attitude and Perception



After surveying the key concepts of 'security' and distinguishing between 'perception' and 'attitude', the next section deals with the concept of 'threat-perception' in greater details.

'Threat' in International Relations / International Security Studies

During the Cold War, ISS scholars have attempted to measure security threats 'objectively' and less so on measuring the subjective perceptions of threat. To neorealists, threat was "a situation in which one agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on another agent or group" (David 2000, 10). Defined by two clear-cut variables, threat levels are significant only if *both* variables take some value: the lack of either reduces threat to nil. By means of mere deduction, threat *perception* was conceptualized as a function of both estimated

capability and estimated intent (Singer 1958, 94). Power asymmetries and changes in power distributions among the actors in the system were considered crucial in shaping perceptions of threat. Later in the 1980s, neorealists began to consider additional factors to the analysis of threat (and by extension, threat perception). Stephen Walt developed the "balance of threat" model which stipulated *how* states evaluate threats from external actors, namely by using four criteria: aggregated strength (in terms of size, population, and economical capabilities), geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions (Walt 1985).[33] Still, the neorealists' treatment of 'threat' mainly focused on the capabilities and intentions of the potential adversary and equated real 'threat' with its perception.

An inquiry into other possible explanatory variables of threat perceptions has been at the center of constructivist studies. Influenced by the work of social-identity theorists, constructivists have maintained that threats are not merely a result of power-asymmetries. Since individuals tend to organize in groups ('categorization process'), prejudicial attitudes toward the out-group would likely ensue (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero, 2007, 748). In ISS terminology, "there is a reason why state A is perceived as a threat to state B but not to state C, and that reason is not power". As Wendt (1995, 73) puts it, Britain's much larger nuclear weaponry is perceived less threatening to the US than North Korea's limited arsenal because "the British are friends and the North Koreans are not." The role of identity and ideology, constructivists have claimed, is pivotal in determining threat perceptions: identity comes before power, but both play a role in threat perception

[33] Later however, some argued that these four factors can essentially be summarized along the original two factors of capabilities and intent. See: Williamson 2014, 43.

(Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero, 2007, 745).[34] Constructivists argue that shared identity among actors in the system can mitigate perceptions of threat, serving to impede evidence such as military build-up.[35]

More recently, the CS with its Securitization Theory (ST) conceptualized threat as a social construction which involves a securitizing actor, "who makes the claim that particular object of value (referent object) is facing an existential threat", and an audience, "which must agree...that the referent object is a thing of value and that it is (existentially) threatened in the way that the securitizing agent claims" (Hayes 2012, 66). To follow, extraordinary means are constructed in order to counter the alleged threat. Threats, claim CS theorists like Ole Wæver, do not come with a label and therefore, "one should not believe [securitization] is an innocent reflection of the issue being a security threat; it is always a political choice to securitize or to accept a securitization" (Buzan et al. 1998, 29). Subsequently, rather than being a question of an objective threat or a subjective perception of a threat, CS scholars conceptualized threats as an

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[34] Based on three laboratory experiments, Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero developed a "threat model" which predicts that, "power influences people's threat perceptions only after identity between the self and the other has been established" (2007, 749). As they put it, "a weak position in terms of military power increases threat perceptions...[and] shared identity decreases it".

[35] In addition to the neorealist and constructivist schools, liberalist theorists have argued that institutions - if managed well - can reduce perception of threat; See: Hoest 2016, 24.

intersubjective procedure.[36] To follow, I offer a brief discussion of the internal mechanisms behind the phenomenon of threat (that is, the *perception* of threat) as outlined by political scientists and social psychologists.

Threat Perception

Since the late 1940s, scholars have been exploring the non-material conditions that induce perception of threat. In their "definition of the situation", Thomas and Znaniecki (1947, 556) differentiated between two sets of factors: the objective conditions, "under which the individual or group has to act" and the "pre-existing attitudes, which operate to select, combine, and interpret the objective conditions". The most crucial of these pre-existing attitudes - according to them - was "ethnocentrism" - which induces one to "judge external phenomena in terms of his membership in a particular national group." David Singer further developed Thomas and Znaniecki's work and argued that based on the assumption of inherent distrust between actors in the system, "a combination of recent events, historical memory, and identifiable sociocultural differences" provides the mechanism by which ethnocentrism may be transformed into concrete hostility toward an external actor (Singer 1958, 90-105). Although he was not clear on how one should determine intent, Singer mentions that "built of hostility plus capability, the inevitable

[36] These three different approaches to threat (and by extension, their perception) represent the ontological debate about the concept. Whereas the neorealist school assumes an outside reality of threat, some constructivists and scholars associated with the CS view it in terms of social construction. Three points in this context. First, oftentimes, threats involve high levels of uncertainty and as a result, few types of threats can be conceptualized and measured as quasi-mathematical equation of capabilities multiplied by intention. Second, military-security threats are inherently different from other security threats such as natural disasters or infectious diseases, because they assume intentional component upon their potential adversary. Third, because the majority of scholars (excluding the CS) equate threat with its perception, the differences between 'threat' and 'threat perception' and the various mechanisms that underlie the perception of threat were left under explored in the IR/ISS literature.

consequence is that each elite will interpret the other's military capability as evidence of military intent."

The Social Psychologist Dean G. Pruitt (1965) built on Singer and proposed that threat perception is a function of evidence of threat (capability and intent, which are brought together by the strategist into an intelligible picture), and *dispositions* to perceive threat. Among the predispositions involved in the cognitive process are distrust[37], past experience, contingency planning, and personal anxiety; these may generate "systematic distortions" in the comprehension of evidence, leading to negative thinking, "in which future events are seen as probable that should only be seen as possible." Pruitt further defines four categories which relate to "evidence of intent": (1) capability - such as armaments;[38] (2) actions - such as movements on the radar screen or other symbolic actions that consists of stepping over a 'boundary' on a conceptual dimension; (3) statements, and (4) the benefit the state A can derive from harming the state B's interests (for example, if state B's armed forces are in vulnerable position). Following these categories, Pruitt proposes two propositions about the relationship between predispositions and threat perception: one, the stronger a disposition, the more impact it will have on what is inferred and two, the more ambiguous the evidence of another state's capabilities or intentions, the greater the influence of the predisposition on the perception of threat (Pruitt and Snyder 1969, 26).

The literature mentioned thus far provide a good starting point for our discussion. One, it becomes clear that perception of threat and threat are, ontologically, *not* one and the same;

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[37] Distrust according to Pruitt, is "when predisposition is specific to a certain source of threat...distrust of another state is usually based on unfavorable past experience with that state.

[38] Often, evidence of capability - such as large arm forces - can be considered as evidence of intent, along the lines of, "Why would they have all those arms if they didn't intend to attack us?". (Pruitt and Snyder 1969, 24-25).

different actors can perceive the same stimuli in different ways. The perception of threat necessitates some kind of inference which is dependent on a set of pre-existing dispositions. But the research into these pre-existing dispositions has not developed enough; it is not clear for example why distrust or negative experience, so common in international politics, do not always lead to the perception of threat; why some actions are perceived to be breaching a conceptual boundary while others do not. Two, as the political scientist Raymond Cohen has argued (1979, 7), both Singer's and Pruitt's conceptualization of capability and intent is a "tautology", still lacking an explanation as to *why* a threat is perceived.

The Psychology of Threat Perceptions

Later in the 1970s, scholars drew attention to the psychological factors that shape perceptions of threat by turning to empirical studies. In his research about the period between the first and second World Wars, Klaus Knorr (1976) explores the cognitive process that underlies the perception of threat. Knorr acknowledges the ambiguous nature of stimuli, arguing that the perception of threat is a "cognitive construct" which "creates an image of reality". Knorr classifies several factors - "intervening dispositions" in his words - that either enable, hinder or generate misperception of threat. Among these are personality of decision makers, past and present experience of societies (reoccurrence of military attacks in the former, and changes in power asymmetries in the latter case), and the structure of the relevant actors involved in policy-making (Knorr asserts for example that threats are underestimated by governments characterized by de-centralization and competition and that the defense establishment is prone to emphasize military threats in order to secure more budget). Adding to the empirical momentum in the research of threat perceptions, Raymond Cohen (1978; 1979) further explored the "psychological

dimension" of the phenomenon by using comparative analysis of six historical case studies. Cohen (1978, 96-8) identifies three "criteria of selection" of stimuli, inducing the perception of threat:

1. Geographical ("the attention of decision makers was drawn to the events in question because they concerned areas strategically or emotionally of high priority");

2. An atmosphere of tension and mistrust in relations between actors involved;

3. The observer's sense of vulnerability to the given opponent in the area involved.

To explain what causes the interpretation of these stimuli as threatening, Cohen (1978, 103) draws on other scholars and develops the notion of "rules of the game", which he defines as "precepts of international law, international agreements, bilateral pacts, concepts such as those of sovereignty and spheres of influence, and other arrangements." With this notion, one can account for "the gravity attached by decision makers" to the interpretation of signs in the external environment with two explanations. One, by violating the rules, the behavior of the adversary had suddenly ceased to be predictable and two, that the adversary had abandoned all restraint in his actions and now aimed at a policy of domination and aggression (Cohen 1978, 101). Cohen (1979, 189) concludes that threat perception is, "the product of a deductive heuristic - a cognitive 'rule of thumb' - made use by decision-makers in situations of uncertainty about the intentions of other actors."

More recently, Keren Yarhi-Milo (2013, 8) has drawn attention to the internal factors (involving the *observer)* which induce the perception of threat such as cognitive, affective and organizational routines. According to Yarhi-Milo, civilian decision-makers infer intentions based

on "selective attention" rather than the adversary's capabilities or behavior. According to the selective attention thesis, decision makers interpret stimuli based on (1) prior expectations about the adversary, i.e. how much they distrust it and how strongly they believe its intentions are hostile; (2) their theories about the link between the adversary's behavior and its underlying characteristics; (3) and the "vividness" of the stimuli (Yarhi-Milo 2013, 11). Vividness, Yarhi-Milo follows Nisbett and Ross (1980, 45-41), denotes the "emotional interest of information, the concreteness and imaginability of information, and the sensory, spatial, and temporal proximity of information." Based on her empirical analysis, Yarhi-Milo (2013, 9) argues that, "individual perceptual biases and organizational interests and practices influence which types of indicators observers regard as credible signals of the adversary's intentions." Different actors at the sub-state level prioritize different indicators: intelligence organizations, for example, rely more on the adversary's capabilities than civilian decision-makers (Yarhi-Milo 2013, 9).

This thesis builds on the above-mentioned literature and aims to evaluate how Japanese sub-state actors inferred threat during the postwar period. Knorr's and Cohen's emphasis over the cognitive and psychological aspects of threat perception is useful because it considers the internal mechanisms that govern perceptions of threat as opposed to earlier studies which viewed threat-perception in terms of the adversary's capabilities, actions, statements or benefit. Likewise, the use of the concept of "rules of the game" to explain *why* threat is perceived is insightful. But even the work of these scholars does not exhaustively explain why some actions or events are perceived to be breaching the rules of the game while some do not, and how exactly actors infer threat from external stimuli. Likewise, while Yarhi-Milo's work sheds light on how leaders and the intelligence community evaluate threats, its scope is somewhat limited in terms of units-of-

analysis and empirical interest; it is in this context that I wish to situate the current inquiry.

'Military Threat Perception': Definition

Threat is a superordinate signifier, in the sense that it denotes more than one signified concept.[39] And so, there is a need to distinguish among these more specific meanings of the term. Based on the discussion above, this study revises the definition of 'threat' to account for 'military threat' in the following manner: 'A hostile human entity that has the capacity and intent to cause harm by military means to a valued referent object in the future through some sort of action, potential action, or inaction.'[40] Military threat perception, is,'the expectation that a hostile entity will harm a valued referent object (by military means) through some sort of threat-scenario. Threat perception is experienced in the present and conditioned by affective, behavioral-tendency, and cognitive dispositions.'[41] Subsequently, the term "military threat-scenario" is defined as,

> 'An action, potential action, inaction, or a situation involving human entity expected to harm a valued referent object by military means. The perception of Military threat- scenario is experienced in the present and conditioned by affective, behavioral-tendency, and cognitive dispositions. '

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[39] Often 'threat' is used interchangeably to denote an adversary, adversary's capability, scenario such as missile attack, condition such as religious extremism, or a process such as moral degradation or global warming.

[40] By "inaction", I mean a situation in which a hostile entity allows a third-party agent under its influence to to cause harm to the observer. In avoiding taking restraining action against the proxy agent, then, the entity indirectly harms the observer.

[41] This definition is based on Dean Pruitt's definition for "threat perception" and it denotes to perceptions of military-threats. Under a broader definition of the term 'threat', however, socio-political conditions or processes can also be considered. For example, Japan's leftist politicians have framed the US-Japan Security relationship as a 'threat' to Japan's peace and stability. Other issues such as international instability or environmental degradation are considered as threat too, just not as a military threat.

To continue the introduction of the main concepts used in this study, the next section discusses the concept of 'risk perception'.

1.3.4 Risk Perception

Because the perception of threat or a threat-scenario (an expectation of harm associated with a certain hostile entity or a situation) depends on the perception of risk (expectation of loss as a result of threat/threat-scenario affecting referent object), it is important - for analytical purpose - to distinguish between 'threat perception' and 'risk perception'. While the current study does not directly approach Japanese perceptions of *risk,* one can not talk about threat-perception without defining risk-perception. This section consists of two parts: the first introduces my conceptualization of 'military risk perception' and the second reviews the conceptual boundaries of the often-confusing terms 'threat perception' and 'risk perception'.

<u>'Military Risk': Operational Definition</u>

Unlike the perception of threat, which is focused on what an adversary might do, perception of risk is focused on expected outcomes after an exchange between an observer and adversary has been made. To define the concept of military risk perception, I suggest that it is,

> The expectation for loss, after taking into account risk decision, probability and consequence of a threat-scenario materializing in the future, as well as one's counter-measures and subsequent consequences. Risk perception is experienced in the present and conditioned by affective, behavioral-tendency, and cognitive dispositions".

Like threat, risk is a superordinate signifier, in the sense that it denotes more than one signified concept. Risk often denotes interchangeably a decision, probability, consequence, reflexive

danger and counter-measures. In order to limit such conceptual fuzziness, I propose to distinguish between the different functions that 'risk' has taken.

'Risk-Decision'

Risk decision is the *prioritization* of dangers as a result of an adversary exploiting a vulnerability to affect referent object in a negative manner. Such prioritization is ideally based on risk-probability, risk-consequence, and available risk-measures. [42]

'Risk-Probability'[43]

The perception of both military threat and military risk necessitates an expectation about a certain (deliberate) harm or loss. Probability refers to the extent to which a threat or threat-scenario will materialize. Different measures of probability exist; although the aim of this study is not to measure Japanese perceptions of threat/risk in terms of exact probability, I do pay attention to incidents in which official Defense White Papers or leading Japanese figures referred to the probability of threat-scenarios.

'Risk Consequence'

An entity or a situation may potentially harm a referent object in different ways. But exactly what *type* of consequence is an important aspect of the analysis of threat and risk, as the damage can take a physical form, as well as socio-economic, environmental, political or any combination of

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[42] In practice, however, 'Risk-decision', and here I follow Slovic, does not necessitates a mathematical, quantitative rationality. Logic and reason are important, but so does other factors such as emotions, behavioral tendencies and cognition.

[43] Although in statistics, 'probability' and 'likelihood' have different meanings, I use them both to denote a potential of occurrence of something.

these. Similarly, the *scale* of consequences also matters: it can range from limited geographical area to whole states/populations.

<u>'Risk-measure'</u>

'Risk-measure' is the proposed strategy to cope with future uncertainty. It is often based on a specific rationality, and is carried through by choosing a course of action(s) from available pool of resources and policy options that are normatively acceptable.

To sum-up the various sub-concepts that fall under 'risk', I argue that decision-makers perceive potential negative outcomes as a result of an adversary (a threat) exploiting vulnerability to affect referent object (risk perception), prioritize them (risk-decision), and formulate plans in order to manage these dangers (risk-measures). In turn, these measures create 'reflexive-risks' (Luhmann 1993, 29-31; Williamson 2014, 35). 'Reflexive risk' is the potential (negative) consequence of one's own risk-decisions and risk-measures.[44]

After establishing the overarching concept of 'risk' and its specific usages, it is now worthwhile to denote what risk is *not*. Risk is not the equivalent of a hostile entity, such as a state or terror organization. Risk is also *not* an assumed threat-scenario generated by one or more external entities such as nuclear war, external invasion, blockade, missile launch, or hostility in the vicinity of an actor (these sequence of events I define to be 'threat-scenario' as they substantially involve the 'other'). Risk is similarly not about things such as adversary's military weapons-technology or resources; to these I refer to as 'threat-components'. Risk is about the potential *loss* from threats, after weighing in factors such as probability, consequences, and one's

[44] The alliance dilemma of 'entrapment' vs. 'abandonment' is a classical example of 'reflexive risk' as it is often a result of a risk-measure taken by the actor itself in order to deal with a certain threat.

own available options. Risk perception is the expectation of potential loss as experienced in the present. Tables 3 and 4 present definitions for the concepts of 'perceptions of risk' and 'perception of threat', including their "sub-concepts".

Table 3: Perception of Risk **Definition**: The expectation of loss, after taking into account prioritization, probability and consequence of threat-scenario materializing in the future, as well as one's counter-measures and subsequent consequences. Risk perception is experienced in the present and conditioned by affective, behavioral-tendency, and cognitive dispositions			
Decision	**Probability**	**Consequence**	**Measure**
Identifying threats and prioritizing the most urgent potentials for loss of a referent object (s) by taking into account *probability* of threat-scenario, potential *consequences* and *cost* of measure	The extent to which loss is probable	Type and scale of expected damage	An attempt to cope with future uncertainty associated with threats by taking actions based on risk decisions and reflexive risks

Table 4: Perceptions of Threat **Definition:** The expectation that another entity will harm a valued referent object in the future (and by military means) through some sort of threat-scenario. Threat perception is experienced in the present and conditioned by affective, behavioral-tendency, and cognitive dispositions.		
Hostile Entity	**Threat Scenario**	**Threat Component**
Threat Perception necessitates a potential adversary and an inference about its intentions - that is, how dangerous it is: whether it is hostile, has high or low propensity to use force and would not hesitate to use it against the observer.	An action, potential action, inaction, or a situation involving human entities that is expected to harm a valued referent object by military means. Military threat-scenario is experienced in the present and conditioned by affective, behavioral-tendency, and cognitive dispositions'. (Missile attack, nuclear war between two actors, blockade)	An adversary's measure expected to be used in order to harm the observer.

The definitions of threat-perception and risk-perception give rise to several analytical issues which I tackle below. First, as a result of the recent interest in risk as part of the academic disciplines of ISS and IR, some confusion have arose; as Petersen (2011, 701) observes, "these risk studies aspire to say something about social and political life in general - not international relations [security] in particular." The discourse on risk, she continues, "aims to broaden the scope of security studies and to go beyond the classical lines of division between political science, sociology, and economics." But, as I have argued, *military* threats and risks are essentially different from, say, environmental ones, exactly because the intentional component is lacking in the latter category. As research into cognitive psychology has established, threats and risks which are associated with hostile intentions (such as nuclear weapons or terror) are judged to entail more danger than other issues. Two, if we accept the above-mentioned definitions for the terms 'threat-perception' and 'risk-perception' - which include references to capabilities, intentions, probabilities, and consequences, then essentially both concepts become an extension of each other. As Williamson (2014, 34; emphasis original) points out,

> A threat is surely located in what the enemy *might* do in the future. The capabilities are of no interest unless they *might* be *used*, and it is the outcome of their probable use which is the central concern...the enumeration of 'capabilities plus intent' is...an indirect way of saying 'probability plus magnitude of consequences'.

Williamson has correctly pointed out to confusion between 'threat' and 'risk' in the literature about security, claiming that, "the only clear distinction between 'threat' and 'risk' is that 'threat' may refer to an entity (e.g. the USSR) and therefore imply 'hostility' or an 'enemy' whereas

‘risk’ may only refer to an event (e.g. war with the USSR).” Risk, according to Williamson, is more “introspective” as oppose to threat which involves external entity (an ‘other’).[45]

I disagree with Williamson about three points. One, I take ‘threat’ to be equally introspective as one perceives ‘the other’ as a threat based on a subjective psychological attitude. Two, I argue that it is impossible to completely separate the concepts of ‘risk’ from ‘threat’ as risk actually incorporates threat. Considering the event of a war with the Soviet Union for example, then if we remove the source of threat (Soviet Union) from the equation, then there is no potential for loss, namely no ‘risk’. Hence, the perception of ‘risk’ in the context of military-security always implies the perception of ‘threat’. Three, different actors can frame the same scenario in terms of either ‘threat’ (the expectation that another entity will harm) or ‘risk’(the expectation of loss), depending on their *rationality* they prioritize.[46]

To conclude, the first chapter thus far surveyed the key concepts used in this study and drew the boundaries of these concepts: security, threat-perception and risk-perception. The perception of threat is closely related to concepts of security and risk-perception; however, in this study I do not address the latter concepts empirically but only in those places where it is necessary to do so in order to explain the patterns I identify in the data about Japanese perceptions of threat.

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[45] Williamson thereby proposes to view security in terms of, “generation of rationalities for decision-making rather than reaction to external factor”, largely discarding the construction of threat images and focusing on the concept of risk in his study of securitization in Japan between 1945 and 1960.

[46] Take the scenario of external Soviet invasion of Japan during the early stage of postwar period as an example. This scenario has been viewed both along the lines of ‘threat-scenario’ that originates externally and of introspective ‘risk-consequence‘ - as a result of Japan’s own actions, depending on the rationality of the actor.

1.4 Literature Review: Securitization Theory (ST), Japan's Security Culture, and Japanese Threat-Perceptions

This section reviews the relevant literature in four stages. First, I introduce the Securitization Theory which will be used as reference throughout the study. Second, I set the context of Japan's defense attitudes and behavior ("Japan's security culture") in the postwar period by discussing important studies. Third, I survey studies that directly deal with the subject of Japanese threat perceptions and fourth, I underline the main questions or issues yet to be resolved in the literature.

1.4.1 Securitization Theory

Associated with the work of the "Copenhagen School" (CS), the Securitization Theory (ST) which emerged in the 1990s made an important contribution to the field of ISS.[47] The ST draws on Carl Schmitt's work about the "state of exception", and posits that security concerns may be used by various actors as a pretext to suspend the normal procedures of politics (such as legal restrictions or bureaucratic procedures). The process of securitization necessitates the involvement of both a *securitizing actor* - "who makes the claim that a particular object of value (referent object) is facing an existential threat" - and an *audience*, "which must agree...that the referent object is a thing of value and that it is existentially threatened in the way that the securitizing agent claims" (Hayes 2012, 66). The use of the term existential here is critical in order to "have a criteria by which to avoid a slippery slope of everything is security" (Buzan et. al. 1998, 71). In other words, securitizing an issue involves both a claim that the survival of a

[47] Originally introduced by Ole Waever, the Securitization theory was further developed by Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Waever himself in their book "*Security: A New Framework for Analysis"* (1998).

referent object is at stake - whether it is the state in the military sector, sovereignty or ideology in the political sector, national bankruptcy in the economic sector, nation or religion in the societal sector, specie of whales or a water source in the environmental sector - and a claim to the legitimacy of its survival. Indeed, in particular sectors (specifically the economical, societal and environmental) it is often "extremely difficult to establish hard boundaries that differentiate existential from lesser threats" (Buzan et. al. 1998: 23). However, although difficult, it is possible to construct problems in existential terms (Buzan et al. 1998:23).

CS scholars also identified an opposite process to that of securitization which they termed "de-securitization", i.e., "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (Buzan et al. 1998, 4). The ST further advances three facilitating conditions that affect the likelihood of successful securitization (Buzan et al. 1998, 33). The first highlights the rules of the security language, i.e., whether terminology such as 'existential threat', 'point of no return' or 'possible solution' is being employed by the securitizing actor. Subsequently, the ST holds that the making of a threat is done by an illocutionary "speech act" intersubjectively uniting securitizing agent and audience.[48] The second facilitating condition emphasizes the socio-political resources of the securitizing actor and its relationship with the audience. The third facilitating condition focuses on specific characteristics of external objects which deemed as threatening, such as "tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters"; these distinctive features can either enable or hinder securitization (Buzan et al. 2003, 33).

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[48] I would like to thank Ulrik Pam Grad for pointing this out. One of the theory's original pillars is the notion of illocutionary 'speech act', according to which, by saying the words, something is being done (Austin 1962; Waever 1995, 55). Other options for 'speech act' may be 'locutionary (it simply says something), and 'perlocutionary (it affects a change in the listener). See: Balzacq 2005, 175. Later accounts of the Securitization Theory, however, replaced the notion of speech-act with the concept of 'discursive process'.

The study of securitization asks "when does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed" (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). As such, the process of securitization is viewed by CS theorists as an extreme form of politicization. Since for CS theorists any public issue can be traced on the spectrum from non-politicized (the issue is not treated by any social actor) through politicized (the issue is up for debate) to securitized, securitization of an issue is always a political choice (Buzan et al. 1998, 29). Practically, however, choices of securitization deviate substantially from state to state as well as across time; while some states securitize religion (Iran, Saudi-Arabia), some do not (France, the US); while some securitize culture (the former USSR, Iran), some do not (the UK, the Netherlands, see: Buzan et al. 1998, 24).

Criticism

The ST - as initially advanced by the Copenhagen School with its emphasis on language, discourse, and the speech act - has generated much interest among scholars and naturally, criticism. Thierry Balzacq suggests to differentiate between a "philosophical" variant of securitization, as represented by the work of CS scholars like Waever, and a "sociological" variant of the theory. According to Balzack (2010, 1-2), whereas the former approach views securitization of threats as a deliberative, discursive, and performative process, the latter variant considers securitization as either deliberative or non-deliberative, discursive or non-discursive, performative but not necessarily limited to the "speech act". Other scholars (McDonald 2008, 573; Stritzel 2007,363) have pointed out that the role of the audience in the securitization process has been under-conceptualized and so, if and when exactly a securitization has occurred - that is,

an audience agreed to the securitizing move - is difficult to assess. Others (Salter 2008) maintain that securitization is not universal across audiences and actors but that it actually varies according to the social setting; that the concept of "existential" is ambiguous as it does not stipulate the anticipated damage to the referent object - whether it necessitates "annihilation of a unit, or only a qualitative change which would nevertheless alter the existence of that unit " (Williamson 2014, 35); and that there is a need to elaborate on the type of extra-ordinary means advocated by the securitizing actor (Balzack 2010, 16-18).

Still, I find the ST and the model it provides useful when examining threat-perceptions. This is so because it links the three basic pillars of security - threats, referent objects, and risk-measures. Moreover, the emphasis of the ST over the semiotics of language goes hand in hand with my attempt to explore the psychological mechanisms behind the phenomenon: language, to recall, provides a window to the human mind (Pinker 2007).

1.4.2 Postwar Japan's Security Culture

Scholars have struggled to explain Japan's postwar national security culture in terms of attitude and behavior (or policy). The majority of scholarly works on these subjects can be roughly classified along the lines of two schools of thought in IR, namely, adherents of Realism and Social Constructivism ('realism' and 'constructivism' hereafter).[49] Simply put, while realist accounts explain security behavior (foreign or security policies) with material factors, constructivist accounts emphasize the role of non-material factors such as ideas, institutions and

[49] Under the term "Realist" I consider scholars often associated with other strands of realist such as Kenneth Waltz (neorealism).

norms.[50] This section begins by dissecting realist and constructivist (often implicit) contribution to the study of Japanese threat perceptions by introducing some of the most cited studies; Table 5 presents works dealing with Japanese security with more than 350 citations.[51]

Table 5: Works on Japan's National Security with More Than 350 Citations (Source Google Scholar)

Author(s)	Study	Year	Citations
T. U. Berger	"Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan"	1998	536
T. U. Berger	"Norms, Identity, and National Security"	2014	360
R. J. Samuels	"Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan"	1996	372
R. J. Samuels	"Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia"	2011	357
M. J. Green	"Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power"	2003	407
P. J. Katzenstein	Book: "Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan"	1996	618
P. J. Katzenstein	Article: The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics	2006	2600

The realist school views Japan's foreign and defense policies in the postwar era as a result of a rational, deliberate effort to deal with an anarchic world and security threats by adopting various means. Jennifer Lind (2004) presents a classical realist view and argues that in the postwar period, Japanese strategists adopted a low-cost strategy of "buck-passing", which meant that although consecutive governments acknowledged moderate external threat(s) during the early

[50] In practice however, the division between both schools is not as clear-cut, with many of the studies actually incorporating diverse elements and themes.

[51] Number of citations was last modified on March 29, 2016, and was confirmed via the Google Scholar search engine.

stage of the Cold War, they preferred to "pass" the responsibility of dealing with it to a third-party, the US, so that they could concentrate on economic reconstruction and growth. The balance of power between the US and USSR and the subsequent level of external threat to Japan, as well as the level of US commitment to defend Japan are taken to be crucial factors in explaining Japan's security policy-choices. Likewise, Japan's diluted "buck passing" strategy from the early 1980s (and the subsequent enhancement of its security apparatus) is explained as a result of a rational calculation of lower US commitment to defend its allies and higher "objective" levels of perceived Soviet threat generated by the shifting global balance of power toward the Soviet Union (Lind 2004). [52]

Another characteristic of the realist camp is the anticipation that Japan would eventually "re-militarize", "normalize", and reassert its position in the international arena (Layne 1993, 41-5; Waltz 1993, 61-70). Thus, heightened perceptions of threat in the post-Cold War period are often considered to be devices - to some degree or another - used by elites to advance their militaristic aspirations (Hughes 2009).

In sum, realist accounts have highlighted factors such as systemic structure and incentives, long-term interests, and rational strategic-choices made by both Japanese and

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[52] Scholars writing about Japanese foreign and security policies during the postwar period tend to disagree about the utility of these policies. While some argue that these policies were managed in a passive, reactive manner (Calder 1988), with its leaders unwilling to take risks (Blaker 1993), others evaluate them as more sophisticated. In her research concerning Japan's foreign policy, Susan Pharr for example claims that Japanese strategy is characterized by low cost, low risk, benefit-maximizing elements that has served national interest extraordinarily well (1993, 235). Other studies dealing with Japan's risk-measures emphasize strategic hedging (Hughes 2004; Daniels 2004; Samuels 2007a). Samuels (2007, 198) for example, has argued that as any other midsize power, Japan is prone to be ensuring against risk. This strategic hedging often encompasses "mutually inconsistent" goals and can be traced in numerous formal statements and reports, such as the one formulated by the Araki Commission in 2004. In it, Japan was advised to follow a strategy that "pursue self-help, alliance cooperation, and international citizenship", all at the same time (Samuels 2007a, 199).

American leadership as crucial in explaining Japan's security behavior (Chapman et al. 1983; Inoguchi 1998; Samuels 2003; Pyle 2007). Most of these realist-leaning studies - with few exceptions discussed below - tend to deal with "Japan" as a unitary actor seeking to preserve its self-interest and maximize its achievements. To follow, a brief review of the constructivist contribution is offered.

Unlike realists, scholars associated with the constructivist paradigm have emphasized the predominance of domestic sources of identity and norms in shaping Japan's security trajectory (and by extrapolation, its perceptions of threat). Among these sources are "institutionalized norms" (Katzenstein 1996); attitudes of *anti-militarism* (Berger 1993, 1996, 1998) and *anti-nuclearism* (Hook 1996). In *Cultural Norms and National Security,* Peter J. Katzenstein tackles Japan's reluctance to use physical violence to maintain both domestic and international security during the postwar era. In his discussion of Japan's domestic-constraints on its security policy, Katzenstein (1996, 124-29) examines three policy outcomes: the GNP 1 percent ceiling on Japan's defense expenditure, overseas dispatch of troops, and the three non-nuclear principles. Katzenstein (1996, 204) concludes that Japan's security behavior is mostly a result of its domestic structures and predicts that, "Japan's security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international balance of power" . In *Culture of Antimilitarism,* Thomas U. Berger (1998) traces the evolvement of "political-military culture" in postwar Japan, making the case for incorporating intangible social and psychological forces into the analysis of security policies. Berger (1998, 3-5) argues that the strong aversion to the use of force in Japan can not be thoroughly explained by neither unique features of historical experience, nor geo-political/ strategic factors, nor the role of US as a security provider. Instead, he highlights (1998, 6) the social meaning assigned by sub-state actors to their "troubled past" and the lessons they have

generated from it. External demands to re-militarize, Berger suggests, triggered intense political debates in the early postwar period; these political debates then operated to consolidate anti-militaristic sentiments among the society at large.[53] These anti-militaristic sentiments were then embedded through legislation and institutions designed at confining the military establishment, further inhibiting policy initiatives that sought more proactive security policy by generating resistance from socio-political actors to such initiatives.

Berger's analysis provides a fine context for this study. But since his interest lies in Japan's "political-military culture", which he defines as the, "subset of the larger historical-political culture that encompasses orientations related to defense, security, the military as an institution, and the use of force in international affairs", the scope of his work is broad. Subsequently he does not elaborate on how exactly these domestic factors conditioned Japanese perceptions of threat. In addition, Berger's account of the struggle between different sub-state actors to interpret the past, a struggle which according to him was, "guided by a combination of self-interest and ideology", leaves psychological and attitudinal factors under-explored. Glen D. Hook underlines the role of anti-militaristic and anti-nuclear attitudes in explaining general opposition to military build-up, arguing that "mass attitudes have been of crucial significance in constraining the normalization of the military as a legitimate instrument of state power" (1996, 8). Hook identifies two contradictory processes that occurred simultaneously in postwar Japan: first, "the demilitarization of the state and society", and second, the "remilitarization of the state within a bilateral alliance relationship"; he then explores how these dual processes have shaped Japan's defense policy (1996, 3). Hook's analysis and his emphasis on political rhetoric and language is full of insights; but his analysis, too, does not directly comment on threat

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[53] Berger traces the consolidation of these anti-militarist sentiments to the early 1960s, after PM Kishi Nobusuke had to resign over the extension of the US-Japanese security alliance (1998, 10).

perceptions.

Constructivist scholars have a tendency to underplay the dis-continuities in Japan's security culture.[54] Both Katzenstein (1996) and Berger (1998) maintain that Japan's normative and cultural inclinations against militarism throughout the second half of the 20th century have remained rather constant. "Generational effects", concludes Katzenstein (1996, 116), "have been rather small...the end of the Cold War did not lead to great changes...Japan's antimilitarist social norms have been remarkably stable." Similarly, Berger asserts that, "the same antimilitary themes and rhetoric that were prevalent in the 1950s continue to be voiced in the 1990" (1998, 194). On the other hand, Hook (1996, 3) acknowledges that during the 1980s and early 1990s, "the complex interactions between popular attitudes, state structure and external pressures led to the erosion of certain anti-militaristic constraints." More recently, Vosse, Drifte and Blechinger-Talcott's edited volume "Governing insecurity in Japan: the domestic discourse and policy response" and specifically the chapters written by Vosse and Midford testify to the prevalence of relatively high perceptions of threat in domestic discourse but argue along similar lines that anti-militarist values and fear of military conflicts continue to act as a check against more assertive security behavior.

Toward a Coherent Account of Japan's Post War Security Culture?

Both realist and constructivist insights are relevant to the study of Japan's national security

[54] Other critics have made additional counter-arguments. Robert Jervis has written that constructivism fails to explain how norms, identities and interests are formed and defined in the first place, and have little predictive power in anticipating future IR (Jervis 1998, 976). Andrew Moravcsik has argued that ideas "constantly float around" and hence the attempt to make sense of these often contradictory variables is futile (Saurugger 2013, 901-2). Finally political psychologists point out that constructivists' focus on system level factors such as rules, norms and ideas fail to address individual psychology and call attention to the role of individual leaders in policy-making and international politics in general (Levy 2013, 1-3).

(Soeya 1998, 199), in-so-far as they point out to several factors that illuminate the phenomenon of threat-perception in Japan. But scholars among and across both camps still disagree on the interpretation of the "evidence" about Japan's security culture.[55] Moreover, neither account is sufficient to explain the empirical findings concerning Japanese perceptions of threat.

More recently, an integrative approach to the study of Japan's national security can be found in the work of Kenneth B. Pyle (2007) and Richard J. Samuels (2007a; 2007b). Both scholars attach relative importance to the sub-state level of analysis and examine the domestic discourse about security along external developments. They offer a synthesis of both rationalist and constructivist elements and examine Japan's security culture in a historical perspective. Kenneth B. Pyle (2007, 33) argues that, "a nation's style springs in part from intrinsic factors of geography and the nation's natural endowments." Both natural (objective) conditions and cultural traits influence the way elites view and operate in the world. Japan's modern behavior, with its core traits being independence, self-reliance and uniqueness - rests on its premodern history, geographical isolation and "distinctive strategic culture". Pyle (2007, 23) observes that Japanese elites had long been sensitive to "fundamental changes" in the international environment, and that since its modern history, marked by the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1953 and the subsequent Meiji Restoration, Japanese elites have maintained a realistic, opportunistic thinking, "with respect to power...and its pursuit of status and autonomy." Pyle (1992) further observes that

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[55] And so, Japan's risk-measures such as rising defense expenditures from the late 1970s are interpreted by some as "dramatic" military build up (Lind 2004, 115), and by others as comparatively "modest", incompatible with Japan's economic might (Kawasaki 2001, 222). Those who view Japan's security policy outcomes as limited often seek to explain the anomaly between Japan's potential and actual military might in the postwar period by pointing to the persistence of domestic constraints such as anti-militaristic norms, institutions, or culture. On the other hand, those who emphasize Japan's military build-up tend to explain the same anomaly in terms of a rationally guided strategy which aims at hedging against a wide range of security threats.

Japanese grand strategy had long centered on what Japan perceived to be the world's dominant power: The Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States.

Like Pyle, numerous scholars have pointed out to lines of continuities between past and present-day opinions concerning Japan's grand strategy (Mochizuki 1983; Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; 67 Samuels 2007a, 2007b). As Samuels (2007a, 131) puts it, "Much like their predecessors....Japanese security planners now discuss and make choices about the balance between maritime and continental power, between economic and military instruments, between hard and soft power, among alliance partners, and for or against construction of multilateral security regimes." Samuels (2007a, 6) sets to connect these "ideological dots", emphasizing two national objectives that stand unbroken at the "heart of Japan" (and any other nation): autonomy and prestige. These objectives, in turn, entail two values, strength and wealth. But what makes Japanese security culture so unique? are these traits particular to the Japanese case, or can be found among other nations? it seems that here Pyle and Samuels represent two different opinions, a reflection of the old "*nihonjinron*" debate. For Pyle, Japan demonstrates a unique case, similar to that of Galapagos islands in terms of its rare isolation from the outside world; Japan's strategic culture is therefore viewed by him as hyper-sensitive to external forces. For Samuels (2007a, 6) however, Japan's strategic culture is essentially similar to that of other countries. But Samuels, too, seems to acknowledge that, "Japan has evolved a 'strategic culture' and a national identity in which vulnerability [*fuan*] has long been a central feature."[56]

Considering the issue of military threat perception, then, Japan scholars identify patterns

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[56] This study follows the stance articulated so well by social psychologist Mita Munesuke (2011, xviii), that wrote, "There has been much argument as to whether Japanese culture is 'unique'. My answer is, yes and no. Certainly it is unique, but uniqueness is not unique to Japan. Every culture on earth is unique, respectively and respectably. I stand against the ethno-centrists who advocate the 'uniqueness' of Japanese, and only Japanese, culture. I also stand against those 'universalists' who are blind to uniqueness, and hence to the difficulties of understanding different cultures."

of realist thinking among its elites (Pyle), vulnerability as a central feature (Samuels) and a strong aversion to the military and armed forces (Katzentstein, Berger, and Hook). What about perceptions of military security threats? The next section surveys the literature about Japanese perceptions of threat and identifies gaps in it.

1.4.3 Japanese Threat Perceptions

Few scholars have studied Japanese threat perceptions in depth. This section introduces two studies on early postwar (Williamson 2014) and contemporary Japanese perceptions of threat (Hoest 2016).

The most relevant account, both empirically and theoretically, of Japanese security discourse in the period between 1945 and 1960 was authored by Peirs R. Williamson (2014). In his book, Williamson outlines the risk rationalities as held by Japan's conservative politicians on the one hand, and Japan's progressive intellectuals and peace movement activists on the other.[57] Williamson (2014, 6) argues for example that the attempt to deal with the primary risks of economic stagnation and communist influence in the end of the 1940s has prompted both the American and the Japanese leadership to embrace the 'reverse course', and to conclude the 1951 Peace and Security Treaties. Similarly, he asserts that progressive intellectuals advocated for unarmed neutrality and de-securitization, rendering the scenario of nuclear war to be graver than

[57] Williamson demonstrates how policy makers were employing logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness in their production of key documents such as the preamble to the Constitution and article 9, the 1951 Security Treaty, the 1954 SDF Law, the 1957 Basic Policy on National Defense and the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty as well as in their attempt to persuade their audiences (the general public). Similarly, he analyzes public statements made by progressive intellectuals in terms of both logics among which were the "Statement on War and Peace by Japanese Scientists (March 1949), the "Statement on the Peace Treaty Problem by the Peace Issues Discussion Group (PIDG, in March 1950), and the "On Peace, for the Third Time" (December 1950).

did the policy makers, "who were relatively sanguine about the Japanese state's involvement in a showdown between the US and USSR." The result of this threat assessment, in Williamson words, "was that, whereas the policymakers pursued securitization based on the use of military force to prevent the risk of a war they viewed as improbable, the progressive intellectuals pursued de-securitization through rejection of the use of military force to prevent the risk of a war viewed as probable. For the Peace Issues Discussion Group (PIDG), the policymakers' risk-prevention measures drastically increased that probability" (Williamson 2014, 186, 192). Theoretically, Williamson (2014, 188) calls to incorporate the concept of risk in addition to threat in the study of securitization, claiming that "The overwhelming focus on the threat rationality of the Cold War has masked the significant role which risk played in the securitization process in Japan between 1945 and 1960."

Williamson's emphasis on the manner in which sub-state actors construct risk rationality as they struggle for power is insightful, and so is his use of ST to shed light on the security discourse in early postwar Japan. But his empirical disregard of 'threat' and the conceptual equation of 'risk' with 'threat-scenario' is unwarranted.[58] Indeed, during the early postwar period domestic actors avoided framing external entities as military threats, but this does not mean that the perception of threat as an analytical concept should be discarded in analyzing security in immediate postwar Japan. On the contrary; the lack of socio-political attention to hostile entities in this period calls for further examination. I aim to fill the gap created by Williamson's disregard for 'threat' by examining the phenomenon of threat perception in the early postwar period.

The second study surveyed here is Peter Van Der Hoest's doctoral dissertation which deals with Japanese and Indian threat perceptions of China between 1996 and 2014. Although the

[58] For a discussion of this point, please see section 1.3 in chapter 1.

empirical focus differs from the current study in terms of the period covered, Hoest's analytical framework and especially his typology of threats provides an excellent reference. Titled, "De-constructing the "China Threat": an inquiry into changing perceptions in India And Japan", Hoest's study (2016, 11) aims to, "contribute to the understanding of how different factors affect threat perceptions." Similar to the stance of this study, Hoest pays attention to the inter-subjective dimension of threat-perceptions, and to the vulnerabilities of the observer. Hoest (2016, 12) highlights three variables as potential sources for fluctuations in the perceptions of a Chinese threat: China's military capability, "escalatory" foreign policy behavior, and feeling of common identity.[59] Based on these three variables, Hoest (2016, 12-15) puts forward three propositions (which he calls 'material', 'behavioral', and 'ideational'): (a) The more China becomes militarily capable of harming others, the more threatening it will be perceived; (b) The more China acts in an escalatory, non-compromising way, the more threatening it will be perceived; (c) The more China is defined as a significant other, the more threatening it will be perceived. Having tested these three hypotheses, Hoest concludes that it is the second proposition which best determines changing perceptions of threats; the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1996), the Senkaku Islands disagreement about oil and gas (2005), and later about the sovereignty of the islands (2012) generated "significant discursive changes" among Japanese elites.

Hoest's analysis is insightful as it sheds light on the mechanism used by the observer to judge external entities as threats. Specifically, his (2016, 203) assertion that China's escalatory foreign policy behavior from 2009 was framed in Japan, "in terms of its dispositional factors and

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[59] By "escalatory" Hoest means "acts that are perceived to alter the status quo and that, despite prompting the concerns of others, are not retracted, negotiated, or compromised. By the third factor of identity, Hoest means "differentiation of self and other based on "personality traits", such as regime type, nationalism, and values. See: Hoest 2016, 13.

less as a result of situational factors" is convincing.[60] Hoest's study (2016, 16) is also insightful in terms of the three-level typology of threat-perceptions that it proposes and the different rhetorics employed in each of the categories. But while he acknowledges variation of threat perceptions "among different political actors within the state" (2016, 11), Hoest focuses (2016, 16) on "policy elites" which he essentially equates with the Japanese state. The public is therefore not incorporated into the analysis. Likewise, his analysis of the China threat discourse by employing a simple content analysis falls short of an in-depth examination of the manner in which China was *framed* by various actors (Hoest 2016, 177-178). Finally, Hoest's conclusion regarding the importance of the behavior of a potential adversary in the inference process of threat is supported by this study's findings, Hoest does not explain what type of behavior or events are especially prone to be perceived as threatening. I aim to do just that.

1.4.4 The Space this Study Aims to Fill

This study tackles the following gaps in the literature: first, I aim to collect and analyze new longitudinal data about Japanese perceptions of threat among four units of analysis and across three case-studies. By examining the time, context, intensity and distribution of threat perceptions, I hope to, first, offer a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon in postwar Japan; second, to determine whether military-security issues were securitized in postwar Japan; and third, to identify what type of stimuli different actors selected and how exactly did they infer

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[60] This study offers additional evidence to support this statement, extending it even further ; as chapter 6 finds, *Yomiuri* editorials framed Soviet foreign policy behavior in the late 1970s and early 1980s primarily as a result of situational factors; this was in line with their stance against the securitization of the Soviet military threat during this period. Likewise, *Yomiuri* editorials framed the Soviet behavior after 1983 in terms of dispositional factors rather than situational.

threat (or no threat) from the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. By doing so, this study aims to further explore the internal/psychological mechanisms which inform the perception of threat.

1.5 Methodology

The reasoning used in this study is induction. That is, this study first compiles and explores relevant data, then identifies patterns in it and finally formulates explanations that would link back to the research question and relevant theories. In line with its epistemological stance, this study is not a causal study in the sense that it does not attempt to find a causal relationship between two measurable variables. The phenomenon at hand is too complex to be reduced into a straight-forward causal relationship and therefore, the chosen methodology is eclectic and pragmatic; a qualitative research design that combines different methods depending on the research question and units of analysis being explored.[61]

Dimensions of Inquiry

Any social phenomenon can be studied in three dimensions: the objective, subjective and inter-subjective dimensions.

At the objective dimension, perception of threat can be studied by examining observable outcomes associated with it such as military-contingency planning, military deployment or diplomatic initiatives aimed at dealing with the perceived threat.

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[61] Similar to the methodological position of Robert Jervis in his seminal work on perceptions and misperceptions in international politics, this study uses an eclectic approach: rather than applying one theory, I choose to draw on concepts, ideas, and theories of ISS, politics psychology, risk perception, media and sociology. As Jervis (1976, 6) noted, "Mixing incommensurable theories or incompatible assumptions, and failing to do justice to the theories themselves...the...danger is outweighed by the dual advantages of gaining a wider variety of insights and greater confidence in our explanations by finding that they are supported by theories in such different realms."

Threat perception can also be studied in its subjective dimension, by drawing attention to the internal mechanisms that operate to assign attention to certain stimuli and not to others, to select and interpret signs in the external environment. Although experienced subjectively inside one's mind hence implicit in nature, it is possible to evaluate the subjective dimension of threat-perception indirectly through self-reports, private statements, declassified documents and policy recommendations (Yarhi-Milo 2009, 18-19), as well as through rhetoric.

In addition to the objective and subjective dimensions, threat perception can also be studied in its inter-subjective dimension, where it is experienced *between* minds and is given social meaning. Naturally, theories that focus on the intersubjective dimension of security such as the ST and the analytical tools they put forward offer some guidance to the manner in which threats are communicated in a certain socio-political community. Similarly, methods such as Content Analysis and Media-Framing analysis enable the researcher to identify the representations of threat-perception among people and to explore both their explicit and more delicate meanings. This study integrates aspects of all three dimensions but is mostly interested in making a contribution to the knowledge concerning the subjective dimension.

1.5.1 Units of Analysis

This section defines the four units of analysis examined in this study.

<u>Defense Establishment</u>

By "defense establishment" I mean military and civilian officials that share organizational responsibility to defend Japan *militarily* vis-à-vis external threats or to evaluate Japan's security policy options. Among these are the three branches of the SDF and the Joint Staff Council (JSC),

bureaucrats in charge of military and security issues in the JDA/MOD and the National Defense Council (NDC).[62]

Political Establishment

By political establishment, I mean Japan's political leadership including the highest officials of state (Prime Ministers), the government, and all the major political parties represented in the Diet and which take part in the domestic political conversation regrading military-security threats.[63] Among these the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), along with its *kokubozoku/boeizoku*, the Japan Communist Party (JCP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP, now the SDP), Kōmeitō, Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), and other political representatives that took part in the political discourse about threats.

The Media

The media is a prominent actor in shaping perceptions of threat as media outlets report on stimuli, frame it in one way or the other and make judgements on it. As media involves the presentation of information - often in a vivid or visual way - it also posses the ability to greatly influence the attitudinal components associated with a certain dangerous entity or situation (ABC model). One influential media outlet was chosen and a longitudinal framing analysis examined

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[62] The defense industry in Japan, is also an important factor in the military security complex but is not part of the current analysis.

[63] Politicians are people who are being paid for their political activities, and who are being elected or appointed for various roles in the polity. That being said, politicians are not the only participants in the domain of politics, with intellectuals, business leaders, the general public and other actors highly involved in both national and international politics. See: van Dijk 1997, 13.

the manner in which the Soviet, Chinese and North Korean military threats were represented in *Yomiuri Shinbun* editorials over a period of nearly five decades.

The General Public

The public is a an important unit of analysis in the study of threat perceptions as it provide the context for both securitization and de-securitization moves of external military threats by various actors.[64] While this study does not attempt to evaluate the role of public attitudes in shaping perceptions of military threats, it is interested in assessing the distribution of danger-judgements among the public. As a democracy, Japanese lawmakers are held accountable to their public; since the end of the World War leaders have been very sensitive to public criticism and approval. Here I will mainly use public opinion surveys.

Finally, although perceptions of threat may vary between the different organizations, bureaus and individuals that constitute any of these four units of analysis, some degree of generalization is necessary in order to evaluate security attitudes. Since the purpose of this study is not to provide a mere description of all possible danger-judgments available out there, but rather to offer the best measure for the phenomenon of threat-perception, attention must be given to only those that matter more than others.

1.5.2 The Case Study

[64] Various scholars argue that Japanese public attitudes matter (Katzentesin 1996, 39), that they are well-informed, coherent, and resistant to influence from both domestic actors such as the media or political elites as well as from external events (Midford 2011). Rather than pacifist attitudes, Midford asserts, Japanese public attitudes are in line with defensive realism, since the public both supports the SDF as "the guardian of national territory" and holds the utility of the use of offensive force to be low (2011, 171-193). Similar to constructivists logic, Midford suggests that these beliefs come from Japan's dire experience of militarism in the 1940s.

The basic method I employ is the case study. A form of qualitative descriptive research, the case study examines a specific phenomenon at a specific context. As such, it does not attempt to generalize theories or find a cause-effect relationship; emphasis is placed instead on exploration and description, on investigating the why and how of the phenomenon of perception of military threat.[65]

The case study's shortcoming lies in its ability to generalize its findings. To tackle this weakness, I introduce three case studies: the Soviet military threat (early postwar period and late postwar period), the Chinese case (early postwar period), and the North-Korean case (late postwar period). By using a cross-sectional, longitudinal research design, I am able to draw comparisons based on the empirical findings and to arrive at several interesting conclusions.

1.5.3 Sources and Data

This section presents the sources, data, and the specific methods I used to collect and interpret data. Generally, two types of data were collected in this study: macro and micro. I elaborate on these two types below.

At the macro level, I traced the evolution of Japan's official security policy with its organizing doctrines such as the Yoshida doctrine and Comprehensive Security, as well as key documents published by MOFA and JDA/MOD such as the Diplomatic Bluebook, NDPO and defense plan. Also at the macro level, I looked for long-term patterns in the discourse about military-security threats by extensively using the Diet online archive, counting expressions related to military threats across time; I also looked at election results and public opinion surveys

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[65] Colorado State University."Writing Guides". Accessed August 2, 2016. http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/page.cfm?pageid=1285

about security in order to identify shifts in the domestic political climate. These data enabled me to identify threat-perceptions as part of the national discourse about security and to determine how threats were framed, by whom, and what risk-measure were adopted to counter them.

At the micro level, this study analyzed "oral history" interviews conducted with former influential military and defense personnel; policy speeches made by Japan's Prime Ministers at the opening of Diet sessions in two distinctive periods (the early postwar years and the late 1970s and early 1980s). In addition, this study identified media representations of state-based threats in Japan's leading newspaper, the *Yomiuri Shinbun*[66]; drew on studies that conducted ample interviews with key figures in defense and foreign policy-making and examined declassified documents from both Japan and the US such as the National Intelligence Estimates published by the CIA and the unclassified National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM). These data enable me to explore the sources of threat-perception in each of the units of analysis; it also allowed me to determine what indicators actors use to infer threats and whether military threats were securitized in Japan during the period between 1951 - 2000. Both the macro (policy / discourse) and micro levels were then combined together, in what allowed me to determine what factors enabled / hindered the securitization of military security issues as well as the *intensity* and *distribution* of threat-perceptions. Finally, the inquiry of three case studies facilitated a more

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[66] Although discourse and verbal communication are typically associated with the micro-level in Sociology, their analysis reveals much about the society and its politics as a whole. While translating and analyzing this collection, I payed special attention to commentary related to threat perceptions such as military training, planning, and acquisition, as well as to direct commentary about perceptions of the military security threats. Since several decades have passed since the actual events, and since those interviewed no longer serve in the defense establishment, it is possible to assume that they would be willing to express their honest feelings and thoughts about military-security issues, including perceptions of threat. On the down side, the time factor can also obscure interviewees' memory of events and images of past reality; the fact that each interviewee had gone through several and separate interviews may have minimized this potentially negative impact.

holistic interpretation of the phenomenon at hand. To follow, I explain about the specific methods used for data-collection and interpretation for each unit of analysis.

Defense Establishment

Data related to perceptions of threat among the defense establishment was collected from the Diet online-archive; defense figures frequently articulated their judgement and concerns about episodes of potentially threatening stimuli in the Diet. Since the "real" threat-assessment of the defense officials may have been different from what they articulate in public (due to the general taboo on military issues during the early stage of postwar or due to other military-security calculations), I also explored perceptions of threat among the defense establishment "behind the scenes". Such an attempt was made by using a collection of "oral history" interviews with former military and defense officials. This collection, known in Japanese as, "*Ōraru Histori: Reisenki no bōeiryoku seibi to dōmeiseisaku*" [Oral History: Military Buildup and Alliance Policy during the Cold War] is a part of a project run by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) in which repeated interviews were conducted with each interviewee in order to create thick descriptions of real events and issues related to Japan's defense.[67] Finally, I drew on secondary literature that made use of ample documents and interviews with Japanese defense officials, such as the works of Kawasaki (2001), Sebata (2010) and Sasaki (2015). Since processing secondary literature has certain risks in terms of the loyalty to the original data, I limited its use to direct quotes by Japanese defense officials.

Political Establishment

[67] Oral History is a method aimed at creating rich accounts of historical events as experienced and interpreted by people who were directly involved in that event.

Data related to perceptions of threat among the political establishment was collected from the Diet online-archive which enables the researcher to trace all references to a specific word or combination of words and retrieve the exact proceedings of the deliberation. All data related to references of an issue in the Diet was compiled by the author by using the database of the National Diet Archives, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ and by searching for record in both houses of the Diet (unless mentioned otherwise). Since the minutes of both open and close deliberations are image-based, the possibility of mistakes exists. That is why I opted for a longitudinal analysis that covers one issue across time. In addition to Diet deliberations, this study investigated Japanese perceptions of threat as framed in Japanese PM policy speeches (*shisei hōshin enzetsu)*. Japanese Prime Ministers deliver policy speeches (*shisei hōshin enzetsu)* at the opening of both ordinary and extra-ordinary Diet sessions.[68]

PM policy speeches draw extensive media and public attention, and can therefore illuminate the political communication between political elites, media and the general public surrounding specific issues such as security threats. For this reason, these speeches are also heavily informed by political-strategic calculations and should be critically evaluated. Still, followed by thematic speeches of diplomacy, financial and economic affairs delivered by the respective ministers, the PM policy speeches enables the researcher to gauge Japanese attitudes toward military security because they set the stage for political action, frame security issues, and provide the context and policy-direction of the administration for the current Diet session. Chapter 2 examines seven policy speeches given by Yoshida Shigeru; the speeches were given between December 1949 and January 1951. Chapter 3 samples seven policy speeches delivered by Prime Ministers Fukuda Takeo, Ōhira Masayoshi, Suzuki Zenkō and Nakasone Yasuhiro at

[68] The custom of delivering Policy Speeches began in July 1947. Policy Speeches at the beginning of extra-ordinary Diet session were launched in June, 1953.

the opening of the Diet sessions between 1978 and 1983. That is, 14 policy speeches were sampled in total.

In addition to Diet archives and policy speeches, I examined the US National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection, and other declassified materials such as National Intelligence Estimate, and "United States Forces, Japan Command History" document. I also made use of secondary literature and specifically studies that incorporate large number of foreign-policy related documents and interviews with policy-makers, such as Kimura (2000a; 2000b), Hasegawa (1998) and Ito (1990). Like the approach to secondary literature used to measure perceptions of threat among defense officials, I do not rely on secondary literature alone, and try to restrict its use to direct quotes by Japanese defense officials.

Media

In order to evaluate Japan's postwar national discourse about military-security threats, I opted for a longitudinal "Media Framing Analysis" of editorials in one media outlet - the *Yomiuri Shinbun*. The *Yomiuri* was chosen for two reasons: one, it has been one of the most influential media outlets in postwar Japan, and two, the online database hosting its editions- the *Yomidas Rekishikan* - has a function that enables the search for *editorials;* this made the process of data collections simpler.

The *Yomiuri Shinbun* is Japan's and in-fact, the world's largest newspapers in terms of daily circulation.[69] Although the *Yomiuri* had a strong nationalist inclination in the pre-war period and is currently considered as conservative and right-wing oriented, this was not always the case. During the early 1960s for example, Japanese mainstream newspapers including the *Asahi shinbun*, *Mainichi Shinbun* and *Yomiuri* were critical of the conservative policies of the LDP as can be seen in their objection to the revision of the US-Japan Security treaty and their unified call for the resignation of PM Kishi Nobusuke.[70] However, as chapter 5 reveals, around the early 1980s and about the same time the securitization discourse about the Soviet threat permeated Japan's political elites in the Diet, the *Yomiuri* seem to had shifted its stance - at least as communicated in its editorials - toward a hard-line approach to national security, the Soviet Union, and the nature of international politics in general.

Newspaper editorials are taken to convey the newspaper's stance on a specific issue. Although the editorial chief of the newspaper is in charge of their content, he/she does not write all the editorials for obvious reasons. A number of veteran writers specializing in different fields

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[69] Founded in Tokyo in 1874, the *Yomiuri* is one of Japan's oldest newspapers. In 1924, Shōriki Matsutarō, a former officer at the Tokyo Metropolitan Police in-charge of combating domestic unrest, became its manager. Shōriki was known to be a nationalist figure and after WWII, he was briefly arrested as a "Class A" War Criminal although he was not convicted. In October 1945, *Yomiuri* employees had protested against the nationalist owner of the newspaper and sought independent management of the outlet. This attempt did not succeed, however, and in 1950, the newspaper became an incorporated company, part of its former media conglomerate that included a TV channel, publisher, sports newspaper and a baseball team among other cultural assets. Throughout the 1920, 1930, and 1940, the sales of the newspapers have been steadily increasing and by 1950, the newspaper was one of Japan's leading newspapers in terms of circulation and readership; In 1977, the *Yomiuri* became Japan's number one newspaper (Gaulè ne 2010).

[70] In his online article, Satō Takumi, a professor from Kyoto University that specialized in media history and popular culture, points to the recent polarization of Japanese newspapers. While the *Yomiuri* and the *Sankei* supported the national security legislation proposed by Abe administration in Summer 2015, the *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, and *Tokyo shinbun* opposed it.
See: Satō, 2016. "Talk of 'Polarization May Entrench the Phenomenon', in "Nippon.com"; http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a05002/ Accessed on March 7, 2016.

are assigned to write about specific themes; as editorials often deal with issues that recently made it to the headlines or with internationally debated issues, they serve a good indicator as to which issues dominated the national agenda and how they were communicated to the readership. The data was obtained by searching for references to the combination of both a name of an external entity (for example, the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea*)* and "threat" in *Yomiuri* editorials. After an initial screening of the results, I chose the ones relevant to the phenomenon at hand. The initial search for "Soviet Union" and "threat" identified 22 editorials in the period between 1946 and 1990; the search for "China" and "threat" identified 30 editorials in the period between 1952 and 1972, and the search for "North Korea" and "threat" identified 73 editorials in the period between 1990 and 2000. Subsequently, I created three data-bases containing the relevant editorials.

The method I use to interpret these data is "Media Framing Analysis", first introduced by Erving Goffman (1974) under the name of "Frame Analysis". Simply put, frames define the issue at stake, and how to think about it. Journalists evoke frames in order to make sense of new information to broader audiences, often in relation to existing frames. Goffman identified two basic frames: the natural and social. Whereas natural frames denote issues considered to have been caused by factors other than people, such as the weather report, social events are those events that are thought to have been brought about by people, social frames emphasize issues of morality, conflict, and uncertainty. The latter type of frames tend to stir more interest (concerns and fear, see Davis 2009).

Framing can be conceived as a dialectical process: that is, there is no frame without a counter-frame (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). The competition among different groups on how to frame an issue is embedded within a domain of shared beliefs (Pan and Kosicki 1993). Often

left unarticulated, these shared beliefs stand at the core of any inquiry into media framing. In this study, I will try to identify those shared beliefs that are associated with security attitudes. The purpose of the media analysis is to explore how state-based military threats were framed in Japanese mainstream media during the postwar period. To keep a clear focus in the analysis, I tried to answer the following four questions:

1. How was the military threat posed by the entity defined/represented in the editorial? What were the counter-frames?
2. What were the shared beliefs that pinpointed the media framing? For example, did the editorial "securitize" certain referent objects? Did it underline security vulnerabilities?
3. Did the editorial aim at inflating / deflating the threat? (corresponds to 'how to think about the issue')
4. Did it advocate certain risk-measures to deal with the threat?

The examination of these questions in *Yomiuri* editorials enables to capture shifts in the intensity and context of perceived-threats over a long time-period. Although the object of the media-framing analysis is confined to one media outlet, the data collected from *Yomiuri* editorials may point to changes in the broader domestic milieu; since it has been one of the leading newspapers in Japan throughout the postwar period, its editorials matter a great deal in shaping the national conversation about military-security threats.

Public

In order to measure perceptions of threat among the general public, this study makes use of public opinion surveys that deal with issue of military-security such as those done by the GENRON, Japan's Cabinet Office, Jiji Jiji-tsūshin-sha and other surveys as they appear in

secondary literature and Japan's defense White Papers. Since the methodology of public-opinion surveys is often quite different from the one used in this study, I only use surveys to shed light on specific points - for example, Japanese public attitudes toward the Soviet Union, China and North Korea - and only in conjunction with evidence collected through other methods.

1.5.4 Interpretation of Data

This study interprets the data mentioned above by resorting to :(1) three types of *rhetoric* actors often employ when discussing potential military threats; (2) the type of *rationality* underlying the actor's judgement of external reality, and (3) an original analytical framework to the study of threat-perceptions which pays attention to the time-frame, context, intensity and distribution of the phenomenon. I explore the first and second components in this section and elaborate on the third component in the following section.

<u>Rhetoric</u>

Once a judgement about a threat has been made, actors often adopt consistent rhetoric when negotiating the issue with other stakeholders and when debating a proper course of action to respond to the threat. The empirical inquiry in chapters 2-7 identified three types of rhetorics: "inflate" an issue, "deflate" an issue, and what I term the "inflate to deflate" rhetoric. While the first strategy entails an actor emphasizing the danger associated with a certain issue, the second strategy entails an actor de-emphasizing the dangers associated with it. Finally, the third strategy entails an actor inflating an issue in order to deflate a tensed situation associated with it; I term this rhetoric "inflate to deflate".

Rationality

The empirical inquiry into Japanese perceptions of threat among the four units of analysis has identified two opposing rationalities which were often consistent with threat-perceptions in the period covered under this study: peace rationality and security rationality (to recall, I introduced a third-rationality - "pragmatist rationality"- in section 1.3.3; since much has been written about the pragmatist line in Japanese politics I choose to focus on the "end-points" of security and peace rationalities). While those who view reality in terms of peace rationality emphasize cooperation, trust, and a global identity, those who construct reality in terms of security rationality, emphasize competition, distrust and a nationalistic identity, opting for military measures to ensure security. Peace rationality is introspective, and focuses on the danger associated with threat-scenarios such as war (a danger which, if handled correctly, may be prevented); security rationality is outward looking and focuses on the adversary over anything else. In terms of risk-measures, while peace rationality demands diplomatic solutions and denies the use or build-up of military force, security rationality views military means as more efficient to achieve goals. Naturally, the distinction between these two rationalities is not clear-cut; people and actors can be found on the spectrum between the two extremes.

1.5.5 Analytical Framework: Comprehensive Typology of Threat Perceptions

The analytical framework rests on three premises. First, perception of threat culminates in a *judgement* people make about expectation of harm they associate with either an entity (Soviet Union) or scenario (nuclear war). These individual judgements are shared by the community and so it becomes necessary to evaluate the distribution of these judgements. Second, the perception of threat and the response to it are context-dependent, meaning that they are conceived with

certain frames of references (such as political, social, psychological and/or military). Third, the intensity of perceived threat varies and rather than binary construct, threat-perception is better conceptualized on a spectrum. Based on these premises I argue that the analysis of the phenomenon should define the context, intensity and distribution of perceived threats among the major actors in given group and time-frame. Based on earlier works made by Klaus Knorr (1976), the CS (Buzan and Weaver, De Wilde, 1998), Hoest (2016), Talmy (2000) and input from Japan's defense and strategic documents, I suggest the following 8-category typology to interpret data related to the *intensity* of threat-perception in the inter-subjective dimension.[71]

Table 6 - Typology of Threat-Perceptions (Intensity, Rationality and Securitization)

Category	Danger Judgement	Characteristics	Rhetoric	Rationality/ Measures	Securitization
1	No danger	Negates / denies threat	Deflate threat	Security	De-securitized
1a		Negates / denies threat scenario	Deflate threat	Peace	
2	Indirect danger	Threat/Threat-scenario exists as a potentiality;	Somewhat inflate threat	Security (we should *keep* the situation as is)	Politicization
2a		Largely Descriptive	Somewhat inflate threat-scenario to deflate threat	Peace (we should *avoid* the situation)	
3	Direct danger	Threat/Threat scenario exists and is directed at us.	Inflate threat	Security (we must *block* the threat)	Limited Securitization
3a		"Necessity" but not urgency	Inflate threat-scenario to deflate threat	Peace (we must *prevent* the situation)	

[71] For a discussion of Hoest's work, see the literature review.

Table 6 - Typology of Threat-Perceptions (Intensity, Rationality and Securitization)					
Category	**Danger Judgement**	**Characteristics**	**Rhetoric**	**Rationality/ Measures**	**Securitization**
4	Existential danger	Threat/Threat scenario exists and are imminent. Necessity and Urgency; point of no-return ;	Inflate threat	Security (we must *resist* external actor; eliminate the threat)	Full Securitization; Extra-ordinary means;
4a			Inflate threat-scenario	Peace (we must *stop* the situation)	

Table 6 presents four categories to the analysis of the intensity of threat-perception. Each category contains two sub-categories represented in the table by *number* and *number(a)*. While the first type denotes arguments made by those who adhere to the security rationality and focuses on the hostile entity (for example, the Soviet Union), the second type denotes arguments made by those who adhere to the peace rationality and focuses on a threatening scenario (for example a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the US).

Table 6 also identifies four levels of intensity of threat (danger-judgements): from no-danger (category 1, 1a) to indirect danger (2,2a), direct danger (3,3a), and existential danger (4,4a). I use a four-level typology because it corresponds to the language use of force dynamics (Talmy 2000, Chapter 7): at the highest level (category 4), an observer assumes the adversary intends to completely annihilate it (and has the ability to do so, thus posing an existential threat); at the third level, an observer assumes the adversary can significantly exert force over it, but not to totally annihilate it; at the second level, an observer assumes the adversary can become dangerous in the future but currently does not post imminent danger (indirect danger or latent threat). And finally at the first level, the observer assumes that the adversary wants to leave it

alone. The table displays the rhetoric actors often invoke to justify the intensity of danger-judgement, and the preferred response they assign to the threat.

Each threat-argument of the eight types has its own characteristics. Types 1 and 1a negate the existence of threat / threat scenario by claiming that "x is not a threat". Types 2 and 2a do not completely negate the existence of threat/threat-scenario but maintain that they exist as a "potentiality". While their language is mostly descriptive, the arguments they represent do recommend to either "keep" the threat at a certain level, "monitor" the developments related with the threat or "avoid" the possibility of a threat-scenario. Types 3 and 3a imply that a direct threat exists and it is directed / involves the actor at stake. They often incorporate arguments about the *necessity* to do something about it (either block the threat or prevent the threat-scenario). Types 4 and 4a imply that an existential danger exists, and that it is imminent. Hence, there is an urgent need to do so something about it (either resist/defend against the threat or stop the scenario from happening).

While this typology does not encompass all available danger-judgements out there, it does provide a basic reference to the analysis of the empirical data of threat-perceptions in postwar Japan. And so for example, the first level of 'no-threat' was invoked by left-wing politicians when discussing the Soviet threat in the early postwar period (see discussion in chapter 2); likewise, the third level of 'direct threat' was employed by the 'military realists' in the late 1970s and during the 1980s to denote a Soviet threat (see discussion in chapter 3).

1.5.6 Validity

Since this study is not a causal study, this section only comments on the external validity of the study's findings; in other words, can the findings be generalized across populations and time? On

the surface, the investigation of perceptions of military security threat in postwar Japan, a society with unique historical experience, strategic culture and domestic configuration seems to eschew the ability to generalize the conclusions of this study to other populations or periods. But while empirical findings about the context, intensity, and distribution of perceived-threat in postwar Japan may not apply to other cases (for example, postwar West Germany), the following three findings can :

1. Perception of threat is inferred through certain interpretive codes which relate to some abstract concepts that governs the mind (space, time).

2. The notion of a certain rationality underlying perception of military-threats is generalizable. There is no reason to believe that peace and security rationalities are unique to Japan; indeed, the principles that informed the early 1950s peace-thought of the Danwakai can be found in peace movements elsewhere; likewise, the logic behind the securitization moves of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea is again not unique to the Japanese case and can be found elsewhere.

3. The three types of rhetoric actors employ when talking about threats: inflate, deflate, and inflate-to-deflate strategies, may also be generalized across other case-studies.

1.6 Scope of Research

This study is concerned with the range of conditions and the psychological dispositions that predispose domestic actors to infer military threats in their external environment. As such, an attempt to objectively evaluate military threats and risks remains outside of the scope of the current research. This study is also not concerned with neither policy-science nor decision-making research. An in-depth analysis of Japan's defense-policy formation and the manner in which it served to respond to threats and risks falls outside of the scope of this analysis.

However, the manner in which Japanese actors identified, evaluated and articulated "perceived threats" will be examined. Lastly, although I acknowledge the significance of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral tendencies in shaping military security attitudes and subsequently the perception of threat, this study is not concerned with a thorough exploration of these factors.

1.7 Contribution

This study contributes to existing knowledge in that it collects and analyzes large amount of data about Japanese perceptions of military threat. I examine perception of threats associated with the Soviet Union, China and North Korea covering a period of five decades. During the empirical analysis, I translate significant part of these data from Japanese into English.

This study also contributes to three theoretical debates. First, by introducing the ABC model to the analysis of security threats, this thesis puts forward a new approach to the study of threat-perception. Second, when applied to the case-study of Postwar Japan, the ABC model also offers a synthesis between the realist and constructivist accounts of Japan's security culture. Finally, this study contributes to the understanding of how actors infer military threat: I revise the mainstream conceptualization of threat-perception along the lines of "estimated capabilities" and "estimated intent" and identify two "interpretive codes" which inform these perceptions.

2. Military Threat Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Early Postwar Period (1950-1975)

Abstract

Did Japanese decision-makers perceive the Soviet Union as a military-threat throughout the postwar period? If so, how did they frame this threat? This chapter examines the phenomenon of threat-perception among Japan's public, the defense and political establishments and the media during the early postwar period (1950-1975) by combining macro and micro data. I argue that contrary to earlier findings, the Soviet Union was perceived as a threat during this period, although with fluctuations over time, context, intensity and distribution; and that although Japanese decision-makers were aware of military-security stimuli, a bias against framing the Soviet Union as a military-threat did inform the political discourse on these issues. A Soviet political threat was securitized during the early 1950s.

2.1 Introduction

Early postwar Japanese witnessed regional and international tensions. As one Japan scholar writes, the early postwar period was, "a period marked by intense military opposition and by a permanent, high level of threat directed against both the US and Japan" (Dian 2014, 28). Before the world entered a period of relatively lessened tensions between 1969 and 1979, many events stirred up security concerns in the region: Wars in Indochina and the Korean Peninsula in the early 1950s, the Taiwan Straits Crises (1954-5 and 1958 respectively), close-call clashes between the US and the Soviet Union over Berlin and Cuba (1958-61 and 1962), military interventions by the superpowers in Asia and Europe (in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia); Chinese nuclear tests, and

border conflicts between the USSR and China during the 1960s.

Although these developments generated anxiety among regional and global actors, Japan's national conversation about country-specific threats remained relatively dormant until the late 1970s. An examination of Japan's political discourse indicates that during the early postwar period, external military threats were rarely communicated in the Diet. As Figure 2 shows, the number of specific references to a "Soviet threat" between 1954 and 1976 was extremely low.[1] Moreover, none of the references was actually made to inflate a Soviet military threat.[2] Consequently, a terminology of a "Soviet threat" aimed at inflating a Soviet threat simply did not exist in Japan's political discourse in the early postwar period. Why was it so? The simple answer would be that the Soviet Union was not perceived to be a military-threat to Japan. In an interview he gave in 2004, Ishiba Shigeru seemed to suggest just that as he asserted that, "strangely, although the Soviet Union was extremely strong, it was not perceived as a threat [to Japan]". [3] How did Japanese defense and military personnel *perceive* military threats to Japan's security during the period between 1950 and 1975 ? How did Japanese political elites *frame* security threats? What language did they use and what were the referent objects, vulnerabilities and risk-measures they highlighted in the process?

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[1] Only 10 references were made to "Soviet threat" during this period. I searched for the following expressions: *sobieto kyoui, sobieto no kiyoui, soren kyoui* and *soren no kyoui*.

[2] The following example demonstrates this tendency.
On 1 November 1953, Katō Kanjū (JSP) discussed NATO and emphasizes that whereas European countries joined NATO because of their fear of the Soviet threat, this is not the case for Japan [there is no such feeling of threat]; Accessed 5 January 2016, from National Diet Archives, House of Representatives - Foreign Affairs Committee, 1 November 1953.

[3] An Interview with Ishiba Shigeru (December 2004) in *Jieitai Shiraresaru Henyō* 2005, 235. Asahi Shimbunsha.

Figure 2 - References to External Threats in Diet Deliberations 1954 - 1985 (Source : http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/)



This chapter demonstrates how Japan's military personnel was relatively attuned to military deployment and movements of the Soviet army in the Far East, and how these stimuli were perceived by SDF personnel and interpreted as military-threat cues. But, the distribution of such a danger-judgement was limited to the defense establishment and a Soviet military threat was not securitized in Japan's socio-political discourse during this period. During the first generation after Japan regained its independence, attitudes toward military security threats among the political mainstream and left-wing were reflexive, theoretical, *abstract*, having little 'space' to interpret military stimuli related to the Soviet (or Chinese for that matter) as concrete threat-cues.

While Japan's mainstream elites did, however, securitize *communism* as both external and internal *political* threats in the early 1950s, they refrained from doing so in a military context.

Four competing judgements of a "Soviet threat" were contested in the national conversation during this period: (1) the Soviet military in the Far East poses a direct military-security threat to Japan; (2) the Soviet Union poses a political threat but an indirect military threat to Japan; (3) the Soviet Union poses a military threat to Japan only in the context of the US-Japan security relationship, and (4) Soviet Union is not a threat to Japan. Each of these danger-judgements corresponded to different risk measures. Throughout this period, judgements (2) and (3) were distributed among the larger Japanese society to a greater extent than judgements (1) and (4).

Finally, this chapter demonstrates how Japan's official estimation of threat in its first defense doctrine (1976) became a source of intense debate, and how it turned out to be a political compromise between different interest groups. Threat perceptions and security attitudes in Japan are a politically negotiated phenomena, and can not be explained by neither rational nor ideational factors alone.

2.2 The Bilateral Context

Scholars studying the causes of war have identified three features that appear before armed conflicts: rising tensions, rising military preparedness, and increasingly hostile actions (Holsti and North 1965). Tension can refer to both a gap between actors' goals (whether partly incompatible or completely so) or to the negative feelings among two actors such as anger, disgust, or fear. Any analysis of Japanese perceptions of threat associated with a certain entity should thus identify the general sentiment among Japanese toward that entity. To hypothesize,

negative sentiment toward an entity is a pre-condition for the securitization of an external actor as a security threat.

This section is mostly descriptive and draws heavily on studies dealing with the diplomatic relationship and perceptions of the Soviet Union/Russia among the Japanese. The main purpose of this section is to set the context for the analysis of threat perceptions and to demonstrate that hostile sentiment in Japan toward the Soviet Union was not limited to periods of securitization attempts of the Soviet military threat in the early 1980s. As we shall see, tensions and distrust toward the Soviet Union characterized the Japanese image of the Soviet Union throughout most of the postwar period.

Soviet-Japanese Relations: It's Cold Here

Hasegawa (1998) and Kimura (2000a; 2000b) depict the overall bilateral relationship between Japan and Russia as 'cold' and 'abnormal'. In her study of Japan's foreign policy elites and their views of the Soviet Union Ito (1990) goes further and asserts that Japanese elites have demonstrated "Russophobia". Based on interviews she conducted with 65 foreign policy elites in 1986, she concludes that, "the most important source of perceptions of the Soviet Union" was history (1990, 174).

The emerging Cold-War order and domestic political developments in both countries had set Japan and the Soviet Union estranged during the period between 1945 and 1956. The peace and security treaties signed in 1951 institutionalized this rift and marked Japan's position in the anti-communist camp. This negative shift was briefly reversed when PM Hatoyama from the Democratic Party became the PM in December 1954. Hatoyama, who emphasized the "spirit of friendship and love" as his policy motto, "took a positive attitude toward improving Japan's

relations with its community neighbors", opting for peaceful coexistence with communist nations (Aruga 1998, 140).[4] Although the two nations came close to conclude a peace treaty in 1955-56, signing a joint declaration that officially normalized the bilateral relations on October 19, 1956 instead, several issues in the bilateral relations were, and in-fact still, unresolved. The joint declaration stipulated the end of the state of war, restored diplomatic relations between the nations, and set a protocol for trade relations. It also paved the way for Japan to join the United Nations in December 1956, after the Soviets retracted their objection to such a move.

But the rise of Kishi as Japan's PM in February 1957 put an end to the relative improvement in bilateral relations. Kishi was a stronger supporter of the US-Japanese relationship than Hatoyama and the extension of the security treaty during his tenure negatively affected the bilateral relationship between Japan and USSR. On January 27, 1960, a week after Japan had signed a revised security treaty with the US, Khrushchev sent an informal diplomatic message to the Japanese government. The aide-memoir concluded that "The revision of the security treaty...would increase the chances of Japan's being directly involved in military conflict" (Hasegawa 1998, 136). To Japan's response which stipulated that any sovereign state had the right to determine its security policy, the USSR replied in February 26 that, "The new treaty not only will not guarantee the security of Japan, but, on the contrary, can bring the country to catastrophe, which might inevitably involve Japan in a new war" (Hasegawa 1998, 137). In the months that followed, both governments escalated their tone, making the joint declaration seem obsolete. To make things worse, on May 1, 1960, the Soviets identified a Lockheed U-2 aircraft

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[4] The term "Peaceful co-existence" in the mid 1950s was also associated with the post-Stalin Soviet leadership of Nikita Khruschev. Khruschev first communicated this policy as an alternative to the previous "world revolution" slogan at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party held in 1956. Among the pillars of the new policy were abiding by rules of territorial sovereignty and integrity, mutual nonaggression and nonintervention.

flying on a spy mission in Soviet airspace and shot it down. In the aftermath of the incident, it became known that three U-2 aircrafts were deployed in Japan; although both US and Japanese authorities denied their involvement in spy missions above Soviet airspace, the Soviets had cautioned Japan they would retaliate against Japanese bases because U-2 had invaded Soviet airspace.[5] Throughout the remaining of the 1960s, the main issues on the bilateral agenda were nuclear disarmament, the US-Japanese security treaty, and fishing rights (Hasegawa 1998, 135).

Détente

Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations improved considerably during the second half of the 1960s (Hasegawa 1998, 139). The first ministerial consultations round was held in July 1967 when FM Miki visited Moscow and the second in January 1972, when Soviet FM Gromyko paid a visit to Japan (Watanabe 1977, 131). In August 1969, the highest ranking member of the Soviet government until that point visited Japan.[6] The volume of trade doubled between 1966 and 1972 and direct flight services between Tokyo and Moscow and between Niigata and Khabarovsk began operations in January 1966 and in March 1971 respectively (Watanabe 1977, 131). These positive developments coincided with the relative improvement of the US-Soviet relations and the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations.

Still, the atmosphere in Japan toward the Soviet Union was far from positive. In 1969, a Japanese fishing boat had collided with a Russian vessel, leading to the death of 11 Japanese

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[5] Aruga 1998, 149-50. Aruga cites media reports in *Asahi Shinbun*. See: The *Asahi Shinbun*, May 10, Evening Edition, 1960. This incident also caused "anxiety" among Japanese public about the revision of the security treaty with the US since the revisions seemed to be increasing the danger that Japan would be involved in a war.

[6] A letter from Khrushchev was delivered to PM Ikeda. The letter related a full normalization of the relations with the elimination of the security treaty between US and Japan. See: Hasegawa 1998, 138.

crew members. Soviet authorities had delayed the report of the incident, and media outlets and political representatives criticized the event and the Russian behavior in its aftermath as "murderous". Between 1946 and 1969, the Soviet Union has captured 1302 fishing boats and 10,987 Japanese crewmen (Beer 1998, 203).

The relative improvement in the diplomatic front did not last either. During the first half of the 1970s, the international environment has been changing. Hasegawa (1998, 142) points out three core developments in this period which influenced Japanese-Soviet relations: Brezhnev's military build up which let to a strategic parity with the US, the Sino-Soviet split followed by US-Japan rapprochement with China, and Japan's economic miracle. Between October 1973, when PM Tanaka had met with General Secretary Brezhnev, and 1985, meetings between heads of states were suspended.

Deterioration

The second half of the 1970s brought about cooler tides in the international arena. The relations between the super-powers have worsened since the Soviet intervention in Angola (November 1975). Although both Japan and the Soviet Union had attempted at rapprochement, the following incidents hindered any chance of positive progress: the *MiG*-25 incident (1976), fishing-zone negotiations (1977), Japan's peace treaty with China (1978), Soviet redeployment of troops in the Northern Territories (1978), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979), Japan's participation in the US-led sanctions against the USSR (1980s), and the GSDF intelligence spy incident (January 1980. See: Hasegawa 1998, 144, Kimura 2000a, 111-12).[7] Regular foreign

[7] The spy incident involved at least three former and in-service GSDF intelligent officers, who passed confidential information about China to Soviet contacts. As a result of the incident, JDA officials including GSDF Chief of Staff and JDA Directer-General accepted responsibility for the case and resigned. See: Olsen 1985, 52.

ministerial exchanges were suspended in 1978 and Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories in May 1978 prompted “bold headlines” warning of an impending Soviet attack on Hokkaido in Japanese newspapers (Hasegawa 1998, 161-62). A perception of Soviet military threat had emerged in national discourse, not limited anymore to the defense establishment; on the political stage, media and among the general public, negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union intensified (Hasegawa 1998, 164).

Figure 3: Dislike of Foreign Countries 1960 - 1985.

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Figure 3 presents shifts in the negative image of three foreign countries, as was perceived by the Japanese public between 1960 and 1985: the Soviet Union, US, and the PRC. Nationwide opinion-surveys conducted by Jiji Press asked respondents to select three countries they disliked most from a pre-determined list of 9-10 countries.[8]

As the figure demonstrates, the Soviet Union was the most disliked nation between 1960 and 1966, and again from 1968 to 1985 (and in fact, until 1988 when North Korea took the lead).[9] Negative sentiment toward the Soviet Union intensified during the second half of the 1970s and remained hostile during the first half of the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1981 there was a relatively sharp increase in the unfavorable feelings toward the Soviet Union which I attribute to the militarization of the Northern Territories and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[10] The year 1984 was the peak of anti-Soviet sentiment; this trend can be attributed to the KAL incident. To recall, on September 1, 1983, Soviet pilots shot down a civilian KAL plane off Sakhalin, and all passengers including 28 Japanese citizens died.

Signs of Improvement

From the end of 1984, the diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan indicated positive progress, as seen in optimistic statements, official meetings and visits, and increased

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[8] The surveys sampled randomly 2000 adult males and females; the return sample was around 1500. See: Hasegawa 1987, 38.

[9] Ito argues that the root causes of Japanese negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union were historical rather than ideological, namely, the Soviet conduct at the end of WWII including the long detention and mistreatment of Japanese prisons of war and the seizure of the Northern Territories (1990, 171).

[10] Ito argues that 1979 was a turning point in the course of Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union. "The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan awakened Russophobia that, among some groups of intellectuals, has been "dormant" since the Russo-Japanese War (1990, 171).

trade and economic exchanges. In November 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev indicated that both he and his nation "are for an improvement in relations with Japan and are certain that such a possibility is a real one" (Clark 1987, 135). USSR FM Eduard Shevardnadze visited Japan in January 1986, after a decade of no such visit, and again in February 1988 and in September 1990; both countries initiated working level meetings concerning a future Peace Treaty. In April 1991, President Gorbachev became the first Russian head of state to visit Japan. But, the visit did not lead to a significant breakthrough, especially in relation to the issue of the Northern Territories. During most of the 1980s, Japan's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union emphasized the issue of the Northern Territories, insisting that any significant improvement in the bilateral relationship has to go through the "entrance" of the territorial dispute (*iriguchi ron* or the "entrance theory"). Such a policy is described by Ito as "minimalist", stability-seeking, "not antagonistic", and inclined to keep diplomatic channels open (1990, 170).

After the USSR entered a state of turmoil with the *coup-d'etat* in August, it dissolved in late 1991 and Boris Yeltsin became the first President of its political successor, the Russian Federation. No significant improvement in the relationship was registered during the 1990s and unfavorable sentiment among the Japanese public intensified again and even reached Cold-War levels.

To summarize, little has changed during the postwar period in Russo-Japanese relations in terms of the issues on the bilateral agenda. The territorial dispute and Japan's strategic relationship with the US continue to act as sources of bilateral tensions and general distrust today as they did five decades ago. But while the Soviet Union was perceived to be a military threat (to varying degree) by some domestic actors during the early and late postwar period, Russia today is not perceived to be a military threat. As we shall see, hostile sentiment toward the Soviet

Union indeed preceded the securitization of the Soviet threat in Japan that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s and vice versa, sign of improvements in the bilateral relationship (and subsequently, in the sentiment toward the Soviet Union) preceded the gradual de-securitization of the issue which occurred during the 1990s. Table 7 summarizes the overall Japanese sentiment toward the Soviet Union in the postwar period.

Table 7: Japanese Sentiment Toward the Soviet Union in the Postwar Period	
Period	**Sentiment**
1946 - 1956	Hostile
1956 - 1960	Less Hostile
1960 - 1964	Increasingly Hostile
1964 - 1976	Less Hostile
1976 - 1979	Increasingly Hostile
1979 - 1985	Hostile
1985 - 1989	Less Hostile
1989 - 1992	Less Hostile (diplomacy), Still hostile (public)

Table 7 indicates that hostile sentiment is not a *sufficient* condition for the securitization of a threat but a *necessary* one. As can be seen in the table, early periods of hostile sentiment toward the Soviet Union (1946 - 1956 and 1960 - 1964) did not lead to securitization of the Soviet Union as a *military* threat. To brush up the hypothesis outlined in the beginning of the chapter, then, *a negative sentiment between actors in the international arena is a necessary condition, but not sufficient, in order to induce change in threat-perception and securitization/de-securitization*.

Finally, it is important to note that however hostile the Japanese sentiment toward the Soviet Union have been throughout the Cold-War and after it, since WWII a military conflict has not broken out between the two countries. And even during periods of heightened tensions between the governments, about 40 percent of the general population still did no select Soviet Union as one of the three countries they disliked most. Likewise, a direct Soviet military threat was perceived by only a minority of Japanese throughout the early postwar period (although since the late 1970s, more Japanese came to view the Soviet Union as a military threat, as chapter 3 reveals).

This section reviewed the diplomatic and public-opinion aspects of the Japanese sentiment toward the Soviet Union. The following section tackles Japanese military threat perceptions of the Soviet Union between 1950 and 1975, when it was best described as an "indirect threat".

2.3 Macro Level of Analysis

At the macro level, I infer perceptions of threat from Japan's defense policy, including its military build-up, force-deployment and strategic planning process, and conduct content analysis of references to specific terms by using the online database of Diet deliberations.

<u>Japan's National Defense Policy 1952 - 1976</u>

Japan's postwar security framework had gradually evolved in the second half of the 1940s and

during the 1950s.[11] The postwar security framework was shaped by both domestic political circumstances and changing US foreign policy goals with respect to Japan, especially the "reverse course" that since 1947 designated Japan a security role in the US-led global struggle against communism, discarding an earlier idea of unarmed Japan. US pressure on Japan's political elites to re-arm in the second half of the 1940s and in the early 1950s ensued, and the GOJ had to accommodate these pressures while balancing domestically against forces from both sides of the political spectrum. Prominent political figures such as Yoshida Shigeru and Ikeda Hayato resisted American pressure to rapidly rearm Japan and emphasized economic reconstruction of the country instead (Weste 1998, 31).

I choose to start the discussion of Japan's postwar defense policy in June 1954, when the

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[11] Early in the occupation period, the Ashida Memorandum designated para-military police role to the Japanese to maintain public order, and the role of defending against external attack to US forces. Watanabe (1998) and Weste (1998) discuss different plans to rearm Japan's defense force in the early 1950s, the successful of which was endorsed by PM Yoshida Shigeru and smaller in scale. Japan's defense force evolved in stages. Less than a month after the outburst of the Korean War, in July 8, 1950, General MacArthur approved an increase of Japan's independent order-keeping capabilities with a force of 75,000 men to be called the "National Police Reserve" (NPR) and a Coast Guard of 8,000 men. Yoshida's appointed Hayashi Keizō to be in charge of the NPR and the structure command of this force was later inherited by the SDF. The Peace Treaty and Security Treaty between Japan and the US were concluded in September 8, 1951 and the American occupation had formally ended in April 1952. In August 1952, the "National Safety Agency" was established, replacing the NPR, with PM Yoshida serving as the Director General of the organization at its early stage. Later Yoshida appointed Kimura Tokutarō who was an anti-communist and fearful of the prospects of communist revolution within Japan. In september 1953, Yoshida and Shigemitsu Mamoru (the head of the right-wing oriented Progressive Party) agreed that the future defense force would be entrusted with defense against direct aggression, meaning external military threats. In March 1954, after several rounds of talks about the content and nature of US-Military Security Assistance to Japan, both sides decided on a gradual increase in Japan's self-defense strength, and on a force structure of 180,000 men which in 1954 sustained 152,000 troops. Subsequently, The Japan Defense Agency was established in July 1, 1954, and Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated on the same day. A National Defense Council (NDC) was established in 1956. During the period that preceded 1957, Japan's defense force and its precedent, the National Safety Agency, had only limited capacity to defend Japan. On February 1958, the ASDF began measures to counter invasions of territorial airspace.
See: Chapman, Drifte and Gow 1983, 91; Defense of Japan 2006, 557; Tanaka 1997, 38-40, 70-88, 117-129; Watanabe 1998, 16; Weste 1998, 24-44; Williamson 2014, 63, 68.

Diet passed the Self Defense Forces (SDF) law. Article 3 of the original version of the law maintains that, "The main duty of the SDF is to protect the peace and independence of Japan, preserve national security, defend against direct and indirect aggression, and if necessary maintain public order" (Williamson 2014, Appendix D). It was not before May 20, 1957, however, when the National Defense Council and the Cabinet adopted the "Basic Policy for National Defense" (BPND), that Japan had officially formulated a defense policy. The basic policy stipulated that, "The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, and thereby, to safeguard the independence and peace of Japan based on democracy.[12] In order to achieve this goal, the policy outlined four core pillars. First, it stipulated a commitment to international cooperation through the support of the United Nations' activities. Second, it opted to stabilize the livelihood of the people and foster patriotism. Third, it sought to build up "rational defense capabilities by steps within the limit necessary for self-defense (*saishōgendo hitsuyō na jiei no taisei*), in accordance with national strength and situation" and finally, the basic policy called for "dealing with external aggression based on the security arrangements with the US until the United Nations will be able to fulfill its function in stopping such aggression effectively in the future." [13]

The BPND dictated an exclusively defense oriented policy and ruled out the use of military-force other than to repel potential adversaries from its territory. Instead, it emphasizes deterrence and upholding denial capabilities (Michishita 2010, 138). Although the policy was

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[12] Japan. Ministry of Defense. "Fundamental Concepts of National Defense". Accessed January 16, 2014. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp02.html

[13] Japan. Ministry of Defense. "Fundamental Concepts of National Defense". Accessed January 16, 2014. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp02.html

adopted almost sixty years ago, until 2013 not a single revision has been made to the document.[14] The original document maintained that Japan's prominent 'referent objects' are its independence (territorial integrity or autonomy) and peace (well-being) and that potential threat-scenarios constitute "direct" and "indirect aggression" in the form of military invasion or intervention in Japan's domestic affairs. The policy also stipulated a range of potential risk-measures to ensure Japan's security, including mitigation of instances of international security tensions, armament of the SDF, and the distribution of the risk with the US.

But nationalist figures in Japan's political elites, such as Prime Ministers Hatoyama (1954 - 57) and Kishi (1957 - 60), were not satisfied with Japan's security framework as described above, including article 9 of the constitution and what they perceived to be unequal security treaty with the US. During the second half of the 1950s, Japanese high officials attempted to challenge both institutions and to increase Japan's independent defense capability. Efforts to update the security treaty finally bore fruit and in 1960, Japan and the US agreed on the terms of revision of the security treaty they had signed in 1951. The new treaty stipulated that the US was to continue to use facilities in Japan for its military forces but now, this use had to come to be confined to the context of "contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" (article 6).[15] The US was to defend Japan in case the latter would come under attack; Japan was to develop its capacities to resist such an armed

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[14] Exclusive defense oriented policy became an official policy of Japan in 1970, when the Satō administration published the first White Paper dealing with defense issues and defined it as the "essence" of Japan's national defense. See: The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report 2009, 56-57. In 2013, Japan adopted a National Security Strategy (NSS) which for the first time outlined a clear policy for national security. For the document see, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf

[15] This point was one of the main motivations behind GOJ's desire to revise the treaty. See Aruga 1998, 149; Tanaka 1997, 166-168.

attack, and the two countries were to consult in case Japan's security or regional security in the Far-East was endangered. As Aruga (1998, 149) points out, "the new treaty changed Japan's role from a passive to a more active one in Far Eastern defense", generating intense political debate and public criticism in the process that eventually led to PM Kishi resignation from office. However critical the reaction was to this move, the long-term implications of the revision to Japan's risk management strategy were important. At least 'on paper', Japan's risk-measures strategy was further linked to the US security guarantee, preparing the ground for a more mature security relationship which would develop in the decades that followed.

Japan's national goals and basic security considerations during most of the Cold-War era were in line with its undeclared foreign-policy strategy, the "Yoshida doctrine". Simply put, the Yoshida doctrine viewed Japan as a beneficiary of the international system rather than a stakeholder (Samuels 2007a, 31). The doctrine specifies that since "economic success and technological autonomy were the prerequisites of national security...an alliance with the world's ascendant power was the best means...until the former could be achieved" (Samuels 2007a, 31). Building substantial military capabilities was out of the question since for the dominant "pragmatic conservative politicians", remilitarization amounted to "financial burden." [16]

At the same time the Yoshida doctrine was consolidated, other alternatives for Japan's grand strategy such as "autonomous defense" (*jishu bōei*) and "unarmed neutrality" (*hibusō chūritsu*), advocated by right and left-wing political actors respectively, were gradually marginalized. Under the Yoshida doctrine, "all three pillars of Japan's postwar security apparatus were established - Article 9, the SDF, and the US-Japan Security Treaty" (Samuels 2007, 32).

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[16] The term "pragmatic conservative politicians", or "mainstream conservatives", refers to Yoshida's close allies and disciples who, with few exceptions, dominated the cabinet for most of the period after the end of WWII, until the early 2000s. Among them were Ikeda Hayato, Satō Eisaku, Ōhira Masayoshi, and Miyazawa Kiichi. See: Samuels 2007a, 31-32.

In military-tactic terms, the BPND and the Yoshida consensus with it various political compromises dictated four military buildup plans under the "Necessity Defense Force Concept" (1957 - 1976). It was not until 1976, with the formulation of the "Standard Defense Forces Concept" (*kibanteki bōeiryoku kōsō*), that a clear strategic doctrine was again formulated.[17]

Japan's Defense Capabilities and Deployment

The first organizing principle of Japan's defense capabilities - the "Necessity Defense Force Concept" - sought to develop Japan's defense force *in proportion* with the military capabilities of neighboring countries. Translated into military expenditure, the unofficial doctrine prompted the doubling of Japan's defense budget with each defense buildup plan between 1958 and 1976 (Sebata 2010, 107).

The first defense plan (1958 - 1960) set build-up targets to be achieved by 1960 for the GSDF and by 1962 for the air and maritime branches. As US forces in Japan were drastically reduced in the second half of the 1950s, priority was given to achieve the target for the ground forces, and the program itself, "was designed essentially to cope with the American phased withdrawal from Japan"(Chapman, Drifte and Gow 1983, 93). The targets of military buildup were set for the GSDF (180,000 men by 1960), the MSDF (124,000 tons and 200 aircraft by the end of 1962), and the ASDF (about 1,300 aircraft by 1962).

The role of the SDF was articulated in the second defense plan (1962 - 66). It was defined as "coping with an aggression, using conventional weapons, on a scale smaller than localized

[17] The "Standard Defense Forces Concept" (1976 - 2004) was updated to "Multifunctional, Flexible, Effective Defense Capability" (2004-2010), and most recently to the "Dynamic Defense Force" (2010-today).

warfare", and coping with a larger-scale aggression until US aid would arrive (Chapman, Drifte and Gow 1983, 93-94). The type of aggression, and the identity of potential aggressors, however, were left unstated. The following targets of military buildup were set for the GSDF (180,000 men and 30,000 reserves), the MSDF (140,000 tons of ships), and the ASDF (1000 aircraft).

The third defense plan (1967-1971) marked a shift from the role of *coping* with an aggression to *deterring* one. The program expanded ground-defense capabilities, including the introduction of 83 helicopters and 160 armored vehicles, and upgraded 280 tanks with newer models. It also enhanced Japan's air and maritime capabilities including 93 Anti-Submarine Aircraft, 33 Anti-Submarine helicopters, 5 submarines, 2 helicopter carriers, 14 escort ships and 56 vessels. "The SDF were now to cope...with aggressions lower in scale than a conventional war" (Chapman, Drifte and Gow 1983, 94-95).

The fourth defense plan was a source for intense political debates. On March 9, 1970, the JDA newly appointed Director-General Nakasone Yasuhiro stipulated the basic guidelines for the future fourth program. The guidelines acknowledged the détente in the international arena and the lack of a large-scale threat to Japan but also highlighted dangers such as guerrilla warfare and internal disorder (Chapman, Drifte and Gow 1983, 95). Yet Nakasone's subsequent Defense White Paper and its attempt to re-orient Japan's defense policy toward the autonomous defense with its massive defense build up targets eventually led to his replacement before the first draft of the fourth defense program had been finalized. Additional turmoil caused by the Mishima incident (November 1970), the collision between an ASDF aircraft and All-Japan airliner (July 1971), and the controversial statement regarding the UN made by Direct-General Nishimura (December 1971) resulted in revolving doors of JDA chiefs, further delaying the formulation of the fourth defense-plan. Eventually, during the winter of 1972, the JDA finalized the fourth

defense pan in line with the third program and the BPND, curbing ambitious build-up targets and ridding it from the attempt to downgrade the role of US forces in Japan's defense (Chapman, Drifte and Gow 1983, 96-97). The following targets for military build-up were set for the GSDF (280 tanks, 170 armored vehicles, 90 automatic mobile cannons, 90 self-propelled artillery, 159 tactical aircraft), the MSDF (13 escort ships, 2 helicopter carriers, 5 submarines, 92 aircraft), and the ASDF (2 units of ground-to-air Nike J missile unit, 211 aircraft including 46 F-4E-J fighters, 14 RF-4E reconnaissance planes, 68 FST-2 support planes, and 24 C-1 transport planes). Similar to the third defense program, the fourth defense program emphasized qualitative improvement and replacement of old models of weapons system with newer ones (Chapman, Drifte and Gow 1983, 97).

The four defense plans formulated between 1958 and 1976 were a product of their time. The strategic rationale behind the programs designed Japan's military build-up based on the *capabilities* of neighboring countries, not on their intentions, and based on an exclusively defensive role for Japan's military force. The defense plans also focused on territorial defense, and were based on risk-measure that incorporated (at least in theory) the role of US forces in the defense of Japan, especially if a large scale conflict were to occur. The defense plans also avoided designating the threat against which the SDF is to protect Japan in terms of foreign countries.

Although the military threat against which the SDF would defend Japan was not articulated in the defense plans, the deployment of the SDF during this period indicated that the Soviet Union was considered to be the main potential enemy. In terms of force deployment, by 1962, the GSDF had restructured its force so that an overall number of thirteen divisions were deployed across the country, four of which were based in Hokkaido (the "Northern Army"). In 1965, one third of the GSDF's manpower was deployed to Hokkaido: out of 97,000 GSDF

personnel in all thirteen divisions, 32,000 were deployed to the Northern Army (Sasaki 2015, 10).

Contingency Plans

During the early postwar period, SDF contingency-plans focused on the Soviet military threat. In 2004 it was revealed that between the years 1955 and 1975 and along with the US military, the SDF had formulated an annual coordinated joint contingency plan to unify both military commands in an emergency.[18] According to a former GSDF operations officer, concrete plans for the defense of Hokkaido involving both the SDF and the American Army had been made prior to 1955 as well (NIDS 2012, 260). A concrete military-contingency plan involving China, though, was lacking through most of the early postwar period. Although defense analysts did consider the scenario of a Chinese attack on Japan's remote islands such as the Senkaku at the end of the 1960s, this threat-scenario was soon dropped after the reapproachment between both countries in 1972 (Dian 2014, 77). Accordingly, even after the US and Japan had agreed on the reversion of Okinawa (June 1971), the SDF did not see a need for a China-based contingency plan or force deployment in Japan's Southwest (NIDS 2012, 318).

Threat Assessment

During the early postwar period, as indicated in the BPND, threat scenarios were framed in abstract terms of direct aggression (*chokusetsu shinryaku*) and indirect aggression (*kansetsu*

[18] Apparently, the plans were being formulated without the Prime Minister's knowledge. See: Honda et. al, 2005, chapter 7.

shinryaku).[19] In the early 1970s, officials in the JDA under the leadership of Director of Defense Policy Bureau Kubo Takuya began reformulating Japan's military-security policy. Central to this process was the circulating of two memos by Kubo (1971, 1974) in which he outlined his ideas about defense capabilities and likelihood, distinguishing between a *possible (latent)* Soviet threat and a *probable* one while tilting toward the former.[20] Kubo opined that, "There is no immediate factor for military conflict surrounding Japan. Therefore, there is no probable threat to Japan, while a possible threat exists....[Such a] possible threat is a limited war" (Kawasaki 2001, 234). Japan, claimed Kubo in the first memo, can not develop defense capabilities that would effectively cope with the militaries of neighboring countries. Instead, the SDF should develop effective capabilities to deal with "*slightly possible*" threat-scenario of a limited-scale invasion. Kubo further asserted that the SDF was lacking the ability to defend Japan in a large-scale war without resorting to American military assistance. The second memo, published in June 1974, prioritized the alliance with the US in terms of military security but stressed the importance of other non-military security sectors in providing for Japan's security. [21]

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[19] In a more general context, a third threat scenario existed; that of a nuclear conflict between the superpowers (*kakusensō)* that had the potential to spill over to Japan. Whereas in the Soviet context, direct aggression pertained to military invasion likely to target Hokkaido, an indirect aggression denoted negative consequences of Soviet agents or revolutionary activities led by political actors such as the Japan Communist Party (JCP). I would like to thank Honma Go, a colleague in the University of Tokyo, for this comment.

[20] See: NIDS 2012, 287. Kubo criticized the prevailing "Necessary Defense Force Concept" as unrealistic. This concept, claimed Kubo, resulted in a large defense force, albeit with serious weaknesses such as limited function of logistical support, sparse recruit resources, low capacity to resist a potential enemy and a difficulty to obtain land for training and force deployment. See: Sebata 2010, 109. For a summary of Kubo's papers see: Tanaka 1997, 244-260; Kawasaki 2001, 232-36 .

[21] Green suggested that this line of thinking resonated with the alliance politics dilemma, which is the constant need to balance between the reflexive risks of entrapment and abandonment and would ultimately evolve into the comprehensive security approach (1995, 74).

What were the background and implications of Kubo's likelihood argument? According to Kawasaki (2001, 233), Kubo believed that as long as Japan maintained a strong alliance with the US, the Soviet Union would most likely *not* initiate a nuclear strike nor invade Japan with mass conventional army, because of US-Soviet strategic parity in terms of nuclear weapons and Japan's defensive advantage in terms of geography. Kubo's intention, according to Green (1995, 73), was to reduce defense spending and improve the image and status of the defense establishment among the general public. To recall, the early 1970s seen the public image of the defense establishment deteriorating to a new low after Mishima incident and the collision between ASDF fighter and All Japan airliner. As Katahara Eiichi (1990, 135) puts it, the new concept would take into account probable political intentions of Japan's neighbors rather than military capabilities. Indeed, Kubo's distinction between possible and probable threat was new to Japanese strategical thinking: defense officials prior to this time did not make such a distinction. In many ways, this framing of 'degrees of likelihood' in terms of 'possible' and 'probable' persisted throughout the Cold War.

Kubo's ideas, inaccurately titled "Kubo's no-threat argument" by his opponents, were later adopted by the National Defense Council in November 1975, and used as an important reference point in formulating the 1976 NDPO, after Sakata Michita was nominated as Director General (DG) and after Kubo himself had taken the role of JDA administrative vice-minister in July 1975. Among military officials, however, the reaction to the threat-assessment was unwelcoming. Sebata (2010, 133) maintains that some officials went as far as to resist "carrying out concrete work based on the concept." But this criticism was not restricted to SDF military officials, as even civilian officials from within the JDA had initially disassociated themselves from Kubo's policy line, claiming that it underestimated the Soviet threat (Sebata 2010, 109).

Later, Kubo's opinion gained support (or "passive acceptance") among civilian officials and became the dominant view among JDA officials (Sebata 2010, 116).

To summarize this section, Japan's BPND had dictated four military build-up defense plans between 1958 and 1976; Japan's force-deployment was oriented toward defending Hokkaido from a possible attack from the North. However, none of these official plans clearly designated foreign countries as threats to Japan's security. Military threat-scenarios were articulated in vague terms such as "direct" and "indirect" aggressions, "large-scale war", "small-scale war", and "localized warfare". Behind the scenes, however, as one can learn from the Kubo papers in the early 1970s, the language was more concrete: starting in the early 1970s, the perception of a Soviet Union threat had diminished in intensity, and the likelihood of a Soviet invasion was downgraded. As the next section continues to demonstrate, this vague language in Japan's official documents did not reflect strategic thinking *among* military personnel. Although not communicated in public as such, individual testimonies of SDF officials who served in key positions between 1952 and 1976 indicate that the Soviet Union was perceived to be a serious military threat.

2.4 The Micro Level: Military Threat Perceptions of the Soviet Union among the Defense Establishment (1950 - 1975)

Individual Accounts:
Horie Masao (GSDF)

Horie Masao served in numerous defense and operational-planning positions at the GSDF between the years 1955 and 1962, and later as GSDF Chief of Staff, Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman, and a member of the House of Councillors (LDP, the Tanaka faction). Horie states that he supported the BPND and the security relationship with the US: "Since the world was

becoming smaller, it became somewhat difficult for a country to provide [independently] for its national defense" (NIDS 2012, 266). The biggest challenge according to him was to determine just how much of independent capabilities Japan should have. Horie asserts that the only threat that preoccupied defense planners in Tokyo at that time was the Soviet Union with its enhanced military presence in the Far-East (NIDS 2012, 255,261). Specifically, he recalls that unofficial debates during the time of the second defense plan had authorized the SDF to prepare for a conventional Soviet ground-attack, which was assumed to be directed at Hokkaido (NIDS 2012, 265, 287). Horie further recalls differences between the GSDF and the MSDF about the credibility of the American commitment to defend Japan. Whereas GSDF personnel had doubts whether the US will come to Japan's aid in case of contingency, MSDF commanders were more positive about the American security guarantee (NIDS 2012, 266).

Tamaki Seiji (Career Official, JDA)

Tamaki Seiji served as career official at the JDA between 1958 and 1980 and was highly involved in drafting the third defense plan (1967-1971). Tamaki reports that during the early 1970s, "the outbreak of a third world war [between East and West] was growing hazy in our minds" (NIDS 2012, 43). Yet, according to him, the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between the two great powers was still being considered. In terms of military threats, two factors particularly alarmed both the JDA and SDF officials during that time: the frequent movements of Soviet forces in the Far-East including violations of Japan's airspace by Soviet aircrafts (around 160 per year), and the sixteen nuclear-powered submarines deployed in the port of Vladivostok. In other words, military movement and deployment were the two components of the Soviet threat perception. These components of the Soviet military threat pre-occupied defense planners at the time of

drafting the fourth defense plan as well (NIDS 2012, 44). Tamaki further distinguishes between the intensity of the threat as perceived by SDF forces that monitor Soviet movements ("the people on the radar sites") and defense civilian officials in Tokyo ("was not as shocking for us"). Still, even among JDA officials, there was a "sense of intimidation" due to Soviet movements and deployment in the region (NIDS 2012, 44).

Takeda Gōtarō (ASDF)

Takeda Gōtarō served at the ASDF and his testimony sheds light on the perception of threat around him during one of the most important military incidents during the postwar era. On September 6, 1976, a Soviet *MiG*-25 pilot defected to Hakodate airport in Hokkaido. The pilot had requested a political asylum in the US and the GOJ granted it three days later (September 9). The Soviets demanded the immediate return of the aircraft but the GOJ decided to examine the aircraft first with US Air Force. The plane was finally returned to the Soviet Union after the inspection, on November 14 that year.

The incident exposed just how much Japan's airspace was vulnerable to intrusion of Soviet aircraft without being targeted or forced to change its course.[22] Takeda, who served as the commanding officer of the Northern Air Defense Force at that time, describes the atmosphere in the days that followed the incident as full of stress and confusion (NIDS 2012, 158). As politicians were in dispute over what to do, no instructions had been granted from government officials. Despite rumors that the Soviets were planning to destroy the aircraft, Takeda's commanders were instructed to obey the current principle of avoiding the use of force, which

[22] Although an unidentified aircraft had been detected by a Japanese radar station in Okushiri Island, leading to a scrambling of two ASDF F-4EJ (Phantom), it soon disappeared from its screens and managed to operate an emergency landing in Hakodate. See: Defense of Japan 1977.

meant that if Soviet aircrafts were to enter Japanese airspace in the aftermath of the incident he would have had to disobey the instructions to order his pilots to intercept them (NIDS 2012, 159).[23] Takeda also observes that the *MiG*-25 incident had served as a trigger for the acquisition of weapon systems which could detect low-altitude flying aircrafts, such as radars and Aerial Early Warning aircrafts (E-2C). Although Japanese military strategists had been aware of Japan's vulnerability to incoming low-altitude aircrafts, it was only after this incident that necessary budgets were allocated to counter this threat. The incident, then, played to the hands of the ASDF, serving as "a bad example from which one can learn" (NIDS 2012, 160).[24] Overall, the *MiG*-25 incident had highlighted the SDF's technical, legal and psychological vulnerability.

The individual testimonies brought above demonstrate that during the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, SDF officials were mostly occupied with a Soviet threat. But the perceived intensity of the Soviet threat was not necessarily shared among civilian officials in the JDA or outside the defense establishment. The following section presents a case in which attitudes held by SDF military personnel and civilian officials in the JDA regarding the probability and scale of Soviet threat were incompatible, and outlines its surprising outcome. [25]

2.5 Threat Assessment as a Political Compromise: The 1976 NDPO

In February 1975, Sakata Michita, then Director-General of the JDA, established an advisory panel to reflect on defense issues and formulate a new defense plan. A study group composed of

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[23] Later it was discovered that some operational preparations were taken by all three branches of the SDF.

[24] Similar view is suggested by Sasaki (2015, 138).

[25] Tamaki testifies to similar differences between military personnel and civilian officials in the JDA during the drafting of the Third defense plan. See NIDS 2012, 76-77.

eleven "politically moderate" individuals finished its work by late 1975 and presented its report to Sakata. The report - later titled as the "National Defense Policy Outline" (NDPO) was adopted by the National Defense Council and by the Cabinet on October 29, 1976. The NDPO stipulated that,

> Japan's basic defense policy is to possess an adequate defense capability of its own while establishing a posture for the most effective operation of that capability to prevent aggression. In addition, a defense posture capable of dealing with any aggression should be constructed, through maintaining the credibility of the Japan-US security arrangement and insuring the smooth functioning of that system. Against nuclear threat Japan will rely on the nuclear deterrent capability of the United States.[26]

The main military threat-scenario was framed in the context of a limited invasion of the Japanese territory. Although the NDPO did not identify a specific country as threat, it was evident that the scenario of small scale invasion was associated with the Soviet Union.[27] However, such threat-scenario was "not imminent [and therefore] Japan need not reach beyond its grasp" (Samuels 2007, 2-3). Consistent with the ideas articulated by Kubo, who became the Administrative Vice-Minister of the JDA in July 1975 and remained in the post until July 1976, the report assumed that, "under present circumstances...there seems *little possibility* of a full-scale military clash between East and West or of a major conflict possibly leading to such a clash, due to the military balance - including mutual nuclear deterrence - and the various efforts being made to stabilize

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[26] "National Defense Program Outline". *The World and Japan* Database, Tanaka Lab, University of Tokyo. Accessed on January 17, 2016, from http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html

[27] By 1976, China was no longer perceived to be a military threat to Japan, as the diplomatic relationship between both Japan and China were normalized in 1972. To recall, during the 1960s, China did raise concerns among Japan's defense establishment after it conducted a nuclear test in 1964 and its first successful nuclear missile test in 1966. Japanese military personnel were also aware of China's chemical and biological weapon but these aspect were perceived to be less alarming than China's nuclear capability. See: NIDS 2012, 135.

international relations."[28] The NDPO also specified Japan's military power in peacetime, setting quantitative goals for air power (430 aircrafts), ground force (180,000 soldiers) and sea power (60 vessels). But rather than quantity of the armed forces, the document had emphasized the importance of quality of weapon-technology and manpower of Japan's future defense force (Defense Agency 1977, 54-56). The main military threat-scenario entrusted with the SDF was a limited invasion of the Japanese territory, but defense officials and military personnel strongly disagreed about the probability and scale of this threat-scenario, as can be seen from inconsistent views presented in the 1976 NDPO and 1977 Defense White Paper and from individual accounts presented below.

While the 1976 NDPO estimated the Soviet threat to be not imminent and correspondingly, "lowered the assumed level of threat from a large-scale limited attack to a small-scale limited attack", the 1977 Defense White Paper virtually revised this stance and stipulated that Japan's defense capabilities should enable "the country to deal, independently, with instances of limited, small-scale aggression whose occurrence was deemed *relatively likely*" (Samuels 2007a; Sebata 2010, 113; NIDS 2011, 240). By limited and small-scale aggression, defense analysts had now meant, "an invasion that is as a rule conducted without large-scale preparations in a surprise manner so as not to reveal the aggressor's intentions and is intended to create a fait accompli in a short space of time."[29] These inconsistent views of the

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[28] Richard Samuels points out five assumptions that guided the document: the international security environment would remain stable; the SDF could carry substantive defense functions; Japan had adequate intelligence and surveillance capabilities to cope with limited aggression; the SDF could be reinforced if needed; and the worst thing Japan could do would be to establish an independent military capability that would offset the regional balance of power (Samuels 2007a, 2).

[29] For attacks above this level, "the SDF would be dependent on US forces." See: NIDS, East Asia Strategic Review 2011, 240.

threat scenario, differing both in risk-probability and risk-consequences of a Soviet surprise attack can be settled if we follow Muroyama (1992), Green (1995) and Sebata (2010, 114-15) to assume that the 1976 document and the following year's Defense White Paper were essentially a political compromise between the international environment and domestic political constraints on the one hand, and the opinions of military personnel and some civilian officials in the JDA who called for a stronger emphasis on military preparedness on the other hand. As Muroyama suggests, Kubo had to dissuade "the military that supported an autonomous defense buildup by providing them with the role that Japan would repel 'a small-scale limited attack' without external help." And so even if for JDA high-ranking officials - certainly to Sakata and Kubo - the probability of a Soviet attack during a period of easing hostilities between the East and the West was deemed to be low ("slightly possible"), supplemental material to the 1976 NDPO had been revised to emphasize such a threat-scenario, upgrading its risk-probability and thus pacifying irritated military personnel.

This episode provides us with an important insight: rather than a "cold", rational calculation of external military-threat cues, military security threat-assessment is a *politically negotiated* phenomenon between key stakeholders. The following individual accounts by former SDF personnel substantiate this claim.

Individual Accounts: Takeda Gōtarō (ASDF), Kurisu Hiroomi (GSDF), and Yoshida Manabu (MSDF)

Takeda Gōtarō's (ASDF) communicates a strong feeling of discontent with the 1976 NDPO at that time. According to him, the main scenario military personnel were instructed to consider was that of "a surprise attack" (*kishūteki kōgeki*), rather than a conventional full-scale war. Although the annex of the 1976 NDPO did consider the latter scenario, it remained vague about it, noting

that the SDF would rely on the US military in such contingency. In case a full-scale war were to be anticipated five years later, necessary preparations would take place (NIDS 2012, 164). "How can one accurately estimate what will happen in five years?" asks Takeda, further arguing that if a conventional war were to break out, the SDF would have faced numerous challenges such as small reserve-duty force, little ammunition supply, and most importantly, little coordination with the American forces on whose help Japan would have to rely. Specifically, uncertainty about the number of days until the American army would come to the SDF's help, as well as uncertainty about the number of aircrafts and divisions the US would deploy to the area generated a sense of insecurity among SDF personnel.[30] Consequently, Takeda comments that the overall feeling around him (high ranking officers in the ASDF) was of disagreement with Kubo's "no-threat theory", with uniformed personnel viewing the foundations of Japan's defense doctrine as extremely weak (NIDS 2012, 165-66).

Similar grievances about the NDPO were voiced in the other two branches of the SDF. Then Ground Chief of Staff, Kurisu Hiroomi, severely criticizes the 1976 NDPO, claiming that a lack of consideration to the military capabilities of neighboring countries, as well as vague definition of "limited and small scale" attack, the "static" evaluation of the international situation, and the dependence on US military were counterproductive. Kurisu had even called to invalidate the plan immediately.[31] Yoshida Manabu, an officer at the MSDF Chief of Staff Office, states that the MSDF did not embrace the NDPO and Kubo's "no-threat theory", recalling that such issues

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[30] NIDS 2012,166 . While officials in the JDA assumed that US military will be deployed in less than 10 days, Takeda speculated it would have taken a month. Moreover, were the US been militarily involved in a different region, it might have taken more time.

[31] Sebata 2010, 116. Kurisu was later dismissed from his role as Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office in1978, after making a controversial statement in July 1978 during an interview with *Shūkan Posuto,* in which he stated that Japanese troops would be forced to take "actions beyond legal constraints" in case of military emergency". See: Sakamoto 1988, 93; Sasaki 2015, 134-35.

caused concerns among MSDF personnel and led some officers to doubt whether the MSDF would be able to protect Japan in possible contingencies (NIDS 2012, 236).

During the mid 1970s then, Japan's threat assessment was a source for heated debate between uniformed and non-uniformed personnel. The intensity of threat, its risk-probability and risk-consequences were judged more severely by the former group. While military personnel viewed the Soviet threat as direct and probable, civilian officials thought of it as a indirect (latent, possible) threat.

Defense Establishment - Findings

This section examined the phenomenon of threat-perception in the Japanese defense establishment by looking into both the macro and micro levels of analysis and at military and civilian personnel during the 1950s, 1960s and first half of the 1970s. It suggests the following findings.

First, the mainstream approach to Japan's grand strategy in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s pursued autonomy and prestige through economic means (the pragmatist rationality). Military security threats were met by relying on Japan's independent defense capabilities and on the American military power and three main threat-scenarios were identified: a nuclear war, direct aggression, and indirect aggression.

Second, the force-deployment and contingency plans of the SDF were oriented toward meeting the Soviet threat. But, even though Japan's defense policy and force-deployment was "Soviet oriented", and the period between 1950 and 1962 is considered to be the height of the Cold War, it was not before the late 1970s and early 1980s that other domestic actors in Japan - outside of the SDF and defense establishment - had began to consider a Soviet threat seriously.

Third, reflecting on the issue of military threat-perceptions among the defense establishment, it becomes clear that there has been dissent about the *intensity* of the perceived threat between the military personnel and the liberal civilian officials in the JDA. This disagreement reached a climax in the first half of the 1970s, when policy papers and official JDA documents such as the Kubo papers, the "peacetime defense force capabilities", and the 1976 NDPO were circulated. Alleviated security tensions around Japan and the domestic political atmosphere in which high officials in the JDA had to operate collided with the opinions held by military officials, who stressed the likelihood of military conflict with the Soviet Union and Japan's military vulnerabilities.[32]

Fourth, as individual accounts by defense officials demonstrated, military-security threats and risk assessment are a product of political negotiation between key stakeholders to some extent: opinions regarding the likelihood of a threat materializing vary among people, branches and ranks. Overall, military officials in the early 1970s evaluated the Soviet threat as more likely to materialize compared with civilian officials in the Defense Agency. Whereas military officials prioritized stimuli of military buildup, movement and deployment, JDA high officials attached importance to the international environment and to domestic political considerations such as the SDF and JDA's public image as well as to budgetary constraints.

These findings stir up an interesting question: Why did SDF officials assigned higher risk-probability to military threat-scenarios associated with the Soviet Union? Did they know something that the JDA officials did not know? The answer to this question, I argue below, is

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[32] Referring to models of decision making, Sebata Takao claims that from an organizational point of view, since it is in charge of defending the state, the SDF had no choice but to reject the threat-assessment which lowered the possibility and scale of a Soviet attack, while introducing qualitative goals. Similarly, he argues that from a bureaucratic-politics point of view, the JDA had to consider political constraints when formulating new defense strategy. See: Sebata 2010:115.

essentially of psychological nature, and can be found in the manner in which people form attitudes toward something.

2.6 Application of the ABC Model to explain deviations of threat-assessment

The ABC model that describes attitudes (and subsequently, perceptions) with affect, behavioral tendencies and cognitive beliefs can illuminate why SDF personnel evaluated the Soviet threat to be more serious than their counterparts at the JDA.

First, as Tamaki Seiji has pointed out in his oral history testimony, field personnel - "the people at the radar sites" - were more intimidated by the Soviet intrusions to Japan's airspace than the officials in Tokyo. Since they experience stimuli first-hand, field-personnel are indeed inclined to have graver assessment of threat and risk. Whether they monitor Soviet aircraft on the radars or hear the sound of Japanese aircrafts as they scramble to respond to Soviet violations, field personnel may be prone to *feel* more frightened than those who receive second-hand reports of such incidents while sitting in their office hundreds of kilometers away.

Second, as a result of the behavioral tendency of SDF members to *resist* Soviet aggression, the level of perceived exposure to risk among uniformed personnel was likely to be higher. In other words, since the basic purpose of the SDF as an organization was to defend Japan, its very survival as an organization is dependent upon its ability to defend against external threat. Therefore, members of the organization were likely to be invested in fulfilling this task. But how? SDF officials are in charge of confronting Soviet invasion in military, rather than political or economic means. It is in this context that Soviet movements and deployments are judged to be threatening; because SDF personnel, and not Japan's fire-fighters for example, are in charge of managing risks associated with the Soviet military. Thus, the behavioral tendency to

physically fight against a potential enemy, and the higher personal exposure to the subsequent risk(s) serve as "threat multiplier", operating to raise the risk-probability one assigns to the scenario of a Soviet aggression.

In addition to affect and behavioral tendency, the third component of the ABC model may explain why SDF officials viewed the Soviet military threat as more intense compared with their civilian counterparts at the JDA. Personal experience of military stimuli and its implications aside, the cognitive factor of perceived internal weakness ('vulnerability') has played a crucial role in the military personnel's evaluation of the risk-probability of a Soviet military threat-scenario. I elaborate on this point below.

The SDF was perceived by its members as having low capacity to fulfill its role as the defender of Japan against external threats. Considering material conditions, during the period covered in this chapter, the SDF was indeed inferior to the Soviet military strength in terms of capability, preparedness and battle experience.[33] In addition, the SDF had to operate within serious legal restraints that made it extremely difficult to defend against a potential Soviet aggression, or any aggression for that matter.[34]

Subjectively, too, as oral-history testimonies of military personnel indicate, SDF officials perceived technical, organizational, legal and psychological vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Considering the technical point of view, Takeda Gōtarō articulated in the context of the

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[33] In concrete terms, whereas between 1945 and 1960 the Soviets stationed one division of about 20,000 soldiers on these islands, this force had drawn back in 1960-1. Apart from Soviet forces in the stationed just north of Hokkaido, the Soviet Union military had naval and air capabilities in the region.

[34] 'Technical vulnerability' refers to insufficient knowledge or systems in order to manage security risks; 'Organizational vulnerability' denotes the inadequate capacity to manage risks on the organizational level and 'Legal vulnerability' refers to the inadequacy of legislative regulations to manage security risks.

MiG-25 incident that while Japanese military officials had been aware of Japan's vulnerability to incoming low-altitude aircrafts during the 1960s, it was only after the *MiG* incident that politicians allocated the necessary budgets to manage this security threat. From an organizational perspective, Takeda critically evaluated the 1976 NDPO by stating that Japan's small reserve-duty force, little ammunition supply, little coordination with the US forces and the uncertainty about the timing of US military involvement generated a sense of insecurity. From legal and psychological perspectives, Horie Masao testified that the Soviet threat to Hokkaido during the early part of this period was felt to be strong because: (1) the Soviet force was superior and gradually increasing (2) Japan's exclusive defense policy and specifically the ban on building military fortifications on private land meant that in case of a military contingency, the GSDF had to confront the Soviet force while being totally *exposed (*NIDS 2012, 261). Similarly, Takeda recalls that following the *MiG* 25 incident, SDF commanders were instructed to obey the principle of avoiding the use of force, meaning that even if Soviet aircrafts were to approach Japanese airspace, he would have to disobey the instructions in order to tell his pilots to intercept them. Taken together, these technical, organizational, legal, and psychological vulnerabilities generated a strong belief among SDF personnel regarding the internal weakness of the organization vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In other words, they judged the Soviet Union to be potentially dangerous to Japan.

In conclusion, the analysis above indicates that the perception of military-security threats and subsequent risks are - at the collective level - a politically negotiated phenomenon. At the individual level, perception of military threat is conditioned by the level of exposure to threatening stimulus and the fear it generates, the organization to which one belongs to (and its expected behavioral tendency), and the cognitive beliefs about the capacity of the organization to

fulfill its role (or the internal weakness of the actor vis-à-vis a certain entity). The stronger the value attributed to each of the ABC components, the stronger the evaluation of military threat-scenarios, both in terms of threat-scenario (limited scale or large scale Soviet invasion) and risk-probability.

2. 7 Military Threat Perceptions of the Soviet Union during the Early Postwar Period: the Political Establishment

After surveying military-security perceptions of the Soviet Union among the defense establishment, this section examines the same phenomenon among Japan's political establishment. I analyze policy speeches given by Japanese PM at the beginning of Diet sessions, examine the political communication regarding a Soviet threat by using the online-archive search-engine of the Diet, and draw on available literature and declassified documents. The questions that guide this section are: How did political figures frame the Soviet military threat in the Diet between 1950 and 1975? Had there been attempts at securitization of the Soviet military threat? If so, by whom and how?

During the early postwar period, the Soviet Union was not framed publicly as a direct *military* threat to Japan by Japan's political leadership. In-fact, the use of the word "threat", or "hypothetical enemy" was consistently and intentionally avoided by the political leadership. Broader terms outlined in Japan's BPND denoting a military threat-scenario such as "direct aggression" and "in-direct aggression" were more common in the national conversation than country-specific terminology such as 'Soviet submarines', 'Soviet missiles', 'Soviet invasion' or 'Soviet nuclear weapons'. Although during the early postwar period a number of right-wing politicians such as Ishihara Shintaro, Aikawa Katsuroku, and Tsuji Masanobu did raise alarm vis-à-vis the Soviet military deployment and conduct, their statements were limited in number when

compared to later periods covered in this study. Finally, while the Soviet threat was not securitized in a military context, Japan's political elites from the ruling party did publicly frame communism as an existential *political* threat to Japan. In addition to the securitization of communism as a political threat by Japan's mainstream political leadership, another securitization move was advanced during this period. Japan's peace intellectuals (such as the Danwakai) and left-wing politicians perceived and framed the threat-scenario of a nuclear war as an extreme military danger to Japan. This section proceeds to identify the securitization of the Soviet Union in a political context before moving to introduce the broader national discourse about military threats.

2.7.1 Securitization of the Soviet Union Threat in a Political Context: Examination of PM Policy Speeches 1948 - 1951

This section aims to reveal securitization moves in respect to the Soviet Union in annual policy-speeches delivered by Prime Minister Yoshida (1948 - 1954) as well as other incidents of political communication such as Diet deliberations and media reports during the 1950s.[35] Seven policy speeches given by Yoshida Shigeru were sampled in total: all were made between December 1948 and January 1951. Overall, the speeches demonstrate that Yoshida prioritized economic reconstruction over anything else, emphasizing the revival of Japan's economy and people's well being. That being said, Yoshida did identify external and domestic dangers and associated these dangers with the "radical ideology" of communism. Sensitive to both external developments in the Far East and domestic unrest, Yoshida mentioned different threats, referent objects, and risk-measures depending on the period in which the speech was made. The analysis

[35] In order to enhance the quality of findings, I explored for securitization moves of issues that are not limited to military sector but also in the political, societal, and environmental sectors. For a discussion about the significance of Policy Speeches see the Methodology section.

identifies the Korean war as a critical juncture after-which a securitization move of the communist political threat was made.

PM Yoshida Shigeru's Policy Speeches

Yoshida Shigeru delivered his first policy speech as head of state upon his re-election to a second term as Prime Minister on December 4, 1948. In the speech, Yoshida mentions the following policy themes: revising Japan's National Civcil Servant Law, approving the reconstruction budget and hasting the return of more than 400,000 Japanese nationals still abroad as a result of the war. Yoshida further stresses the importance of sound economic measures, democratic education, the Peace Treaty and the constitution and the love for one's country in reconstructing Japan. He does not mention military security threats whatsoever.[36]

Yoshida delivered his second policy speech on April 4, 1949. Similar to the previous speech, Yoshida emphasizes reconstruction; he also extends gratitude for the support the allied countries gave Japan and mentions the need to repatriate about 400,000 Japanese nationals.

But unlike the previous speech,Yoshida comments about external and internal security affairs. Internationally, he notes "rumors" among the public regarding future "dangerous" course of Japan's international situation, hoping to alleviate such concerns. Domestically, Yoshida refers to what critics had defined as a political division between "extreme left" and "extreme right" among the Japanese society and comments that although he believes that most of the Japanese desire political stability and economic reconstruction, "We also have to acknowledge the regretful reality in which there is a minority of people who wish to disturb our motherland's

[36] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19481204.SWJ.html Accessed on February 16, 2016.

reconstruction by resorting to various measures." [37] Yoshida concludes his speech by expressing a desire to position Japan as an "honored member" of the international society as soon as possible.

On November 8, 1949 Yoshida delivered his next policy speech. He begins by commenting on the looming Peace Treaty and on the gradual restoration of diplomatic relations with the international community. He presents his views on Japan's security posture, and asserts that Japan should be a demilitarized (*hibusō)*, peace-loving, civilized nation that renounces war and contributes to the international society in a positive manner. Yoshida reflects on Japan's past and maintains that as a result of insufficient knowledge of the world and excessive emphasis on military force, "We have disrupted world's peace, dishonored our history, hindered national prosperity, lost sons, husbands, parents, and brought about unprecedented misfortune as the world's enemy." [38] His plan, therefore, was to guarantee Japan's national security by avoiding having arms, and by reaffirming Japan's identity as a peaceful nation. Next, Yoshida moves to discuss diverse issues among which is the issue of repatriation; he mentions that although many Japanese had returned home, still thousands are kept in Siberia and areas held by Communist China and that this situation is a cause of great concern. Finally, Yoshida concludes with a reference to the social unrest generated by what he terms to be an irrational attraction to "radical foreign ideology", calling the public to resist such disrupting tendency. [39]

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[37] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed on February 16, 2016.http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19490404.SWJ.html

[38] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed on February 17, 2016. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19491108.SWJ.html

[39] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed on February 17, 2016. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19491108.SWJ.html

On January 23, 1950, Yoshida delivered another policy speech. He begins by commenting on the continued improvement of economic conditions, and on the "accurate judgement" of the Japanese people in regards to "radical ideology" (*kageki shisō)* as demonstrated in the results of the recent elections which favored his conservative camp. He then examines the situation in the countries surrounding Japan. "The political situation in China is unstable... and South-East Asia feels extreme threat from the activities of communist elements there." Here Yoshida uses the expression *hijō na kyoui* ("extreme threat") to denote the first Indochina War (1945-1954) and maintains that such circumstances are "regrettable" when considering peace and the security environment of the Far East. Yoshida restates Japan's security framework as a democratic, peaceful country in accordance with its war-renouncing constitution, but he also adds that abrogation of war does not mean the renouncement of the right to self-defense (*jieiken*). Finally, Yoshida mentions that his government will continue to examine the situation of the "detained compatriots" in the Soviet Union and concludes by highlighting the government's resolve to settle this issue by exerting all efforts.[40]

On July 14, 1950, Yoshida addressed the Diet in another policy speech. He begins by discussing the revised law of local tax and moves to discuss the sudden invasion of South Korea by North Korea and the efforts of the United Nations to restore the peaceful situation in the Peninsula. "But, unfortunately", says Yoshida, "a situation of chaos emerged in Korea", and this should concern Japan, "as the threat of the communist force has already been approaching Japan." Yoshida then employes expressions such as "the red aggressors" and "evil influence" when relating to the communist forces. He further argues that Japan is already under danger

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[40] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed on February 17, 2016. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19500123.SWJ.html

(*kiken*) of the communist threat, and that the public is concerned about how a demilitarized Japan would secure itself in case a large-scale war were to break out. Yoshida opines that although Japan is in no position to actively participate in the efforts of the United Nations, the government will seek to cooperate with the organization according to Japan's capabilities.

On the debate about Japan's preferred risk-measures in the international arena, Yoshida takes a critical stance in this speech, suggesting that the policy options of "complete peace" (*zeznmen kōwa)* and "permanent neutrality" (*eisei chūritsu*) are, "dissociated from reality." He cautions against falling into what he terms, "the trap of the Communist Party's ideology", and argues that Japan's stability and security would come from the pursuit of peace and international justice *alongside* the liberal nations of the world. Commenting on "internal communist forces", PM Yoshida singles out the central committee members of the Japan Community Party (JCP) and the editors of its party newspaper "red flag" (*akahata*) in the context of a disturbance to public order and democracy. He asserts that his government will continue to take legal measures against such subversive (*hakai bunshi*) organizations and activities.[41] He also presents in this context the recent decision to increase Japan's independent capabilities with a police force of 75,000 men (the "National Police Reserve", NPR) and a Coast Guard of 8,000 men, which had been authorized by General MacArthur a week earlier. Japan's Coast Guard, asserts Yoshida, is crucial in order to protect Japan's long coast line from infiltrators and

[41] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed on February 17, 2016. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19500714.SWJ.html

smuggling, and together with the National Rural Police and the local government the country's public order will be protected.[42]

Using the ST as a point of reference, did PM Yoshida 'securitize' the Soviet Union issue during the final policy speech mentioned above? Did he use security terminology as the ST posits, advocating for extra-ordinary measures to counter it? Interestingly, PM Yoshida did not employ country-specific terminology, cautioning instead against a broad, *urgent* "communist threat" from both outside and inside Japan. Yet, by associating communism with threat, and by linking extra-ordinary measures to the domestic manifestation of the communist threat, Yoshida essentially makes a securitization move against the political ideology of communism. The referent objects of the securitization move in that point in time were (1) public order and (2) Japan's economic reconstruction, but not necessarily Japan's "sovereignty" or "security".

On November 24, 1950, Yoshida delivered another policy speech. Commenting on the "regrettable" (*ikan*) continuation of the Korean War, he refines the harsh language he had employed toward the communist camp in the previous speech and emphasizes his desire for peace in the region and in the world.[43]

On January 26, 1951, Yoshida opens his policy speech by commenting on the Korean War: "The participation of communist China's army in the Korean War complicates the situation all the more." Since Japan is a democracy, he asserts, it is expected to assume a position along

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[42] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed on February 17, 2016. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19500714.SWJ.html

[43] He then moves to comment about annual supplementary budget, government workers' wages, citizens tax, international trade, infrastructure, response to natural disasters and concludes with repatriation of overseas Japanese. See: The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed on February 20, 2016. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19501124.SWJ.html

side the liberal nations such as the US and UK. Yoshida discusses the forthcoming Peace treaty, arguing against the option of re-armament by saying that, "A state's security and independence are not determined by military capabilities alone." [44]

To reflect on the speeches sampled above, then, Yoshida's securitizing move vis-à-vis the communist threat in the political sector is gradual and links between external and domestic elements of this entity. International and domestic security affairs were first mentioned in the second policy-speech made in April 1949, when Yoshida vaguely referred to domestic elements - "a political minority"- whose aim is to disrupt the "reconstruction of the mother land" (actually referring to communist activists). Later in November that year, Yoshida linked between the political minority and "radical foreign ideology", still avoiding a clear language when depicting the communist threat. Yoshida's tone changed significantly in July 1950 during his first policy speech after the outburst of the Korean War. He employed harsh language of "communist threat", and linked the aggression in Korea with domestic "disturbing" elements further implying urgency. This is the first policy-speech in which Yoshida discards the vague terminology he used in former speeches, actually naming two domestic elements: the Communist Party central committee and the editors of its newspaper. He also advocated for legal measures against these two elements, and presented the recent decision to increase Japan's police force and Coast Guard in this context.

The evolution of Yoshida's securitization move of the communist political threat is also apparent in terms of the risk-measures he advocated for. The PM's first reference to Japan's national security measures was made in November 1949, when he advocated a demilitarized

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[44]The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed on February 20, 2016. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19510126.SWJ.html

posture in the international arena as the best guarantee to ensure Japan's security. In January 1950, Yoshida made an important addition to the latter statement by mentioning that the renouncement of war does not mean renouncement of the right for self-defense. Next, in speeches he made after the Korean War had broken out, Yoshida argued that Japan's stability and security would come from the pursuit of peace and international justice *alongside* the liberal nations of the world, thus rejecting the policy of 'unarmed neutrality'. Finally, in the speech he made in January 1951, Yoshida also rejected the option of 'full-rearmament'. By doing so, Yoshida essentially positioned Japan's risk measures strategy as hedging between armed and unarmed role, between ideological support for the liberal camp but not an active military support.

Yoshida's hesitance to rearm is better understood when considering two points in a psychological context: Yoshida's stance on Japan's militarist past and his belief about the likelihood of a Soviet military invasion of Japan. First, Yoshida demonstrated a strong anti-militaristic attitude about Japan's recent history. His November 1949 speech leaves no doubt about his attitude toward militarism and its dire consequences for Japan. Two, Yoshida seemed to have maintained a cognitive belief according to which the Soviet Union will not invade Japan with military forces in the form of direct aggression, but in the form of ideological disturbance. He maintained this belief even after the outbreak of the Korean War. On 13 January 1951, Yoshida said to a former Japanese diplomat that,

> [With the] situation objectively viewed, both blocs will never go to an all-out war. [The] present confrontation will eternally continue, though, from time to time, there will be ups and downs, during which [Japan] should not be tricked by psychological warfare claiming, 'War will break out soon.' I think that the Soviet Union will never invade Japan" (Shibayama 2008, 18).

Yoshida, claim several scholars, has not retracted this belief since then (Shibayama 2008, 18; Williamson 2014, 66). During a meeting with US Ambassador John Foster Dulles held on

January 31 1951, Yoshida told his counterpart that "there was no immediate danger" in East-Asia, and that he foresaw a danger materializing in Europe (Shibayama 2008, 18).[45]

The findings of the analysis above call for closer examination of the impact of the US assessment of the Soviet threat over Yoshida's beliefs about the likelihood of a Soviet invasion. While such a thorough evaluation falls outside of the current analysis, it is worthwhile to note that the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson (who served between 1949 - 1953) has indicated that the primary scenario threatening Japan was not a Soviet direct attack in the form of military invasion, but a covert operation, a "conspiracy inspired by the Kremlin...conducted by Japanese. It is essentially a conspiracy from within - and whether it succeeds depends primarily on the political, economic, and social health of Japan." As a proposed risk-measure, the State Department opted for increasing internal-defense mechanism such as the NPR and other measures to enable a "pro-Western orientation" in Japan such as force reduction and the conclusion of a Peace Treaty (Schonberger 1989, 242). Acheson's statement suggests that the State Department had deemed indirect - not direct Soviet aggression - as more likely: Yoshida's terminology seem to had reflected the American assessment.[46] To recall, Yoshida had only pin-pointed the domestic elements of the communist threat by name, but not the countries behind it.

The framing of the communist issue as an urgent political threat and its subsequent securitization had outlasted Yoshida's premiership and can be traced in the tenure of Japan's PM Hatoyama Ichirō, too. Hatoyama, a prominent nationalist representing an opposition figure to Yoshida's line and critical of the legacy of the American occupation including article 9 of the

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[45] Yoshida also admitted that he had limited information about contemporary security affairs.

[46] Other opinions in the US about the dangers Japan faces from the Soviet Union existed of course. For the sake of simplification, though, I treat the US here as a unitary actor as its communication with the Japanese was confined to specific channels during that period.

constitution and the security treaty, became Japan's PM on December 1954. While he sought a more neutral foreign policy line toward the Soviet Union and other communist nations (Aruga 1998, 140), he was still critical of communism in a political and ideological sense.

Critical Hatoyama was, but also cautious as not to frame the Soviet Union and China as military security threats. The following remark is a case in point. On June 17, 1955, Hatoyama stated in the Diet that, "I believe that we have to scrutinize communism. And I believe we have to defend against communism *ideologically*, but, as I have already said in the past, it is not advisable to identify the Soviet Union as well as communist China as *hypothetical enemies*." [47] This statement is interesting because it suggests that Hatoyama had a psychological bias *against* framing the Soviet Union or China as military threats ("hypothetical enemies"). By declaring that such a view is not "advisable", Hatoyama essentially excluded a securitization of both the Soviet Union and China as military threats.

2.7.2 The Political Discourse About Military Security Scenarios

During the late 1940s and 1950s, then, the Soviet Union was securitized politically but not militarily by Japan's political leadership. An examination of Japan's broader political conversation in the Diet corroborates the latter finding. As can be seen in Figure 4 below, the number of specific references made to "Soviet threat" between 1952 and 1976 is extremely low, with only 10 references.[48] In addition, none of the references were made to inflate a Soviet

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[47] National Diet Archives, June 17, 1955. House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee Correspondence 5.

[48] I searched for the following expressions: *sobieto kyoui, sobieto no kiyoui, soren kyoui* and *soren no kyoui*.

military threat.[49] Consequently, a terminology of a "Soviet threat" simply did not exist in Japan's national political conversation between 1952 and 1976.

Figure 4 - References for Specific Threats in Diet Deliberations 1952 - 1992



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

This is not to argue that Japanese political elites disregarded a potential military threat from the Soviet Union throughout this period, either.

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[49] The following three examples demonstrate this tendency.* In November 1953, Katō Kanjū (JSP) discussed NATO and emphasized that whereas European countries joined NATO because of their fear of the Soviet threat, this is not the case for Japan [there is no such feeling of threat]; see: National Diet Archives, Foreign Affairs Committee - House of Representatives, 1 November 1953. Correspondence 4. ** In a question he referred to PM Hatoyama on March 23, 1956 asks JSP representative whether Japan is not taking part in the anti-Soviet threat efforts as led by the US by developing its defense capabilities. PM Hatoyama denounces this idea, saying that he does not think that Japan should play a role in American military expansion; see: National Diet Archives, Budget Committee - House of Councilors, 23 March 1956. Correspondence 8. *** On June 1967, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Miwa Yoshio mentioned the Soviet threat in a discussion he held with Ooide Shun (JSP). Miwa was asked about SDF trainings and defense planning, denying that the SDF have an hypothetical enemy in mind. "Unlike NATO members who call attention to a Soviet threat, we are striving for good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union"; see National Diet Archives, Cabinet Committee - House of Representatives, 29 June 1967. Correspondence 11.

First, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, diplomatic correspondence between the Japanese government and the Soviets in the aftermath of the revision of the security treaty between Japan and the US and the "U-2 incident" (1960) did generate tensions and even implicit Soviet threats against Japan. Second, a number of defense hawks inside the LDP did push for legislative measures including emergency preparedness, civil defense, and the institution of martial law in times of military crisis (Green 1992, 29). Third, rather than a straight-forward "Soviet threat" terminology, threat-scenarios and subsequent risks were framed in terms of (1) a nuclear conflict between the superpowers (*kakusensō)* that has the potential to spill over to Japan (2) direct aggression, and (3) indirect aggression.[50] Whereas in the Soviet context, direct aggression (*chokusetsu shinryaku*) pertained to a military invasion that would most likely target Hokkaido, an indirect aggression (*kansetsu shinryaku*) denoted negative consequences as a result of Soviet agents or revolutionary activities led by political actors such as the Japan Communist Part (JCP). I summarize the number of references made to these three threat-scenarios in the Diet in Table 8.[51] As Table 8 demonstrates, while the three broad threat-scenarios were communicated in Diet deliberations between 1946 and 1976 in relatively large numbers (585 for 'direct aggression', 547 for 'indirect aggression', and 398 for 'nuclear war'), specific terms such as "Soviet submarines" or "Soviet aggression" were only mentioned 45 and 37 times respectively. [52] The "threat of communism" (associated with the political context and not military context of

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[50] I would like to thank Honma Go, colleague in the University of Tokyo, for this comment.

[51] For comparison purposes, specific threat-components and threat-scenarios such as "Soviet submarines" and "Soviet aggression" were also sampled. Also, Figure 4 shows data all the way until 1992, in order to add time-perspective to the analysis.

[52] Other specific terms such as "Soviet attack" and "Soviet invasion" were mentioned even less in the Diet. I used both "attack" (*kōgeki)*, "invasion" (*shin'nyū*) and "aggression" (*shinryaku)* as well as "*soren*" and "*sobieto*" in order to maximize the results and the result mentioned above is the amalgamation of all these possible combinations.

security) was also communicated more times than specific terms, with 101 times references for the period until 1976. Of-course, this term may include references to other non-Soviet forces, such as communist China and North Korea. I return to this issue later in this chapter. To follow, Table 8 presents the political communication of these aspects during the period between 1946 and 1976 in overall numbers and Figure 4 presents references by year for the period between 1946 and 1992; I elaborate on the quantitative findings below.

Table 8: Number of References to Military-Security Scenarios and Soviet Military Components in Diet Deliberations 1946 - 1976

Threat Scenario / Component	Number of References	Type
"Direct Aggression"	585	Broad: Military Sector
"Indirect Aggression"	547	Broad: Political Sector
"Nuclear War"	398	Broad: Military Sector
"Soviet Submarines"	45	Specific: Military Sector
"Soviet Aggression / Attack / Invasion "	37	Specific: Military Sector
"Soviet Nuclear Weapons"	14	Specific: Military Sector
"Soviet Missiles"	11	Specific: Military Sector

*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

It is important to note that a significant part of the references made to the three "broad" types of military and political-security scenarios ("direct aggression", "indirect aggression", and "nuclear war") were *not* communicated in the context of military-security threats to Japan, but in the context of the political debate on Japan's preferred risk-measures. Thus, for example, the peak in references to both "direct" and "indirect" aggressions in 1954 can be attributed to the legal

debate about the SDF law that reached a climax during that year and not to rising military tensions (suggesting growing perception of a military threat). In other words, the high number of references to these scenarios is not associated with heightened perceptions of military security threats but are better explained by inter-party rivalry. As Figure 5 demonstrates, while the first half of the 1950s was a period marked by intense political debate concerning "direct" and "indirect" aggression, since 1955, the debate had abated.

Another point about the data has to be made. In many cases, references to both broad and specific terms were made by opposition representatives. But rather than attempting to inflate the perception of military scenarios or components of the Soviet military threat, opposition members aimed to achieve the opposite: they pointed out the "exaggeration" of these terms by the government or other actors, thereby deflating the threat associated with this term (for example, the Soviet Union). However, these quantitative data are valuable because even if we can not identify the content of political communication, e.g. whether it was made to inflate or deflate a specific threat or whether it was in the context of perceived security dangers or Japan's security measures, the very reference *itself* means that the issue was mentioned in Japan's political discourse. Therefore, high number of references to political communication episode(s) may indicate a period whereby *heightened* inter-subjective negotiation between socio-political actors about military-threat perceptions took place.[53]

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[53] An opposite assumption renders low number of references to a particular object as a possible "agreement" between political actors about the content of a certain episode. So, for example, a period of low references to "communist threat" does not necessarily mean that such a threat was not perceived, but rather that such a threat was perceived to be present, and hence there was no need of "discussing" it. I reject this assumption simply because we are dealing here with an open, political stage in which political representatives are expected to push issues that they deem important, or of high-priority. And so, if a party member perceived a threat, he is expected to act on it, and raise the issue in order to promote policy measures to counter it. I thank my colleague, Josh Cader, for raising this point.

Figure 5 : Number of References to Threat and Threat-Scenarios in Diet Deliberations by Year 1946 - 1992



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

Nuclear War [54]

While Japanese intellectuals addressed the issue of nuclear war as early as the late 1940s, references to "nuclear war" in the political discourse have been rather scarce before the 1960s. One prominent group of intellectuals dealing with peace and security issues was the Peace Issues Discussion Group (*Heiwa Mondai Danwakai*), whose ideas about cooperation, peaceful coexistence and unarmed neutrality shaped Japan's national discourse about security as well as

[54] In order to narrow the focus of the sample, I searched for references to "Soviet Union" *and* "Nuclear War". Such combination appeared 112 times in Diet deliberations, first appearing in 1957.

the Japan Socialist Party's (JSP) security policy (Hook 1996, 26-41). The group members advocated for peaceful measures and cautioned against the destructive force of nuclear weapons. In December 1950, the Danwakai published a statement in the magazine *Sekai*, which stipulated that, "The idealistic position holding peace to be the supreme value and war to be the absolute evil has become, as a result of war reaching the nuclear stage, at the same time highly realistic" (Hook 1996, 34).

The latter half of 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s brought heightened security tensions between the US and the Soviet Union, and between Japan and the Soviet Union to a lesser degree. However, a scenario of an all-out nuclear war between the US and USSR was perceived to be rather unlikely, since both sides would encounter great losses.[55] Defense strategists assumed a threat-scenario of a *limited-scale war* with the potential to deteriorate to a nuclear conflict as more plausible than an all-out nuclear war. The Japanese defense establishment at the time was also aware that Soviet Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) were not targeting Japan.[56] Interestingly, once again Japanese perceptions of the threat-scenario of nuclear war were in-line with US security doctrine which since the end of the 1950s re-oriented itself toward limited war, rather than "massive retaliation" in terms of nuclear weapons.

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[55] In a Diet deliberation on September 11, 1957, JDA DG Tsushima Juichi stated that since Japan lacked nuclear weapons and forbade US nuclear weapons from its territory, then in the unlikely scenario that a nuclear war broke out and Japan became the target of direct aggression, "our country would have no other option but to rely on the US or the international community for security guarantees." See: National Diet Archives, Cabinet Committee - House of Councilors, September 11, 1957. Correspondence 18. The following year (March 15, 1958) Tsushima stated that although there was a great danger in case of an-all out nuclear war between the East and the West broke out, this era was yet to come. He expressed a general belief that doomsday weapons would not be put to use. See: National Diet Archives, House of Councilors, Budgetary Committee, 15 March 1958. Accessed January 15, 2014, from Kokkai.ndl.go.jp.

[56] National Diet Archives, House of Councilors, Budgetary Committee, 15 March 1958. Accessed January 15, 2014, from Kokkai.ndl.go.jp.

This shift was a result of the end of US monopoly on nuclear weapons and enhanced Soviet capabilities in terms of ICBM (Sokolovsky 1963).

Direct Aggression

The political discourse concerning 'direct aggression' took place in two contexts: the general legal context of Japan's risk-measure strategy, meaning, the desirable measures to maintain its security in the world, and the particular context of an armed attack from the Soviet Union.

An example of the first type is found in the following statement. On July 30, 1953, Ashida Hitoshi, a nationalist politician who served as Japan's PM in 1948 and as representative of the short-lived *Kaishintō* Party (Constitutional Reform Part led by Shigemitsu Mamoru), criticized the government's risk-measures strategy of relying on the US defense commitment: "in the case of foreign invasion of Japan, American soldiers will defend Japan and Japanese will watch from the back while playing pachinko. Is this [the government] plan?."[57] To this question, Director-General of the National Safety Force (*hoantai*) Kimura Tokutarō responded that while every independent country should be able to defend itself, under the current circumstances, especially the financial constraints and the "mental-state" of the citizens, Japan can not afford to develop such a capacity, and therefore, he continued, "I regret to say that in case of foreign enemy's invasion, we will have to rely on US forces stationed in Japan and on the National Safety Force for maintaining peace and order."[58] The focus of this type of communication is therefore Japan's

[57] Ashida has played an important role in interpreting Japan's post-war constitution so that it would enable the right to use force for self-defense (Williamson 2014, 55-6). See: National Diet Archives, July 30, 1953. House of Representatives - Budget Committee, Correspondence 2. Accessed on January 17, 2016.

[58] See: National Diet Archives, July 30, 1953. House of Representatives - Budget Committee, Correspondence 2. Accessed on January 17, 2016.

risk-measures to maintain its security, whereby external aggression was equated with foreign invasion as a *theoretical* scenario (and not as a practical one). To recall, soon after Ashida's statement in the Diet (in September 1953), the leaders of the progressive and the conservative parties - Yoshida and Shigemitsu - reached a political agreement according to which Japan's defense force would be in charge of repelling direct aggression.

The second type of political communication regarding 'direct aggression' pertains to a potential Soviet military threat and is demonstrated in the following two examples. On October 25, 1951, Professor Imanaka Tsugumao (1893-1980) elaborated on the scenarios of direct and indirect aggression during a Diet deliberation about the Peace Treaty and US-Japan security framework. Imanaka argued that there was no external threat to Japan at present, since communist ideology was not promoting aggression but only the support for peoples' " right [of] self-determination." Although communist countries have been assisting North Korea during the Korea War, admitted Imanaka, this was in-line with their ideology. As long as Japan remains a peaceful country, Imanaka contended, the official stance of communism would reject aggression against Japan. However, if the current policy of maintaing US troops on Japanese soil persisted, Japan would expose itself to direct aggression.[59] The second example is dated to March 25, 1952 (in the midst of the Korean War), when Yamashita Gishin (JSP) referred to reports made in the *Sankei Shinbun* about "Soviet enormous military capabilities in the Far East, including Siberia, Karafuto (Sakhalin), and the Sea of Japan, and their preparedness to conduct military operations". Yamashita asked PM Yoshida to explain to the public his stance concerning the Soviet threat of a "direct aggression". PM Yoshida responded by saying that although he received

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[59] National Diet Archives, October 25, 1951. House of Councilors - Ad-hoc Committee for the Peace Treaty and US-Japan Security Framework, Correspondence 3. Accessed on February 2, 2016.

partial information about the state of affairs in Korea, currently the government was in no position to judge the accuracy of such information as it does not have an independent intelligence mechanism. By saying that, Yoshida has in effect, avoided to comment about a Soviet Union military threat.[60] Both examples deal directly with the potential for a Soviet direct aggression, but rather than inflating a Soviet military threat, they weigh in a different factor, namely Japan's security relationship with the US.

Indirect Aggression

The scenario of indirect aggression denoted negative consequences as a result of the activities of either Soviet (or Chinese) agents or domestic political actors affiliated with the communists. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the scenario of indirect aggression was given the highest priority among Japanese political elites as a result of the relative success of the JCP in the 1949's elections (won about 10 percent of the popular vote) and the violence instigated by communists in Japan during the Korean War. Both PM Yoshida and PM Hatoyama showed a tendency to over-emphasize indirect aggression and de-emphasize the scenario of an external invasion (Williamson 2014, 66-67).

Similar to the observation about 'direct aggression', the political communication concerning 'in-direct aggression' took place in two contexts: the general legal context of Japan's risk-measures to maintain its security in the world, and the particular context of in-direct aggression by the Soviet Union or "communist forces". As Figure 5 displays, 'indirect aggression' was mentioned most frequently around 1954 when the SDF was created and political representatives fiercely debated whether the SDF should be designed to deal with indirect

[60] National Diet Archives, March 25, 1952. House of Councilors - Budget Committee Correspondence 12.

aggression, as memories of Japan's militarist regime and oppression of civilians were fresh.

The following two examples illuminate the different applications of the term 'indirect aggression'. On June 17, 1955, Ootsubo Yasuo, a representative of the right wing oriented Liberal Party, asked PM Hatoyama to elaborate on the meaning of 'indirect aggression', and specifically whether it denoted a foreign instigation by communist countries or domestic instigation by Japan's Communist Party. PM Hatoyama replied that 'indirect aggression' refers to "all aspects of communism", essentially treating both Japan's Communist Party and the communist nations with the same political caution.[61] The second example can be seen in an exchange between JSP representative and JDA official. On July 8, 1970, JSP representative criticized the JDA for what he believed to be an attempt to portray the Soviet Union and communism as a threat while using vague terms such as indirect aggression.[62] Interestingly, both examples share one theme in common: they underline the unclear meaning of the term 'indirect aggression'.

The Communist Threat

As mentioned above, the political term of "communist threat" was employed 102 times between 1946 and 1976, ten times more than the number of references made to the term "Soviet threat". Figure 6 below presents data about the 'communist threat' as communicated in the Diet by the two main political actors between 1950 and 1975. As can be seen, the debate about the communist threat was more equal in terms of number of references when compared to other

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[61] National Diet Archives, June 17, 1955. House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee Correspondence 5.

[62] National Diet Archives, July 8, 1970. House of Councilors - Cabinet Committee, Correspondence 30.

debates (for example the debate about military threats associated with specific actors such as the Soviet Union or China in which opposition members made the majority of references as a way to criticize government policies).

Figure 6 : Number of Utterances of "Communist Threat" by Political Actor 1950 - 1975



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/

These data suggest that rather than a country-specific threat, the main debate about security threats in the early postwar period was about the broader "communist threat".

Other Components of the Soviet Union Military Threat

A number of right-wing political figures cautioned against other components of the Soviet military, thereby inflating a perception of a Soviet military threat. The following instances of political communication demonstrate the lack of trust toward the Soviet Union, the threat-scenario of a Soviet attack, and the issues of Soviet submarines and military build-up. In May 1955, in an exchange with Aikawa Katsuroku (Liberal Party) about the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, claimed PM Hatoyama that "the Soviet Union would not attack Japan without a reason". Aikawa then challenged Hatoyama and asked whether the

Soviet Union had a reason to attack Japan at the end of the Second World War, while both countries were signatories of the non-aggression pact. "Isn't that a case where the Soviet Union attacked Japan for no reason?". To this question, Hatoyama responded by saying that recent Soviet efforts to prevent a war between China and Taiwan proves that the Soviet Union strives to avoid war and maintain regional stability. Hatoyama further argued that even in the US no-one believes that the Soviet Union desires war.[63] In March 1958, Tsuji Masanobu (LDP) stated at a Cabinet Committee deliberation that, "Whereas the Americans can compete with the Soviets in the air and on the sea-surface, they can not compete with Soviet capabilities under the sea...". Therefore, argued Tsuji, the MSDF has to fill this gap.[64] Similar sporadic statements inflating the Soviet Union threat were made by DSP representative and LDP representative such as Ishihara Shintarō. In a Budget Committee meeting held on March 15, 1969, Ishihara doubted the sincerity behind the Soviets' "Asian diplomacy" and maintained that the number of Soviet submarines and ships in Asia water has dramatically increased. Subsequently, Ishihara called to take a proactive defense policy that ensures the maritime routes taken by oil-tankers all the way to the Persian Gulf.[65] Finally, Japanese high officials were also sensitive to Soviet military build up in the Far East in the early 1970s, as a private statement by PM Tanaka reveals. To recall, rising tensions between the Soviet Union and China in the end of the 1960s resulted in a Soviet increase of its force from 30 divisions in 1970 to 44 divisions a year later (Dian 2014, 73). During a summit meeting with US President Ford on November 20, 1974, stated PM Tanaka that, "Whereas Japan

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[63] National Diet Archives, May 12, 1955. House of Representatives - Budget Committee Correspondence 11.

[64] National Diet Archives, March 7, 1958. House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee Correspondence 7.

[65] National Diet Archives, March 15, 1969. House of Councilors - Budget Committee. Correspondence 26.

does not assess China as a major threat to Japan's security... the Soviet military forces deployed in Siberia along the Chinese border may at the same time also be viewed as a threat to Japan. Therefore Japan is most sensitive to the Soviet military build-up in Siberia." [66]

To conclude this section, although an attempt to securitize the Soviet Union as a *direct military* threat or to frame the Soviet Union as an enemy to Japan is lacking during the period between 1952 and 1976, several political figures did draw attention to Soviet *threat-components*, as well as to the relative balance between US and Soviet military power. In addition, attempts to securitize the scenarios of a nuclear war and indirect aggression were made from both sides of the political spectrum.

2.8 Summary - Military Threat Perceptions of the Soviet Union 1950-1975

This chapter examined early postwar perceptions of military-security threat associated with the Soviet Union among Japan's defense and political establishments. It found the following conclusions:

First, military personnel in Japan perceived a Soviet threat in the military context and were specifically concerned with the scenario of a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido. Differences among military and civilian officials appeared during the 1970s. In order to explain why SDF personnel evaluated the Soviet military threat in graver terms than their civilian counterparts in the JDA, I applied the ABC model and interpreted these differences to be a result of direct experience of stimuli (hence greater fear among uniformed personnel), the behavioral tendency to resist a Soviet attack and the subsequent higher perceived exposure to risk among SDF

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[66] See: National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Memorandum of Conversation, November 20, 1974. Accessed December 30, 2013, from http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/guides/findingaid/Memoranda_of_Conversations.asp#Box14 ;

members, and finally, their cognitive belief about the SDF's perceived weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.[67]

Second, I discerned three main danger-judgements about the *intensity* of the Soviet military threat in early postwar Japan. One, the Soviet Union with its dishonest nature, great military capabilities, deployment and movements in the Far East posed a *direct* military threat to Japan. Two, the Soviet Union posed an existential political threat as part of a communist menace but only an *indirect* military threat to Japan. Three, in itself, the Soviet Union did not pose a threat to Japan; however, it did so in the context of the US-Japan security relationship (and, therefore, Japan must eliminate this relationship). Supporters of the last judgement were also inclined to securitize the threat-scenario of nuclear war as an *existential* danger.

Third, in terms of the *distribution* of the danger-judgements among Japan's defense and political establishments, the first danger-judgement was held by SDF personnel and several right-wing politicians; the second danger-judgement was mostly held by Japan's mainstream leadership and civilian officials in the JDA, and the third danger-judgement was held across Japan's political left. While only a minority of early postwar Japanese held to the first judgment, the second and third judgements were more prevalent. While it is difficult to quantify the distribution of these judgements in exact numbers, it is clear that neither the second nor third danger-judgement achieved a level of consensus in early postwar Japan.

Fourth, a unique socio-political atmosphere in early postwar Japan hindered the public framing of the Soviet Union as a military threat and shaped the national security conversation to

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[67] Such a psychological explanation can be represented as an alternative to traditional explanations which emphasize the organizational / bureaucratic models in which each bureau strives to maximize its interests and secure more budgets. Here I argue that the graver assessment of a Soviet military threat by the SDF personnel was due to psychological reasons: namely , affect, behavioral tendency and cognitive beliefs.

a large extent. Military threats and threat-scenarios were communicated in broad, abstract terms, and often in the context of the legal debate about Japan risk-measures. Japanese high officials intentionally avoided references to a specific adversary such as the Soviet Union. Thus, vague expressions such as "direct aggression" and "communist threat" were used in the political discourse more often than concrete terms such as "Soviet attack".

Fifth, in terms of context, the Soviet Union was perceived to pose an existential *political* and ideological threat to Japan by members of Japan's political leadership, such as Prime Ministers Yoshida, Hatoyama and Ikeda. The only attempt at securitization of the Soviet Union was made in the political rather than the military sector: a terminology of necessity, urgency, and threat was applied to denote communism since the early 1950s. Thus, the political term "communist threat" was used more often than terms such as "Soviet threat". The analysis traced the securitization of the communist threat by PM Yoshida to the outburst of the Korean War, after which Yoshida gradually linked both external and domestic threats with a range of risk-measures.

Finally, an examination of political communication concerning components of the Soviet military threat and of military-security threats across a longer time-frame (1946-2000, see Figure 7) reveals an interesting pattern: Japan's political conversation about specific components of the Soviet military threat was dormant during the early postwar period (1950-1975). Since the mid-1970s, the political conversation was re-activated with an explosion of references in the early 1980s. What were the reasons behind this trend in Japan's political conversation about Soviet threat-components?

Figure 7 - Number of References to Various Aspects of the Soviet Threat in the Diet by Year 1946 - 2000 *



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

During the early postwar period, as constructivists point out, the Japanese political establishment exhibited strong *aversion* to military security issues, *including concrete threats*, military, wars, and the use of force. In what can be attributed to the dire consequences of Japan's long involvement in wars, its traumatic experience of the Second World War, and low trust in

military personnel, political actors displayed attitudes of strong dislike to symbols of military-security, and tried to distant themselves from such symbols as much as possible. Beginning in the late 1970s however, as the next section details, the Government of Japan had been pursuing various security measures which agitated the political discourse about military-threats. As an attempt to resist these policy-measures, opposition representatives evoked different components of the Soviet threat and the debate about military threats, values, and measures became more specific. To follow, the next chapter examines perceptions of the Soviet Union threat in the late postwar period, and especially during the securitization of the Soviet military threat in the early 1980s. As we shall, the context, intensity and distribution of Japanese threat perceptions toward the Soviet Union during this period changed dramatically.

3. Military Threat Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Late Postwar Period: 1976-1991

Abstract

Did Japanese decision-makers perceive the Soviet Union as a military-threat in the late postwar period? If so, how did they frame this threat? This chapter examines the phenomenon of threat-perception during the late postwar period (1976-1991) by combining macro and micro data. I argue that during this period, a growing number of Japanese became concerned with a Soviet military threat, and that the Soviet Union was securitized in a military context by some domestic actors. The chapter explores both the international and domestic circumstances that enabled this trend. But as the analysis also reveals, the securitization of the Soviet Union in a military context was rather limited, and the majority of Japanese did not accept it.

3.1 Introduction

As discussed in section 2.1, the bilateral relations between Japan and the Soviet Union deteriorated from roughly 1976 on, and remained "coldest and most difficult in the entire postwar history" until 1983 (Kimura 2000a, 111). Unfavorable sentiment toward the Soviet Union among the Japanese public too had increased in the end of the 1970s, and remained strong until the end of the 1980s. Anti-Soviet attitudes have taken roots among the political establishment, media and general public, especially after the Soviet air-force shot down a civilian airliner in the Sea of

Japan on September 1, 1983.[1] This chapter explores Japanese perceptions of the Soviet military threat in the late stage of the Cold War among the three units of analysis: the defense establishment, the political establishment and the public. It deals with the following questions: did Japanese decision-makers perceive the Soviet Union as a military-threat during the late postwar period (1976 - 1991)? Had the Soviet military issue been securitized in Japan during the 1980s? If so, by whom and in what context? What was the perceived intensity and distribution of these danger-judgements?

While scholars point out to the emergence of Soviet *military* threat discourse from the end of the 1970s (Berger 1998; Tanaka 1997, 2002; Sebata 2010; Sasaki 2015), they seem to disagree about the reality of the Soviet threat, the reasons behind the emergence of this threat-discourse, as well as its context, perceived intensity and distribution. Two main views about Japanese threat-perceptions during the 1980s can be extrapolated from scholarly works that deal with the broader topic of Japan's national defense during this period.

The first view assumes that the Soviet military threat to Japan was real; that the reasons behind the emergence of threat-discourse in the early 1980s were of strategic, rational nature (Soviet military build-up, its increasingly aggressive behavior, and US response to it); and that the intensity of the perceived threat grew stronger. Soeya (1998, 201) argues that during the Cold War, the Soviet threat was a major security concern for "central decision makers", providing a rationale for the security treaty with the US, but argues that the Japanese government de-emphasized the military context of the threat even after it decided to bolster its security

[1] "Polls taken in the wake of the [1983] disaster showed that 91.6 percent of the public felt that Soviet military force was a threat to Japan and 46.3 percent believed that Japan was not making an adequate effort in its own defense." See: Johnson (1983).

cooperation with the US since the 1970s.[2] Tanaka (2002, 27) asserts that the Soviet military buildup in the Far-East including aircraft carriers and Backfire bombers in the early 1980s, "was the reason...talk of the Soviet threat was rampant in Japan in the 1980s." Widespread fears that the Soviet Union was entertaining plans to invade Hokkaido, continues Tanaka, were countered by military means such as defending the sea-lanes and military buildup of the GSDF ability to defend Hokkaido. Finally, Kimura argues that the single most important factor in shaping Japanese perceptions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was the latter's global military build-up and especially in the areas near Japan. "There is no question", articulates Kimura (2000a, 17), that, "without the rapid, massive Soviet armament efforts, the policy shifts in Japan would not have occurred."

The second view about Japanese threat perceptions of the Soviet threat questions whether the Soviet military threat to Japan was real; attributes the emergence of threat-discourse to broader political and economic reasons and especially to US external pressure on Japan, and underestimates the intensity of the perceived threat. Hook (1996, chapter 3) takes a sceptic stance vis-à-vis the reality of the Soviet threat and the rationale behind the GOJ decision to enhance its military cooperation with the US. To him, Japan's alignment with US strategy during the 1980s may have actually increased the risk-probability of Japan's involvement in a war with the Soviet

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[2] As early as 1975, Japan's highest state official declared his will to enhance security cooperation with the US. On August 5-6, 1975, Japan's Prime Minister Miki Takeo and US President Gerald Ford held talks in Washington, with the participation of other high-ranking ministers and officials. During these meetings, PM Miki reiterated a similar statement he had given in the Diet, saying that, "I believe Japan and the US should consult on the possibility of establishing greater cooperation in defense. I believe the Secretary of Defense should discuss this matter with DG Sakata. I wish to see more consultation between our defense officials. There has been too little in the past, and I wish to see our consultations expanded within the framework of our present mutual security arrangements." The President responded by saying that he shares the PM views on the matter. See: Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, August 6, 1975.

Union. In terms of context and intensity, Hook (1996, 68) implies that rather than a perception of a direct Soviet military threat, the Japanese viewed the Soviet issue through the prism of economic security considerations and specifically the need to maintain the overall relationship with the US and the security system. Hook (1996, 211) further casts doubt about whether Japanese defense strategists genuinely perceived a Soviet threat: "even Admiral Sakonjo Naotoshi denied the likelihood of the Soviet Union actually attacking the sea lines of communication".[3] Sebata views the intensity of perceived Soviet threat in similar lines. In his discussion of *kokubozoku* - Diet members who became strong advocators of a considerable increase in the defense budget - Sebata (2010, 147) claims that the support for higher military expenditure and specifically for increasing the share of weapons procurement did not originate in assessment of the Soviet threat but rather in American pressure on Japan to do more for its defense. Such pressure, claims Sebata, can be attributed to soaring Japanese trade surplus vis-à-vis the US. Finally, Sasaki points out a deliberate fear-mongering campaign - "the northern threat" campaign, in which former SDF military personnel and civilian military experts played a leading role. Sasaki (2015, 139-55) positions this threat discourse in a broader political and economic context which consisted of economic frictions and political tensions caused by Japan's trade surplus vis-à-vis the US on the one hand, and the Japanese government's attempt to legitimize the SDF as a military organization in order to impede the leftist idea of unarmed neutrality on the other. In order to examine Japanese threat-perceptions of the Soviet Union during the late 1970s and the 1980s, the subsequent sections analyze the phenomenon among the defense and political establishments, as well as the public.

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[3] Hook cites a statement by Admiral Sakonjo: "It is totally inconceivable...that the Soviet Union's major surface ships will move into the Pacific and attack Japanese and American warships or cargo ships or sea lines." (quoted in Hayes et al. 1986, 295).

3.2 Macro Level of Analysis

Japan's Defense Policy 1976 - 1991

Japan's political elites turned to enhance the security relationship with the US because of the perception of a declining American power in the Asia-Pacific on the one hand, and increasing Soviet power on the other hand (Berger 1996, 347).[4] The choice, according to Berger, was between two alternatives: autonomous defense and stronger relationship with the US.[5] The latter choice was pursued, under an emerging security doctrine: the Comprehensive Security (*sōgō anzen hoshō*) approach, surveyed below.

The idea of comprehensive security first gained acknowledgement in the aftermath of the first oil shock (1973) and later developed in two stages: first, in the 1978 report of the National

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[4] The lack of organized framework for military cooperation under the security alliance with the US became visible to civilian officials in the JDA during the compilation process of the 1976 NDPO. A question posed by the opposition parties, which inquired about the division of roles between the MSDF and the American Navy in contingency situation disposed Sakata (DG), Kubo (Director of Defense Policy Bureau) and Maruyama (Director of Defense Policy Section) to consider concrete measures to strengthen military cooperation between the two forces (Sebata 2010, 330). Subsequently, the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) was established under the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on July 8, 1976. The SDC was mandated with formulating guidelines for military cooperation in three areas: operations, intelligence, and logistics, and published its report in November 1978. This report, known as the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, was significant because as Hook points out, it, "expanded the range of cooperation to include (1) preemptive defense against attack, (2) cases of possible military attack against Japan, and (3) situations in the Far East judged to exert s serious influence on the security of Japan" (1996, 48). Although the Guidelines maintained Japan's exclusively defensive defense, they also defined Japan's military role as the primary defender against external attack instead of the previous role of supplementing US forces, allowing for the latter forces to devote more efforts to meet the Soviet threat in the region. The guidelines also laid the groundwork for increased interoperability and greater integration between the military forces, and despite their significance, they were not ratified in the Diet but only approved by the Cabinet (Sebata 2010, 304; Curtis 2000; Hook 1996, 48).

[5] Unarmed neutrality advocated by the Japanese left was losing support in the 1970s and Japan's LDP leaders were in favor of a strong relationship with the US and not Soviet Union.

Institute for the Advancement of Research (NIRA) and the Nomura Research Institute, and second, in a 1980 report formulated by a private advisory group appointed by PM Ōhira. The doctrine, viewed as an extension of Yoshida's pragmatism, recognized that, "of all changes in international affairs in the 1970s, by far the most fundamental fact is that the clear superiority of the US, both militarily and economically, has come to an end" (Tanaka 2002, 45). Japan's grand strategy would therefore ought to incorporate diplomatic, political, military, economic and other available resources in tandem with respective threats. Since security comes from wealth and not the other way around, the focus was still on achieving prosperity. Accordingly, Japan would be a "non-nuclear, lightly armed, economic superpower."[6]

The comprehensive national security approach has for the first time acknowledged the importance of independent military capability in the international arena and identified a gap between Japan's economic capabilities and its political role in the international arena. It advocated for a 20 percent increase in the military budget (about 1.07 percent of GNP) in order to achieve the goals set by the NDPO in 1976 (Sakamoto 1988, 94). However, the relative importance of the military component was still weak compared with other tools of state power and the report rejected the idea of "autonomous defense" because it "would...lower the level of Japan's security by provoking the aversion of other countries and thereby increasing the possibility of inducing threats that exceed Japan's ability to defend herself." (Soeya 1998, 212; Pyle 1998, 264).[7] Instead, the comprehensive security doctrine opted to continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella and military aid: "Japan's defense policy has been based on the stance that

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[6] This interpretation of "comprehensive security" was made by Nagai Yōnosuke, an influential IR scholar in Japan. See: Soeya 2005, 94-97, Tanaka 2013.

[7] Comprehensive National Security Group, *Report on Comprehensive National Security* (English Translation). Tokyo: Prime Minister's Cabinet Office, 1980. Accessed January 11, 2017. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19800702.O1E.html

Japan totally depends (*zenmenteki izon*) on the United States for nuclear deterrence and that, against aggression with conventional forces, Japan possesses defense capability as a `denial force' in the case of small scale, limited military aggression to make such aggression costly and to prevent invasion of Japan from easily becoming a fait accompli, and it waits for the US forces to come to Japan's aid in the case of large-scale aggression."[8] Finally, the report urged Japan to contribute politically to the stability of areas of vital interest (The Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East) by cooperating with the Western Allies (Pyle 1998, 264).

To conclude, while the comprehensive security doctrine acknowledged the importance of the military component of Japan's defense policy it still prioritized economic and diplomatic measures over independent military means, reconfirming the importance of US security guarantee. As a result, the policy highlighted the need to preserve good relationship with the US and other Western countries. And as economic frictions deepened between both governments, with US trade deficit vis-à-vis Japan reaching 15 billion US dollars at a year end of 1981, there was an increasing need to accommodate American pressure on Japan to do more for its defense (Solomon 1981, 688). The rest of the chapter proceeds in the following manner: it summarizes the main trends in external stimuli related to the Soviet military, surveys Japan's risk measures as pursued in the late 1970s and early 1980s in order to determine whether the Soviet threat was successfully securitized, and examines the subjective dimension of Japanese security attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

External Developments: Soviet "Threat Cues" As Selected by the Japanese

[8] Comprehensive National Security Group 1980.

This section examines external development related to Soviet military build-up, deployments, language and military planning as selected and interpreted by Japanese actors during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Military Build-Up

The Soviet military buildup in the Far East developed in two phases. Traced to the Brezhnev era (beginning in 1965), the first phase included dramatic increase of ground and air combat forces. The second phase commenced in the early 1970s and was characterized by slower quantitative increase and stronger emphasis on qualitative aspects such as weapon modernization, combat support infrastructure and a new command structure (US CIA 1982, 2). Whereas the quantitative buildup had ended in the 1970s, Soviet qualitative improvements in ground, air, and naval forces continued in Asia through the 1980s. Specifically, military buildup during the 1980s was increasingly perceived to be aimed at neutralizing American forces in Asia including US bases in Japan (Solomon 1981, 690).[9]

The Soviet military strength in the Far East had grown drastically between 1965 and 1985. Its maritime tonnage grew from around 70,000 tons to slightly less than 180,000 tons, the number of Soviet combat aircraft from about 1,400 to 2,100 aircrafts and the number of ground personnel from about 10,000 to about 40,000 (Ministry of Defense 2008, 394). Whereas between 1945 and 1960 the Soviets stationed one division of about 20,000 soldiers on these islands, this force had drawn back in 1960-1 with only limited presence of coast guard and garrison left behind; but in early June 1978, the Soviets once again began reinforcing their military presence on the islands, and expanded it to a third island - Shikotan - as the Japanese had learned in late

[9] National Intelligence Estimate 1984, 11.

September 1979; the Japanese public became aware of Soviet reinforcement in Kunashiri and Etorofu in late January 1979.(Kimura 2000a, 174). The overall number of Soviet soldiers was less than one devision (about 10,000 men). Concretely, the Soviet military buildup and deployment included :

- The growing presence in Vietnam (Cam Ranh Bay) since 1975, in terms of bombers and fleet.
- Increase in the number of nuclear submarines stationed in the Pacific (from about 20 at the beginning of the 1970s to about 69 at the end of the 1970s).[10]
- Enhancement of naval assets in the Pacific in 1979 including aircraft carrier "Minsk" and amphibious assault ship Ivan Rogov. Previously deployed in the Pacific against targets in the US, Y-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines began patrolling the Sea of Japan, from where they could cover Japan, South Korea, Eastern parts of China, Northern Philippines and Guam.[11]
- Intermediate-range ballistic SS-20 missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads were deployed east of the Ural Mountains , from where they could reach not only most of China, but also Japan, South Korea and Northern Philippines. The Soviet Union revealed this move on January 17, 1983, and offered that relocation of missiles was meant to cope with "new positions in Japan" (USFJ 1983, 137). According to US National Intelligence Estimates, there had been "an almost 100-percent increase since 1981" in these missiles. [12]

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[10] The US had 41 nuclear submarines throughout the 1970s. See Yarhi-Milo 2009, 250.

[11] National Intelligence Estimate, "Soviet Policy in East Asia", (NIE 11/40-84) pp. 8, 10; Solomon 1981, 690.

[12] See: National Intelligence Estimate, "Soviet Policy in East Asia", (NIE 11/40-84), p. 1. Actors in the US believed that because the SS-20 were accurate and had good capability, survivability and mobility, they would become "the backbone of the land based ballistic missile forces for peripheral nuclear attack", giving the Soviet Union strategic superiority in regional theaters such as Europe. See: Yarhi-Milo 2009, 255.

- Stationing of Tu-22M "Backfire" medium-range supersonic bombers on the coast opposite Sakhalin and in Cam Ranh Bay. Theses strategic bombers were capable of attacking both land and sea based targets and fly high-speed in low altitude (Yarhi-Milo 2009, 251).
- Building a military base on one of the Habomai islands, only 4.5 miles from coast of Hokkaido.

In addition to military build up and deployments, Soviet actions seemed to be growingly assertive. Especially, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) and Soviet military maneuvers in May-June 1978 around the island of Etorofu were interpreted as signs of higher propensity to use force. Tanaka (1997, 286-88; 2002, 27) asserts that the introduction of these new capabilities to the Far East coincided with a wide-spread perception of the Soviet Union as a growing potential threat to Japan's security.

Soviet Language

In addition to military capabilities and actions, Soviet leaders had been employing harsh language vis-à-vis Japan during that time. Such language incorporated two themes: Japan risks entanglement in a dangerous situation, and a threat in Soviet "retaliatory" measures should Japan ignore the Soviet warnings (Kimura 2000a, 106). For example, after GOJ decided to allow the deployment of US F-16 fighters at the Misawa airbase in Aomori prefecture in September 1982, Soviet leader Iurii V. Andropov threatened it with nuclear retaliation, in what Kimura views as "an attempt to check [the decision]" (Kimura 2000a, xxi). In January 1983 - in response to Nakasone's interview with the *Washington Post*, in which the Japanese PM was quoted as saying that "the whole Japanese archipelago should be like an unsinkable aircraft carrier against infiltration by the [Soviet] Backfire bomber" - the Soviets indirectly threatened to retaliate

against Japan.[13] Vasily Kharkov - commentator for TASS (Telefigure Agency of the Soviet Union) cautioned that, "Is it not clear...that in the present nuclear age, there can be no 'unsinkable aircraft carrier', and that by deploying 'onboard the carrier' arsenals of armaments, including American ones, the authors of such plans make Japan a likely target for a [retaliatory] strike...and for such a densely populated, insular country as Japan, this could spell a national disaster more serious than the one that befell it 37 years ago."[14] Kharkov's statement which came as a response to Nakasone's offer of solidarity to the US seems to be a calculated attempt to target Japanese apprehensions and fear of war with its reference to the dire consequences of the WWII in Japan and to strengthen the opposition to Nakasone within Japan.

Privately however, Soviet figures tried to alleviate the rising tensions with the Japanese by asserting that the military deployments near Japan were necessary for "defensive purposes", and that, "Soviet military divisions are not in any way directed against Japan and do not generate any threat to her" (Kimura 2000a, 174-75). Such appeasing messages were communicated in the following instances. After they deployed forces to the Northern Territories in 1978, the Soviets emphasized that this move was a response to the signing of a Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty earlier in September (Solomon 1981, 691). Likewise, a Soviet military general stated that the SS-20 were deployed to the Far East to cope with China and US aircraft carriers and submarines, and that they do not target Japan (UFSJ 1982, 69). Furing a discussion held in 1983 about the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Siberia between Foreign Ministry representatives from Japan and the Soviet Union, Soviet representatives stated that as long as Japan does not

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[13] *Washington Post*, January 19 ,1983.

[14] Quoted in Clark 1987, 134.

become involved in US military strategy, the Japanese should not be concerned about a Soviet missile threat (Olsen 1985, 51).

Military Planning

Soviet military strategy incorporated the notion of interrupting to the sea-lanes of communication of its enemies in case of a war since the early 1960s. Vasily Sokolovsky, who was the Inspector General of USSR's Ministry of Defense between 1960 and 1968, edited a 1962 publication of a book called "Military Strategy" about various aspects of contemporary warfare. In this book and the editions that followed, Sokolovsky presented the idea that if a war were to break out, Soviets Pacific naval forces would target the sea-lanes of communication of the enemy as well as bases and cities in Japan and South Korea.[15] This strategy was known to the Japanese and it was communicated in the Diet as early as 1971.[16]

By the end of the 1970s, the Soviet "safe bastion strategy" had increased the strategic importance of the Sea of Okhotsk, the Northern Territories, and Japan's straits (Kimura 2008). According to this strategy, the Sea of Okhotsk was framed as a "safe bastion" for the Soviet ballistic missile submarines.

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[15] For an english translation of the book: Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, ed. Military Strategy - Soviet Doctrine and Concepts. Praeger: New York, London. 1963. The Japanese translation followed in 1964. For an articulation of the Soviet naval strategy see pp. 298-302 in the 1963 English translation.

[16] During a December 20, 1971 meeting of the Special Committee on the Revision of Okinawa Agreement of the upper house, mentioned Somura Yasunobu, a scholar specializing in diplomatic history during his testimony, the Soviet "Sokolovsky strategy" which stipulates "crushing the enemy's maritime transport." Subsequently, Somura called for increased vigilance in regard to the Soviet Union, its "dramatic buildup of submarine capabilities" and specifically the Y-Class type.

Discussion

Taken at face-value, Soviet military buildup and deployment across the Far East, shifts in the international balance of military power toward the USSR, Soviet military deployment and movements near Japan, harsh Soviet language and aggressive conduct seem to justify genuine concerns among those in charge of Japan's defense. But, as I argue below, the Soviet threat was not fully securitized by the GOJ and no consensus has emerged about a Soviet direct military threat, let alone an existential threat.

First, Soviet military buildup began well before the late 1970s as mentioned above. In fact, as early as 1971 a CIA assessment stated that USSR had rebalanced its conventional and nuclear forces toward the eastern front, making its Pacific navy the largest of its four fleets (US CIA 1971, US CIA 1969). Globally, the Soviets had achieved superiority over the US in terms of strategic nuclear delivery systems as early as 1972 (Tanaka 2002, 67-68). This tendency was apparent to Japanese strategists, as evident from Okazaki Hisahiko testimony for the Special Committee on Diplomacy and Comprehensive National Security in April 1984, in which he referred to the Soviet military expansion during the era of Brezhnev (1964 - 1982) by saying that "already in the beginning of the 1970s [it] bore signs indicating that it would threaten the West-East equilibrium.[17]

Second, as we have seen, Soviet military movements and deployments have been viewed as threats cues to SDF military personnel as early as the 1950s and throughout the 1960s as well. Although the stimuli in terms of Soviet military movements and deployments near Japan have been on the rise in the second half of the 1970s, Soviet forces in the Far East still accounted for only 1/4 of the overall Soviet military power (Solomon 1981). In addition, out of roughly 50

[17] National Diet Archives, April 25, 1984. House of Councilors - Special Investigation Committee on Diplomacy and Comprehensive National Security. Correspondence 2.

Soviet divisions stationed in the Asian region, only one division was stationed in the Northern Territories; the overwhelming majority of Soviet ground devisions were stationed at the border with China. Subsequently, Soviet capabilities in the Far East were still inferior to the Soviet capabilities deployed in the European front and a large concentration of troops in the immediate vicinity of Japan was lacking. Similarly, Soviet doctrine of targeting the adversary's SLOC was not new either and can be traced to the beginning of the 1960s. Even the US DOD asserted in 1983 that the Soviet goal in the Far Eastern Theater in case a war would break out was to "control western and northeastern China, to *preclude Japanese participation in a war* in Asia and defeat US and South Korean forces in Korea" (DOD 1983).[18] And so, the Soviet invasion of Japan was not mentioned as a possible scenario. Therefore, it is difficult to solely attribute shifts in Japanese threat perception of the Soviet Union military threat in the late 1970s and early 1980s to Soviet growing capabilities, military doctrine, or perceived offensive intentions vis-à-vis Japan.

Third, harsh Soviet language toward Japan was not new either. Clark (1987, 134) maintains that whereas statements by Soviet figures during this period did harbor intense criticism, they did not incorporate new themes. As we have seen, memoires sent by Soviet leaders as early as the 1960 incorporated similar content: by aligning itself closer with the US, Japan "increase the chances...[of] being directly involved in military conflict", and "the new [security treaty] not only will not guarantee the security of Japan, but, on the contrary, can bring the country to catastrophe" (Hasegawa 1998, 136-137). Kimura maintains that although "it was impossible to dismiss [Soviet] words as mere bluffs", the Japanese leaders, "were not easily impressed or influenced by the demonstration of naked military might" (2000a, 106-107). A rare

[18] Accessed June 8, 2016. http://fas.org/irp/dia/product/smp_83_ch3.htm

case of Soviet frankness communicated to the Japanese by a Soviet former political figure and journalist at that time supports this line of argument. During his visit to Japan in 1983, stated Aleksander I. Bovin, "I want to say that we are not frightened by the Japanese military forces as such. What I am saying is that a Japanese military alliance with the US makes us uneasy. We are well aware that Japan will never attack the Soviet Union, but the US can do so, using its bases in Japan, which are located near the USSR, and this does alarm us. We are not frightened of Japan."

Finally, it is worth to note that although the perceived prospects of military confrontation between the US and USSR in the 1980s were on the rise, a military conflict between the USSR and Japan was still predominantly perceived to be plausible in the context of hostilities between the USSR and the US. A direct military clash between Japan and the Soviet Union which did not involve the US still seemed unlikely to the majority of Japanese. Below, I explore Japan's risk measures.

Extra-ordinary Measures ? Japan's Risk Measures

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the JDA and the administrations of Fukuda, Suzuki and especially Nakasone advocated a range of security measures, assigning growing importance to a high-quality defense force (in order to deter the Soviets). In an interview he gave to the *Washington Post* on January 18, 1983, summarized PM Nakasone some of these military measures in a straightforward manner: (1) make the Japanese archipelago defendable against intrusion of Backfires, (2) take over the four straits and prevent passage of Soviet submarines in case of contingency, and (3) secure the sea-lanes (USFJ 1983, 137). All three points became politically contested and a debate about Japan's defense budget, capabilities and roles ensued. In addition, different actors in the political system such as the JDA tried to pursue other security

measures such as emergency legislation in case of war, but these attempts have failed because of strong political opposition from both within the LDP and the opposition parties. Below I survey the developments in terms of Japan's defense budget, military preparedness, capabilities and roles, and argue that taken together, these macro-level data point to a direct Soviet military threat as perceived by the defense establishment in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But while the defense establishment perceived a stronger Soviet threat during this period, the overall distribution of danger-judgements concerning the Soviet Union still fell short of a consensus regarding a direct Soviet threat.

Defense Budget

From 1975 to 1985, Japan's defense budget increased at an annual rate of 9 percent, an increase larger than rate of the education and science budget (Sebata 2010, 185). Between 1980 and 1986, Japan'd defense budget grew in 50 percent, compared with only moderate growth rate in the budget areas of welfare, education and science, and public works - 20, 7 and 7 percent respectively (Sebata 2010, 148). Although some part of this increase can be attributed to soaring salaries, land prices and other economic factors, it also coincided with a shift in the allocation of the defense budget. Whereas between 1981 and 1990 the share of personnel and provisions decreased by 7.6 percent (from 47.7 to 40.1 percent), expenses for equipment procurement increased by 4.9 percent (from 22.5 to 27.4 percent).[19]

Interestingly, the increase in defense budget and specifically in the share of equipment procurement came at the same time a similar trend was taking place in the US. Shortly after the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan, president Carter announced in January 1980 that the US

[19] Sebata 2010, 147. Since 1991,

would increase its defense expenditures as well as its military presence in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. In January 1981, the Reagan administration was inaugurated and the "Second Cold War" began. Reagan was known to have a hard line attitude toward the Soviet Union and during his tenure he appealed to US allies to strengthen their defense capabilities.

American appeals resonated well in Japanese domestic debate about defense although Japan's PM's denied it had a role in formulating Japan's defense budgets. In his new year message, PM Suzuki asserted his determination to steadily increase Japan's defense capability and emphasized that recent increase in Japan's defense budget was *not* a result of foreign pressure. After his inauguration in November 1982, PM Nakasone stated his intent to revise the current frame of defense expenditure (1 percent of GNP), similarly stating that US request for budget increase does not amount to "pressure" (USFJ 1982, 66).[20] JDA sources revealed on January 5, 1983 that the agency commenced a study of a new criteria on Japan's defense budget to replace the current 1 percent of GNP (USFJ 1983, 136). [21] And finally, the Nakasone administration launched a five-year Mid-Term Defense Build Up Plan in 1986, with a defense spending of 1.004% of GNP.

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[20] Nakasone, who enjoyed a close relationship with president Reagan, was also one of the most outspoken supporters of the "autonomous defense" approach. In his book "My Life in Politics" published in 1982, Nakasone states that, "To attain Japanese independence in national defense, the security treaty with the US should be revised to put equal responsibility on both parties, and US military forces should be gradually removed from Japan". See: Yasuhiro Nakasone, *My Life in Politics* (private edition), 1982, p. 26, cited in Kimura 2000a, 38. This plan, as Kimura points out, did not contradict the security relationship with the US but on the contrary, reaffirmed the importance of this relationship to Japan's peace and security. Consequently, both efforts were complementary (Kimura 2000a, 39)

[21] Two Similar studies were initiated outside the JDA in 1984. The first by the PARC's Subcommittee on Defense Capabilities and the second by a private committee that PM Nakasone summoned in 1984. The second committee was headed by Kyoto University professor Kosaka Masataka. Both studies advised on breaking the 1% limit of the GNP.

Military Preparedness, Capabilities and Roles

In addition to the increase in Japan's defense budget, a series of decisions regarding military preparedness, capabilities and roles were taken by the JDA and the GOJ during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1979, the JDA made public its decision to upgrade the Seventh Division stationed in Chitose, Hokkaido, to an "armored division", as a counter-measure to the Soviet military buildup in the Far East (Sasaki 2015, 150).[22] The GSDF rate of actual serving members to the desired quota was raised from 86 to 89 percent, and additional personnel was stationed in Hokkaido. In 1981, the GOJ decided to license produce the latest US fighter aircraft, the F-15, thus meeting the US demand to increase its share of the defense burden by buying expensive US weapon systems. The ASDF purchased 94 F-15 Eagle between 1982 an 1987. Forty of these aircraft were deployed to Chitose air-base during the 1980s (Hook 1996, 49; Sasaki 2015, 150-51).

In terms of military capabilities and roles, the SDF enhanced its anti-submarine and anti-ship capacities in order to fulfill new defense roles in the context of US war-strategy to engage Soviet military power. As a result of military contingency plans between the US and Japanese forces and in an attempt to prevent the Soviets from utilizing the full potential of their Vladivostok based fleet, the SDF had been authorized to serve as a check on Soviet access into the Pacific by blocking the Sōya, Tsugaru and Korea straits. According to covert military plans, the SDF would have curbed 30% of the Soviet force, after-which the MSDF would protect "points of intended [Soviet] movement". Through these strategic locations, US forces would

[22] Armored means that the division would be equipped with armored vehicles, such as tanks. As for 2015, this unit was the only armored division in the GSDF. See: Sasaki 2015, 150.

move to the offense.[23] To this end, the MSDF had purchased 41 P-3C Orion anti-submarine patrol aircrafts between 1982 and 1987 (Hook 1996, 48). Military deployment followed and in April 26, 1983, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units were deployed in Tsushima island in the Sea of Japan (USFJ 1983, 144). On May 10 the same year, the MSDF began patrolling the Sōya straits, augmenting similar missions taken-up earlier in 1978 for the Tsushima and Tsugaru straits (USFJ 1983, 146). On June 11, 1983, JDA DG Tanikawa Kazuo observed a GSDF exercise in the vicinity of the Northern Territories and finally, the 1983 Defense White Paper had acknowledged for the first time the importance of sea-lane defense in the range of 1,000 nautical miles from Japan's territory (USFJ 1983, 59-60).

Threat Assessment

In 1979 (before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) the JDA initiated an examination of Japan's defense posture and needs, including possible scenarios of a military attack directed at its territory. The study advised Japanese officials to realize the existence of a threat from the Soviet Union (Olsen, 1985, 44). In 1980, the Defense Agency publicly announced that there was an increase in the "potential" Soviet threat to Japan.[24] This assertion was accompanied with concrete reports in the Japanese media in October 1980 according to which the JDA was formulating defense plans to deal with a specific threat - the Soviet Union. A political backlash against the depiction of the Soviet Union as an "imagined enemy" ensued (Chapman, Drifte and Gow 1983, 102).

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[23] Michishita Narushige, in a lecture he gave at Temple University, March 29, 2013; NIDS 2012, 238.

[24] Defense Agency 1980, 55. This statement was removed from the Defense White Paper in 1990.

On January 7, 1982, the *Nihon Keizai* newspaper reported the content of a JDA document titled "The Defense Capabilities of the JSDF", which had been completed in October 1976; having considered a hypothetical threat-scenario of a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, the document estimated that the GSDF would sustain 30 percent damage in a week time, while inflicting 15 percent damage on the invaders, and that the ASDF would lose all of its 200 aircraft in just two days of fighting. In the third wave of Soviet invasion which would have occurred about three weeks since the opening of hostilities, the GSDF would have no fighting capacity (USFJ 1982, 136-37). This image of a strong vulnerability vis-à-vis the Soviet military - once mostly shared among military personnel - had come to dominate the civilian personnel at the JDA in the early 1980s.

To conclude the discussion about military threat-perceptions of the Soviet Union at the macro level, developments in defense budget, preparedness, capabilities, roles and threat-assessment point to growing intensity of perceived Soviet threat. Although official White Papers referred to an increase in the *potential* Soviet threat, in reality, the Soviet threat was perceived to be *direct* among those in charge of Japan's defense at the JDA, as I elaborate below.

3.3 Micro Level: Military Threat Perceptions of the Soviet Union among the Defense Establishment (1976-1991)

This section examines threat-perceptions among the defense establishment by exploring micro data. It identifies how the Soviet Union threat was framed among defense personnel and specifically, by JDA Director Generals. I find ample evidence of growing anxiety concerning the Soviet threat in the late 1970s in oral history interviews and public statements: below is a summary of this inquiry.

In his oral history testimony, Yoshida Manabu testifies for a perception of a Soviet naval

threat. Yoshida mentions Soviet nuclear submarines and the military buildup in Vietnam as two components of the Soviet military threat that caused the gravest concerns in his time.[25] As a risk-measure, defense officials considered the blockade of the straits as part of mutual efforts with US forces to contain the Soviet fleet. Once again, military capabilities and deployment are mentioned as a threat stimuli by defense official.

JDA Director Generals publicly communicated concerns about the Soviet threat since the mid 1970s. Commenting on the issue of Soviet military build up in the Northern Territories, JDA DG Yamashita Ganri stated on March 1, 1979 that, "Although we judge Soviet force deployment in the area to be defensive [in posture], we can not exclude that from a purely military point of view, it can also shift to an offensive posture."[26] Five days after DG Yamashita had mentioned that Soviet forces stationed near Japan can switch to an offensive posture, he somewhat moderated the previous statement and re-affirmed the official position that the Soviet-Union military capability in the vicinity of Japan only amounts to "potential threat" (*senzaiteki kyoui*). Yamashita added that although he could not determine at the moment whether the deployment has an aggressive design, Soviet naval and air movements, force modernization in the Far East and military build-up demonstrates "an enormous military capability."[27] Indeed, JDA high officials were sensitive to public and political fallout of framing the Soviet Union as a direct, imminent military threat, hence Yamashita's insistence on terminology of latent threat.

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[25] The Soviets increased the number of nuclear submarines in more than three-fold during the 1970s. By the end of the decade, the Soviets were perceived to have a clear advantage in this area. See: NIDS 2012.

[26] Accessed November 19, 2015, from National Diet Archives, Budget Committee - House of Representatives, March 1, 1979. Correspondence 6.

[27] Accessed November 19, 2015, from National Diet Archives, Budget Committee - House of Representatives, March 6, 1979. Correspondence 29.

A similar pattern of pointing out the severity of the Soviet threat and then moderating the tone is found in the following statement made by Hosoda Kichizo, who became the JDA DG in February 1980. Hosoda stated that the Soviet Union posed a "serious threat" to Japan. A public controversy had ensued and PM Ōhira Masayoshi intervened and reaffirmed that this statement was Hosoda's personal view and that the government's official view - that the Soviet Union is a potential threat - remains in tact; Hosoda later changed his terminology so it would fit to the official line (Olsen 1985, 48). In 1982, DG Tanikawa Kazuo asserted that he does not think the Soviet Union would translate its potential threat into immediate action, *unless* international instability were to erupt (USFJ 1982, 69, italics mine).

As the statements above reveal, military personnel and defense officials demonstrated perception of a growing Soviet threat in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Such concerns about the Soviet military threat can be traced among the SDF and JDA circles to the period that *preceded* the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although they were publicly communicated under the terminology of "latent threat", when combined with macro level data and oral-history testimonies, it becomes clear that during the 1980s, the Soviet threat was perceived to be a direct military threat to Japan by the majority of Japan's defense establishment.

3.4 Military Threat Perceptions of the Soviet Union among the Political Establishment (1976-1991)

The previous section examined how the Soviet-Union military threat was perceived among the defense establishment and how it was framed and communicated to various audiences. This section explores patterns of securitization moves in annual policy-speeches delivered by Prime Ministers Fukuda, Ōhira, Suzuki and Nakasone at the opening of the Diet sessions between 1978 and 1983, as well as other incidents of political communication such as media reports.

3.4.1 A Limited Securitization of the Soviet Union Threat in a Military Context: Examination of PM Policy Speeches 1978 - 1983

Seven policy speeches were sampled in total. As the following examination demonstrates, the Soviet military build-up in the Far East was mentioned in the speeches as a source of concern only after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, during PM Ōhira's policy speech made in January 1980. Earlier speeches made after the Soviet military build up had began in the Northern Territories in late March 1978 by PM Ōhira and Fukuda in November 1978 and November 1979 respectively did not refer to such military developments. Similar to the dramatic impact of the Korean War on Japan's political elites perception of the Soviet Union, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan highlighted the potential threat posed by the Soviet Union. In terms of risk-measures, a political debate about the SDF's roles and missions and about Japan's defense expenditures including breaking the 1 percent ceiling ensued.

PM Fukuda Takeo

PM Fukuda's first extensive reference to "defense issues" came as part of his policy speech in the Diet (84th Diet ordinary session), on January 21, 1978.[28] In the beginning of his speech, Fukuda mentions that his previous statement made about a year ago in which he said that the world is at an "historical turning point" appears ever more relevant this year, as issues such as energy resources, the "north-south problem", governing the oceans, economic frictions, instability of international currencies and unemployment impede all countries of the interdependent world. Under the title of "defense problems", PM Fukuda highlights the importance of national defense

[28] The Fukuda administration attempted in 1978 to introduce emergency legislation which would enable the SDF to deal with military contingencies. For a discussion of the broad political opposition to this move and its failure to materialize, see Berger 1998, 138 -9. For Fukuda's speech, see http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19780121.SWJ.html

as the "greatest duty" of any government, and reasserts the significance of the security relationship with the US as well as domestic consent regarding defense matters. PM Fukuda then outlines his basic ideas about Japan's national security: Japan would commit to be a peace-loving country and continue to renounce the use of military force to solve international conflicts; fulfill its international duties as an honored member of the international community in order to ensure peace and prosperity; and, would use its human potential and encourage sense of self-confidence and pride among its people.

At the opening of the 85th Diet ordinary session in November 1978, PM Fukuda refers to the Peace and Friendship Treaty concluded with China earlier in August that year. Fukuda then discusses the bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union and re-affirms Japan's inclination to strive for mutual understanding and multi-faceted exchanges between both countries, while re-asserting his government's determination to conclude a peace-treaty with the Soviet based on the return of the Northern Territories to their "motherland".[29] However, PM Fukuda does not refer to the Soviet military buildup in the Far-East.

PM Ōhira Masayoshi

On November 28, 1979, PM Ōhira delivered his policy speech at the commencement of the 90th Diet ordinary session. He touches upon the following issues - ethics of political action, administrative reform, financial cutbacks of government expenditures, revival of economic growth and energy issues - before addressing "[Japan's] contribution to the international society". He observes that international circumstances have been increasingly severe, both politically and

[29] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed February 1, 2016. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19780920.SWJ.html

economically, and declares that Japan aims to build friendly relations with China, the Soviet Union (after solving the Northern Territories issue), among other Asia-Pacific nations. "We must take a posture of active cooperation in order to [contribute] to the political and economic stability of the Korean peninsula, SouthEast Asia and the Middle East as a member of the international society."[30] Ōhira further notes the sudden tensions between the US and Iran and the refugees fleeing from Indochina but he does not tackle military-security issues. There is also no reference to East-West tensions but rather to a general tensed political and economic climate in the world.

On January 25, 1980, PM Ōhira delivered his policy speech at the opening of the 91th session of the Diet, and the difference compared to the previous speech is striking. In his opening remarks, PM Ōhira refers to complicated domestic and international circumstances, with rising interdependency and multi-polarization in the international society, and "abnormal intensification of international tensions." Ōhira mentions the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the declining détente between US and the Soviet Union before moving to mention other issues related to economic frictions, problems for international currencies, energy and limited resources, as well as inflation and un-employment. His next statement is of particular interest as it touches upon international security:

> I believe that everyone on earth holds a strong desire for peace. But, I must regretfully say that some countries, in the present time, claim their position [in the world] with power, threatening the peace and stability of the world. Regarding the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, it can not be justified for any reason. [We] must entrust Afghanistan's domestic problems to that country itself. Japan calls for a prompt withdrawal of Soviet military and supports the resolution of the special emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly. As for the government, in order to contribute to solving this serious situation, [I am of the view that Japan should], based on the US

[30] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed January 18, 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1980/s55-shiryou-10104.htm.

> axis, join with Europe and other friendly nations, and pile up efforts in a manner appropriate for our country.[31]

Concretely, the PM mentions his intent to strengthen the export control as part of the COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Area) in order to send the Soviet Union a strong diplomatic signal. Moving on to discuss Japan's "independent contribution" to the international society, PM Ōhira finishes this section of the speech with a reference to the Soviet Union. He describes Japan's foreign policy goal toward the Soviet Union first,

> Concerning the relationship with the Soviet Union, in addition to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan mentioned earlier, the Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories brings about an extremely regrettable situation. As for the government, [we] call for a speedy revision of the current situation, a solution to the Northern Territories issue and a conclusion of a peace treaty.[32]

After this statement pertaining to the Soviet military build up in Japan's backyard, Ōhira touches upon Japan's risk-measures by referring to the comprehensive approach to security which combines measures of diplomacy, defense, and internal administration. Ōhira asserts that based on the security relationship with the US, Japan will advance a policy of defense capabilities that maintains a "*high-quality,* limited to the necessary, self-defense."

Using the ST as a point of reference, did PM Ōhira 'securitize' the Soviet Union issue during his policy speech ? Did he use security terminology as the ST posits, advocating for extra-ordinary measures to counter it? It seems that although PM Ōhira did single out the Soviet Union as a threat to world's peace and stability, his language fell short of advocating extra-ordinary

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[31] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed January 19, 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1981/s56-shiryou-101.htm

[32] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed January 19, 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1981/s56-shiryou-101.htm

measures, opting instead to diplomatic and economic means. While Ōhira's references to a "high-quality" defense force and his call for a "speedy revision" of the Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories are noteworthy, his speech still falls short of a securitization of the Soviet Union as a military threat according to the CS definition.[33]

PM Suzuki Zenkō

Suzuki Zenkō took office after Ōhira's sudden death on June 1980. On January 26, 1981, he delivered his policy speech at the opening of the 94th session of the Diet. PM Suzuki begins with a remark on the upheavals brought about by the previous decade, including the two oil shocks, the advance of multi-polarization, and change in the economic structure of the free world; he maintains that not only that Japan withstood these challenges, but it also enjoys stability, prosperity and high reputation from the international community. "At the same time", argues Suzuki, Japan's responsibility in the world has considerably increased. Moving on to the international situation and to comprehensive security considerations, Suzuki first notes the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, alongside the Iran-Iraq war, the situation in Poland and economic challenges. He then reasserts that, "Japan must seek for peace and security" by assertively contributing to solving these issues. He moves to talk about defense,

> In recent years, public understanding and interest in defense matters have increased. The defense of a country is the basis of its existence, it is a question for the whole nation and a broad, constructive debate would hopefully lead to national agreement. [34]

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[33] I suggest that by bringing the defense component of the comprehensive security approach on the table, PM Ōhira politicized the issue of security, which until then - was a taboo, or non-issue. I further discuss this point in chapter 8.

[34] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1981/s56-shiryou-104.htm Accessed January 22, 2016.

Suzuki then elaborates on his intent to maintain Japan's exclusively defensive, non-nuclear, security policy, and calls for having the spirit of defending Japan with "our own hands", with *reasonable, high-quality* defense capability and the Japan-US security structure. Moving to comment on "Peace and Diplomacy", PM Suzuki repeats his predecessor's foreign policy goals toward the USSR, including the demand to revise the current situation in which the Soviet military is deployed to Afghanistan and the Northern territories.

In his New Year's policy speech delivered on January 25, 1982, PM Suzuki points to rising tensions between the East and the West, poor economic conditions among the Western countries, and Japan's relatively positive economic indicators with its steady economic growth. "It would not be exaggerated to say that against these international concerns, our country is the most blessed as we continue to enjoy freedom, peace, and prosperity. "[35] He then introduces two "urgent challenges", namely his intent to conduct economic reform, and the need to solve international economic frictions. Moving to discuss diplomacy, PM Suzuki states that,

> One of the important challenges for our country's diplomacy is the improvement of the relationship with the Soviet Union. But, I regret to say that due to the Soviet military build up in our Northern Territories, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the state of affairs in Poland, the bilateral relationship is still strained with difficulties.[36]

Moving on to discuss security affairs, Suzuki asserts that Japan must strengthen the current security structure based on its own capabilities and the relationship with the US. "Today", he continues, "as a prominent member of the free nations, we have to be determined to defend our own country with our own hands, within the range of constitution and while steadily increasing

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[35] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1982/s57-shiryou-104.htm Accessed January 14, 2016.

[36]MOFA. Accessed January 14, 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1982/s57-shiryou-104.htm ;

the minimum necessary defense capability." Subsequently, Suzuki declares to make efforts toward achieving the level of defense capability outlined in the 1976 NDPO "as soon as possible" while adhering to the exclusive defense-oriented policy, the avoidance of becoming a military threat to other nations, and the three non-nuclear principles. [37]

Using the ST as a point of reference, did PM Suzuki 'securitize' the Soviet Union issue during his policy speech ? Did he use security terminology as the ST posits? The answer to this questions seems to be straight forward no. Whereas PM Suzuki did mention his intent to prioritize implementing the NDPO levels of desired defense capabilities "as soon as possible", this issue was not framed in terms of Soviet "threat", or even "concern". In-fact, the Soviet Union is completely absent from the part of the PM speech that deals with Japan's defense capability. That being said, Suzuki's emphasis on Japan's resolve to defend itself is noteworthy as it marks a shift in the national debate regarding security issues (and indicates a stronger behavioral tendency to resist external attack).

PM Suzuki announced his resignation on October 12, 1982. Speedy elections inside the LDP resulted in a landslide victory of Nakasone Yasuhiro, who served between January 1970 and July 1971 as the DG of the JDA. [38]

PM Nakasone Yasuhiro

PM Nakasone made his first New Year policy speech on January 24, 1983. In the opening remark, he mentions the military face-off between East and West in addition to "unprecedented"

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[37]MOFA. Accessed January 14, 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1982/s57-shiryou-104.htm ;

[38] Nakasone's second destination abroad was Washington (after a visit to Seoul), where he met with President Reagan on January 18, 1983.

socio-economic issues that affect all countries. "In an international society [characterized by] deep inter-dependency, the faith of the world is also Japan's faith."[39] Nakasone stresses that Japan is in a crucial turning point in its post-WWII history and that current achievements in terms of its prosperity, freedom, peace, democracy and basic human rights are based on the constitution, the US-Japan peace treaty and the security framework. Discussing Japan's diplomacy, Nakasone emphasizes the central role of US-Japan relationship in Japan's diplomacy. Commenting on the Soviet Union, he does not refer to Soviet conduct or military deployment but maintains that he wished to continue the dialogue with the Soviets in order to solve the Northern Territories issue and sign a peace treaty. Moving on to discuss Japan's security, Nakasone touches upon the military state of affairs in the world and especially in Asia. "The Soviet military build up in the Far East including the Northern Territories...should concern us." Based on this situation, he continues, and in line with the US-Japan security frame-work and the necessary limit for self-defense, "there is a need to have high-quality defense capability... and to achieve the NDPO target in a speedy manner".[40] In order to do that, Nakasone suggests to carefully consider this year's [defense] budget based on "strict financial situation of the country", Japan's position in the world, and the necessity to defend the country.

Nakasone's speech reveals both continuity and change. In terms of continuity, Nakasone, like Suzuki before him, does not designate the Soviet Union as a threat. The "need" to defend Japan remains vague as the PM does not clarify against what Japan needs to defend itself. However, Nakasone also chooses to raise the issue of the Soviet military build up in the *security*

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[39] MOFA. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1983/s58-shiryou-106.htm

[40] MOFA. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1983/s58-shiryou-106.htm

part of his policy speech, rather than his predecessor who chose to mention it under the *diplomacy* part. In that sense, the issue is taken away from the realm of politics (diplomacy), and framed in the realm of security. In addition, Nakasone also mentions his intent to achieve the 1976 NDPO target in a speedy manner with the "necessity" to maintain first-class defense force. In this way, Nakasone creates a link between the Soviet military build-up and Japan's military risk-measures.

Using the ST as a point of reference, PM Nakasone security language employs greater sense of 'necessity' and 'urgency' when compared with Suzuki's speech from 1982. It seems to safe to assume that Nakasone was indeed more concerned with the Soviet threat than his predecessors. Especially disturbing to him was the potential shift of SS-20 missiles previously directed at the European front to the Far-Eastern front.[41] According to Curtis (2000,16), Nakasone, "succeeded in convincing Reagan that it was essential that an agreement with the Soviet Union to remove SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe should also prohibit their redeployment to East Asia". Still, the terms 'existential threat', 'point of no-return', or 'possible solution' are absent, and no "name" is given to the threat against which there is a need to defend Japan (although it is clear from the context that the Soviet Union is the "issue"). In this sense, I argue that Nakasone's speech is indeed a first securitization move of the Soviet military threat offered in policy speeches sampled since 1978, although it is a limited one. I discuss this point in chapter 8.

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[41] The US government had proposed in November 1981 an arms-control agreement with the Soviets in which in exchange for the removal of all Soviet SS-20s (range of up to 5,000 kilometers) targeting Europe, the US would remove Pershing II and cruise missiles. See: Evangelista 1987, 18. For Nakasone's response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 to Europe during the G7 Summit in Williamsburg (May 1983) see his autobiography. In short, Nakasone supported the American position of deploying the Pershing II missiles to Europe as a counter-measure to the Soviet deployment and emphasized the need to bring the Soviets back to the arms-reduction talks. See Nakasone (2004, 110, 117-20).

Framing of the Soviet Union Military in Other Incidents of Political Communication

In addition to policy speeches made by Prime Ministers at the Diet, how did Japan's national-defense and political leadership frame the Soviet Union during the late 1970s and early 1980s? Publicly, Japanese high officials voiced their concerns about Soviet potential threat but usually avoided framing the Soviet Union as a direct threat to Japan. In April 1979, Japanese PM Ōhira was quoted in the *Los Angels Times* as saying that the Soviet Union could become a "threat" to Japan (Kimura 2000a, xx). In a private talk held between PM Ōhira and his Chinese counterpart on December 5,1980, Ōhira raised concerns about the Soviet Union military buildup in the Northern Territories, claiming that,

> Recently, the Soviet Union expanded its military power in the Northern Territories, and that poses heavy concern (*Jūdai na kanshin*) for our country. Why the Soviets chose this timing is not clear, but [in any case] Soviet conduct *threatens* peace (MOFA 1979; italics mine).

Both privately and publicly then, the term "threat" was avoided and "potential threat" or "concern" (*kanshin)* were used to refer to Soviet military deployment. Such terminology was used also by other Japanese Prime Ministers, as the following examples demonstrate. In response to a question posed during a plenary session in the Diet on May 15, 1981, PM Suzuki mentioned both the Soviet military expansion and its military invasion of Afghanistan as issues for *concern* in Tokyo and Washington.[42] In a response to criticism from the opposition parties about the content of his interview with the Washington Post (January 1983), PM Nakasone asserted during Diet deliberations in February 4 and in March 9, 1983 that, "whereas a dangerous situation involves both the capability and intent to invade, the Soviet Union does not fall under

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[42] National Diet Archives, Plenary Session - House of Representatives, May 15, 1981. Correspondence 20.

this category at the moment"; and that the "Soviet Union is not a potential enemy at present".[43] Considering the terminology employed by Japan's political leadership and its defense leadership, it is interesting to note a certain gap between both groups, as can be learned from JDA high officials having to moderate their tone about the Soviet Union threat (recall the statements made by Yamashita and Hosoda).

To conclude this section, although a perception of *growing* Soviet military threat was shared among Japanese high state-officials, Japan's political establishment did not perceive a direct military threat from the Soviet Union, but only an *indirect threat*. The consecutive administrations of Fukuda, Suzuki, and Nakasone demonstrated changing attitudes toward security including diminished *aversion* to the use of force for defense purposes (affect), a stronger inclination to defend Japan against external threats (behavioral tendency), and a belief that the Soviet Union would most likely not invade Japan. While political elites securitized the Soviet military threat in a limited manner and only *after* the Soviet Union had used military force in Afghanistan in December 1979, they had also framed it in a military *context*.

These findings stir up two related questions about the intensity of the Soviet threat: Why did Japan's political leaders perceive a growing Soviet military threat in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and why such a perception still fell short of a direct military threat? I return to these questions later in the chapter. In terms of the distribution of danger-judgements, although in overall numbers the Japanese were increasingly concerned with a Soviet threat, domestic political actors could not reach a consensus about a Soviet military threat during the late postwar

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[43] National Diet Archives, February 4, 1983. House of Representatives - Budget Committee. Correspondence 6; National Diet Archives, March 9 1983. House of Councilors - Budget Committee. Correspondence 7. Nakasone later denied that he used the expression "unsinkable aircraft career" and that it was the translator's mistake. For Nakasone's explanation see Nakasone 2004, 112-14.

period.

3.4.2 The Political Discourse About Military Security Threat-scenarios

The political discourse about military-security threat-scenarios heated up since the late 1970s and exploded in the early 1980s, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Several actors participated in the debate about security and military threats. I explore the role of some of these actors and the changes in domestic circumstances which enabled this discourse as well as the risk-measures adopted by the GOJ.

US as a Securitizing Actor of the Soviet threat

An important securitizing actor with immense socio-political resources must be taken into account when considering the political discourse about a Soviet military threat in 1980s Japan: US political and defense leadership.[44] Since the second half of the 1970s, a growing number of American decision-makers and government bureaus started viewing the strategic balance between the US and Soviet Union as tipping toward the latter; special adviser Brzezinski for example warned against a "strategic dip" in the 1980s unless trends in the balance of military power would not be corrected (Yarhi Milo 2009, 245). By 1977, a perception of a strong Soviet navy in the East-Asian region was fixed and framed as "critical in pursuing the US interests and to reassure the allies" (Dian 2014, 79). The CIA published its National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in February 1982; the document stipulated that, "Moscow perceives a direct threat to its security from US naval and air forces in the Far East" and that in case of a war broke out the

[44] US is taken in this analysis as a unitary actor because it is outside of the scope of the current analysis. Needless to say, there were various actors in US policy toward Japan including the president, his national security adviser, the State Department, Department of Defense, US congress and US defense industry.

Soviet would target US bases in the region, including those facilities on Japanese soil (US CIA 1982, 6). During that period, the US sustained the following foreign policy objective toward Japan: "The US cannot permit the Soviet Union to encourage or force Japan, with its existing abilities and potential, to assume a "Finlandized" or "Sovietized" position in the international system" (Olsen 1985, 55). It is in this context of international balance of military power and in the context of US foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis Japan that the US securitization of a Soviet military threat should be understood. How exactly did US officials pursue this foreign policy objective during the 1980s? Seemingly, by underlining a Soviet military threat to Japan, pressuring Japan to increase its defense budget and encouraging Japanese decision makers to accept proactive military roles and missions such as defending sea lanes in case of contingency with the Soviet Union.

A Perceptional Gap between the US and the GOJ

Since the mid 1970s, US actors associated a growing global military threat with the Soviet Union and particularly in the Far East. This threat perception and the strategic shift that followed it are

the backdrop against which US actors securitized the Soviet military threat in the Far East when dealing with their Japanese counterparts.[45]

The shift in US military doctrine which came to assume "three-and-a-half-wars" fought simultaneously around the world co-occurred with the notion of "horizontal escalation", which linked for the first time a conflict in Europe or in the Middle East with a potential opening of a second front in the Far East against the Soviets (Tanaka 2002, 27). Rather than an isolated event, a land invasion of Hokkaido by Soviet forces was deemed more likely as part of a military crisis in the Persian Gulf whereby the Soviets would either interrupt SLOC from the Middle East to Japan or attack Japan as US forces would be busy fighting in the Middle-East (Solomon 1981, 705). As a result of this notion, concrete military contingency planning followed between both forces. The Americans were straightforward in their assessment of the Soviet military build-up in the Far East. "The objective of [Soviet] force buildup [in the Far-East", wrote Richard H. Solomon from the RAND institute in 1981 to the journal *Foreign Affairs,* was,

> To deter attacks on the Soviet Far East, and to neutralize militarily the coalition of the US and its treaty partners...Moscow is now creating in East Asia - as in Europe - a nuclear and conventional military threat designed to intimidate US and allied forces operating on Asian soil or in nearby waters, as well as the Chinese (Solomon 1981, 690).

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[45] In order to comprehend the scope of the change in US military strategy, it is important to note the changes in US military doctrine. Prior to 1969, the dominant military doctrine in the US aimed to build up capabilities to fight "two-and-one-half-war" simultaneously: a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, Chinese invasion of Korea or SouthEast Asia and one more "small-scale" contingency elsewhere (for example, the Middle East). This scenario was cut down in the early 1970s to "one-and-a-half-war", as subsequent administrations of Nixon (1969 - 1974), Ford (1974 - 1977) and Carter (1977 - 1981) discarded the Chinese threat in the aftermath of the US-Sino rapprochement during the 1970s. Beginning in the early 1980s however and through the Reagan administration (1981-1989), a significant shift in American military strategy expanded the scenario into a "three-and-a-half-wars". The latter doctrine aimed at fighting three wars in Western Europe, Western Pacific and the Middle East simultaneously. The Western Pacific, with Japan at the center of US force deployment, became a designated front line in case of a military clash between the two superpowers. I further discuss this point in the next section.

US officials communicated the perception of a a growing Soviet military threat to their Japanese counterparts on numerous occasions. In the 14th SSC meeting held in Hawaii between August 30 and September 1, 1982, the US side emphasized the Soviet military build-up and urged Japan to cooperate in countering this threat. Admiral Robert Long (the US Pacific Command) cautioned that the Soviets were deploying fourth generation aircraft to the Far East; US representatives further proposed that Japan would block the three straits (Sōya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) in case of contingency and defend 1,000 nautical miles on the seas while US forces move to attack the Soviet fleet (USFJ 1982, 71). In turn, GOJ representatives played down the Soviet threat in the meeting, responding that "there are no serious moves in Asia by the Soviet military buildup as there are in other parts of the world". They also mentioned that Japan's defense of its sea-lane must remain within the framework of individual self-defense (USFJ 1982, 71). Seemingly, government officials from both sides were at odds about the intensity of the threat they associated with the Soviet military threat in the Far East. [46]

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[46] Japanese and American diplomats substantiate the perceptional gap hypothesis. Ushiba Nobuhiko, a Japanese diplomat, stated in 1983 that the Americans were more concerned about the Soviet threat than the Japanese during that time (Ushiba et al 1983, 27). Edward Olsen, who served as a political analyst on Japan and Korea in the US Department of State between 1975 and 1980 commented that, "it is imperative that the US...encourage the Japanese people and their leaders to be *realistic* about the dangers lurking in Asia", implying that a perceptional gap existed between US and Japanese governments and that the Japanese underestimated military threats (1985, 58; italics mine). In September 1981, PM Suzuki reacted to the Pentagon's report titled "Soviet Military Power" which received attention in the Japanese press and Diet. Suzuki questioned its content and ordered the Japan Institute of International Affairs to conduct an independent inquiry of "Soviet Union's overall national power" (Solomon 1981, 705). An American defense analyst close to key political figures in Washington anticipated in *Foreign* Affairs that, "the study will downplay the direct military threat to Japan posed by the USSR, while emphasizing economic and political vulnerabilities" (Solomon 1981, 705). Finally, the US Assistant Secretary of Defense stated at a Asia-Pacific Affairs Subcommittee hearing that, "Japan does not possess defense capabilities to fully cope with threat it will face in the 1980s" (USFJ 1982, 139). To US officials, intelligence analysts, and policy makers then, Japan's political elites underestimated the intensity the Soviet threat in Asia; to Japanese leaders such as PM Suzuki, the US was exaggerating the Soviet threat.

American Pressure on Japan to do more for its Defense

At the same time US officials emphasized the Soviet military threat to their Japanese counterparts, they also pressured the GOJ to "do more" for Japan's defense. In the beginning of the 1980s these efforts incorporated two complementary themes - each with a corresponding rationale: inflating the Soviet threat (the "threat rationale") and criticizing Japan's "free ride" on the US security guarantees (the "economic rationale").[47]

American politicians and figures in the industry lost patience toward what they perceived to be Japan's "free-ride": little contribution in defense matters while enjoying huge economic benefits and trade surplus with the US. Beginning in the second half of the 1970s, both issues (security and economy) were tangled together. While the Carter administration made "low-key" efforts to induce Japan to increase its defense expenditures, the Reagan administration increased the pressure on the Japanese government and defense spending was high on the agenda in a May 1982 meeting between President Reagan and PM Suzuki, in which the latter pledged to "make ever greater efforts" that would bolster Japan's defense capabilities and accept larger financial burden of maintaing US forces in Japan (Solomon 1981, 703).[48]

US Communicates Positive Feedback after Defense Increases

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[47] For an interesting perspective on the "free-ride" argument that views the US - and not Japan - as a free-rider, see Hook 1996, 58-64. Curtis argues that the Reagan administration actually lessened the pressure on Japan to increase its defense budget, and focused instead on military roles and missions. The logic behind this move, according to Curtis, was that if Japan would accept these roles and missions, it would have to increase its budget to abide by the agreement. See: Tanaka 1998, 289; Curtis 2000, 16.

[48] Japan's defense budget for fiscal year 1981 did not entail a dramatic increase (Solomon 1981, 703)

After Japan's 1982 fiscal budget had been issued, US officials communicated positive feedback to Japanese officials.[49] Secretary of Defense Weinberger visited Japan and presented a letter to PM Suzuki from President Reagan, in which the president shared his high appreciation for Japan's 1982 defense budget, expressing hope for similar action in the future. Also during Weinberger's visit, the secretary referred to the potential Soviet threat and to American expectation that Japan would defend its sea-lane up to 1,000 nautical miles.[50] US military and defense officials followed suit and expressed to JDA DG Ito their hope that the current trend (increase in defense expenditures) will continue. Secretary of Navy John F. Lehman confirmed "the need for free nations to collaborate to cope with the Soviet military buildup" (USFJ 1982, 68). When the time had come to circulate the 1983 defense budget, US Ambassador to Japan Mansfield urged JDA DG Tanikawa to aim for a 7.75 percent increase in the budget, like the increase made in the previous year; similar messages were conveyed through other US-Japan channels (USFJ 1982, 73). US congress passed the military authorization bill on July 1983 with an amendment, "calling on Japan to assume a defense role commensurate with its economic strength" (*The Daily Yomiuri,* August 3, 1983). A significant increase in defense budget as part of the GNP from 0.933 percent in FY1982 to 0.978 percent in 1983 followed.

To conclude, US high officials played a role in Japan's political discourse about military-security as the evidence brought above suggests. In doing so, they resorted to two logics: the threat rationale that inflated the Soviet military threat in the Far East to Japan and the economic

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[49] Other Western allies of the US expressed similar expectations. During her visit to Japan, PM Thatcher expressed hope that Japan would protect its sea-lanes and its own country as a response to increasing Soviet military buildup. Like her US counterparts, Thatcher had mentioned Britian's wish for Japan to buy British weapons systems. See: USFJ 1982, 68.

[50] The content of the meeting between SoD Weinberger and PM Suzuki was reported in the Japanese press. Here I cite from the USFJ 1982, pp. 66-67.

rationale that presented Japanese officials with criticism about their limited defense roles and expenditures. Although Japanese and US officials did not perceive the Soviet military threat in the same way, GOJ did try to accommodate American pressure as policy outcomes in the early 1980s indicate.

But the US securitization of the Soviet Far-Eastern threat in the late 1970s and early 1980s would have had less impact on Japanese military-threat perceptions and risk-measures if Japan's security culture and the trends in domestic political distribution of power were to remain unchanged since the early post war period. I explore three aspects in this context below: first, once a highly contested issue, the security framework associated with the Yoshida doctrine had come to be supported by the majority of the Japanese political parties and public. Second, the trend of the LDP's decreasing share of public votes which put the political leadership under much pressure had been reversed at the end of the 1970s, and finally, various domestic actors with considerable socio-political capital began securitizing the Soviet military threat in public.

Domestic Considerations

The growing support for the security framework among domestic political actors can be observed in the Kōmeitō's acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the SDF in 1978, and from its acceptance of Japan's affiliation as a member of the West and the US-Japan alliance in 1981 (Keddell 1993, 97; Hook 1996, 72). Likewise, the DSP stated in 1983 that it supported larger defense expenditures and the defense role of securing the SLOC as a member of the West and the JSP too had acknowledged the legal status of the SDF during the 1980s, although it maintained that it was still un-constitutional. Only the Communist Part did not revert its traditional stance on security issues (Hook 1996, 71-72).

In line with changes in the proposed policies of the political parties, the Japanese public had demonstrated growing support for the security framework with the SDF and the security alliance with the US. Figure 8 demonstrates the growing legitimacy of Japan's security risk-measures with the SDF and the Japan-US security arrangements between the early 1970s and mid 1980s. From 1972 to 1975, those who supported the maintenance of security with the SDF under the Japan-US security arrangements exceeded for the first time the 50 percent barrier. This trend continued until the mid 1980s and supporters of the security apparatus steadily grew in numbers. In 1984, about 70 percent of the Japanese public supported the defense posture dictated by the Yoshida doctrine (the pragmatist rationality). Correspondingly, economist Komiya Ryūtaro (1979) had observed in the late 1970s that the percentage of opinion leaders who advocated for unarmed neutrality which until the mid 1960s stood at 80 percent has been turned around and the majority of opinion leaders were now leaning toward the center or right-wing of the political spectrum. Public opinion surveys confirms the latter's observation.

Figure 8: Measures to Maintain the Security of Japan

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A domestic consensus about Japan's security framework and the political alignment with the West had emerged with both opinion leaders and public attitudes endorsing this framework during the 1970s. But not all was good news for the ruling party. While the strategic doctrine associated with the LDP pragmatist leadership was gaining momentum, the party itself was gradually losing the majority of electorate votes to centrist forces such as the DSP and the Komeitō. As PM Miki, who served in office between December 1974 and December 1976 explained in a private meeting with President Ford in August 1975, "In each of the three elections conducted since 1967, when [the LDP] share of the vote first fell below 50 percent, the LDP vote declined, to 46.9 percent in the most recent general election in 1972.

Figure 9: Japanese Attitudes Toward Political Alignment 1960 - 1985.

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In the Upper House election last July (1975) its vote was 39.8 percent." Since his predecessor PM Tanaka Kakuei resigned from office over a personal scandal, Miki was especially sensitive to the LDP support-base among the Japanese public, and thus strove to pursue policies by "avoiding confrontation, and seeking dialog and cooperation [from opposition parties]".[51] But the negative trend in LDP votes in elections was reversed in the late 1970s and the party regained some of its past popular support (Kohno 1997, 124; Murakami 1998, 4). Likewise, although its share of the votes fell since the mid 1960s, the LDP retained its majority in both houses of the parliament

[51] This statement was made by PM Miki in his meeting with President Ford. US Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 5, 1975, 7 pm. Accessed on April 24, from http://www.history-lab.org/documents/frus1969-76ve12d208.

throughout the 1970s (Murakami 1998, 3). The LDP confidence vis-à-vis the opposition parties had therefore been restored by the end of the 1970s.

As a result of these changes in domestic politics, by the end of the 1970s, the political milieu became ripe for the ruling elites to enhance Japan's security role in the context of the treaty with the US. This political atmosphere also enabled harder-line voices not heard before to advocate for enhanced military roles and missions, both within the LDP (the "Defense *Zoku*", see Green 1992) and outside party circles (the "military realists", see Mochizuki 1983, 168-75, Sakamoto 1988, 94-95). The next section examines these actors in greater details.

Military Realists and Defense *kokubōzoku*

In addition to the securitization of the Soviet threat by the SDF, JDA, and US officials, and to the increasingly assertive line toward the Soviet Union taken by Japanese PM's after December 1979, two securitizing actors played an active role in the political discourse about military threats: the "military realists" and "defense *kokubōzoku*".[52]

The military realists came from various positions in society: hundreds of former military personnel and figures from the political right and academy, media and government organizations. Although they held different opinion about some issues - for example, the intensity of the Soviet threat and the credibility of American military support in case of contingency - they shared a

[52] This terminology is for analytical purposes, as people within these groups (or "actors") did not necessarily define themselves along such names and did not share completely similar views about Japan's national defense.

common opinion about Japan's risk-measures and specifically, the need to build-up its defense expenditures and enhance its military roles.[53]

The military realists criticized the NDPO issued in 1976 by proclaiming that "Japanese strategists should focus on the objective military capabilities of [other] nations rather than remain complacent in their judgement that other nations have no 'intent' to attack Japan" (Mochizuki 1983, 169). A crucial factor in their threat assessment was the US-Soviet military balance, both in the region and beyond. In this context, particularly disturbing to them were the Soviet military buildup in the Far East, the American defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the nuclear parity between the two superpowers, which was undermining the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella and the economic frictions between Japan and the US, which cast doubts as to whether the US would actually come to Japan's defense should a conflict arise (Mochizuki 1983, 157;170). One of the prominent figures of this group, Okazaki Hisahiko, has claimed that rather than the security alliance with the US and the American military presence on Japanese soil, it is Japan's *geo-strategic position* which facilitates the threat of a Soviet attack in case of a direct clash between the latter and the US (Okazaki 1982,191). According to both Soviet and American perspectives, elaborates Mochizuki (1983, 170-71), control over the Sōya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima straits was highly important in the strategic calculation of exercising naval power in the Western Pacific and limiting the opponent's military options. This threat was

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[53] At one end of this analytical group titled "military realists", one can find former SDF military personnel such as Kurisu Hiroomi, Mitsuoka Kenjiro, Hirose Eiichi, and others, who doubted American security commitment to Japan. Kurisu for example had pointed out to the differences between US relationship with NATO countries - "a community of fate", and its relationship with Japan - "a community of interest" and subsequently, to the possibility that the US would "give up Japan to the Soviets, depending on the conditions in which a conflict developed." See Sasaki 2015, 141.
At the other end of this so-called group, some military realists were much more positive about the US security commitment to Japan.

especially imminent, because "the country at issue [Japan] were inadequately armed" (Okazaki 1982, 191).

Subsequently, the military realists opted for alignment with one of the two superpowers. Due to both ideological ("membership in the community of free and democratic nations") and "geopolitical reasons" they favored strengthening the alliance with the US. (Mochizuki 1983, 171-72). As a suitable countermeasure to their threat assessment, the military realists called for emphasizing the "missions of defending the straits [specifically the Sōya strait] and adjacent territory and of SLOC protection." The Japan Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), an outspoken actor of the military realists' view, had recommended the re-organization of SDF-deployment toward the north, as well as the stationing of long-range fighter squadrons and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) units on the Bonin (Ogasawara) and Volcano (Kazan) islands, the acquisition of extra anti-submarine aircraft units composed of P-3Cs, and supplementing the ASDF interceptor squadrons, primarily in quality but also in quantity (Mochizuki 1983, 173-74).[54]

A second securitizing actor of the Soviet military threat was a loose coalition of LDP politicians committed to defense issues ("*kokubozoku*"). As Sebata (2010, 142) puts it,

> Until the 1979 fiscal year, few groups lobbied for the defense budget. Entering the 1980s, however, the LDP's three defense-related committees to which *kokubozoku* Diet members belonged have had greater success in budget requisitions than any other committees in the LDP.[55]

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[54] Seven F-15 squadrons instead of five F-4E squadrons; 11 instead of 10 interceptor squadrons in total as well as 4 instead of 3 support fighter squadrons in total.

[55] Sebata based this statement on numerous interviews he conducted, including one with Mihara Asao who served as the JDA Director-General and at the PM office's Director-General between 1976 and 1979.

Yet this support for higher military expenditure and specifically for increasing the share of weapons procurement did not necessarily originate in military calculations concerning the Soviet threat but rather in American pressure on Japan to do more for its defense, which can be attributed to soaring Japanese trade surplus vis-à-vis the US (Sebata 2010, 147). As discussed above, *Kokubozoku* advocacy for defense issues came *after* American administrations began exerting pressure on Japan to increase its defense budget.

Representations of the Soviet Threat in Literature

Another aspect of the growing discourse about the Soviet threat can be observed the printed media. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet military threat was represented in literary work. Sasaki (2015, 137) highlights efforts made by former SDF officers and civilian military experts to push the issue of the Soviet military threat on the national agenda. These ex-military officers created literary works that frequently used terms such as the "Soviet threat" (*Soren no kyoui)* and "Northern threat" (*hoppō kyoui*), alongside overdramatized content. Although the "Northern threat" campaign was launched mostly outside the national political stage (Diet) and media outlets, it did have some implications for the political conversation.[56] Numerous articles and books dealing with hypothetical war with the Soviet Union were published in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Both fiction and non-fiction books incorporated

[56] Although only 11 direct reference for the term "Northern threat" (*hoppo kyoui)* were identified in Diet deliberations between 1979 and 1985, many political representatives have referred to the works of the former military personnel in their Diet statements.

themes such Soviet invasion, SDF or Japanese guerilla counter-strike as well as ordinary life in Soviet-occupied Japan. [57] Two non-fiction works are introduced below. [58]

Former military personnel such as Kurisu Hiroomi and Takeda Gōtarō made public statements and published non-fiction books emphasizing the Soviet military threat. Kurisu had served as the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office in 1978, when he stated during an interview with *Shūkan Posuto* that Japanese troops would be forced to take "actions beyond legal constraints in case of military emergency" (Sakamoto 1988, 93; Sasaki 2015, 134-35). Lack of support from his superiors in the JDA and harsh criticism of opposition representatives led to his resignation in July 1978. After he was dismissed from service, Kurisu continued to reiterate his opinions and in 1980 he published a book titled "The hypothetical enemy Soviet Union: This is how we will strike back" (*kasō tekikoku Soren: warera kō mukae utsu*). The book ascribed high likelihood for a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, criticizing the LDP government for its failure to formulate sufficient defense plans vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (Sasaki 2015, 136). According to Sasaki (2015, 136), Kurisu's statement and this book paved the way for other military officers to communicate their opinions regarding defense matters in public:

> After the military's frequent and ultimately disastrous interference in politics during the imperial era, postwar Japanese society generally agreed that it was preferable for uniformed offices to stay out of public discussions over national defense, diplomacy, and the Constitution, and officers did not directly challenge this popular sentiment. Kurisu broke this taboo. His...statement encouraged many officers discontented with their depoliticized status to speak out in public.

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[57] The latter theme included narratives of restricted personal freedom, communist norms and regulations, ban on foreign travel and Japanese TV programs.

[58] For a discussion of the non-fiction books, see Sasaki 2015, 142 - 146. Some of these literary texts had sensational names such as: "Hokkaido Occupied" and "The US and USSR clash! Recapture Kunashiri Island!" (Iwano Masataka), "An Eleven-Day War in Hokkaido", (Sase Minoru), and "The day Hokkaido becomes a people's republic" (Izaki Hitoshi).

A similar pattern is observed in the case of Takeda Gōtarō (mentioned earlier in the chapter as part of the oral history project conducted by NIDS). In an interview he gave to *Hōseki* weekly magazine in February 1981 while serving as the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office, Takeda criticized the government's policy of limiting the defense budget for 1% of the GNP and of refusing to introduce a conscription policy (Sasaki 2015, 136). A political backlash in the Diet followed suit, eventually leading Takeda to retire from his post earlier than he had planned. Soon after, Takeda contributed a chapter entitled "Even so, we can prevent a Soviet invasion" (*Soredemo Soren no shinryaku wa soshi dekiru)* to a book titled "Debate: Does the SDF serve a useful purpose?". The chapter, according to Sasaki (2015, 137), elaborated on his earlier statement in the media.[59] Both Kurisu and Takeda made it to the headlines because they communicated their opinions *while* serving at the SDF; to recall, the civilian-military relationship had been an extremely sensitive issue in postwar Japan. The very fact that former officers like Kurisu and Takeda decided to communicate their opinions in public indicated that Japan's security culture was changing; the outcome of both cases however, imply that the sensitivity surrounding civilian control issues was still intact in 1980s Japan.[60]

To summarize, an inquiry into the political discourse (or the inter-subjective dimension) of Japanese perceptions of threat revealed shifts in Japanese security attitudes in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with growing support for the pragmatist rationality (Yoshida doctrine) including

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[59] Other examples for this type of non-fiction literary published by ex military personnel are described in Sasaki 2015, 137.

[60] In addition to serving SDF officers, former officers also contributed to the Soviet threat discourse. In 1983, Hirose Eiichi, a retired GSDF commander, published an edited book titled "Frank talk on defense by one hundred former SDF officers" (*Jieitai Kanbu OB hyakunin no bōei chokugen)*. The book criticized the Japanese society for its lack of realist thinking on defense matters. As the title suggests, 100 former military personnel contributed their opinions, which often involved anti-constitution nuances and criticism toward complacency of the public (Sasaki 2015, 137).

the SDF and the US-Japan security relationship, larger number of securitizing actors with stronger political clout and frequent representations of the Soviet threat and Japan's risk measures in the media. Although the mainstream leadership and the JDA still held to the "latent threat" judgement officially, their actions and statements suggest that their perception of Soviet military threat had intensified. To the military realists, the Soviet threat was direct. To complement the discussion of the inter-subjective dimension, the next section explores the subjective dimension of Japanese perceptions of threat.

3.5 Application of the ABC Model to explain the overall shift in Japanese perception of a Soviet Military Threat in the late 1970s and 1980s

Why did Japanese people perceive a growing Soviet military threat in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and why such judgement still fell short of a direct military threat? The answer to these important questions, I believe, is essentially of psychological nature and lies with the ABC model and with two interpretive codes I identify later in this study.

Affect

As briefly mentioned in chapter 2, hostile feelings toward the Soviet Union significantly increased during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Likewise, as this chapter demonstrated, a growing willingness to defend Japan against an external enemy was observed in policy speeches given by Japanese PM in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Finally, the beliefs that the world was becoming more dangerous and that the Soviet Union was becoming more dangerous to Japan was shared by a growing number of Japanese.

Various public-opinion polls point to a negative trend in Japanese affect toward the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1970s and first half of the 1980s. As Figure 10 demonstrates, the year 1974 was a turning point in the Japanese public's attitude toward the Soviet Union, and the relative decline in negative feelings has ended. From less than 30 percent of respondents selecting the Soviet Union as one of three countries they dislike most in the beginning of the 1970s, the percentage has increased to above 40 percent in 1978, further reaching 55.4 percent in 1980.

Figure 10 : "Which Foreign Countries Do You Dislike Most : Name Three Countries (%)



*Source: Figure 10 is compiled from data taken from surveys conducted by Jiji-tsūshin-sha, Tokyo.[61]

As can be seen, between 1979 and 1981 there had been a sharp increase in unfavorable feelings toward the Soviet Union; I attributed this trend to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to

[61] Data about North Korea was collected only from 1970. Nationwide opinion surveys conducted by Jiji Press asked respondents to select from a pre-determined list of 9 or 10 countries the three countries they liked best and the three they liked least. Similar data is from Watanabe 1977, 124.

reports about military deployment to the Northern Territories.[62] On September 1, 1983, Soviet pilots shot down a civilian KAL plane off Sakhalin, and all passengers including 28 Japanese citizens died. "More than anything else, the incident shocked the Japanese, imprinting in a most dramatic form the image of a Soviet threat into their consciousness" (Hasegawa 1998, 179). Figure 10 offers support for Hasegawa's observation. Whereas in 1983, 49 percent of Japanese public chose USSR as one of the three countries they disliked most, in 1984, the number increased to 59 percent, the highest record in postwar history.

Behavioral Tendencies

As mentioned, Japan's strategic culture in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s prioritized economic over military means in order to achieve the national goals. The Yoshida doctrine proved successful as the Japanese economic development broke records. Japan's security needs during the pro-Yoshida, pro-US administrations of Ikeda (1960-1964) , Satō (1964-1972), Tanaka (1972 -1974) and Miki (1974-1976) were met by security system with the alliance with the US as its core pillar. But during the 1970s, changing international circumstances triggered a re-evaluation of Japan's national security policy and risk management strategy; the outcome of this process - explored earlier - was the comprehensive security doctrine. To recall, the doctrine acknowledged the importance of an independent military-defense and reaffirmed the importance of the security relationship with the US. With the developments in the second half of the 1970s and the 1978 guideline for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, Japan was emerging to be a military player in the

[62] Ito argues that 1979 was a turning point in the course of Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union. "The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan awakened Russophobia that, among some groups of intellectuals, has been "dormant" since the Russo-Japanese War. See: Ito 1990, 171.

international scene.[63] Although public and political resistance to the resurgence of militarism had remained an important factor, defense measures were now deemed necessary, even if their efficiency still under doubt.[64]

The SDF - and the use of force to defend Japan which is inherent to it - had achieved social legitimacy and Japanese youth demonstrated a relatively stronger inclination to defend their country against foreign invaders. At the same time, the progressive "unarmed neutrality" version of Japan's security was losing support among Japanese politicians, media, and public, while the conservative alternative had come to dominate the discourse. According to national surveys asking whether Japan should join the Western camp, communist camp or remain neutral, the early 1980s saw a slight decline in the number of Japanese who wished to be neutral (25 percent in 1978, and 1980, down from 32 in 1960). However, the number of Japanese who supported aligning with the free world has significantly increased from 37 percent in 1972 to 55 percent in 1980 (Berger 1998, 112). In addition, more Japanese had come to see the need to defend their country against external threats as a legitimate mission of the SDF. Whereas during the 1960s and 1970s, "about three quarters of poll respondents indicated that emergency relief in

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[63] This process intensified during the Nakasone administration which governed Japan between 1982 and 1987. "Nakasone", writes Pyle, "had an impressive grand design to ready Japan for global leadership that called for reforming Japan's institutions, restoring national pride in Japan's history, and, above all, adopting an active role in strategic affairs" (2007, 5).

[64] As Sakamoto argues, "While the majority of Japanese supported the maintenance of the Japanese military, only about 10-15% believed that the military forces would be effective in defending Japan." See: Sakamoto 1988, 95. The military aspect of the US-Japan relationship remained sensitive in Japan even during the 1980s. For example, in May 1981, at the end of a visit of PM Suzuki to Washington, a joint communique depicted the relationship between the US and Japan by using the term *dōmei*, which has military connotation. The political uproar caused by this incident brought to the resignation of Foreign Ministry Ito. See: Solomon 1981, 701.

fact was the major function of SDF...an increasing share of the public also recognized the defense functions of the SDF in the 1970s"(Mendel 1975, 163). This emphasis on defense was also accompanied by a growing willing to fight for one's country among Japanese, specifically in the early 1980s. Finally, on January 27, 1982, a survey conducted by All-Japan Collegiate Newspapers Union suggested that Japanese youths are more ready to fight against foreign invaders than had been previously observed. Of male and female university students, 57 percent would sacrifice for the sake of their country, a 20 percent increase compared to last year's numbers (USFJ 1982, 138).

Cognitive Beliefs

Concerning beliefs, a longitudinal public opinion poll (Figure 11 below) asking about the risk-probability that Japan would be involved in war indicates that the percentage of Japanese who believed there was "high risk" doubled between the mid 1970s and mid 1980s (from roughly 15 percent to 30 percent). Similarly, during the period of securitization attempts of the Soviet threat between 1978 and 1981, the number of Japanese who believed there was "no risk at all" *decreased* from about 36 percent to 21 percent. Interestingly, the number of those who believed there was "an insignificant risk" that Japan would be involved in a war also increased during this period and in-fact, was higher than those who opted for the previous two categories. And, so, subjective beliefs about the probability that Japan would be involved in a war have diffused among the public since the mid 1970s; yet, those who were largely indifferent to the probability of war were still the majority, with 53.8% of the population believing there was either "no" or "insignificant" risk in 1984 and only 30.9 percent believing there was "high risk".

Figure 11: Risk That Japan Would be Involved in a War

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To conclude, data concerning affect, behavioral tendency, and cognitive beliefs in the late postwar period indicated patterns of change in these three components of the ABC model. Growing dislike of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s, stronger behavioral tendency to use force to defend Japan, and more people believing there was a risk-probability that Japan would be involve in a war cmay explain why more Japanese became concerned with a growing Soviet threat.

3.6 Summary: A Direct Soviet Threat? 1976 - 1991

This section summarizes the findings concerning Japanese perceptions of a Soviet Union military threat between 1976 and 1991 and the conditions that enabled the limited securitization of the Soviet military threat by defense officials and to a certain extent by political leaders.

Context, Intensity and Distribution of Threat-Perceptions

In terms of context, the Soviet Union issue was increasingly framed as a military issue in the political discourse, as apparent in the analysis of PM policy speeches between 1978 and 1983. This was especially so during the tenure of PM Nakasone. In terms of intensity, various securitizing actors emphasized different components of the Soviet Union threat, opting for different risk-measures. During this period too, as in the early postwar period, Japanese military threat-perceptions of the Soviet Union can be discerned along the danger-judgements of no-danger, indirect-danger, and direct danger, based on the rationalities of security and peace. While the majority of the defense establishment and military realists underlined a direct Soviet threat - pointing to scenarios such as a Soviet land invasion directed at Hokkaido and a Soviet naval disruption to Japan's SLOC and calling for emergency legislation and military preparedness to counter these scenarios, the mainstream pragmatist elites emphasized the threat-scenario of a disruption to Japan's maritime lines of communication, the "life-lines" of Japan's economy. The latter scenario, argued defense-oriented politicians, necessitated an increase in the defense budget in order to enhance SDF capabilities and closer cooperation with US forces. The Soviet threat discourse also involved Japan's political-left, although the opinions across this camp diverged. While some acknowledged the Soviet Union as a *potential* military threat to Japan's peace and stability, others still maintained that by itself, the Soviet Union was not a threat to Japan. But

unlike the security rationality of the military realists, the danger-judgements embraced by the political left were still based on peace rationality and thus advanced a different reasoning: because the Soviet Union is militarily powerful and the SDF can not compete with it, Japan should withhold from military expansion and closer cooperation with the US. Since security measures would only increase the military threat from the Soviet Union, Japan should instead pursue peace, check its security apparatus to minimum and curb both the SDF capabilities and the cooperation with US forces.

Table 9: Danger-Judgements about the Soviet Union (Late 1970s - Mid 1980s)			
Intensity	**Actor**	**Rationality**	**Risk-Measures**
Direct Danger (3)	Defense establishments, Military Realists, DSP, US, some at the LDP	Security	Emergency Legislation, armament, contingency planning, force-deployment, expanding roles
Direct Danger (3a)	JCP, New Liberal Club	Peace	Unarmed Neutrality, Elimination of the Security Alliance, Objection to government policies
Indirect Danger (2)	Mainstream leadership of the LDP,	Pragmatist	Alignment with the US politically and to a lesser degree militarily (LDP);
Indirect Danger (2a)	JSP, Kōmeitō	Peace - Pragmatist	Objection to some of the government policies
No Danger (1)	Kōmeitō	Peace	Unarmed Neutrality

In terms of the distribution of danger-judgements, it is clear that compared to the early postwar period (1950-1975) the judgement of a direct danger (3, 3a) and the judgement of an indirect danger (2,2a) had come to be shared by more Japanese. This shift occurred on the expense of the

no-danger judgement (1). In general numbers, since the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, more Japanese people had come to associate a danger with the Soviet-Union - indirect or direct, with about 60 percent of the public testing to either high or low probability that Japan would be involved in a war during the first half of the 1980s. Still, a consensus about an actual Soviet military threat did not emerge during this period.

4. The Soviet Submarine Issue: A Case Study 1952-1991

Abstract

How did Japanese defense officials and politicians frame the issue of Soviet submarines in the postwar period? What referent objects, vulnerabilities and risks they invoked when discussing this issue? This chapter provides a longitudinal content analysis of one component of the Soviet military threat - its submarines - by examining the political discourse about it in greater depth and over four decade (1952 - 1991). This chapter substantiates a pattern of "threat-avoidance" in early postwar Japan as outlined in previous chapters. It also determines the main "inflators" and "deflators" of the Soviet threat, and demonstrates how the type of rationality informed their position on the submarine issue. I find that the JDA was the prominent actor in inflating this issue since the early 1970s, but also that during periods of rising tensions between Japan and the Soviet Union - such as the "second Cold War" - defense officials avoided provocative terminology and moderated their overall tone. This point is illuminating as responsible framing of security issues can be taken as a sign of "real tensions" among both sides, indicating a desire to prevent further escalation of the situation.

4.1 Introduction

From the outset, the underwater threat-component posed by the Soviet submarines was linked in Japan's political discourse to a referent object - the livelihood of the state and its people - and with a dual vulnerability, both in terms of Japan's dependency on maritime transport and its lack of resources. This sense of geo-economic vulnerability was reaffirmed by references to historical experience, such as the American blockade during WWII. As an example, on March 13, 1958, PM Kishi linked his experience during the war, in which "Japan's merchant fleet and naval military force had been rapidly lost due to [enemy] submarine attack", with the risk-consequence of food shortages ("*shokuryo no mondai*").[1] How did Japanese defense officials and politicians frame the issue of Soviet submarines in the postwar period? What referent objects, vulnerabilities and risks they invoked when discussing this issue? This chapter provides a longitudinal content analysis of one component of the Soviet military threat - its submarines - by examining the political discourse about it in greater depth and over four decade (1952 - 1991).

Three general points should be made about this chapter. First, why did I choose the issue of Soviet submarines to begin with? Figure 12 displays the number of references to different components of the Soviet threat in Diet deliberations by year (1950 - 2000). During this period, 217 references to "Soviet submarines" were made in the political discourse. Although relatively less discussed compared to other components of the Soviet threat such as 'SS-20', the issue of Soviet submarines was mentioned in the political discourse as early as the 1950s and throughout the postwar period. This allows for a longitudinal perspective in the analysis.

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[1] Subsequently, the PM directed the JDA DG, Tsushima Juichi, to conduct further research regarding the best strategy to deal with the submarine issue. See: National Diet Archives, House of Representatives, Cabinet Committee, March 13, 1958. Accessed January 15, 2014, from Kokkai.ndl.go.jp.

Figure 12 - Number of References to Various Components of the Soviet Threat in Diet by Year 1951 - 2000



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

Second, the overwhelming majority of interactions in the Diet regarding Soviet submarines were made between Government/bureaucratic officials and representatives from political parties; specifically, between JDA officials and opposition representatives. Third, the peak in references to *Soviet submarines* throughout the postwar period (see Figure 13) was in 1987, at the final stage of the Cold-War; the reason being the revelation of the "Toshiba incident". To recall, in 1987 it became known that the Japanese company had supplied sensitive equipment to the Soviet Union between 1979 and 1984. According to US sources, this equipment was used to enhance the

ability of Soviet submarines to remain undetected underwater (technology of "silencing"). By doing so, the company violated the COCOM agreement and later became a target for US sanctions. The peak in references to Soviet submarine was thus not in a military context but in the context of the bilateral relationship with the US.

4.2 Defense Establishment

How did Japan's defense establishment frame the issue of Soviet submarines? What referent objects, vulnerabilities and risks they invoked when discussing this issue? Whereas the Soviet submarine issue preoccupied defense planners as early as the 1960s, as Tamaki Seiji reports, JDA officials had began communicating the issue publicly only during the 1970s (NIDS 2012, 44).[2] Beginning in the 1970s, the issue of Soviet submarines gained a certain momentum both in the defense establishment and on the political stage. Yoshida Manabu reports that the objective of the fourth defense plan (1972-1976) was to enhance the MSDF's ability to protect the waters surrounding Japan and to guarantee the safety of maritime transport (NIDS 2012, 204).[3] In order to defend the sea-lanes that were deemed vulnerable to attacks from the enemy's submarines and aircrafts, the Defense Section considered the acquisition of various weapon systems. But as Yoshida reports, then-head of Japan's National Defense Council, Kaihara Osamu, rejected the request, saying "we do not need these [weapon-systems]" (NIDS 2012, 205). Kaihara, who served as the head of the council between 1967 and 1972, had been thought among MSDF personnel to prefer the GSDF over their own service, opposing the blue-water ambitions of the

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[2] Tamaki is a former JDA career official who served in different capacities between 1958 - 1980, and was highly involved in drafting the third Defense Buildup plan (1967-1971),

[3] Yoshida is a former MSDF officer who served on the Defense Section of the MSDF Chief of Staff Office in the early 1970s,

MSDF.[4] By 1980, Uchida Kazutomi, a former MSDF Chief of Staff (1969 and 1972) who maintained an influential position in maritime affairs decades later, insisted that the "Soviet naval capability posed the utmost threat to Japan", stressing that "an anti-submarine warfare capability must be the first charge on the resources of any nation precipitately faced with the possibility of *starvation* and *exhaustion* by hostile blockade" (Graham 2006,141; italics mine).[5] Uchida's ideas, - later termed the "Uchida doctrine"- outlined complementary roles for both the Japanese and the US navies: while the MSDF will concentrate on mine-sweeping and anti-submarine warfare, the US navy will carry out the main attack over the Soviet Pacific fleet which consisted of about 800 ships.

The emphasis over the submarine aspect of the Soviet military strategy in the defense establishment had culminated in a shift from territorial defense to extra-territorial defense (Graham 2006, 149). Subsequently, rather than the previous scenario of Soviet land-based invasion, a potential seal of Japan's sea lanes became the dominant threat-scenario in the minds of defense strategists. I explore the manner in which Japan's political establishment framed the Soviet submarine issue in the next section.

4.3 Political Establishment

How did political actors frame the issue of Soviet submarines? What referent objects, vulnerabilities and risks they invoked when discussing this issue? The issue of Soviet submarines was first raised in the period under study by LDP member Kita Reikichi in February 1953. Kita

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[4] MSDF personnel cynically referred to Kaihara, which is read in Japanese as "海原" - the first character literally means 'sea' - as "Rikuhara" - "陸原". The first character was changed to "ground", capturing his reputation to prefer the ground-forces. See also: Graham 2006, 141.

[5] Graham, 141.

stated that, "Soviet submarines are in Hainan Island, Tsingtau, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dalian, and in Vladivostok", highlighting the suspension of food supplies as a risk-consequence to Japan in case a war between the US and USSR would break out.

The issue of Soviet submarines was also picked up by opposition members, often in the context of their objection to military procurement that would counter the Soviet military power. For example, in April 1954 mentioned Tanaka Toshio (JSP left wing) the "excellent submarines" deployed by the Soviets in Vladivostok, and the American request to sell Japan ("old") destroyers to attempt to block these submarines from going out to the Sea of Japan/Pacific ocean.

Sooner than later, inflators of the threat began to incorporate another theme of vulnerability, namely US inferior capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in terms of under-water warfare. In March 1958, another LDP member named Tsuji Masanobu who was a former military army officer and an avid supporter of Japanese militarism, referred to the issue of Soviet submarines and said, "Whereas the Americans can compete with the Soviets in the air and on the sea-surface, they can not compete with Soviet capabilities under the sea." Tsuji pointed out that the Soviets had a total number of 475 submarines of which more than 150 were deployed in the Far-East - six times more than the US. He further suggested that Japan should fill this quantitative gap between Soviet and US capabilities by acquiring its own submarines.[6] By suggesting such a risk-measure, Tsuji had linked Japan's military role with US anti-Soviet military strategy: exactly what the opposition parties wanted to prevent. Interestingly, members of the opposition did not deny that Soviet submarines had the potential to inflict considerable damage on adversaries but only rejected the security rationality which aimed at countering this

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[6] National Diet Archives, March 7, 1958. House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee Correspondence 7.

alleged threat with armaments, opting instead for peaceful countermeasures as the only viable alternative.

The difference between these two versions of communicating the Soviet submarines issue, then, was essentially a difference in risk-measures. Whereas one side opted to manage the danger associated with Soviet submarines by aligning closer with the US and to develop anti-submarine capacity, the other side opted to disassociate Japan from the US and ultimately, to disarm. The latter risk-measure can be identified in a meeting of the Ad-hoc Committee for the US-Japan Security Treaty of the Upper House, convened on March 16, 1960. Takeya Gentarō (JSP) asked PM Kishi for his opinion regarding the probability of a total war between the superpowers, to which the latter answered that not only it existed, but that with the current weapon technology it would wreck a heavy damage on both sides. Takeya then quoted a news report according to which Soviet [nuclear power] submarines had been spotted near Nuevo Gulf, Argentina and suggested that the Soviets had the ability to inflict damage around the globe. But rather than calling to enhance security measures, Takeya called for a reduction in arms, and for policies that emphasize peace; the extension of the security treaty, he claimed, was counter productive in that sense and a "great mistake."[7]

The dual articulation of the Soviet submarine issue according to opposite rationalities had been maintained throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Whereas those who opted for more security by aligning with the US drew attention to the number and type of Soviet submarines stationed in the Far-East, those who spoke the language of peace maintained an anti-US position, while often invoking the exact same things.

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[7] National Diet Archives, March 16, 1960. House of Representatives - Ad-hoc Committee for the US-Japan Security Treaty. Correspondence s 10-11.

In line with developments in the defense establishment explored above, the issue of Soviet submarines received growing attention in the political discourse since the early 1970s. During a session of the Special Committee on the Reversion of Okinawa Agreement in December 1971, Somura Yasunobu, a scholar specializing in diplomatic history mentioned the Soviet "Sokolovsky strategy" which aimed at "crushing the enemy's maritime transport." [8] Subsequently, Somura cautioned against the Soviet Union, its "dramatic buildup of submarine capabilities" and the Y-Class type submarine.

The political discourse about Soviet submarines in the Diet escalated during the 1980s. It involved frequent criticism by opposition members who objected the plan to block the straits, inflated the fear of entrapment in a superpower war and cautioned against the re-militarization of Japan. The opposition framed these issues as endangering Japan's peace, constitution and non-nuclear principles.

Interestingly, since the late 1970s, actors from both sides of the political spectrum had began to emphasize the issue of Japan's sovereignty; while right-wing oriented politicians aimed to protect Japan's sovereignty by guarding its territorial waters against violations of foreign vessels and especially Soviet submarines, left-wing oriented politicians emphasized the need to

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[8] Vasily Sokolovsky was the Inspector General of USSR's Ministry of Defense between 1960 and 1968 and edited a 1962 publication of a book called "Military Strategy" about various aspects of contemporary warfare. Although there were only two other references to Sokolovsky's publication in Diet deliberations: on September 1964 and June 1981, the idea that Soviets naval forces would target sea-lanes of communication if a war were to break out was widespread. For an english translation of the book: Sokolovsky 1963. The Japanese translation followed in 1964. For an articulation of the Soviet naval strategy see pp. 298-302. For the Diet record see, National Diet Archives, December 20, 1971. House of Councilors - Special Committee on the Revision of Okinawa Agreement. Correspondence 13.

guard the national waters in order to prevent Soviet nuclear-submarines from violating Japan's non-nuclear policy. [9]

4.4 Soviet Submarines: Political Message

What was the content of the political message conveyed by various actors when referring to Soviet submarines throughout the postwar period? Generally, representatives from both sides of the political spectrum employed three types of arguments when discussing the issue of Soviet submarines in the Diet. The first type of argument emphasized the danger associated with Soviet submarines, and called on to counter it with security measures such as armament; this type of argument "inflates" the issue and had been mostly employed by JDA, DSP and LDP members. The second and third type of arguments were mostly invoked by opposition members. Some representatives questioned the severeness of the Soviet submarine issue altogether, adopting sophisticated arguments that targeted the assumptions underlying US and Japanese defense planners' thinking; in essence, they "deflated" the Soviet submarine issue. Other opposition members emphasized the quality of Soviet submarines (or generally, Soviet military power) - thus inflating the issue, but instead of calling to respond to this issue with security measures, they opted for peaceful measures. I call this type of rhetoric the "inflate (the issue) to deflate (a tensed situation)" strategy.

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[9] The following is an example of such an argument. On April 16, 1981, at the Transport Committee of the House of Councilors, Meguro Kesajirō (JSP) mentioned the military balance between Soviet submarines stationed in the Far East ("about 120 of which about 60 are nuclear-powered") and the US Seventh fleet, and emphasized that many such submarines - some of which are "loaded with nuclear weapons" are sailing in the vicinity of Japan's territorial waters. Meguro then demanded to strengthen Japan's patrol capabilities in order to prevent similar incidents in the future.

Figure 13 - Number of References to "Soviet Submarines" in Diet Sessions 1951 - 1991*



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

Figure 13 shows the number of references made to "Soviet submarines" in both houses of Diet between 1951-1991, that is, as long as the Soviet Union existed as a political entity.[10] By designating the mere number of occurrences of these word-combinations in the political discourse, the figure captures the frequency of political communication concerning Soviet submarines in time-perspective. But since the figure does not differentiate between the three types of arguments mentioned above, these data can not clarify whether a certain political statement inflated, deflated, or inflated to deflate the "Soviet submarine" issue thus making commentary about the type of message political actors wished to convey impossible. Although it is possible to infer from the data when was the issue most discussed on the political stage; as we shall see, high points in the figure are correlated with developments in the security environment, government policies, and issues related to US-Japan alliance. As Figure 13 illustrates, while in the early postwar period (1950-1975) annual references to Soviet submarines had fluctuated between 0-6, from the mid 1970s this number had increased. The period with the most heated

[10] For the word-combination, I searched for (1) "*soren sensuikan*" (2) "*sobieto sensuikan*" (3) "*soren no sensuikan*" (4) "*sobieto no sensuikan*" in order to ensure better results. These combinations were searched for the period between 30.12.1950 and 30.12.1991.

political discourse about Soviet submarines was the 1980s, with 1981, 1983, and 1987 as points of especially heated discussion. As one might expect, the political conversation concerning Soviet submarines has abated with the demise of the Soviet Union.

In order to enhance the content analysis, a database of the total number of references to Soviet submarines was created. Into the database, I typed the name of the person that uttered the expression "Soviet submarines", his/her affiliation, the reaction made by the correspondent (if there was one), the immediate context, language used, and the type of argument: was the speaker/ correspondent attempted to "inflate", "deflate", or "inflate to deflate" the issue.

The examination of the data by political actors (Figures 14 and 15) reveals pattern of change in the distribution of references between the political parties across time: whereas between 1953 and 1974 the share of references made by JSP representatives was 69 percent of all references, after 1975 this share has dramatically dropped to 36 percent of all references made between 1975 and 1991.[11] This trend can be attributed to the rise of the share held by JCP (from 8 to 30 percent) and Kōmeitō (from 3 to 13 percent). The nearly four times increase in JCP's share of references is only part of the story. Measuring JCP-references from 1981 would result in even larger share. Clearly, during the 1980s, the JCP had been the most outspoken actor in the context of Soviet submarines.[12] Additionally, a comparison between Figures 14 and 15 suggests an interesting pattern: during both periods, the number of references made by supporters of the

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[11] Few references were made by people affiliated with other political actors, or with people who ran as independent in the elections.

[12] Interestingly, the majority of JCP public supporters felt a Soviet military threat during the late 1970s and early 1980s (JSP supporters felt a Soviet threat too, but less so when compared to JCP voters. See: Hasegawa 1985, 65). Coupled with the JCP's critical stance toward the USSR - which it took in 1964 - it becomes clear that JCP representative in the Diet indeed felt a direct danger associated with the Soviet Union and therefore, communicated their desire for peaceful measures more strongly during this period.

Soviet threat thesis and of security countermeasures - almost always members of LDP and DSP - has been 20-21 percent. The share of references made by those who were either critical of the Soviet-threat thesis or supporters of countering the Soviet threat with peaceful countermeasures (JSP, JCP and Kōmeitō) has been 79-80 percent respectively.[13]

[13] Representatives of political parties in the Diet are allocated time to raise questions in the Diet according to their relative size in the house. I would like to thank Professor Matsuda Yasuhiro for pointing this out. Checking for the frequency of references to Soviet submarines by individual person, then Ooide Shun (JSP) - who was considered an authority on security issues - was the most outspoken figure about the Soviet submarine issue with 12 references. In the second and third places came defense hawks such as the former PM Nakasone (11 references) and Okazaki Hisahiko (7 references).

Figure 14 - Number of References to 'Soviet Submarines' in the Diet by political actor 1953 - 1974



Figure 15 - Number of References to 'Soviet Submarines' in the Diet by political actor 1975 - 1991



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(data compiled by the author)

4.4.1 Inflating Rhetoric

By "inflating rhetoric" I assume an actor was either emphasizing the danger posed by Soviet submarines per-se or as part of a broader Soviet security threat - and opting for security measures to counter it. Inflating rhetoric of the danger posed by Soviet submarines can be seen, for example, in Ishihara Shintarō's reference to Soviet submarines given on March 15, 1969. During a meeting of the Budget committee of the Lower House, Ishihara (LDP) questioned the sincerity behind USSR's "Asian diplomacy", and asserted that the number of Soviet submarines and ships in Asian water has dramatically increased. Subsequently, Ishihara called for Japan to take a proactive defense policy that ensures the maritime routes taken by oil-tankers all the way to the Persian Gulf (including the Indian Ocean).[14]

4.4.2 Deflating Rhetoric

A "deflating rhetoric" of the danger posed by the Soviet submarines was employed in three of the following ways: one, by diminishing or rejecting a military threat associated with these vessels; two, by diminishing or rejecting a military threat associated with the Soviet Union as a whole, and three, by acknowledging the quality/quantity of Soviet submarines but advocating peaceful, rather than security-like measures to counter the issue.

The first type of deflating rhetoric is registered in a correspondence between Ichikawa Yūichi (Kōmeitō) and JDA officials during a Budget Committee session of the Upper House on February 17, 1984. In the session, Ichikawa requested from JDA officials to clarify the threats against which it called to protect Japan's maritime traffic-routes; he elaborated on the various

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[14] National Diet Archives, March 15, 1969. House of Councilors - Budget Committee. Correspondence 26.

types and operational radius of Soviet submarines in the Far-East and argued that Soviet submarines would simply not have sufficient time to target Japan's maritime traffic as JDA officials had claimed. Ichikawa then concluded that the concept of sea-lane defense, which is based on exaggeration of Soviet submarines' capabilities, was groundless.[15]

The second type of deflating rhetoric can be observed in a plenary session of the Upper House held on March 8, 1986. In it, Satō Kanju (JSP) made a point against the proposed budget for FY 1986, criticizing PM Nakasone's term in power as staging Japan on a dangerous path to militarization. Satō referred to Soviet submarines in the context of the SDF's expanding military budget and roles, and argued that these developments are inconsistent with the current easing of superpower tensions.[16]

The differences between these two "deflating rhetoric" are evident. Whereas Ichikawa questions the extent to which Soviet submarines are capable of inflicting damage on Japan's vital assets, Satō does not directly comment on the issue but focuses instead on the international situation, with its lower likelihood of conflict between the US and Soviet Union. Moreover, Satō voices his concerns over the danger of Japanese militarization, rather than cautioning against war with the Soviets.

The third type of "deflating rhetoric" actually incorporates inflating elements. That is, the speaker does not attempt to make the issue of Soviet submarines trivial, but on the contrary, argues that it is substantial. Yet rather than calling to meet the potential threat with military means, either independently of or with US forces, the speaker warns against entrapment in a

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[15] National Diet Archives, February 17, 1984. House of Representatives - Budget Committee. Correspondence 8-9.

[16] National Diet Archives, March 8, 1986. House of Representatives - Plenary Session. Correspondence 3.

conflict with the USSR and its subsequent losses, often calling to adopt peaceful countermeasures such as disarmament and friendly relations with the Soviet Union instead.

The "inflate to deflate rhetoric" can be observed in the following examples; notice the slightly different tone between them. The first example is registered during a Budget committee session of the Upper House on February 20, 1984. Yayama Yūsaku (JSP) commented on PM Nakasone's interview with the *Washington Post* (January 1983) in which the latter mentioned that Japan would deny Soviet submarines passage in the straits in case of a war. Yayama argued that by implementing such a policy, Japan would effectively accept a supplemental military role in the American global strategy. Yayama then asked JDA officials to note one conflict-scenario embroiling Japan, and asserted that such a conflict is only likely as a result of war between the US and USSR. In other words, underlying this deflating rhetoric is the assumption that the USSR simply does not have a reason to attack Japan independently of the US hence there is no logic in provoking it. The second example is closer to the inflators stance: during a Budget committee session of the Upper House on February 5, 1980, stated Ooide Shun (JSP) that Japanese military capabilities are inferior to the Soviets' and argued that in case of a war *it would be impossible for the SDF to protect Japanese citizens and property*.[17] That is, Ooide did not discredit the inflators' thesis regarding Japan's military vulnerability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but instead, seem to have accepted it. Yet instead of military preparedness or resorting to security argument, Ooide called on the government to disassociate itself from US war plans and strategy.

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[17] National Diet Archives, February 5, 1980. House of Representatives - Budget Committee. Correspondence 12.



Figure 16 : Inflating the Soviet Submarine Issue by Actor, 1953-93

*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

4.5 Threat Inflators: JDA

Figure 16 shows data indicating the most active actor in terms of emphasizing ("inflating") the Soviet submarine threat between 1953 and 1993. In the first pace came the JDA, with 37 percent of the overall share, in the second place came the DSP (25 percent), and in the third place with 18 percent politicians from the LDP. This section explores changes in JDA rhetoric over time.

The JDA's official stance and language vis-à-vis the Soviet submarine issue has evolved with time. On October 23,1960, in a session of the Budget committee of the Upper House, attempted JDA DG Esaki Masumi to justify the decision to introduce 18 new helicopters and to build a helicopter carrier by stating the following:

> As you are aware, Japan's is surrounded by sea from four directions...there is a tendency in [contemporary] maritime military force to strengthen under, rather than above-water

> capabilities. Accordingly, if an act of aggression were to happen, it is natural for us to consider anti-submarine abilities. Helicopters can interfere [with submarine activities].[18]

Esaki set with his statement a basic pattern to be used in the decades that followed: a pattern which revolved around Japan's vulnerable geo-political position and an external event or process - here the trend in military technology to strengthen under-water capabilities.

The first concrete "wake-up" call to observe Soviet submarine-related developments in Diet deliberations was made on April 24, 1972. In a correspondence with Iwama Masao (JCP) JDA high official Kubo was asked about the current situation concerning Soviet submarines. Kubo replied that there are about 100 submarines of which about 30 are nuclear-powered and stationed in Vladivostok, further stating that the Soviets are rapidly progressing with building Y-class type submarines. Kubo concluded that the "The possibility of [Y-class] deployment has to be considered."[19] By 1976, JDA officials had toughened their tone. In a March 2nd meeting of the Cabinet Committee of the Upper House said JDA high-official Maruyama Ko that there are, "120 submarines in the Far-East, of which 40 are nuclear powered". Maruyama detailed the increase in the amount of Soviet submarines ("compared with 10 years ago, the number of submarines increased by 85, and nuclear-powered submarines increased by 12") and called specific attention to the dramatic increase in the number of nuclear-powered submarines.[20] By 1977, JDA officials resorted to harsher argumentative jargon. Speaking in a Cabinet committee session on October 27, 1977, Defense Bureau Chief Ito stipulated that,

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[18] National Diet Archives, Budget Committee, October 23, 1960. Correspondence 26. This decision was later shelved.

[19] National Diet Archives, April 24, 1972. House of Councilors - Budget Second Sub-Committee. Correspondence 30-32.

[20] National Diet Archives, March 2, 1976. House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee. Correspondence 39-40.

> Japan is surrounded by seas. The most prominent threat from the seas is the submarine threat. Furthermore, if we compare the capabilities of the US and USSR in this respect, the latter has a lot more [submarines]. Finally, about 45 of the 125 Soviet submarines stationed in the Far East are nuclear-powered. [21]

Although Ito denied later in the session that he sees the Soviet Union as an enemy state, he asserted that Japan has to "naturally" consider the submarine danger coming from the seas and subsequently, to opt for the P3C, which is "the most effective" measure to counter adversary's submarines. Ito's language encapsulates a clear articulation of Japan's dual vulnerable situation: first, it is engulfed by seas, and second, the USSR exercises both a quantitative and qualitative advantage over the US in this area. His "solution", or countermeasure, is straight-forward: the P3C, anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft.

By 1978, however, JDA officials had toned down their language. During a correspondence with Yamazaki Noboru (JSP) on April 11, for example, JDA DG Kanemaru Shin was asked whether recent remarks on the Soviet submarines made by defense planners, such as those made in a book published by the former Chief of Joint Staff Nakamura Ryūhei , reflected a JDA's working assumption according to which the Soviet Union is an hypothetical enemy, thus leading to the creation of an actual threat. Kanemaru replied by emphasizing that the JDA strives for friendly relations as much as possible with the Soviets. Nevertheless, continued Kanemaru, the fact that the Soviets fortified their military facilities in the Northern Territories can not be disregarded.[22] From then on, JDA officials seemed to largely follow what I term a 'responsible inflating strategy' vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. At the same time they called for attention to the

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[21] National Diet Archives, October 27, 1977. House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee. Correspondence 43.

[22] National Diet Archives, April 11, 1978. April 11, 1978. House of Councilors - Cabinet Committee. Correspondence 35.

Soviet military buildup in the Far-East, they would stress the need to maintain "friendly relations" with the Soviet Union.

JDA's avoidance of framing the Soviet submarines as a direct-threat in Diet deliberations continued well into the 1980s. In March 1986, for example, discussed Futami Nobuaki (Kōmeitō) the issue of SLOC with Chief of Defense Bureau Nishihiro Seiki and claimed that it would be hard to defend the Northeastern maritime route against Soviet submarines. The Chief of Defense Bureau Nishihiro Seiki responded by saying that the JDA does not bear in mind specific country when formulating its defense strategy.[23]

The Toshiba incident altered JDA official attitude yet once again. Confronted with the political upheaval created by the illegal export and its implications for the US-Japan bilateral relationship, JDA officials as well as FM Kuranari Tadashi and PM Nakasone had begun to emphasize the issue of silencing of Soviet submarines in Diet deliberations and link it to the countermeasures the government had taken including enhanced information-sharing and operational cooperation with US forces. Different from the official government response that emphasized the negative impact of the security of the Western block as a whole, JDA officials underlined the challenges the incident had created for Japan's national security. In a Cabinet committee meeting in the Upper house, held on August 20, 1987, stated JDA DG Kurihara Yuko that the violation of the COCOM agreement [by Toshiba] creates a problem not only to the security of the Western camp but more importantly, to Japan's national security. Kurihara then confirmed that the silencing of Soviet submarines was discussed in a meeting he had held with Secretary Weinberger earlier that year. "From a national security point of view, [the issue of silencing] is a great concern."

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[23] National Diet Archives, March 5, 1986. House of Representatives - Budget Committee. Correspondence 28.

By 1990, the international situation had drastically changed with an overall political perception of a reduced Soviet threat and reduced likelihood of a superpower conflict. Drawn to the defense again, JDA officials turned to traditional patterns of emphasizing Japan's vulnerability and inferiority in terms of military capabilities vis-à-vis other countries. One such example can be observed in the following discussion. Although JDA DG Ishikawa Yozo acknowledged the global changes including the disarmament moves agreed upon by the two blocks, Chief of Defense Bureau Hiyoshi Akira soon picked up the topic of the regional military balance, asserting that Japan's military capabilities in terms of personnel, tonnage, air power and lack of nuclear weapons are inferior to those of its neighboring countries. Hiyoshi also verified the concept of sea lane defense, attributing it to the traditional convention of "Japan is an island country, surrounded by waters, and mostly dependent on maritime traffic for its resources."[24]

Roughly at the same time, JDA officials began commenting on the developments in USSR, saying that there is "a gap between declarations and putting [things] into practice" (April 23 1990), and that, "there are no assurances that the [positive] trends will continue" (June 11, 1990). In a correspondence with JSP member Yamaguchi Tetsuo, who emphasized the aging of the Soviet submarine fleet and offered his objections to the defense budget, DG Ishikawa denied that the JDA is inflating the Soviet threat in order to achieve financial gains.[25]

To conclude, beginning in the spring of 1972, the JDA had called for *consideration* of the Soviet submarine capability; by 1976 it had underlined a "*dramatic increase*" and by 1977 it had framed the submarine issue as "*the most prominent threat from the seas*", linking it with Japan's

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[24] National Diet Archives. May 29, 1990. Cabinet Committee - House of Representatives, Correspondence 25.

[25] National Diet Archives, June 12, 1990. House of Councilors - Cabinet Committee. Correspondence 7.

strategic vulnerabilities. Beginning in 1978, however, JDA officials had begun incorporating a more responsible inflating tactics, denying that they view the Soviet Union as an "imagined enemy". By 1987, the JDA had once again updates its official stance. The political atmosphere created by the Toshiba incident facilitated a growing emphasis of Soviet submarines' silencing, as JDA officials turned to justify closer cooperation with the US with the improvement in Soviet technology. Finally, during the final stage of the Soviet Union's demise, JDA officials had assimilated both old and new "inflating" strategies, such as stressing Japan's inferiority vis-à-vis neighboring countries, its vulnerability ("surrounded by water"), as well as uncertainty regarding Soviet policy future trajectory.

4.6 Summary: The Soviet Submarine Issue

Chapter 4 examined how one component of the Soviet threat -its submarines - was framed by the defense and political establishments over a period of four decades. I summarize the findings below.

First, the analysis of references to Soviet submarines made by JDA officials throughout the postwar period suggested three conclusions:

1. JDA officials have consistently maintained an inflating rhetoric toward the Soviet submarine issue, albeit with varying intensity and fluctuations over time. JDA officials presented the agency's position in Diet deliberations according to the following pattern: inflating it during years of Soviet military buildup (early 1970s), responsible inflating strategy during years of heightened security tensions (mid 1970s-mid 1980s) and inflating various components of the Soviet military during years of relative low-security tensions (end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s).

2. To support its inflating stance during the Cold War, JDA officials have often invoked three factors: the actual number and quality type of Soviet submarines in the Far-East, the relatively inferior position of US forces compared with Soviet submarines, and Japan's vulnerable position as an archipelago.
3. To support its inflating stance after the demise of the Soviet Union, JDA officials emphasized the modernization of Soviet submarines, Japan's inferior capabilities vis-à-vis the neighboring countries and its vulnerable position as an archipelago, and the un-certainty about future Russian behavior.

Second, the political conversation about the Soviet submarines has both maintained old referent objects, vulnerabilities and risks and incorporated new ones with time. While Japanese actors during the early 1950s and 1960s focused on the scenario of a foreign disturbance to the SLOC and the risk-consequence of food shortages, beginning in the 1970s and more forcefully during the 1980s, the issue of Japan's *sovereignty* has been emphasized by both sides of the political spectrum. While members of the DSP and LDP emphasized territorial violations as a challenge to Japan's sovereignty from a security point of view, left-wing politicians (JSP and JCP) cautioned against Soviet (and US) violations of Japan's territorial waters and especially of nuclear-powered submarines since they obstructed Japan's non-nuclear principles. Still, the risk-consequences of *starvation* and *exhaustion* were associated with Soviet submarines as late at the 1980s.

Third, the chapter found that the major "inflating actors" of the Soviet submarine issue were the JDA, the DSP, and the LDP. But, in light with earlier findings, most references to 'Soviet submarines' were made by members of the left-wing opposition in an attempt to deflate

the Soviet threat discourse. and therefore can be seen as a political reaction to the government's defense policy, as well as to media reports and other external events. Opposition members also referred to 'Soviet submarines' in their attempt to caution against entrapment in a war with the Soviet Union as a result of the security cooperation with the US.

Fourth, defense officials and government representatives were aware of the "making of the threat" issue, and were cautious not to frame the Soviet Union as a threat during periods of rising tensions such as the "second Cold War". This point is illuminating since responsible framing of security issues can be taken as a sign of real tensions among both sides and a desire to prevent further escalation of the situation.

Fifth, attitudes toward military security issues were *almost always* consistent with one's political affiliation: just as JDA officials have rarely deflated military issues, opposition members have rarely inflated the Soviet submarine issue with security countermeasures in mind. Likewise, the risk-measures advocated by the speaker (arming, or disarming, enhancing the alliance with the US or abandoning it) were consistent with the rhetoric of the speaker. That is, inflating the issue of Soviet submarines by speaking the language of security would result in sending a message of armaments, and inflating the issue by using the language of peace or deflating the issue altogether would result in objecting such measures while calling to protect symbols of non-militarism such as the constitution or other institutions.

Sixth, the analysis of the political discourse about Soviet submarines in postwar Japan provided evidence in support of the "threat-avoidance" hypothesis laid out in chapters 2 and 3. Even the most heightened tensions of the Cold War (from the Korean war to the Cuban missile crisis) did not trigger a political conversation regarding the Soviet submarine issue. The pattern

of ‘avoidance’ in relation to the submarine issue weakened in the second half of the 1970s, with references to Soviet threat increasing in the early 1980s.

5. Media Framing Analysis of the "Soviet threat" Issue as Represented in *Yomiuri Shinbun* Editorials 1952-1990

Abstract

How was the Soviet military threat framed by Japan's domestic media during the postwar period (1950 - 1990)? This chapter explores the phenomenon of threat perception in Japan by employing Media Framing Analysis to *Yomiuri Shinbun* editorials with references to both 'Soviet' and 'threat'. The chapter identifies important changes in terms of the newspaper's underlying attitude toward security and of its judgement of the Soviet threat. Although the analysis traces these changes to the late 1970s and early 1980s, neither the Soviet military build-up in the Northern Territories (1978-9) nor the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) had tipped the editorial stance concerning the Soviet threat and consecutive editorials in the early 1980s still resisted the securitization of the Soviet issue as a military threat. It was in March 1983 that the Soviet Union was first framed as a military threat in *Yomiuri* editorials.

5.1 Introduction

A summary of the empirical findings concerning Japanese perceptions of the Soviet military threat covered by chapters 2-4 would be helpful at this point. To recall, Chapter 2 outlined the trends in bilateral relations between Japan and the Soviet Union throughout the postwar period, suggesting that a hostile sentiment toward the Soviet Union - both among Japanese diplomats and the general public- prevailed through most of the postwar period. The chapter then examined perceptions of the Soviet Union threat during the early stage of the postwar period (1950 - 1975) among Japan's defense establishment and political elites. It found that at least among military personnel, the Soviet Union was perceived to be a direct military threat, but such a perception

was not communicated publicly. The chapter concluded that the domestic political conversation about military security threats was abstract, concentrated on Japan's risk measures while *eschewing* references to concrete threats (Such as the Soviet Union). The political mainstream (the majority of LDP and bureaucrats) judged the Soviet Union military threat to be indirect (latent), while the political left (JSP and JCP) did not judge the Soviet Union itself as a military threat.

Chapter 3 examined Japanese perceptions of the Soviet threat during the later stage of the postwar period (1976 - 1991) and found that the Soviet military threat was securitized to some extent in Japan's national conversation during the tenure of PM Nakasone (1982 - 1987). The chapter identified both the international conditions and domestic circumstances that enabled the dissemination of the Soviet military threat discourse among the Japanese society in the early 1980s, including the rise in hostile sentiment toward the Soviet Union, a growing resolve to defend Japan against external threats independently, and growing concerns that Japan would be involved in a war.

Chapter 4 examined how one aspect of the Soviet threat -its submarines - was depicted in the Diet during the Cold War period. The chapter concluded that danger-judgements are almost always consistent with the political/organizational affiliation of the speaker involved and can be described along two types of competing rationalities: security and peace. Combined together, the analysis presented in chapters 2-4 suggests several tentative conclusions related to the research questions.

First, rising negative sentiment toward the Soviet Union was a necessary but not sufficient condition to the limited securitization of the Soviet military threat in Japanese public

discourse. This is so because in earlier periods characterized by high tensions the Soviet military was not securitized in the political discourse.[1]

Second, Japan's national conversation about military threats has undergone major changes during the postwar era; while in the early stage of the postwar, the conversation was relatively muted, beginning in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, an explosion of references to different components of the Soviet military threat were identified in Diet deliberations (such explosion of references in itself does not "proves" that a securitization of the Soviet military threat occurred, as many of these references were made by opposition representatives seeking to deflate a Soviet threat; however the mere amount of references can be taken to be a response to *some* kind of policy or trend advocated by the government or other securitizing actors). This trend indicates that the early postwar taboo surrounding military-security issues has been eroding from the late 1970s and military-security issues were politicized in Japan once again.

Third, perceptions of threat during the postwar period were strongly correlated with one's political or organizational affiliation and attitudes toward military-security. I discerned two main rationalities: "peace" and "security". During the 1980s, the latter stance seemed to be gaining the momentum. Covering the period between roughly 1950 and 1990, the analysis of perceptions of the Soviet military threat in chapters 2-4 finds an interesting pattern: during the early stage of the postwar period, Japanese defense officials and decision makers refrained from publicly communicating military concerns about the Soviet Union. Early aversion to military-security in the political discourse was mitigated during the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s with growing attention given to Soviet-related stimuli. Subsequently, the Soviet military threat was

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[1] Although the Soviet Union was not securitized as a military threat during this period, it was perceived to pose a political and ideological threat as discussed in chapter 3.

publicly securitized by certain actors, while other actors still opposed this securitization.

The purpose of this chapter is to capture and analyze the manner in which the Soviet military threat was framed in domestic media in Japan during the period between 1952 and 1990. To achieve this goal, I apply the Media Framing Analysis to *Yomiuri Shinbun* editorials with references to both "Soviet" and "threat".[2] Four sets of questions guided the analysis: (1) How was the threat posed by the Soviet Union represented in the editorial? What were the counter-frames? (2) What were the shared beliefs that pinpointed the media framing? (3) Did the editorial inflate / deflate the threat?[3] (4) What kind of risk measures did it recommend for Japan in order to deal with the Soviet Union?

5.2 Content Analysis of *Yomiuri* Editorials

This chapter uses a dataset consisting of 25 editorials; Table 10 presents the titles and dates of the editorials, as well as frames used to describe the Soviet Union issue either implicitly or explicitly. While in most of the editorials the term "Soviet threat" was mentioned as a word-combination, this was not always the case: in editorials from the early postwar period, the words "Soviet" and "threat" were often separated and appeared in completely different paragraphs. Still, the mere existence of the words "threat" and "Soviet Union" - even if not associated with one another - can teach us something about the way these two words were used in the media discourse.

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[2] To recall, "Media Framing" is associated with Erving Goffman, first introduced by him under the name of "Frame Analysis" (Goffman 1974). Simply put, frames define the issue at stake, and how to think about it. Framing can be conceived as a dialectical process: that is, there is no frame without a counter-frame (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, quoted in Davis 2009). The competition among different groups on how to frame an issue is embedded within a domain of shared beliefs (Pan and Kosicki 1993, quoted in Davis 2009). For the full discussion of this theory, see chapter 1.

[3] By "inflating" a threat I mean to overemphasize the danger associated with it, and by "deflating" a threat I mean the opposite: de-emphasizing the danger associated with it.

One semantic point about the data should be made. When Yomiuri editorials referred to a 'Soviet threat' (*soren no kyoui* or *soren kyoui*), they sometimes did so under quotation-marks, as in a "Soviet threat" and sometimes without it. The first time an editorial did not use quotation-marks when mentioning a 'Soviet threat' was in September 1981 (editorial number 10), when reporting the gaps in perception of the Soviet Union between US and Japanese representatives. Later editorials, however, were not consistent on this point and while some used quotation-marks others did not. This point may be important because when a word-combination is put under quotation mark, it is often associated with common knowledge or inappropriate view ("so-called"). When used without quotation-marks, the expression denotes a claim about a certain truth - that there is a Soviet threat and it is not fabricated or exaggerated in any way.[4]

A content analysis of the distribution of references in *Yomiuri* editorials indicates that the Soviet threat discourse appeared in domestic media during the same time it engulfed the Diet, that is, from the end of the 1970s; a Media Framing Analysis of this content further revealed deep changes in framing the issue of Soviet military threat and in the shared beliefs about security as represented in *Yomiuri* editorials. I explore these findings below.

5.3 Findings

A careful investigation of the data suggests several findings.

First, the attitude toward Soviet related (military) stimuli in the editorials has undergone a major change when considering a long-time perspective. Consider for example the following comparison between editorial number 1 (1953) and 4 (1979). In August 1953, an editorial titled "The Spy Control Law is a threat to [free] speech" discussed the political ramifications of an

[4] I would like to thank professor Tanaka Akihiko for fine-tuning this argument.

incident in which a small Soviet "spy farm" in the area of Wakkanai (Hokkaido) was discovered earlier that month.[5] But rather than considering the revelation from an outward point of view, e.g., the extent of Soviet intelligence penetration to Japan, the editorial disregards the Soviet Union and focuses on criticizing a call made by government officials in response to the incident to legislate spy-control laws. The editorial frames the attempt to legislate such a law (and not the Soviet spy incident) as a *threat* to free-speech and democracy, implicitly cautioning against a return to the war era.

Now consider editorial number 4 (January 1979) titled "Regrettable 'basification' of the Northern Territories by the Soviet Union." This editorial reflects on the Soviet Union militarization of Kunashiri and Etorofu with "full-scale" military bases, citing JDA DG's statement about the details of the Soviet deployment which included tanks, artillery, anti-air missiles, and few thousands soldiers. It depicts both islands as Japanese "characteristic territory", highlights just how close they are to Hokkaido and maintains that such military deployment on these islands hurts the "nation's feelings". Although the editorial emphasizes that this deployment does not mean that Japanese should panic about an impending war - calling instead to react to it with "calm" (*reisei ni)* - it does urge the government to protest the deployment to the Soviets.

[5] The words "Soviet" and "threat" were separated from each other in this editorial.

Table 10: Editorials in Yomiuri Shinbun with References to "Soviet" and "Threat" 1946 - 1990			
#	Title	Date (YY.MM.DD)	Frames (If and How the "Soviet Union" or a "Soviet threat" was framed?)
1	"The Spy Control Law is a threat to [free] speech"	1953.08.24	De-voiding a threat: pretext for introducing the argument against security legislation)
2	"New prospects for Europe"	1971.05.31	Historical threat to Europe
3	"Trends in Asia's significance to America"	1978.08.06	Insecurity (to SouthEast Asia)
4	"Regrettable 'basification' of the Northern Territories by the Soviet Union"	1979.01.31	Insecurity (Threat to US but not to Japan)
5	"Why [the Soviets] establish a base in Shikotan?"	1979.09.28	Growing insecurity
6	"American budget to counter two threats"	1980.01.30	Insecurity (Threat to the US).
7	"Too big too soon [of a] demand"	1981.07.01	Insecurity (Threat to the US).
8	"Let's calmly construct a perception toward the Soviet Union"	1981.07.05	Insecurity (framing the threat in global rather than regional perspective)
9	"Lessons from the 'Missile Launch' incident"	1981.08.30	Insecurity and the threat of super-power and regional conflicts ; (Soviet threat in quotation marks)
10	"For a fruitful Dialogue between Japan and the US"	1981.09.06	Soviet Union is perceived by both Japan and the US as mutual threat, but both countries greatly differ in their risk-measures. (Soviet threat without quotation marks).
11	"Middle East affairs as advanced based on an Arab logic"	1982.03.01	Insecurity
12	"Soviet military build-up that [we] can not accept"	1983.03.11	Threat. The Soviet use of Space for military purposes - a threat that "We can not accept
13	"ASEAN strengthened by political coloring"	1983.06.30	Insecurity. The Soviet threat was mentioned under quotation marks
14	"Aiming for a mature Japan-China relationship"	1983.09.09	Soviet Union is perceived by both Japan and China as threat to Asia
15	"Reflections on the anti-nuclear movement in Western Europe"	1983.10.24	Soviet Union as an Adversary, that entertains malign intentions as the recent Korean airliner incident "have taught us"
16	"China-US relationship to enter a new period of maturity"	1984.01.16	Insecurity
17	"Disappointing Kovalenko statement"	1984.02.10	Insecurity and Threat. SS-20 are the source of the nuclear threat to Asia

Table 10: Editorials in Yomiuri Shinbun with References to "Soviet" and "Threat" 1946 - 1990			
#	**Title**	**Date (YY.MM.DD)**	**Frames (If and How the "Soviet Union" or a "Soviet threat" was framed?)**
18	"Soviet military build in the Far East and Japan's stance"	1984.05.13	The Soviet Union Military as a Potential adversary (threat is implied)
19	"Compound eyes consideration that do not fail on defense and diplomacy"	1986.01.19	Threat and Opportunity. Japan should deter the Soviet Union military while seeking friendship at the same time. The Soviet threat is mentioned without quotation marks.
20	"Expectation for US-ASEAN cooperation"	1986.05.04	Threat to US and to lesser extent to ASEAN countries; The Soviet threat is mentioned without quotation marks.
21	"Agitated Europe's difficult challenge"	1989.04.05	Reduction in the perception of Soviet threat in West Germany; still, the editorial calls for caution in dealing with the Soviet Union and opposes de-securitization of the issue.
22	"US moves toward sharp decrease in military expenditures"	1989.11.24	Soviet Union military as a threat in the Far-East and Northern Pacific. While tensions in Europe have been mitigated, the threat in the Far-East region did not subside.

The differences between both editorials are striking. While the 1953 editorial essentially dissociates the "Soviet spy-farm" incident from its perpetrator (the Soviet Union), taking an introspective harsh-line against risk measures proposed by government figures, the 1979 editorial reflects on the Soviet "basification" with an outward, realistic, national-security-informed point of view, calling the incident "regrettable" and urging the government to file a protest to the Soviets through such channels as the Soviet embassy in Japan. To recall, no such a call to protest the spy farm incident has been made in the 1953 editorial. This shift in attitude is even more striking considering that the Soviet spy-farm was discovered *inside* Japanese territory (although in its margins) and the Soviet military deployment was made to a territory that Japan does not effectively control (the Northern Territories).

The second finding illuminates patterns of change in the "shared beliefs" that stand at the

core of Japanese threat perceptions and security attitudes.[6] As for belief (1), since the end of the 1970s editorials had demonstrated a strong tendency toward greater "defensive-realist" view of international politics, including a stronger recognition of the importance of military power in protecting one's interests in the international arena (for a detailed account of this point, see the discussion in finding number 4).[7]

Likewise, *Yomiuri* editorials from the end of the 1970s had showed a growing anxiety about the prospects of global and regional stability. As for belief (2a), when editorial number 8 attempted to assess the risks associated with the Soviet Union (July 1981), it mentioned that even the JCP admits that recent Soviet actions such as the military invasion of Afghanistan amount to "Socialist imperialism" and that a negative trend in Soviet expansionism simply "can not be denied".[8] Discussing the situation on the Korean Peninsula, editorial number 9 (August 1981) called for a dialogue between the North and the South and for alleviating the tensions in the peninsula; it also placed the responsibility for such dialogue on the Soviet Union and the US, claiming that, "Soviet Union's military expansion in the Far East" and the Reagan administration's severe countermeasures make things in the peninsula worse. Seemingly, both Soviet behavior in the world with its revisionist tendency *and* US reaction to it were taken to be de-stabilizing factors; these comments in editorials 8 and 9 testify to a growing perception that

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[6] To recall, this study defines three sets of cognitive beliefs as crucial in shaping perceptions and attitudes of security issues: (1) the view of international politics (realist vs. non-realist view including the concept of power and its key ingredients and the utility of military force; (2a) that the world was becoming a safe / dangerous place to live in; (2b) that Japan's direct security environment was becoming safer / more dangerous; and (3) that an entity, in this case the Soviet Union, was becoming less/more dangerous to Japan, meaning that it was decreasingly / increasingly (3a) hostile ; (3b) had high propensity to use force, and (3c) would not hesitate to use it against Japan.

[7] This point is in line with Paul Midford study of Japanese public attitudes (Midford 2011).

[8] *Yomiuri Shinbun*, July 5, 1981, "Let's calmly construct a perception toward the Soviet Union".

the world was becoming more dangerous.

As for belief (2b), whether Japan's security environment was becoming more or less stable, Soviet military deployments on the Northern Territories became the topic of several editorials (editorials number 4, 5 and 12). Editorial number 5 (September 1979) for example asserted that many people have doubts as to why the Soviet Union puts "military pressure" on Japan while seeking Japanese cooperation on the development of Siberia, and reflected on the purpose behind this military deployment. Such attention to the Soviet military buildup - although often framed in a broader context - is, I suggest, an indication that editorial writers increasingly believed that Japan's security environment was becoming less safe.

As for belief (3), whether the Soviet Union was judged to be increasingly dangerous or not, the data indicate that editorial writers increasingly believed that the Soviet Union was dangerous. First, concerning belief (3a), consecutive editorials framed the Soviet Union in increasingly negative terms from 1979 and on. Editorial number 5 (September 1979) for example framed recent Soviet actions (the deployment of "Minsk" aircraft carriers to the Far-East, the basification of the Northern Territories as well as on Soviet policy measures toward Japan) as bearing certain "devilishness" to them (*mashō*). By October 1983, editorial number 15 argued against those who oppose the US missile-deployment in Europe as a counter-measure to Soviet deployment by stating that those who believed that the Soviet Union would respond positively to Western abandonment of its weapon deployment plans to Europe - along the lines of the "Soviet Union's fundamentally good nature" (*soren seizensetsu*) - are simply wrong, as the recent Korea

airliner incident "have taught us".[9] Subsequently, by the end of 1983, the Soviet Union was framed as an entity with essentially bad nature: in other words, as a villain.

As for the Soviet propensity to use force - belief (3b) - editorials number 5 and 18 point out that the Soviets have high propensity to use force. Here, too, there is a negative tendency in the evaluation of the Soviet propensity to use force, as later editorials not only acknowledged this Soviet tendency, but also asserted that this tendency is especially visible in Soviet dealings with weak actors in the international system. The Soviets, commented editorial number 5 (September 1979), have an almost inherent tendency to solve international conflicts by force. The history of the Russian nation is frequented with wars, domination and aggression; and in the postwar period, the Soviet Union has been heavily relying on military force. Similar views were articulated in 1984. Titled "Soviet military buildup in the Far East and Japan's stance" (May 1984), editorial number 18 advocated a defensive military build-up for Japan as a response to the Soviet military expansion near Japan, suggesting that those who think that such a defense build-up will harm peace (and relatedly, those who advocate surrendering in case Japan was to be invaded) are wrong - as the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan had demonstrated. The Soviets, concluded the editorial, tend to use military power against weak countries (but not necessarily against strong countries).

As for belief (3c), the belief about the propensity of the Soviet Union to use force *against Japan*, editorials between 1978 and 1984 avoided articulating a clear stance on this issue.

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[9] The Soviet air-force shot down a civilian airliner (flight 007) above the Sea of Japan on September 1, 1983. The aircraft was on its way from New York to Seoul and all 269 passengers and crew members were killed, among which were 28 Japanese, 105 South Koreans and 62 US nationals. *Foreign Affairs* referred to the incident's impact and reported that, "Polls taken in the wake of the [1983] disaster showed that 91.6 percent of the public felt that Soviet military force was a threat to Japan and 46.3 percent believed that Japan was not making an adequate effort in its own defense." See: Johnson 1983.

However, a trend toward increasingly uncertain position about Soviet *intentions* vis-à-vis Japan can be identified. When discussing the first wave of Soviet military deployment to the Northern Territories, editorial number 4 (January 1979) negated the possibility that Soviets entertain offensive intentions, instead providing the rationality behind these developments (see further discussion below). Next, editorial 12 (March 1983) revealed more confusion about the Soviets' intentions behind their military expansion in the Far East and especially near Japan. The editorial poses the following question: "Why, as no country - including Japan - has the intention nor capability to attack the Soviet Union, have the Soviets been pursuing this military build up?" As a possible answer, it cited a US DOD report, which opined that the Soviet Union intended to use military expansion to pressure Japan in order to reduce its contribution to the security of the Western Camp. "Even if this is the Soviets' intention", commented the editorial, "then [their military activities] have the exact opposite effect" because such moves only shake Japan's trust and friendship toward the Soviets, asserted the editorial. Editorial number 17 ("Disappointing Kovalenko statement", published on February 10, 1984), went one step further and cast doubts on the sincerity of Soviet intentions behind the military buildup in the Northern Territories. The editorial dismissed the Soviet position as expressed by Kovalenko, according to which the military expansion on the Northern Territories is for guarding purposes only (*keibi ni hitsuyou na dake*) as groundless, citing the substantial amount of troops equipped with tanks, missiles, helicopters, artillery and *MiG*-21 that were deployed to the islands as counter-evidence.

And so, although there is no mention in the editorials to a Soviet inclination to use force *against Japan*, there is growing uncertainty about such an option. Evidently, a growing negative trend in almost all of the shared beliefs were traced in editorials during the period in which the securitization discourse of the Soviet Union had emerged: an increasingly (defensive) realist

view of international politics, rising importance of military power, growing insecurity in the world and in the region, and growing tendency to view the Soviet Union as dangerous. That being said, throughout this period, *Yomiuri* editorials advocated *dialogue* with the Soviet Union and insisted on Japan's exclusively defensive defense policy as the appropriate risk-measures; that is, the editorial stance on these two themes remained constant.

The third finding is related to the judgement of the editorials about whether or not the Soviet Union posed a military threat to Japan. When considering the rhetoric *Yomiuri* editorials employed - whether they deflated or inflated the perception of a Soviet threat - it becomes clear that although the Soviet Union was framed in terms of insecurity prior to the early 1980s, editorials were more prone to *deflate* a Soviet threat during that period. Editorial number 4 is a good case in point.

The editorial (January 1979) proposed that recent Soviet deployments in the area, including the nuclear submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk and their capability to strike US mainland are part of Soviet strategy directed at the US (and not at Japan). Because the Sea of Okhotsk had become vital to Soviet strategy, the editorial hypothesizes, then it became necessary for the Soviets to defend it (against American forces): it is in this context that the Soviets deployed forces to both Kunashiri and Etorofu. In addition to the military-strategic context, the editorial opined that the with the deployment, the Soviets not only put "silent pressure" (*mugon atsuryoku*) on Japan, but also enhance their claim on the territories with effective control of the islands. The editorial further speculates that the decision to militarize both islands came after the *MiG* Incident (1976) and after Soviet concerns of the rapprochement between Japan China and the US intensified. And so, rather than attributing offensive intentions to the Soviet military deployment in Japan's backyard thus inflating a Soviet threat, the editorial actually does the

opposite: by providing the strategic and political rationale behind the Soviet action it works to alleviate such concerns, hence deflating the Soviet threat.

The editorial stance on the deflate/inflate debate of Soviet Union military threat seem to had shifted between editorials number 11 and 12, that is, sometime between March 1982 and March 1983. During this period, "a watershed line" after which *Yomiuri* editorials switched their rhetoric about the Soviet military threat from pro-deflate to pro-inflate stance can be imagined.[10] Whereas before March 1983 the Soviet military threat had been framed in terms of *insecurity* and consecutive editorials had called to consider the issue of Soviet Union military expansion in a situational context (due to geo-political or diplomatic reasons), thus implicitly *deflating* a Soviet *military* threat, from March 1983 and on, the *Yomiuri* framed the Soviet Union military as a *threat*, no longer trying to justify Soviet actions, hence *inflating* it.

The following two examples demonstrate the shift in the editorial stance vis-à-vis the Soviet military threat to Japan. Published in September 1979, editorial number 5 (titled "Why [the Soviets] establish a base in Shikotan?"), linked the most recent development in Shikotan with previous Soviet military "basification" of Kunashiri and Etorofo. The editorial reflected on the purpose behind the Soviet military deployment, citing MOFA's stance according to which the Soviet militarization of the islands was *not* directed specifically against Japan but was a part of a global strategy. The editorial then moves on to discuss the history of the Russian nation with its record of wars, domination and aggression. It asserted that in the postwar period, the Soviet Union has drawn heavily on military force and that especially since the 1970s, the Soviet Union has been "rapidly" improving its nuclear arsenal and the capability of the Warsaw Pact. The most recent deployment of "Minsk" aircraft carriers to the Far-East and the basification of the

[10] Why this shift had occurred during that time period is a matter for debate. I suggest two possible types of explanations in the conclusion part of this chapter.

Northern Territories seems to be another layer in this strategy, alongside policy measures toward Japan that have seem to exceed the anti-Japanese stance and have a certain "devilishness" to them. The editorial then suggested to view recent Soviet-related developments under a situational context of the *diplomatic negotiations* on a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union, and calls to maintain open channel of communication between leaders of both nations. It concluded with a call for the Soviet Union to take a careful attitude and avoid hampering improvements in bilateral relations (*mizu o sasu koto ni naranai you, soren no shinchō na taido o yōbō shitai)*.

And so, although the editorial acknowledged a negative trend in Soviet military capabilities and behavior, and in "Russian nature", it positioned those exaggerating a "Northern threat" as a counter-frame to its stance and highlighted open communication and improvement of relations as policy goals toward the Soviet Union. The editorial does not consider any military response to the Soviet basification, and interprets this development both in the context of Soviet global strategy and the bilateral political relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan, and specifically, past negotiations of a peace treaty and the Soviet agreement to hand both Shikotan and Habomai back to Japan. By doing so, it interprets Soviet related stimuli through situational lens rather than dispositional lens and operates to cautiously deflate a Soviet threat.

An opposite case in point is demonstrated in editorial number 12 published on March 11, 1983. Titled "Soviet military build-up that [we] can not accept" (*younin dekinu soren no gunjiryoku zōkyo*), the editorial shared its opinion about a new publication of US DOD dealing with the Soviet military power and especially those parts in the report directly involving Japan. Although it asserted that the report does not single out shocking new military trends and that it includes an American reassurance of the US nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, the editorial claims that the most important point for attention in this report is the *unusual* nuclear

and conventional military expansion of the Soviet Union in the Far East. As evidence it cites the ratio of SS-20 missile bases (out of total of 351 Soviet SS-20 missile-bases, 110 are located in the Far-East), Soviet consistent military expansion in Japan's Northern Territories and deployment of nuclear submarines to the Sea of Okhotsk. The editorial discussed other points of attention in the report, including the Soviets development of a program to use of space for military purposes, apparently in order to achieve superiority in this area over the US. The editorial frames the Soviet Union military threat - and specifically, its new "extension" into *space* - in terms of a direct threat: something against which 'we must defend', and in an urgent way. The editorial urged the government to work with the international community to prevent the Soviet space program and concluded by stating that these new developments in the use of space for military purposes "can not be left unattended" (*korera no uchū heiki kaihatsu o, nobanashi ni suru koto ga dekinai)*.

Here, too, the difference between the two examples is striking. Whereas the 1979 editorial interpreted stimuli related to the Soviet military buildup both in the context of Soviet global strategy (hence, not directed at Japan) and bilateral diplomacy, thus operating to diffuse concerns about the nature of the Soviet threat, the 1983 editorial focuses on the potential threat to Japan, framing Soviet-related military stimuli as unusual. Moreover, the editorial frames the Soviet intention to militarize space as a direct threat by employing terminology of urgency, an obligation to act and a necessity to prevent such future development. Consequently, the editorial inflates the Soviet military threat.

The fourth finding of the Media Framing Analysis relates to the risk measures advocated by *Yomiuri* editorials. The first time a *Yomiuri* editorial (from our dataset) has called for emphasis of defense power in the context of Soviet policy was in May 1984 (editorial number 18). The editorial called for defense buildup that would be able to *deter* the Soviets, who presumably

respond well to power-calculations as their intervention in Afghanistan had suggested. That is to say, editorials before May 1984 either rejected or ignored the option of Japanese military buildup as a counter-measure to the Soviet actions. To recall the example of editorial number 4, it lamented that Soviet military deployment on the Northern Territories would only enhance support for those in Japan that aim for more military buildup, thus revealing its stance as somewhat opposing Japanese military build-up. On the other hand, editorial number 18 made the case for risk-measures that include "defense power", in addition to the economic and political dimensions of what it calls "integrated power". The editorial asserted that defense power is a *key for peace* ; its mere existence enables an actor to restrain / deter the opponent (*aite no shin'ryaku o yokushi suru tame no bōeiryoku no sonzai da*). In light of Soviet military expansion, argued the editorial, it is inevitable that Japan would increase its defense power too.[11]

The fifth findings identifies a special dynamic that took over once the Soviet military was securitized and coined "a threat". Put simply, once a danger-judgement about a Soviet threat had been consolidated, editorials refrained from de-securitizing it even when confronted with US de-securitization of the Soviet Union, mounting evidence of easing tensions in Europe, progress in negotiation about arms reduction and the Soviet pullout from Eastern European countries (editorials number 21 and 22). Take editorial number 21 for example. Published on April 5, 1989, the editorial - titled "Agitated Europe's difficult challenges" - commented on the political changes taking place in Europe, namely Gorbachev's reforms and the attempt to finalize a unified market by the EC countries. The editorial described Gorbachev's new thinking as a "shock wave" coming from Moscow, and identifies in it both a desire for disarmament and deep changes in

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[11] At the same time, the editorial reaffirms Japan's commitment to exclusively self-defense policy and denial of offensive ambitions. See: *Yomiuri Shinbun*, May 13, 1984. "Soviet military build in the Far East and Japan's stance".

anti-Western attitude. The editorial mentioned a dramatic decrease in the perception of Soviet threat in West Germany as a result of the recent policy changes in Moscow. Also, Soviet response to the movement toward democracy in Hungry and Poland is mentioned in a positive way. Still, the editorial maintained a skeptical position toward future Soviet behavior (commenting that there is no guarantee that the Soviet would allow for a full neutralization of these countries) and called to formulate a policy shared by the Western camp *as a whole*. Such policy, recommended the editorial, would take into account both the national security considerations and the overall relationship between the Eastern and Western camps. By stating so, the editorial urged caution in the attitude toward the Soviet Union, warning against a hasty de-securitization of the issue. Interestingly, editorial 21 distinguished between real and subjective ("psychological") threat, referring to a reduction in the psychological Soviet threat in West Germany (*soren no shinriteki kyoui)* thus implying that a real threat still existed.

This caution in de-securitizing the Soviet threat stands in stark contrast to the caution Japanese actors demonstrated when faced with securitizing moves and evidence for Soviet military expansion presented to them by US actors as demonstrated in editorials number 4, 7 and 8. Th hesitation to securitize the Soviet issue was often justified by invoking Soviet political and economic strengths and weaknesses and especially its difficult energy situation, as well as the state of affairs in the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and the Sino-Soviet conflict which had allegedly prompted harsher Soviet conduct.

5.4 Summary: Media Framing Analysis of the "Soviet threat" Issue as Represented in *Yomiuri Shinbun* Editorials 1952 - 1990

To conclude, this chapter identified changes in the *Yomiuri*'s attitude toward the Soviet Union, the Soviet threat and its shared beliefs about security and risk-measures during the first half of the1980s. The specific shift in the editorial stance about the Soviet threat (and its rhetoric) neither occurred *immediately* after the Soviet military build-up in the Northern Territories (1978-9) nor after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979); consecutive editorials in the early 1980s still tried to deflate a Soviet threat during this time-period. The tendency to argue against the securitization of the Soviet military threat had ended sometime between March 1982 and March 1983. Thereafter, the Soviet Union was framed as a military threat and increasingly as a villain (dispositional rather than situational context). These findings invite the obvious question: Why did the *Yomiuri's* editorial stance concerning the Soviet threat change around 1983?

Both "external" and "internal" explanations for this change in judgement may be considered. An external explanation (which emphasizes the importance of external stimuli in shifting the editorial stance) would take into account the Soviet announcement on January 17, 1983, that Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (SS-20) capable of carrying nuclear warheads were deployed east of the Ural Mountains, from where they could reach not only most of China, but also Japan, South Korea and Northern Philippines. The coinciding Soviet statement that the relocation of these missiles was meant to cope with "new positions in Japan" (USFJ 1983, 137) may have tipped the newspaper's stance toward a consolidation of the Soviet Union military threat.

Other "internal" explanations may be considered. Human resource changes in the newspaper editorial board or management may have introduced new persons in-charge of writing

the editorials whose attitude and judgement about the Soviet Union military was different from previous editorial-writers. Whatever the reason may be, once the perception of a Soviet threat was more or less fixed, it remained so for several years and consecutive editorials in the second half of the 1980s rejected evidence of diminished threat by using the same interpretive codes that were used to deflate a Soviet threat several years earlier. I return to the theme of "interpretative codes" and to the question of the editorials stance concerning the Soviet threat later in the study (chapter 8).

6. Military Threat Perceptions of China (1950-1975)

Abstract

How did Japanese domestic actors perceive and frame China during the early postwar period? Had there been attempts at securitization of threats associated with it? If so, by whom? This chapter analyzes declassified documents and empirical data about the China threat-discourse. The chapter finds that some at the defense establishment and political leadership did perceive a grave nuclear threat and communicated their concerns privately as well as publicly in what amounts to a judgement of a direct threat. Whereas to the defense establishment China's nuclear program was the main threat-component, Japanese PM Satō[12] and Foreign Ministers Shiina (1964 - 66) and Miki (1966 - 68) emphasized China's *behavior* in addition to its nuclear ability. Nuclear China was securitized *behind the scenes* but the securitization move was not accepted *publicly,* in the sense that neither the majority of Japanese political parties nor the public had come to view China as a direct military threat, resisting extra-ordinary means such as the development of an independent nuclear option.

[12] To a large degree, the political project of securitizing China's nuclear program remained in the hands of PM Satō. Satō, according to Tamaki's testimony in "Oral History", was much more involved in defense matters than PM Ikeda. For example, Satō was personally involved in the finalization of the Third defense-plan. See: Tamaki's testimony in NIDS 2012, 72 -73.

6.1 Introduction

In order to come up with a comparative framework to the Soviet Union case study, this chapter and the following one examine the phenomenon of threat perceptions associated with two additional states: China (1950-1975) and North Korea (1976-2000). During the early postwar period, I argue, China's nuclear development and animosity toward Japan, both historically and ideologically, coupled with the lack of diplomatic relations between the countries and deteriorating relations from 1963, as well as the harsh Chinese language toward Japan's political leadership during Satō's premiership, could have provided sufficient ground for the Japanese to securitize Communist China not only as a political threat but also as an urgent military threat. But as we shall see, this was not the case.

This chapter examines perceptions of military threat associated with China during the early postwar period among Japan's defense and political establishments, mainstream media and the public. The questions that guide this section are: How did Japan's defense and political establishments, mainstream media and the public think and frame the Chinese military threat? Had there been attempts at securitization of threats associated with this entity? If so, by whom?

6.2 Bilateral Relations

Chalmers Johnson study (1998) provides a good account of the bilateral relationship between Japan and China during the early postwar period and a point of reference for the analysis of Japanese military-threat perception toward China. In his article about Sino-Japanese relations, Johnson defines Japanese attitudes toward China (and Asia in general) during the period that preceded the 1970s as "collective Japanese amnesia":

> Except for few specialists, the Japanese people also seemed to forget about the concrete details of their earlier Asian period. To the extent that they thought about Asia at all, it was in terms of abstractions about their own feelings of guilt, or as a tool for criticizing American policies...or as a place to go for cheap vacations.

Johnson (1998, 154) concludes in his commentary on Sino-Japanese relations that,

> ...From 1952 down to sometime after the normalization of relations with China, Japan was pre-occupied with developing new markets to replace those it lost as a result of war and revolution, and it paid little or no attention to East Asia, intellectually or politically, except insofar as it had to, as a result of American leadership or pressure.[13]

Johnson assumes a lack of interest on behalf of "Japanese people" in China during the 1950s and the 1960s. But rather than amnesia, other scholars point out the lack of negative feelings toward China and perhaps even, to the existence of a positive image of China during the early postwar period. Ogata Sadako (1965, 389) for example suggested that, "not many Japanese regard Communist China as a 'Cold War' enemy, nor do they accept the 'China-communism-enemy' equation that is so widely held in the United States." When asked by President Kennedy about how he planned to tackle the regional threat from China, PM Ikeda evaded a direct answer, replying that this was "a difficult problem" since many Japanese feel a "sense of kinship to Mainland China due to geographic propinquity, long historical ties, and a sense of guilt regarding the last war."(Department of State, Doc. 330)[14] Finally, when considering the question of whether China was perceived as a military threat after 1964 (when it had detonated nuclear bomb) then Cheng (2014, 44) asserted that "no important political group in Japan considered that [PRC's first

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[13] Johnson maintains that the factors that facilitated this change in Japanese attitudes toward China were China's opening to Japan and the US, Japan's economic success, the Nixon shocks, the oil shocks, the anti-Japanese riots of 1974 in SouthEast Asia, the growing presence of the newly-industrialized-economies in East-Asia and their challenge to Japan's economic hegemony in the region, and the US pressure on Japan to become a more assertive player in the democratic camp. See: Johnson 1998, 154.

[14] I would like to thank my colleague at the University of Tokyo, Matthew Brummer, for pointing this out.

nuclear test] would pose a serious military threat to Japan."[15]

The empirical data brought below seem to support this assertion, although partially. Indeed, international security tensions involving the PRC, such as the war in Indochina and war on the Korean Peninsula in the early 1950s, as well as the conflict between the PRC and ROC culminating in the Taiwan Straits Crises (1954-5 and 1958) were not picked up as major security concerns in Japan's national conversation. Aside from economic issues such as trade, it was only in the late stage of the Satō administration that a Japanese interest in formulating a new China policy developed into a diplomatic initiative that finally resulted in the normalization of relations during the Tanaka administration and the ensuing "panda-mania."[16] This renewed interest in strengthening the bilateral relationship in both Japan and China culminated in the communique signed on September 19, 1972 between PM Tanaka and Zhou Enlai in Beijing. The communique established the normalization of the bilateral relationship; in September 1974, both sides agreed to launch negotiations about a peace and friendship treaty and in August 1978, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed (Johnson 1998, 143-44).

But as briefly mentioned in chapter 2, a "Chinese threat" discourse did emerge in the early postwar period and moreover, the Chinese threat discourse was more prevalent than the Soviet threat discourse, with the second half of the 1960s seeing its climax. The Chinese threat discourse was correlated with years of rising diplomatic tensions between both countries and

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[15] To give one example, a statements given by the LDP Investigation Council on National Security (November 18, 1964) read that: "The success of [the] Chinese nuclear test does not mean that Chinese military nuclear power would immediately pose a threat [to Japan]. Moreover, even if China develops further certain types of nuclear arms, it would still be a little plus on top of the Soviet nuclear power that has threatened Japan from the past, so it is not necessary to be disconcerted and feel particularly shaken now." See: He 2009, 144.

[16] China has donated two pandas to Ueno zoo in Tokyo, Japan in October 1972 after PM Tanaka had visited in Beijing and signed the communique with Enlai.

with external developments related to China's nuclear program. To recall, China conducted its first nuclear missile test on the 16th of October, 1964; its first nuclear warhead- missile launch in 1966, and its first hydrogen weapon test in 1967. I present relevant data in Figure 17 below. As the figure demonstrates, references to "China threat" in Diet deliberations appeared in 1964, sharply increasing between 1966 and 1968 before decreasing after 1968. By 1973, references to "China threat" completely disappeared from Diet deliberations. What was this discourse about? Was the expression "China threat" used mostly by opposition representatives, similar to the case of the "Soviet Threat" discourse which emerged in the later stage of the postwar period? Was there an attempt to securitize a "China threat" in a military context? If so, what extra-ordinary measures did the securitizing actors advocate for?

Figure 17 - References to Country Specific Threats in Diet Deliberations 1954 - 1985



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

Similar to the Soviet case, negative sentiment toward China was a necessary condition for the emergence of the "China threat" discourse. But, unlike the Soviet case, in which the bilateral relationship had deteriorated both in diplomatic terms *and* in terms of the public' sentiment (more than 50 percent of the public named the Soviet Union the 'most disliked nation' in the early 1980s), Japan's relationship with China was mostly characterized by negative air among diplomatic circles, and specifically among the highest officials of state-power.[17] The deterioration of the bilateral relationship can be traced to November 1964 when the Satō administration was inaugurated; Chinese media repeatedly targeted PM Satō himself, as the following example testifies. On November 25, 1964, the *People's Daily* published a critical view of Japan's new PM, and his allegedly hostile stance toward China, criticizing his response to China's nuclear test among other items.[18] Satō's visit to Taiwan in 1967 and the joint Japan-US communique of 1969 that tied Japan's security with Taiwan's separation from Mainland China further complicated the bilateral relationship, and the Chinese leadership refused to negotiate improvement of bilateral relations as long as Satō remained in office. That being said, a strong dislike toward China among the Japanese public and larger political establishment was less the case; inside the ruling party, the pro-China faction exerted considerable influence throughout the 1960s. In-fact, as Cheng (2014, 115) suggests, the China issue became the primary point of contention between Satō and

[17] Although China was the most disliked nation in the second half of the 1960s (about 40 percent of the Japanese public has declared so), China was doing relatively better when compared to the public sentiment toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the sentiment toward North Korea in the 1990s. See discussion in Section 7.6.

[18] Another critical editorial appeared on February 12, 1965, condemning Satō and his policy toward China. See: Clark, 1971.

those who opposed him within the LDP. Finally, the rapprochement between the US and China - received in Tokyo as a diplomatic surprise - reshuffled the cards and paved the way for a warmer relationship which ensued during Satō's next in line, PM Tanaka. Once again, an increasing negative sentiment toward an external actor was a necessary condition to a securitization attempt of that actor. To be clear, the attempt did not succeed as the majority of Japanese did not embrace the danger judgement of a direct Chinese threat.

6.3 Defense Establishment

This section explores the perceptions of military-threat among Japan's defense establishment. The question that guides this section is: How did defense personnel perceive and frame the Chinese military threat during the early postwar period?

Considering the early postwar period in general, threat perceptions among Japan's defense establishment were mostly fixed on the Soviet Union and not China. Whereas the first successful nuclear test of China on October 16, 1964 and those that followed did raise concerns among the defense establishment, and inducing JDA high officials to frame China as a direct threat, other components of China's military capabilities - such as its chemical, biological, and conventional weapon capabilities, had a limited effect over Japanese defense policy. By the 1970s, though, JDA high officials changed their stance on China, clarifying that it was only a latent (indirect) threat.

Takeda Gōtarō, who served as a career officer at the ASDF during the 1960s and 1970s and later as the SDF Chief of Staff between 1979-1981, described the perception of a "China threat" in the defense force as dual in nature. While a nuclear China *was* considered "a serious threat" (*taihen na kyōui*) to Japan, Chinese military capabilities as a whole , and specifically its

naval capacity - were judged to be *underdeveloped*. Takeda recalls thinking to himself "is this an army"? upon seeing a Chinese navy ship while visiting China under his capacity at the SDF. In other words, only the nuclear aspect of Chinese military capabilities was deemed a threat. Since Japan did not have available risk-measures and anti-missile technology had not been developed yet, continues Takeda, the only available option was to strengthen the alliance with the US (NIDS 2012, 52-53). That being said, defense analysts did consider the scenario of Chinese attack on Japan's remote islands such as the Senkaku in the end of the 1960s, but the consideration of this threat-scenario soon faded with the reapporachment between both countries in 1972 (Dian 2014, 77). Accordingly, even after the US and Japan had agreed on the revision of Okinawa (June 29, 1971), the SDF did not see a need for China-based contingency planning / deployment of forces in the SouthWest (NIDS 2012, 318). And, so, the period between 1964 and 1972 requires further analysis as China's nuclear tests during this period were perceived as threat-cues by Japanese military and defense officials.

JDA high-officials conveyed their concerns about China's nuclear capability in the Diet on numerous occasions, framing it as a grave threat (*hijō na kyoui)*. On March 29, 1966, JDA DG Matsuno Raizo linked China's nuclear program with Japan's next third defense plan, arguing that,

> [Chinese development of nuclear weapons] is a grave threat not only for Asia, but for the whole world...the fact that it happens in Asia near us *doubles* the threat...as for development of nuclear weapons, having them means that there is a potential to use them...both the physical and psychological threat does not leave [my thoughts].

As a risk-measure to this judgement of the Chinese nuclear threat, Matsuno mentioned that in addition to the deterrence of the US-Japan Security alliance as advocated by the FM, Japan needs to consider acquiring independent capabilities to cope with nuclear missiles. Since acquiring nuclear weapons was not an option, asserted Matsuno, other available options were anti-missile

capability or preventive attack capability; The JDA, he concluded, was currently in the process of formulating the third defense-plan and research was underway to develop a counter plan.[19]

The third defense-plan was approved on November 29, 1966, with no specific risk-measures to counter the Chinese nuclear threat as elaborated below. In a Cabinet Meeting at the House of Representative on June 20, 1969, JDA DG Arita Kīchi referred to China's growing nuclear capability as a "threat". Arita continued to reassure that Japan relies on US nuclear deterrence and that comparatively, China can not compete with the US supremacy in this area.[20] Arita also commented on the Sino-Soviet conflict which had erupted earlier in March, and its implications to Japan's security. "Even if I don't judge [the conflict] to be a direct threat...to Japan..when we look at Japan's surrounding, and at the Sea of Japan, we can not be easy-going [about it]." Subsequently, Arita called to strengthen Japan's defense to be able to deal with a worst-case scenario [of an invasion] to the Japanese territory. Speaking after him, his subordinate at the JDA outlined the security concerns in Japan's environment, including tensions in the "closest of all" Korean Peninsula, as well as China's nuclear tests ("8 times since 1964") and reported ability to load nuclear or hydrogen bomb on planes. China's efforts toward loading ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and potential future developments in the 1970s such as small number of submarines capable of launching missiles loaded with nuclear warheads were also mentioned. This information, added JDA official, was based mostly on reports given to JDA

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[19] National Diet Archives, March 29, 1966, House of Councilors - Budget Sub-Committee, Correspondence 14. No anti-ballistic-missile system was available back then, and so eventually the third MTDP did not introduce such an option.

[20] National Diet Archives, June 20, 1969, House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee, Correspondence 20.

by its American counterpart.[21] As can be seen, JDA officials communicated China's military present *and* future capabilities in the context of its nuclear program as threat components.

The year 1970 marked a change in JDA's official stance toward China. In April 1970, DG Nakasone claimed that since it does not have the intention to attack Japan, China is not an actual (direct) threat but a latent one.[22]

To conclude this section, Japan's defense establishment communicated a medium-intensity of the Chinese threat during the second half of the 1960s. This securitization assumed a direct threat and deemed a response to it as necessary. But a terminology of high-level securitization was not adopted, and extra-ordinary actions such as Japan going nuclear was ruled out. Instead, preventive attack and anti-missile capabilities were mentioned in the Diet as possible risk-measures.[23] To follow, to what extent the JDA's danger-judgement about the Chinese threat disseminate beyond the defense establishment?

6.4 Political Establishment

This section explores the perceptions of military-threat among Japan's political establishment. The questions that guide this section are: How did political figures frame the Chinese military threat in the Diet during the early postwar period? Had there been attempts at securitization of

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[21] National Diet Archives, June 20, 1969, House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee, Correspondence 20.

[22] National Diet Archives, House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee, 24 April 1970.

[23] Michael Green suggested that during the 1960s, the China threat was used to justify military build up of the SDF (Green 1995, 59). As mentioned above, indeed, JDA high officials often linked Chinese nuclear program with Japan's MTDP, but this does not mean that these officials did not genuinely perceive a threat from China. To the people comprising Japan's defense establishment, I argue, China's nuclear program was a serious military threat.

dangers associated with this entity? If so, by whom?

Similar to the Soviet Union case, Communist China was framed in Diet deliberations as a political threat in the early 1950s. On January 25, 1950, PM Yoshida stated that, "Regarding the situation in China and in South-East Asia, the arrival of communist influence poses extreme threat to [South-East Asians]... [and] to Japan [too]." [24] The political [Chinese] communist threat was framed then in the context of an "indirect invasion" to Japan. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the Chinese participation in the war from October later that year, the Chinese Communist threat was linked with a threat-scenario of "direct invasion" (Honma 2015, 1). This was true especially for conservative politicians. On January 27, 1951, Miki Takeo, a Democratic Party politician, stated during a Diet session that, "We can not say that the probability of the world's communist armies seizing strategic locations is low. And we can not doubt that, based on various indications, our country is under [the communists] target." Miki then recalled a declaration made by Chinese Communist army leader about "liberating Japan", concluding that, "regrettably, we must admit that there exists a threat of revolt and violent revolution." In a follow-up comment, Yoshida dismissed Miki's observation speculating that, "[T]he democratic nations would persist [over the communist countries]...and the thought of communist countries invading Japan is inconceivable (*omoi mo yoranai)*."[25]

Although it was framed as an extreme political threat, Japan's political leadership avoided framing China as a *military*-security threat thereafter as well. Prime Minister Hatoyama

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[24] National Diet Archives, January 25, 1950. House of Councilors - Plenary Session Correspondence 3.

[25] National Diet Archives, January 27, 1951. House of Representatives - Plenary Session Correspondence 6.

statement a in Cabinet Meeting of the House of Representative held on June 1955 is an excellent case in point. Hatoyama stated that,

> [I] believe that we have to scrutinize Communism. And I believe we have to *defend* against Communism *ideologically*, but, as I have already said in the past, it is not advisable to identify the Soviet Union as well as communist China as *hypothetical enemies*.[26]

Such avoidance to frame China as an enemy can be traced well into the 1960s, during PM Ikeda's tenure. On February 18, 1964, LDP member Hasegawa Jin asked FM Ōhira about "the Chinese threat problem", and specifically whether the latter views China as a military threat or economic threat at present or in the future. Ōhira responded by saying that he does not see China as neither economic nor military threat to Japan but he did say that China's foreign policy is "extremely aggressive and assertive".[27]

<u>China's Nuclear Tests (October 16, 1964 and on)</u>

China conducted its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, in what generated a shift in the threat discourse. The following month, Japan's newly established administration headed by PM Satō began communicating a sense of threat as a result of China's policy. Rather than China's nuclear weapons, Japan's political leadership focused on China's behavior in the international arena and to a lesser extent, on Chinese statements. An examination of the "Chinese threat" discourse in both public and private communication channels reveals a gap between public and private statements as made by Japan's highest officials in relation to China.

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[26] National Diet Archives, June 17, 1958. House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee Correspondence 5.

[27] National Diet Archives, February 18, 1964, House of Councilors -Foreign Affairs Committee, Correspondence 1.

China was high on the agenda during PM Satō's visit and talks with President Johnson in Washington on January 12-13, 1965. Publicly, the joint statement released after the meeting communicated concerns about China's behavior but refrained from depicting China as a threat.[28] The joint statement also highlighted Japan's basic policy of striving to maintain friendly relations with its neighbors based on the principle of separating politics from economic. The term "security" was not mentioned in the document in relation to China. Back home, PM Satō commented on Communist China in the Diet in November 1965,

> I believe that rather than [the possession of] nuclear weapons in itself, it is the policies of a country that determine whether we feel a threat or not. Although the Soviet Union posses nuclear weapons, at the current state of affairs, I don't feel there is a threat [from the Soviet Union] as it adheres to the line of "peaceful coexistence...[However], recent public statements [made by Chinese figures] naturally cause grave concerns...And if we assume that the Peking government posses nuclear weapons...[then] I do feel [a threat from China].

Satō then asserted that his government had no intention of introducing nuclear weapons even if it would not receive nuclear protection from a country that has such weapons.[29] Privately however, memorandums of conversations held between the leaders of Japan and the US on January 12-13, 1965, and on November 15, 1967, reveal different Japanese attitudes concerning Japan's risk measures. During their first exchange, PM Satō anticipated that "China will continue to pose serious difficulties until it has completed its revolutionary phase", seeking the President's opinion regarding Japan's defense. "Since Japan possesses no nuclear weapons, and we do have them, if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the US would stand by its commitments and provide that defense" answered President Johnson. To the President's question whether by

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[28] The World and Japan Database, Institute of Oriental Culture, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko Lab. Accessed March 18, 2016. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/indices/JPUS/index-ENG.html.

[29] National Diet Archives, November 25, 1965, House of Councilors -Special Committee on Japan-Korea Treaty, Correspondence 12.

"Japan's defense" this [nuclear umbrella] is what Satō had meant, Satō allegedly replied positively, stating that "that is what I would [have] liked to ask but...I am unable to say so publicly." [30]In a follow-up conversation later that day, Satō stated in-front of a larger audience (including FM Shiina and LDP General Secretary Miki) that, "Due to the US commitment under the US-Japan Security Treaty, the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion had not had great impact in Japan."[31] Privately then, in his conversation with President Johnson, PM Satō did seek for risk-measures that would meet the nuclear threat from China, namely, US defense reassurances that it would defend Japan by providing it with nuclear deterrence.

In their second summit meeting on November 15, 1967, China was still relatively high on the agenda for the Japanese side (but less than before and seemingly less for the Americans, who emphasized their deficit in "balance of payment" due to continuation of the Vietnam war and urged the Japanese for increased financial aid). PM Satō said in relation to China that, "at present Japan is secure under the US-Japan Security Treaty, which provides that the US will defend Japan against external attack. However, Communist China is developing nuclear weapons and *Japan may soon be threatened by a nuclear attack*." Satō also shared with the President that before he left for Washington he had been received by the Emperor, who emphasized the paramount importance of Japan's security. Satō then asked President Johnson to reassure him (like he did in 1965) that the US was committed to defend Japan "against any form of attack". He

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[30] See: Memorandum of Conversation, January 12, 1965, 11:30 a.m. Accessed March 15 from, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d41. Original source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JAPAN–US. Secret. Drafted by Wickel and approved in the White House on February 2. The meeting was held in the Office of the President and lasted approximately 45 minutes. An unapproved copy of the memorandum is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Japan, Satō's Visit, Memos and Cables, January 11–14, 1965.

[31] See: Memorandum of Conversation, January 12, 1965, 12:30 p.m. from, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d41 Accessed on March 15.

explained this request by referring to the "concern expressed by the Emperor" and in view of the discussions on the status of Okinawa. President Johnson answered that as long as he was President, the US would abide by this commitment.[32] The summit culminated in The US-Japan Joint Statement, which referred to China's development of nuclear weapon as a threat to its neighbors. I bring the text below:

> The President and the PM exchanged frank views on the international situation, with particular emphasis on developments in the Far East. They noted the fact that Communist China is developing its nuclear arsenal and agreed on the importance of creating conditions wherein Asian nations would not be susceptible to threats from Communist China. The President and the Prime Minister also agreed that, while it is difficult to predict at present what external posture Communist China may eventually assume, it is essential for the free world countries to continue to cooperate among themselves to promote political stability and economic prosperity in the area. Looking toward an enduring peace in Asia, they further expressed the hope that Communist China would ultimately cast aside its present intransigent attitude and seek to live in peace and prosper alongside other nations in the international community.[33]

And so, the joint statement released after the summit-meeting endorsed harsher language toward China than the previous statement in 1965. It aimed to deny China from "threatening" Asian nations. Seemingly, Satō's private exchanges with President Johnson in the second half of the 1960s reveal the manner in which Japan's leadership thought of China's nuclear program: as a direct *military* threat.

Extra-Ordinary Means ?

Back at home, Japan's political leadership consistently denied that it has been considering extra-ordinary measures such as developing independent nuclear capability, tilting instead toward US

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[32] Memorandum of Conversation. Washington, November 15, 1967, 5:23 - 6:59 p.m.

[33] *The world and Japan Database,* 'Joint Statement of Japanese PM Satō and US President Johnson', November 15, 1967. Accessed March 18, 2016. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19671115.D1E.html

nuclear deterrence and diplomatic efforts at arms reduction vis-à-vis the Chinese government. The following month after China's first successful nuclear test, Imazumi Isamu, a DSP member, commented on this development at the Diet and said that, "This [nuclear test] causes great uneasy-ness (*ooinaru fuan*) and distrust for the whole world, and a great threat (*ooki na kyoui)* to Asian countries neighboring China. Imazumi called the Japanese government to communicate a strong protest to Chinese Communist regime and urged China to join the Partial Test Ban Treaty ("PTBT"), signed by the US, UK, and Soviet Union in August 1963.[34] PM Satō responded to Imazumi's comment and said that although Japan's fundamental disposition of "peaceful co-existence" designed to bring prosperity to the Japanese people would not change, Asia is indeed becoming a hotbed of rising international tensions, and Japan, as a country in this region, should put all the more efforts to achieve long-term stability and prosperity. As for China's nuclearization, Satō concluded that, "We don't have a way to stop this [Chinese nuclearization]", before suggesting his endorsement of diplomatic measures such as pressuring China to join the PTBT. [35]

Publicly, Japan's political leadership was not going to embrace risk-measures such as developing its own nuclear ability, opting for diplomatic measures instead. Privately however, as de-classified confidential documents indicate, the nuclear option was considered by Satō and in the Foreign Ministry. On December 29, 1964, US Ambassador to Tokyo Edwin Reischauer sent an urgent telegram to Washington reporting the content of a private meeting he held with PM

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[34] National Diet Archives, November 25, 1964, House of Representatives - Plenary Session, Correspondence 7.

[35] National Diet Archives, November 25, 1964, House of Representatives - Plenary Session, Correspondence 12.

Satō earlier on the same day, in which they discussed the China problem and Japan's potential risk measures. Reischauer had shared his impression of Satō by writing that,

> His views coincided with those expressed to him by British PM Wilson that if other fellow had nuclear [weapons] it was only common sense to have them oneself. Japanese public he realized was not ready for this but would have to be educated to this point, and he felt younger generation showed hopeful signs of going this way. Nuclear [weapons] he had discovered were much less costly than was generally assumed and Japanese scientific and industrial level was fully up to producing them. He then hastily added that, of course, Japan had non-of 'imperialistic' ambitions of past so US should not be worried by what he said.

Reischauer's telegram also reveals that PM Satō intended on promoting a re-evaluation of Japan's national defense posture, a revision of the constitution "though the time was not ripe", and an increase of defense spending up to 2 percent of the GNP. [36] Later in 1967, PM Satō had authorized the Cabinet Information Research Office to study Japan's nuclear option secretly. The Cabinet Information Research Office established a research team of four experts, among which were Professors Kakihana Hidetake and Nagai Yonosuke from Tokyo Institute of Technology; Maeda Hisashi from Sophia University and Professor Michio Royama head of the International House of Japan Research Office. The group was called the "Kanamaro group" after the initials of its members' names (*Mainichi* November 4, 2015).

The research group debated at length Japan's vulnerability to a nuclear attack, and the significant damage atomic or hydrogen bombs can inflict if used against Japan's population centers. It submitted its reports to PM Satō in September 1968 and January 1970, finally concluding against the nuclear option, citing likely negative international response as the primary reason, and financial burden as a secondary reason (*Mainichi* November 5, 2015). PM Satō's response, according to a testimony of his official secretary Kusuda Minoru, was a mixture of disappointment and doubt. "I wanted at least one of the [research] group members to say Japan should go nuclear. Shall I say Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons and step down?" he was quoted as saying on September 16, 1968, upon learning on the group's first report (*Mainichi* November 5, 2015). Although the GOV adopted the "Three non-nuclear principles" that later granted PM Satō the Noble Peace Prize, behind the scenes it was considering extra-ordinary

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[36] Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State. Tokyo, December 29, 1964, 6 p.m. Accessed March 18, 2016. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d37

means.[37]

Japan's political elites also weighed the factor of US security guarantees in their debates about risk-measures. Right-wing member of the LDP Genda Minoru stated during a party panel dealing with Japan's position on the NPT held on November 7, 1969, that,

> It would be too late to consider the nuclear issue if the US were to scrap the bilateral security treaty and Japan were to withdraw from the NPT. I can't be confident that the US would strike back at China's nuclear weapons.

After much deliberations, the following policy outcomes ensued: Japan and the US extended the bilateral security treaty and the GOJ agreed to sign the NPT - doing so on February 1970. It is also possible to assume that un-officially, it was decided that Japan would enhance its nuclear-technological base which would enable a production of nuclear weapons in a short time (about a year) if the need arose.

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[37] Roughly at the same time the PM authorized this study, Japan's MOFA initiated a similar study-group of the nuclear option, covering international security, technology and domestic politics implications of Japan's policy options. Former diplomat Yatabe Atsuhiko recalled in an interview he gave to journalist Aikawa Haruyuki (*Mainichi Shinbun*) that "young officials around me [in MOFA], such as Okazaki Hisahiko and Murata Ryohei made a fuss" about the security environment and the need to consider the nuclear option (*Mainichi* November 6, 2015). In addition, Some bureaucrats and politicians were also considering whether it was the right timing for Japan to positively respond to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon initiative, advocated strongly by to the US and USSR after the Chinese nuclear test. According to a declassified Foreign Ministry report, deputy Foreign Minister Ushiba Nobuhiko had communicated to US officials in November 1966 that an international order with five nuclear states is a world in which Japan would be a "second-class country" and such a situation is "unacceptable" from both international political perspective and national prestige (*Mainichi* November 6, 2015).

At the time, such level of technology had not been reached.[38]

From a theoretical point of view, the GOJ indeed securitized the Chinese nuclear program in the second half of the 1960s and even considered extra-ordinary measures - its own nuclear program - in a confidential manner. I suggest that the intensity of the perceived danger associated with China was of an actual, direct threat. But since the impact of the social taboo on military threat issues was still quite strong, the securitization of a nuclear China happened behind the scenes, in what amounts to a "covert securitization attempt".

It is important to note that the majority opinion among LDP members was less critical of China during that time. The majority view was also less supportive of US policy of containment toward China, including its attempt to exclude Beijing from the United Nations. "The men now in charge of the Japanese Government", wrote US Ambassador to Japan Reischauer to his superiors in the US Department of State on August 1966 , "represent those Japanese who are most fully in sympathy with the US position [regarding harsh line toward Communist China]. A large part of their own party, however, is restive above Japan's close identification with our China policy". The majority of LDP politicians sought to maintain private channels of communication with the Chinese, hoping to enhance trade between Japan and China.

Aside from the nuclear program, what other components of a China threat generated unrest among Japanese politicians? In a Cabinet Meeting at the House of Representative on June

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[38] According to Ayakawa Haruyuki, in the end of the 1960s, "Japan faced a technological barrier to going nuclear. The research group considered that plutonium contained in nuclear fuel spent at the Tokai Nuclear Power Plant could be used to produce atomic bombs if Japan were to arm itself with nuclear weapons. It was possible to produce 100 kilograms of high-quality plutonium a year from spent nuclear fuel at the power station -- enough to produce 12 atomic bombs. The nuclear reactor at the plant, which was introduced from Britain, was a moderated nuclear reactor originally designed to produce plutonium for military purposes. North Korea used this type of reactor to produce its atomic bombs. However, Japan needed nearly a decade after that until its first nuclear fuel reprocessing facility and uranium-enrichment facility began operations." See: *Mainichi*, November 5, 2015.

20, 1969, mentioned Yamaguchi Toshio from the LDP the following aspects of the "China problem" (*wareware no mijika na mondai de aru chūkyō*): China's large territory with its 2,700,000 soldiers and nuclear weapons. Yamaguchi recalled that right after the first nuclear test in 1964, an editorial in the *People's daily* provoked Japan with what he interpreted as an implicit threat regarding its ever decreasing capability to protect itself. Yamaguchi then surveyd other sources of insecurity in the region such as Soviet Union North Korea, arguing that "intentions aside, there are countries in our region that can attack Japan."[39] However, other opinions in the political spectrum existed.

Opposition members made explicit attempts to deflate the Chinese threat. One such example is a discussion that took place on February 27, 1965 in the Lower House's Budget committee. In a response to Foreign Minister's endorsement of PM Satō's stance which stipulated that Communist China has an aggressive tendency (*shinryakuteki keikō)* and Shiina's claim that China has been inclined to threaten the safety of neighboring countries (*anzen ga kyoui sareteoru to iu katamuki ga aru)*, Kobayashi Susumu from the JSP commented that China's nuclear ambitions are a self-defense measure against the US, and that, "I, personally, don't feel even a bit of a threat as a result of China's nuclear bomb test. This is the view of the great majority of citizens." Kobayashi emphasized that China does not have an aggressive design against Japan and that the real source of anxiety among many Japanese is US bases and troops stationed in Japan, with their active participation in the Vietnam War. In response, FM Shiina denied that he had said that China is already aggressive toward Japan and repeated his earlier stance according to which China's recent policy is expansive, generating pressure (*atsuryoku)* to its surrounding. Shiina further argued that contrary to what Kobayashi believes, such is the view

[39] National Diet Archives, June 20, 1969, House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee, Correspondence 20.

held by the majority of Japanese.[40]

To summarize the discussion up to here, China's vast territory, its large conventional army and most importantly, its newly acquired nuclear capabilities were the main threat-components politicians such as Yamaguchi used to inflate the threat. Japan's PM and FM seemed to focus on China's foreign policy inclination (its behavior and statements) in their public statements, working toward US defense assurance and a consideration of the independent nuclear option behind closed doors and communicating US deterrence as a countermeasure to the Japanese public. Publicly, Japan's highest officials refrained from framing a nuclear China as a direct or imminent *military* threat to Japan, even in the face of opposition members' attempts to drag them into such statements. Instead, they highlighted China's *policy* as dangerous. China was still, however, considered as a political threat, as MOFA's denial of passport for Japanese students who wished to study in China in 1966 suggests. MOFA's justified its decision to reject the students' application by highlighting potential negative influences of Chinese Cultural Revolution on the students and subsequently, on Japan's public order (Honma 2015, 2). Yet, this negative attitude toward China was the minority view among the LDP, and among DSP members, and had limited political support elsewhere.

Both the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 41-68 circulated on January 11, 1968 and the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) number 9 corroborate the proposition that the majority of Japanese political elite did not perceive China as a direct military threat to Japan, even after it had nuclearized. Rather than perceiving China as "the Cold-War enemy", Japan's political leadership saw it mostly as a long-term political competitor. Three factors mentioned in the document as reasons for the latter attitude: first, the Sino-Soviet conflict improved the

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[40] National Diet Archives, February 27, 1965, House of Representatives - Budget Committee, Correspondence 2-4.

Japanese situation. Second, China did not have a major naval capability, and third, its military posture was defensive.[41]

The diplomatic breakthrough between the US and China and the subsequent positive progress in Sino-Japanese relations shuffled the cards again. By 1972, China was no longer considered to be a military threat, not even behind the scenes. During a summit meeting with US President Ford on November 20, 1974, stated PM Tanaka that, "[Whereas] Japan does not assess China as a major threat to Japan's security... the Soviet military forces deployed in Siberia along the Chinese border may at the same also be viewed as a threat to Japan. Therefore Japan is most sensitive to the Soviet military build-up in Siberia."[42]

Earlier in October, during a correspondence with JDA's head of Defense Bureau Kubo in a Cabinet meeting at the Upper House about the fourth defense plan, Kōmeitō member Mineyama Akinori commented that based on a panel discussion he watched on TV, the normalization of the bilateral relations with China induced the public to cease perceiving China as a "threat".

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[41] In 1969, Japan perceived only a minimal military threat from Communist China (Dian 2014, 76). For the NIE, see: NIE 41068, "Main Trends in Japan's External Relations". Accessed on March 18, 2016, from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d106.

[42] See: National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Memorandum of Conversation, November 20, 1974. Accessed December 30, 2013, from http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/guides/findingaid/Memoranda_of_Conversations.asp#Box14 ;

Kubo replied by saying that although the international situation around Japan now seems to be peaceful, the situation is fluid and such judgement of Japan's security environment can also be incorrect. Mineyama then cautioned against military build-up and its potential threat to Japan's neighbors including China.[43] Other opposition members communicated similar opinions, and criticized past LDP governments for depicting China as a hostile country to the Japanese public (Honma 2015, 4).

To conclude, the previous two sections have established the dominant threat perceptions toward China as held among Japan's defense and political establishments. I argued that to Japan's defense establishment, China's nuclearization was perceived to be a direct threat, although other components of China's military capabilities less so; likewise, while Japan's PM and FM framed China's foreign behavior as aggressive publicly, their actions and statements behind the scenes indicate that they judged China to be a direct threat. However, theirs was only a minority opinion among the ruling party. Finally, it became clear that Japan's opposition parties' did not perceive China to be a military threat to Japan.[44] In terms of political communication, the China threat was relatively more prevalent than the Soviet threat in Diet deliberations. To recall, chapter 2 identified ten references to the term "Soviet threat" between 1952 and 1976 and concluded that

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[43] Kubo gives as an example the wrong American judgement of the Japanese threat before Pearl Harbor. According to him, the Americans focused on Japan's intentions and failed to consider its capabilities. As a result of lack of assurance to the continuation of peaceful situation in Japan's security environment, he advocated a "gradual increase" of Japan's defense capabilities as part of the fourth MTDP. See: National Diet Archives, October 17, 1972, House of Councilors - Cabinet Committee, Correspondence 42.

[44] In terms of political communication, a terminology of 'China threat' was relatively more prevalent than the 'Soviet threat' in Diet deliberations. To recall, chapter 3 identified 10 references to the term "Soviet threat" between 1952 and 1976 and concluded that the dominant message behind those references was *not* to inflate a Soviet threat, but actually to do the opposite. Compared to this small number of references, a total of 58 references in Diet deliberations to "China threat" were found in the same period.

the dominant message behind those references was *not* to inflate a Soviet threat, but actually to achieve the opposite. Compared to this small number of references, a total number of 58 references in Diet deliberations to a "China threat" was found in the same period.

Figure 18 - Number of Utterances to "China Threat" by Political Actor 1950 - 1972



* Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

But as Figure 18 above indicates, the majority of references to a "China threat"" in the Diet were made by opposition members: namely Diet representatives of the JSP and Kōmeitō. Subsequently, it was primarily the opposition who used the language of "China threat", insomuch as to deflate it.

6.5 Media

The purpose of this section is to capture and analyze the manner in which the Chinese military threat was framed in domestic media between 1952 and 1976. Similar to chapter 5, the media outlet chosen is *Yomiuri* editorials and the method I use is the Media Framing Analysis.[45] Four sets of questions guide the analysis: (1) How was the threat posed by China represented in the editorial? What were the counter-frames? (2) What were the shared beliefs that pinpointed the media framing? For example, did the editorial reveal certain beliefs about the nature of international relations or the use of force to solve international conflicts ? Did it indicate that a certain entity was hostile? (3) Did the editorial inflate/deflate the threat, or was it neutral about it[46] (4) What kind of risk measures did it recommend for Japan in order to deal with China?

I searched for articles containing references to both "China" and "Threat" in *Yomiuri* editorials. For the word "China" I searched for both "chūgoku" (China) and "chūkyō" (Communist Party or Communist China); 30 editorials were identified all together; 5 for "chūgoku" and 25 for "chūkyō". The results are summarized in Figure 19 below.

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[45] For a discussion of both the method and the background of *Yomiuri Shinbun*, please see chapter 6.

[46] By "inflating" a threat I mean to overemphasize it, and by "deflating" a threat I mean the opposite: de-emphasizing it.

Figure 19 : Reference to “China” and “Threat” in Yomiuri Editorials 1952 - 1976



*Source: Yomidas Rekishikan Archive

As can be seen, while references to “*chūkyō*” and “threat” dominated the period between 1952 and 1964, references to “*chūgoku*”and “threat” first appear in 1965, a year after China had testes nuclear weapons for the first time, and disappear in 1972, when a diplomatic breakthrough between both countries was achieved. It is important to note that editorials containing both “China” and “threat” did not necessarily deal with the subject of Chinese threat and can appear in completely different context; and so, to analyze the manner in which the Chinese threat was framed, there is a need to further examine the content of the editorials. After careful reading of the editorials containing the words “China” and “threat”, 4 articles were identified as relevant to this study; their titles, dates, and frames are summarized in Table 11 below.

Table 11: Editorials in Yomiuri Shinbun with References to "China" and Threat" 1964 - 1972			
#	**Title**	**Date (YY.MM.DD)**	**Frames (If and How "China" or a "China threat" was framed?)**
1	"Regrettable Chinese Nuclear Test"	1965.05.16	Insecurity and the threat-scenario of nuclear war. (China's nuclear program and US response poses "heavy concerns").
2	"Chinese Nuclear Weaponry and Japan's Security"	1967.08.07	Insecurity Nuclear China is a political and psychological threat, but not an actual one
3	"Let's look straight ahead to the China problem"	1969.04.11	Insecurity
4	"Public opinion poll results on Japan-US Security Treaty and China's perception"	1970.05.31	No Threat

An examination of the data suggests several findings.

First, while China's nuclear weapons were framed in terms of *insecurity* between 1965 and 1969, *Yomiuri* editorials avoided framing both China and China's nuclear weapons as a direct military threat to Japan throughout the period between 1964 and 1972. This is not to argue that *Yomiuri* editorials did not communicate serious concerns about China-related military stimuli. China's nuclear experiments were a source for "heavy concerns" for Japan (*wareware ni ooki na fuan o hikiokoshita koto ha jijitsu de aru*) as well as to other Asian neighbors.[47] The main danger however was not *China* itself but the *threat-scenario* of a war between the US and China. Such framing remained consistent even when confronted with repeated nuclear tests and other stimuli related to China's missile program. At its climax, the danger from a nuclear China was framed as both *political* and *psychological* threats, but not as a military one.[48]

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[47] See: Editorial number 1 -"Regrettable Chinese Nuclear Test", published in May 16, 1965.

[48] See: Editorial number 2 - "Chinese Nuclear Weaponry and Japan's Security", published in August 7, 1967.

In terms of counter-frames, *Yomiuri* editorials throughout this period opposed the development of an independent nuclear program as well as the introduction of nuclear bases to Okinawa, as explored later in finding number 4.

Second, as to the shared beliefs about military-security, the editorials sampled did not testify to an increasingly realist perception of international politics. Throughout the period, military power was looked upon negatively and the editorials ruled it out as a central pillar in Japan's foreign and security policies; thus, when combined with other findings it becomes clear that the *Yomiuri*'s peace rationality remained intact throughout this period.

As for belief (2a), *Yomiuri* editorials did not directly comment on the future trajectory of international security hence it is difficult to determine whether they viewed the world as becoming more dangerous. Although concerns about US-China nuclear war (in the context of the hostilities taking place in Vietnam during that time) were raised, an overall attitude that things would become worse from a security point-of-view was not identified in the four editorials sampled. However, a realization that China's nuclear development does make things more complicated on a regional level can be traced.

As for the third shared belief, that is, whether China was judged to be increasingly dangerous to Japan (whether it was hostile, had high propensity to use force, and would not hesitate to use it against Japan), *Yomiuri* editorials were more clear on this point: although as several editorial mentioned, China would soon become an actual military threat from a capability-based point of view (since it would have both the weapon and the delivery means), since it was not hostile to Japan, did not have high propensity to use force, and had no reason to attack Japan, then it was not becoming more dangerous to Japan. A threat-scenario of a superpower nuclear war, however, was judged to be more likely, since tensions between China,

the Soviet Union and the US were on the rise. That being said, there was no reason - according to editorials - that Japan should be targeted in case such a scenario would materialize.

Third, the analysis of *Yomiuri* editorials containing reference to "China" and "threat" between 1964 and 1972 reveals consistent patterns of deflating the Chinese threat even when faced with new stimuli about China's delivery capabilities, repeated experiments and deteriorating attitudes toward the Japanese government . Such judgement was based on the assumption that China is not entertaining offensive intentions, as its nuclear weapons are for defensive purposes only (to deter the US and the Soviet Union) and in any case it would not target Japan.

The deflate rhetoric persisted even as China-related military stimuli had been accumulating. Editorial number 2 for example maintains that the recent Chinese development of MRBM (Middle-Range Ballistic Missiles) enables one to determine that the day that China will pose an "actual threat" to Japan from a (purely) capability-based point of view has nearly come (*chūgoku kakusenryoku ga, sukunakutomo sono nōryoku ni kansuru kagiri, wa ga kuni ni taishi genjitsuteki na kyoui to naru hi ga madjika ni semattekita to ieru kara de aru*). The editorial, titled "Chinese Nuclear Weaponry and Japan's Security" (August 7, 1967) explain why China probably isn't an actual military threat (*gunjiteki kyoui ni ha narumai*) with two reasons: first, China developed nuclear weapons essentially in order to deter the US and Soviet Union and second, since the purpose behind its nuclear program was to deter the two superpowers, and because nuclear weapons were originally thought of as a "response weapon", the likelihood that China would be putting nuclear weapons to use against Japan is almost unthinkable (*hotondo kangaerarenai*). This is especially so since Japan did not pose a threat to China. The editorial concluded that while China's nuclear weapons do pose a political and psychological threat to

Japan, they do not pose an actual threat. Interestingly, the editorial compared this situation to the Soviet nuclear missiles deployed to Primorsky Krai (*enkaishū)*, which after the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union did not generate a feeling of dread among the Japanese.

Fourth, in terms of risk measures, consecutive editorials were persistent in their call to improve relations with China and in their objection to military measures including the nuclear option. Editorial number 3 ("Let's look straight ahead to the China problem" - April 11, 1969) is an example of the first point. The editorial identified three obstacles which hindered the improvement in bilateral relations, claiming that, first, the "China problem" originated in part as a result of a biased subjective perception of China among Japanese politicians, which is not based on logic but rather on immediate benefits and losses. Sectarianism among the main political parties in Japan and conflicting perspectives of China obscured the direction of the overall policy toward it. The editorial calls on Japan's politicians to form attitudes based on the "whole forest" and not on "individual trees". Second, the editorial asserted that Japanese leaders did not understand what China really wants from Japan, and third, that the situation after the Sino-Japanese war had not been properly settled.

In order to improve Sino-Japanese relations, asserted the editorial, the Japanese should first acknowledge that the China problem is related to Japan's future well-being/safety (*anpi*). Similarly, the Japanese should refrain from impolite statements such as the one made in a recent US-Japan joint statement communique which contained the expression "China threat". The editorial concluded by calling on PM Satō to reflect on the need to address Sino-Japanese relations with good will and attentiveness.

Interestingly, the editorial adopted an introspective attitude to the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations, without mentioning China's policy at all. In terms of Japan's nuclear option,

consecutive editorials rejected this option and cautioned against it by highlighting the security dilemma that would ensue were Japan would choose to go this way. When deflating the Chinese threat, editorial number 3 also argued that there is one scenario in which Chinese nuclear weapons can pose actual threat to Japan: when Japan either develops nuclear weapons or provides a large nuclear weapon base for other nations (namely the US); that is why Japan should not go nuclear.

6.6 Public

Japanese public attitudes toward China during the early postwar period and specifically when security tensions were on the rise due to China's development of nuclear weapons are often characterized as "complacent" or "forgetful". During a summit meeting with US leadership held in Washington on November 14, 1967, for example, PM Satō mentioned to Secretary of Defense McNamara that the Japanese masses "were not concerned" with China's nuclear strength and that the so-called "Peace Constitution" gave a "sense of false security unrelated to what Red China might do."[49] But the data I bring below present a more complex picture of Japanese mass attitudes toward China during the mid 1960s.

Figure 20 covers the period between 1960 - 1973 and is taken from Watanabe (1977, 125) based on data collected by Jiji-tsūshin-sha, Tokyo. Nationwide opinion surveys conducted by Jiji Press asked respondents to select from a pre-determined list of 9 or 10 countries the three countries they liked best and the three they liked least. As the figure demonstrates, the Japanese public had indicated growing negative feelings toward China during the 1960s and especially

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[49] Memorandum of Conversation. Washington, November 14, 1967, 5:05 - 9:15 p.m. Accessed on March 17, from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d104

between 1966 and 1968, *when China had surpassed the Soviet Union to become the most disliked nation by the Japanese* (slightly more than 40 percent of the public "disliked" China the most). Combined with public-opinion polls conducted by the *Yomiuri* after China had detonated a hydrogen-bomb in which 72 percent of the public reported that they "felt a threat" - these data somewhat undermine the conviction that the Japanese public was completely unaffected by China-related developments in the mid 1960s. Still, the levels of negative feelings toward China are relatively low when comparing it with the anti-Soviet sentiment in the early 1980, when about 60 percent of the public disliked the Soviet Union. Likewise, by 1972, negative attitudes toward China has drastically diminished, and China enjoyed a better image among Japanese public than the image of the USSR, South Korea, North Korea, and the US.

Figure 20: Nations Disliked by the Japanese 1960 - 1973.

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6.7 Summary: Threat Perceptions of China (1950-1975)

To conclude the discussion about Japanese perceptions of a Chinese threat in early postwar Japan, I argue that Japan's defense establishment perceived a direct threat as a result of China's development of nuclear weapons during the second half of the 1960s. The "Chinese threat" discourse was limited to the nuclear dimension and to the second half of the 1960s. Both military and JDA communicated a direct China threat publicly on a number of occasions. Among Japan's political establishment, similar to the Soviet Union case, state leaders securitized communism *politically* but refrained from doing so *militarily* in the early 1950s. In the second half of the 1960s, however, as a result of external developments such as China's nuclear tests and correlated with worsening air among the leaders of both countries, Japan's state leadership perceived an direct Chinese military threat. Although a systematic attempt to securitize China as a direct *military* threat or to frame it as an enemy to Japan on the political stage is lacking throughout the early postwar period, Japan's state leadership did undermine the taboo on military-threat both publicly and privately. Publicly, Japanese leaders admitted to a Chinese threat, without restricting it to a "political" context like former leaders had done. Thus, leaders such as Satō paved the way to think of China as a military threat without necessarily *labeling* it as such. Privately, by seeking reassurances about the US nuclear umbrella, and by considering extra-ordinary means such as an independent nuclear program, Japanese leaders took actions to counter the Chinese threat from a military perspective.

7. Military Threat Perceptions of North Korea (1976-2000)

Abstract

This chapter explores Japanese perceptions of military-threat associated with North Korea in the "late postwar period" and "post Cold-War era" (roughly between 1976-1991 and 1991-2000 respectively) among the four units of analysis. The questions that guide this chapter are: How did Japan's defense and political establishments as well as mainstream media perceive and frame the North Korean military threat? How did the Japanese public view it? Had there been attempts at securitization of threats associated with this entity? If so, by whom? The chapter finds that negative sentiment among the public toward North Korea had accumulated by the late 1980s, and in the first half of the 1990s the defense establishment and political leadership perceived a latent threat as a result of North Korea's nuclear and missile development. But it was the missile test in August 1998 that intensified perceptions of the North Korea threat among the Japanese society as a whole. North Korea was subsequently securitized in the military context.

7.1 Introduction

North Korea had every reason to be perceived in Japan as a military threat during the postwar period. Its animosity toward Japan, both historically and ideologically, the lack of diplomatic relations between the countries, its provocative behavior (especially toward South Korea the US, but also toward Japan), could have provided sufficient reasons for the Japanese to view Communist DPRK not only as a political threat but also as a military threat.[1] However as we shall see, similar to the Chinese case, North Korea was not securitized in a military context during the postwar period (1950-1991).[2]

The situation had changed during the 1990s. In February 1993 North Korea denied entry from an inspection team of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in the following month, it threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT; later it relented this intention). In May the same year, the DPRK conducted a *Nodong* 1 missile-test and launched it to the Sea of Japan, and was accused by UN inspectors to have been hiding evidence of nuclear-program development.[3] Subsequently, North Korea became a security concern: in 1994 alone, almost 50 references to "North Korea" and "Nuclear weapons" were made in the Japanese Diet.

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[1] For a comprehensive overview of North Korea provocative actions see, Congressional Research Service, Report RL30004: "North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007".

[2] Although Japanese actors did not perceive an actual military threat from North Korea during the Cold War period, they were some concerns about the potential for an indirect aggression to be carried by communist agents such as the North Korean residents in Japan (Morris-Suzuki 2007, 60-61, 199; quoted in Hughes 2009, 297).

[3] This first "North Korean Nuclear crisis" abated the following year, when North Korea signed the "Agreed Framework" in October 1994 with the US which committed the DPRK to stop its nuclear program in exchange for nuclear reactors, aid, and easing of sanctions.

In August 1998, North Korea surprised the Japanese and fired a *Taepodong* missile over Japan's airspace. The missile test generated almost 90 references to the missile's name the following year (1999). During 1999, the North Korean "spy-boats" (*fushinsen*) and the "kidnapping issue" (*rachi mondai*) had also emerged in the political discourse; in terms of external developments, the DPRK agreed to freeze testing on long-range missiles in September that year (it was not before 2002 that the DPRK expelled UN inspectors from Yongbyon nuclear facility, triggering "the second North Korean nuclear crisis").

Mike Mochizuki (1993, 213) observed that, "with the end of the Cold War, the regional security environment seems to be more, not less, threatening to Japan." Now that the Soviet Union was gone, what threats Japanese actors perceived? The 1992 MOFA's Diplomatic Bluebook acknowledged that,

> The general security environment was 'unsettling': the situation is still fluid, since there are still unresolved questions in this region, such as the issues of the Northern Territories and the Korean Peninsula, in addition to such unsettling factors as the Russian military forces in the Far East and *suspicion of nuclear development in North Korea"* (MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook 1992, 2.1, italics mine).

With this unsettling feeling at the background, North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs soon came to dominate the security discourse and North Korea was perceived as a latent threat by the Japanese defense establishment in the early 1990s.

Yet it was only after the launch of *Taepodong* missile (August 1998) - which flew over the main island Honshu - that the Japanese political establishment, media and general public became wary of the North Korean threat. "For most Japanese, the launching was the first occasion in the postwar period in which they really felt their country was being immediately threatened by a hostile external power" (Kamiya 2003). In response to the missile test, the Japanese Diet passed a resolution of protest against North Korea, normalization efforts were halted, and economic sanctions were taken.

Scholars disagree about just how much North Korea poses a military threat to Japan. While some point out to legitimate security concerns (Soeya 1998), others highlight a range of concerns not necessarily limited to the North Korean military context (Hughes 2009). Soeya (1998, 206) identifies two components of the North Korea issue as causing concerns among Japanese government and security experts: domestic instability and nuclear development. As for the first component, he asserts that the entering of refugees and terrorists to Japan, or criminal activities by North Koreans currently residing in Japan induce the perception of a North Korean threat; as for the second component, North Korea's nuclear and missile programs became a major source of concern since February 1993. But perhaps more importantly, Soeya (1998, 206) asserts that it is the combination of the volatile situation on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's unpredictable intentions and behavior, the suspected nuclear program and the development of missiles capable of reaching Japan which amount to a direct military threat. Hughes (2009) asserts that in the post Cold-War era, "Japan...has genuine grounds for viewing North Korea as an existential threat to its security" but argues that, uncertainty about the North's capabilities, lack of financial resources, and US defense reassurances create a situation in which, "on paper, North Korea's existential threat... is thus far not a fundamental element for Japanese national

survival". Subsequently, Hughes argues that the North Korean threat to Japan is multi-layered and that in addition to a direct military threat, North Korea poses a threat to the cohesiveness of the US-Japan alliance (as demonstrated during the 1994 nuclear crisis, when the US requested Japan to provide rear support in case a conflict broke out), a domestic threat, and a "proxy" for remilitarization. How did Japanese domestic actors perceive and frame the North Korean military threat? Had there been attempts at securitization of threats associated with this entity? If so, by whom?

I present data about the North-Korean threat discourse as it emerged in the Diet in Figures 21 and 22. What was this discourse about? Was there an attempt to securitize a "North Korea threat" in military-security terms? If so, what were the extra-ordinary measures securitizing actors advocated for? Before answering these questions, I briefly survey the bilateral relations of Japan and North Korea in the late postwar and post Cold-War periods.

Figure 21: References to Country Specific Threats in Diet Deliberations 1975 - 2000



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

7.2 Bilateral Relations

Several attempts to normalize diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea were made in the postwar period, but all attempts failed (Cha 2001, 551; Hughes 2006, 460-62). Throughout the 1990s, Japan maintained an overall policy of engagement toward North Korea, albeit not without pressure which was applied in diplomatic and economic means after the missile test of August 1998. But while the overall Japanese foreign-policy approach toward North Korea has seem to be of engagement (Cha 2001), security concerns about North Korea had surfaced in national discourse. Similar to the Soviet case, once again, deteriorating Japanese public sentiment toward North Korea (demonstrated from the late 1980s) was a necessary condition to the securitization of the North Korean threat, as discussed below.

7.3 Defense Establishment

This section briefly explores the perceptions of military-threat among Japan's defense establishment. The question that guides this section is: How did defense personnel perceive and frame the North Korean military threat between 1975-2000?

Defense officials' concerns about North Korea can be divided analytically into two categories - "concrete" and "existential". By concrete concerns I mean those components of North Korean capabilities, behavior, and nature such as nuclear and missile development, missile tests in the vicinity of Japan, and the revelations about the kidnapping issue that were perceived to be posing a certain danger to Japan. By existential concerns I mean the uncertainty and fluidity of the security *situation* in the region, especially with the demise of the bipolar order and the increasing domestic instability and deepening economic stagnation in Japan.

Kamiya (2003) mentions that, "From 1993 to 1994, when Pyongyang's nuclear and

missile development programs were disclosed, the Japanese began to recognize North Korea as a potential threat to their security." The 1994 Defense White Paper commented on North Korea's nuclear development,

> North Korea's suspected nuclear development is not only a problem that affects the security of North East Asia, including Japan, but also a serious problem for the international community...a combination of nuclear arms development and missile development could create a more dangerous situation (Defense Agency 1995, 5).[4]

The new NDPO (*taikō*) became the official defense policy in November 1995. The defense outline included new threat scenarios (instead of the traditional threat scenario of a military invasion), such as intrusion of armed refugees, terror activities, guerilla attack, limited occupation of land and the obstruction of sea lanes; as Soeya (1998, 210) points out, "many of these contingencies are associated with instability and conflict in North Korea and the Korean Peninsula, even though the association is not explicitly stated in any government document."

What concrete components of the North Korean threat concerned Japanese defense officials? Among the prime concerns were North Korea's nuclear program, and its delivery means - Ballistic Missiles.[5] In addition, DPRK intrusions to Japanese territorial waters - as demonstrated in the intrusion of North Korean vessels on March 23, 1999 - were also a source of concern. I elaborate on the missile issue below.

In June 1994 (the following month after the *Nodong* test), during a correspondence with JDA DG Kanda Atsushi, Saitō Fumio (LDP) asked the former's opinion about the North Korea threat and its impact on the NDPO, arguing that this issue is related to the survival and well-

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[4] Quoted in Soeya 1998, 206.

[5] And, so, for example, by 1999, the DPRK had about 100 *Nodong* missiles covering Japan's population centers, able to carry nuclear, biological and chemical warheads, and could reach their target in about 10 minutes. See: Michishita 2008.

being of the Japanese people. Kanda replied that the NDPO would include the North Korean issue (*kita chōsen mondai*) and that it is an extremely important issue but stressed that at the moment, it was difficult to outline a clear policy proposal on how to respond to the issue. Saitō then pressured Kanda and asked him whether Japan can protect its citizens' lives and property from the *Nodong* (*nodon ni taishite, nihon no genyū bōeiryoku de kokumin no no seimei, zaisan wo mamoremasuka*). Kanda replied that the answer is no and therefore there was a need to consider a missile defense system. "If that is the case", continued Saitō, "then in the slight chance [of a missile attack], what will happen to the lives of our 120 million people?" (*sō suru to...wareware no seimei dō narundesuka*). The DG replied that in such a case, Japan would have to depend on the US military deterrence.[6] As can be seen in this correspondence, while Kanda refrained from framing North Korea as a threat - calling it a problem (*mondai*) instead - he did highlight the necessity to respond to the issue of North Korean Ballistic Missiles.

In March 1995, JDA Director of Defense Policy Bureau highlighted a "strong concern" about North Korea's development of *Nodong* missiles, mentioning that depending on their deployment position, they can cover the greater part of Japan; asked whether North Korea was a threat by a New Frontier Party representative, JDA official replied that it is difficult to determine what type of damage this missile can inflict on Japan since it was still being developed.[7] As can be seen in the examples above, concrete concerns about North Korea were communicated during the 1990s. What existential components of the North Korean threat concerned Japanese defense officials during the same period?

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[6] National Diet Archives, June 14, 1994, House of Councilors - Budget Committee, Correspondence 35.

[7] National Diet Archives, March 16, 1995, House of Representatives - Foreign Affairs Committee, Correspondence 9.

An example of an existential concern about North Korea can be traced in the following remark made by Okazaki Hisahiko, then the Japanese ambassador to Thailand. In a committee discussion about international issues held in May 1996, Okazaki asserted that while the situation in the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Straits was rather stable in the last 30 years or so, the situation had significantly changed and from hereafter, the situation was unsettled (*antei kikan ga kore de owatte, ryūdōteki ni nattemairimashita*). Subsequently, Okazaki reaffirmed that even though the Soviet threat disappeared, the importance of the security alliance with the US has not.[8]

7.4 Political Establishment

This section explores the perceptions of a North Korean military-threat among Japan's political establishment. The questions that guide this section are: How did political figures perceive and frame the North Korean military-threat in the Diet during the late postwar period? Had there been attempts at securitization of dangers associated with this entity? If so, by whom?

39 references to "North Korean threat" between 1975 and 2000 were identified in Diet deliberations (compare with 57 for "China threat" between 1957 and 1972, see Figure 21 above). A "North Korea threat" discourse surfaced in the national conversation as represented in the Diet in two distinctive periods: first in the years 1980-1981, and second, from 1994 and on. Whereas the nuclear issue took precedence between 1993 and 1996, other themes emerged in the national conversation of 1999: the *Taepodong*, the spy vessels, and the *Nodong*. Since the year 2000, however, the kidnapping issue has taken precedence over other North Korea-related issues, with

[8] National Diet Archives, May 15, 1996, House of Councilors - International Issues Investigation Committee, Correspondence 12.

great number of references in Diet deliberations.

The first reference to a "North Korea threat" appeared in the Diet on October 27, 1980, when JDA's external councilor Okazaki Hisahiko had argued that North Korea was a "latent threat" (*senzaiteki kyoui*). Three days later, opposition member Kadoya Kenjirō (JSP) criticized this comment, and argued that both SDF and JDA officials were discussing a "North Korea threat" (together with a "Soviet threat"), as recent books published by (former) SDF officers had suggested. Kadoya claimed that this type of argument was intended to create hypothetical enemies for Japan so that the country would arm. JDA DG Oomura responded following the usual lines of "the JDA does not have hypothetical enemy in mind" (*bōeicho ga tokutei no kuni o kasōtekikoku to kangeru yō na koto wa shinai*) and asserted that, Okazaki's statement was "inappropriate" and that similar statements would be avoided from now.[9] Likewise, PM Suzuki asserted in November 1980 that although there are no diplomatic relations between the countries, there is a steady improvement in personal exchanges, trade, and culture; asked about whether he views North Korea as a threat, the PM responded by saying that he does not think North Korea poses a direct threat to Japan (*watashi wa chokutekikyoui, senzaiteki ni seyo nani ni seyo, chokuteki nihon ni kyoui ni natteoru to kangaete orimasen*).[10] In September 1981, during a correspondence with FM Sonoda Sunao (LDP), claimed a JSP member that similar to the arguments about a Soviet threat, now a North Korean threat-discourse had emerged, arguing that both the US and South Korea are putting pressure on Japan to accept this view. In response, FM Sonoda asserted that he had never called North Korea a "threat" or "concern", but that the

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[9] National Diet Archives, October 30, 1980, House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee, Correspondence 25.

[10] National Diet Archives, November 10, 1980 House of Representatives - Special Committee for National Security, Correspondence 10.

situation in the Korean Peninsula is still volatile. [11]

The second distinctive period in which a North Korea threat discourse had surfaced was 1994. Concerns about North Korea from a military perspective, however, can be traced to the early 1990s.

North Korea's Nuclear Development

North Korea's nuclear development program emerged as an issue for global concern in the early 1990s. PM Miyazawa Kiichi and President Bill Clinton held a summit meeting in Washington on April 16, 1993, and the issue of North Korea was raised in the News Conference which followed the meeting. While President Clinton directly commented on the North's behavior, saying that, "North Korea's refusal to comply with the international nuclear inspections and standards...causes us serious concern", PM Miyazawa only mentioned that, "the region is undergoing changes with risks and instabilities", reaffirming his American counterpart that, "American presence and Japan-US Security Treaty are indispensable stabilizing elements for the region." [12]

By June, PM Miyazawa was more pronounced on the issue of North Korea. In June, he stated at the Diet that, "Since North Korea develops nuclear weapons, if it can get the means to carry nuclear weapons, then it will pose a direct threat to our country; this is a matter of great concern" (*Yomiuri Shinbun* evening edition, June 7, 1993). The following month, PM Miyazawa

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[11] National Diet Archives, September 2, 1981 House of Councilors - Foreign Affairs Committee, Correspondence 7.

[12] "The World and Japan" Database Project. Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo "The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan". Accessed January 10, 2017, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19930416.O1E.html

met with President Clinton again and North Korea was high on the agenda. In the Joint Press Conference after the meeting, the PM reiterated his statement about North Korea posing a direct threat to Japan were it to own both nuclear weapons and delivery means. The PM emphasized that although Japan did not intend to introduce nuclear weapons itself, being exposed to direct threat naturally causes great concerns (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, morning edition, July 7, 1993).

Other opinions about the situation involving North Korea existed in political discourse, of course. Active voices in this respect were JCP members, such as Ueda Kōichirō, Kasai Akira, and Nakajima Masahiro, who maintained that rather than a "North Korea threat", the biggest threat to Asian peace is the expansion of the US-Japan security alliance and US military presence in the region;[13] Subsequently, JCP members emphasized after the *Taepodong* test that instead of framing North Korea as an existential threat to Japan, a calm diplomatic response was needed.[14] Some voices from within the LDP, too, criticized the government stance vis-à-vis North Korea. In February 1999, claimed Hase Hiroshi for example that the government's reaction to the *Taepodong* missile test was overly sensitive, and that rather than a North Korean threat based on the nuclear or missile aspects, it is the lack of dialogue between Japan and North Korea which is dangerous.[15] A member of the Social Democratic Federation claimed that unlike the Soviet Union in the 1980s, North Korea is an extremely poor country, with insufficient humanitarian

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[13] See for example: National Diet Archives, February 24, 1997 House of Councilors - International Issues Investigation Committee, Correspondence 12; National Diet Archives, May 21, 1997 House of Councilors - International Issues Investigation Committee, Correspondence 5.

[14] National Diet Archives, September 10, 1998 House of Representatives - National Security Committee, Correspondence 32.

[15] National Diet Archives, February 3, 1999, House of Councilors - International Issues Investigation Committee, Correspondence 9.

conditions, and argued against the intimidation tactics which aimed to instigate fear among the public.[16]

Figure 22: Number of References in Diet Sessions to Components of the North Korean Threat 1990 - 2000*



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

Extra-ordinary Measures?

The last two sections established that during the 1990s, concerns about a North Korean threat permeated both the defense and political establishments. What risk-measures were considered by Japanese actors in order to meet the North Korean threat?

In terms of measures, Japan's defense establishment began lobbying for missile-defense research and development in late 1993 and various options for cooperation with the US were

[16] National Diet Archives, February 16, 1999, House of Representatives - Budget Committee, Correspondence 46.

considered.[17] A limited BMD capability including four AEGIS systems with SM-2 was gradually introduced to the MSDF since the late 1980s, and 27 PAC-2 units (about 120 missiles) were deployed by the ASDF since 1996 (the effectiveness of these weapon system, especially when considering the North Korean Ballistic Missiles however, was far from certain).[18] A decision to go for a missile-defense system (based on the PAC-3 system and the Navy Theater Wide system that would upgrade some components of the AEGIS) inside the JDA was reached during the spring of 1997, but the National Security Council authorized a joint research of BMD capacity with the US only in October 1998 after the *Taepodong* test, and the government of Japan approved a multi-layered, expensive BMD system in December 2003. It is plausible to assume that government decisions to introduce the BMD system were made in the context of the North Korean threat; although the system is in line with Japan's exclusively defensive policy, its huge cost can be taken to be an extra-ordinary mean. The bottom line was that the BMD system was linked to the North Korean threat; the securitization of North Korea was therefore completed with the adoption of extra-ordinary means.

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[17] US raised joint development of BMD systems as early as 1983.

[18] These data is from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/kongo.htm and from interviews conducted with defense officials for my MA thesis.

7.5 Media

The purpose of this section is to capture and analyze the manner in which the North Korean military threat was framed in domestic media in Japan between 1975 and 2000. Similar to chapter 6, the media outlet chosen is *Yomiuri* editorials and the method is Media Framing Analysis.[19] To recall, four sets of questions guide the analysis: (1) How was the threat posed by North Korea represented in the editorial? What were the counter-frames? (2) What were the shared beliefs that pinpointed the media framing? For example, did the editorial revealed certain beliefs about the nature of international relations or the use of force to solve international conflicts? did it indicate that a certain entity was hostile? (3) Did the editorial inflate / deflate the threat?[20] (4) What kind of risk measures did it recommend for Japan in order to deal with North Korea?

To search for editorials containing references to both "North Korea" and "threat" in the *Yomiuri Shinbun*, I used "*kitachōsen*" and "*kyoui*" as key-words. Figure 23 presents the number of editorials with references to both "North Korea" and "threat" between 1990 and 2000. 73 editorials were identified(!), a very high figure compared with the number of references to the "Soviet threat" and "Chinese threat". Most references were made in 1993 and between 1998-2000, and corresponded with external developments such as the first nuclear crisis and the *Nodong* test (1993) and the *Taepodong* test in August 1998.

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[19] For a discussion of both the method and the background of *Yomiuri Shinbun*, please see chapter 6.

[20] By "inflating" a threat I mean to overemphasize it, and by "deflating" a threat I mean the opposite: de-emphasizing it.

Figure 23: Reference to "North Korea" and "Threat" in Yomiuri Editorials 1975 - 2000 (Total : 73)



*Source: Yomidas Rekishikan Archive

Because the sample is rather large, I narrowed the analysis to six editorials sampled from different periods: during the Cold War (1981), After the Cold War (1991), during the first nuclear crisis (March 1993), After the *Nodong* missile launch (July 1993), and soon after the *Taepodong* missile launch (September 1998). The editorials are presented in Table 12 below.

The examination of the data suggests several findings. First, unlike the framing of the China threat in the early postwar period, *Yomiuri* editorials framed a nuclear North Korea as a military threat to Japan during the post Cold-War period. While North Korea was framed as a non-threat issue in 1981, it was framed as a potential threat in 1991 and March 1993, as a "new threat" in July 1993 (*arata na kyoui*), and as a serious military threat in 1998 (*jūdai na kyoui*). Unlike the Chinese case study, in which *Yomiuri* editorials argued that both *political* and *psychological* threats had existed but a military threat had not, no such distinction was made in the North Korean case. In addition, late 1990s editorials (#3-5) communicated a strong inclination to respond to the North Korea issue: a *necessity* to deal with suspicions about the North Korean nuclear program (editorial 3), a *necessity* to introduce information-gathering satellites in space (editorial 4), and both *necessity* and *urgency* to proceed with developing a

capability of missile-defense (editorials 5 and 6).

Table 12: Representative Editorials in Yomiuri Shinbun with References to "North Korea" and Threat" 1975 - 2000			
#	**Title**	**Date (YY.MM.DD)**	**Frames (If and How "North Korea" or a "North Korean threat" was framed?)**
1	"Lessons from the missile launch incident"	1981.08.30	No threat
2	"Maintain Principles in the Diplomatic Negotiation with North Korea"	1991.01.29	Potential Threat to Japan if goes Nuclear
3	"An Appeal to North Korea to Reconsider"	1993.03.13	Potential Threat to Asia if goes nuclear.
4	"Calling into question the response to the 'North''s missiles"	1993.07.31	New Threat
5	"After-all, [Japan] should hasten TMD research"	1998.09.01	Threat (nuclear and missile development). Japan should pursue diplomatic and military means.
6	"Firm Response to the North's Reckless Action!"	1998.09.03	Serious Threat (nuclear and missile development). North Korea is framed as a problematic kid in the internatifonal arena

*Source: Yomidas Rekishikan Archive

Second, in terms of shared beliefs, as for belief (1), editorial number 4 testified to a strong "defensive realist" perception of international politics (I elaborate below). As for beliefs (2a) and (2b), *Yomiuri* editorials communicated strong feelings of uncertainty and anxiety in the post-Cold War era, less so globally and more so regionally. Editorial number 4 titled "Calling into question the response to the 'North''s missiles" (July 1993) for example asserted that new threats have

surfaced in the post Cold War period, and that the successful *Nodong* missile test was one of these threats. As for belief (3), that is, whether North Korea was judged to be increasingly dangerous to Japan (whether it was hostile, had high propensity to use force, and would not hesitate to use it against Japan), *Yomiuri* editorials during the 1990s repeatedly mentioned that North Korea's development of weapons threatens peace and stability not only in the region, but in the whole world. Editorial number 6 (September 1998) equated North Korea's behavior in the international arena to a problematic kid (*kokusaiteki na mondaiji*). Interestingly, the belief that once it tested nuclear weapons, North korea would immediately become a grave threat was not analyzed nor explained in the editorials sampled; instead it was taken for granted.

Third, in terms of risk measures, *Yomiuri* editorials throughout this period avoided from commenting on Japan's nuclear option, but did maintain that Japan's risk measures should be confined to nonaggressive defense. In addition, in-line with the findings of the Soviet Union case study, a shift in the *Yomiuri's* rationality (from peace to pragmatist rationality) was identified; while in 1981, the editorial emphasized *dialogue* as means to reduce military tensions in the Peninsula (caused by the firing of anti-aircraft missile toward US reconnaissance aircraft "SR-71"), in a demonstration of peace rationality, by 1993, the situation had significantly changed. Editorial number 4, titled "Calling into question the response to the 'North''s missiles" (July 1993) asserted that, "The perceptions according to which peace and military do not go hand in hand has been disproved, as the Gulf War has demonstrated" (*heiwa to gunji ga aihan suru mono da to iu ninshiki wa kokusaiteki ni wa tsūyō shinai*). Subsequently, the naked demonstration of military power - as exemplified in US military operation in the Gulf - was taken as a guarantee for peace. Furthermore, editorial number 6 (September 1998) claimed that "the most important" measure in responding to the missile threat was developing "flawless defense"

which would provide a "great deterrence". In concrete terms, the editorial called to urgently pursue the research about TMD and to develop independent air-defense and satellite capabilities, all in line with the basic policy of non-aggressive defense. For the for first time in the analysis of editorials from all three case-studies, military (defensive) means had achieved priority over other measures such as diplomatic channels and humanitarian aid.

Fourth, unlike the Chinese case-study in the early post war period, when consecutive editorials had called to improve relations with China and maintained an overall positive tone toward it, no such calls were made in the North Korean case study and the tone was rather negative. Editorial number 2 - "Maintain Principles in the Diplomatic Negotiation with North Korea" - published on January 29, 1991, is a case in point. Published one day before the first round of the normalization talks between Japan and North Korea, the editorial asserted that, "The fact that both countries aim for normalization of relations is desirable", but then it denied that Japan should pay compensation to North Korea, "45 years after the war has ended". The editorial further cautioned against harming the relationship with South Korea as a result of the upcoming negotiation, and concluded by calling on North Korea to accept the nuclear-inspection teams of the UN. The stark difference between the North Korean and Chinese case-studies should be pointed out when considering the introspective, over-sensitive attitude taken by the *Yomiuri* editorial toward improving the relationship with China (see chapter 6).

Finally, considering the media representations of the North Korean threat in general (that is, aside from *Yomiuri* editorials), then, between 1995 and 2005, more than 600 books dealing with the North Korean threat were published in Japan. Such trend led to, "a growing sense of crisis among the Japanese public" (McCormack 2007, 155; Ishiba 2005, 31).

7.6 Public

Japanese public sentiment toward North Korea has deteriorated since the late 1980s, as captured in Figure 24 below. By 1988, North Korea was the most widely disliked foreign country, surpassing the Soviet Union. Since 1993, more than 50 percent of Japanese have consistently chosen North Korea to be the most disliked country, and by 1997, the negative sentiment toward North Korea has broken an all-time record in terms of its distribution among the public, surpassing even the distribution level of the negative sentiment toward the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the KAL 007 incident.

Figure 24 : "Which Foreign Countries Do You Dislike Most : Name Three Countries (1970 - 1997; %)

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But negative sentiment did not necessarily translate into a greater desire to counter North Korea by military means. During the nuclear crisis in May 1994, a *Mainichi* poll suggested that 71 percent of the public supported resolution of the crisis through dialogue; Hook (1996, 124) takes this as evidence for, "the deep-seated Japanese opposition to the use of the military".

Japanese propensity to use military force aside, public sentiment toward North Korea have remained extremely negative throughout the 1990s and further deteriorated in the 2000s. In a survey conducted by the Prime Minister Office in January 2000, 56.7 percent of the Japanese public had 'serious concerns' vis-à-vis the situation in the Korean Peninsula, a ten percent rise from a previous survey conducted in February 1997 (Cronin 2002, 21). In a survey conducted in March 2003, 60.7 percent of the Japanese public felt "insecure" as a result of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. An additional 31.1 percent felt "somewhat insecure". Combining these data together, a compelling 91.8 percent of the Japanese were worried, to some extent, by North Korea's actions.

Public sentiment toward North Korea in Japan is extremely negative even when examining it with comparative data about other strained relationships in the international arena. Data collected from the AsiaBarometer (see Figure 25) has indicated that in 2003, 2004, and 2006 Japanese mass attitudes toward North Korea were the most negative of all the bilateral relations sampled in the survey.[21] And as Figure 25 indicates, about 70 percent of the Japanese

[21] The AsiaBarometer Represents the largest ever, comparative survey in Asia, covering East, Southeast, South and Central Asia. It focuses on daily lives of ordinary people and their relationships to family, neighborhood, workplace, social and political institutions and market place. The survey is conducted country-wide face-to-face, using standardized instruments designed around a common research framework. It is headquartered at Tokyo Satellite Office, University of Niigata Prefecture and Jointly researched at the Research and Information Center for Asian Studies, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. Among the countries sampled were Japan, South Korea, China, Russia, Mongolia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Australia, and the United States.

public believed that North Korea had “very bad influence” over Japan. The next in line, China, was rated with “very bad influence” by only 7.2 percent of the respondents. It is clear therefore that in the first decade of the millennia, the majority of Japanese were overwhelmingly concerned with North Korea as a source of negative influence.

Figure 25 : Japanese View of Other Countries’ Influence Over Japan (2003,2004,2006)



*Source :The AsiaBarometer. The number of Japanese respondents was N=2685 ; data was collected in 2003 (N=857), 2004 (N=825) , 2006(N=1003).

7.7 Summary: Threat Perception of North Korea (1975-2000)

This chapter explored Japanese perceptions of military-threat associated with North Korea in the "late postwar period" (1976-1991) and "post Cold-War" period (1991-2000). I argued that during the 1990s, North Korea had been successfully securitized as a military threat by Japan's defense and political establishments as well as the media and the public. The securitization of North Korea - including components such as its nuclear and missile programs, kidnapping of Japanese citizens, spy vessels, drug and crime activities inside Japan - was further intensified during the "second nuclear crisis" which erupted in the Autumn of 2002.[22]

Concrete concerns about different components of the North Korea threat and existential concerns about the future of the regional and global security environments were linked; external events such as the *Nodong* and *Taepodong* missile-tests had a significant impact over the framing of the North Korean issue in the political and media discourses. Unlike the early postwar period, the political atmosphere placed less constraints on public framing of external entities as threats; as PM Miyazawa's statement brought above revealed, a taboo on a direct military threat was no long in tact.

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[22] The crisis erupted in September 2002, as a result of the release of American intelligence reports which highlighted North Korean progress with its nuclear program. It further intensified in the following month, when - presumably - North Korean representatives admitted to US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly of having pursued a covert nuclear program. An official acknowledgement of holding to a nuclear device was made in a trial meeting between North Korean, American and Chinese representatives in Beijing, April 2003.

The public's strong reaction toward North Korea is - by itself - not so surprising. But when examined *comparatively* it becomes clear that by the early 2000s, Japanese mass attitudes toward North Korea indicated the most negative levels of all countries participating in the AsiaBarometer. As Figure 26 indicates, this intense post Cold-War anxiety over military-security issues is underscored when comparing between components of the "old" Soviet threat and "new" North Korean threat. References to "North Korea" and "Nuclear weapons" (247) exceeded references to "Soviet Union" and "Nuclear weapons" (99); references to the "*rachi mondai*" had reached unprecedented levels.

The overwhelmingly negative manner in which the North Korean threat was perceived in Japan produces a challenge to this study. One might ask what were the reasons behind the full-on securitization of the North Korea threat? Indeed, external stimuli related to North Korea's behavior - both domestically and internationally - as well as its development of military capabilities may have provided necessary grounds for securitization. But as the analysis of both the Soviet and the Chinese case-studies in chapters 2,3 and 6 has shown, similar behavioral and capability stimuli were perceived throughout the postwar period, yet neither actor was securitized as a military threat with the same intensity or distribution of the North Korean threat. Instead, only a covert securitization attempt (China, second half of the 1960s) and a limited securitization (Soviet Union, early 1980s) ensued. I return to this point in the next chapter, which summarizes the study's main findings and theoretical implications.

Figure 26 - Number of References in Diet Sessions to Components of State-Based Threat 1970 - 2014*



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

8. Summary of the Main Findings and Theoretical Implications

The inquiry into Japanese perceptions of military threat during the period between 1950 - 2000 revealed interesting findings. This chapter offers a summary of the major findings and their theoretical implications. I first address the research questions that guided this study and then turn to highlight theoretical implications and areas for further research. To recall, this study has set to tackle the following questions :

1. What were the military threat perceptions in postwar Japan?
2. What were the main 'traditional' security threats in Postwar Japan ? How were these threats framed? By Whom?
3. Were these threats "securitized" in CS language? What factors determined the *intensity* and *distribution* of threat-perceptions and their securitization?
4. Are there long-term patterns in postwar Japan's national discourse about military-security threats?

8.1 Measuring Threat Perceptions: Time, Context, Intensity and Distribution

Based on the empirical analysis of postwar Japanese military-threat perceptions, I suggested that, first, perception of threat is a cognitive process which involves the selection and interpretation of external stimuli based on an underlying rationality (or attitude). The cognitive process culminates in a *danger-judgement* people make about a certain entity (e.g. the Soviet Union) or situation/ scenario (nuclear war). These individual judgements are shared across the community through "channels" such as causal conversations, parliamentary deliberations, media coverage, government policies - and so it becomes necessary to evaluate the *distribution* of these judgements in the larger society. Second, the perception of threat and the response to it are

context-dependent, meaning that they are conceived with certain frames of references (such as political, social, psychological and/or military). The way an issue is framed naturally shapes the reaction to it: a political threat would likely to trigger political measures, while a military threat would likely to result in advocating for military measures. Third, the *intensity* of the perceived threat fluctuates with time and varies in its degree and so, rather than a binary construct, threat-perception should be evaluated on a spectrum and by a specific unit of analysis. Subsequently, an analysis of the phenomenon should define the time, context, intensity and distribution of perceived threats among major domestic actors. Below, I reiterate the main findings related to perceptions of threat associated with the Soviet Union, China and North Korea along the lines of these four elements.

8.1.1 The Soviet Union Case Study

Time

Contrary to earlier findings - or the No-Perceived-Threat (NPT) proposition outlined in the introduction chapter - military personnel in the SDF did perceive a direct Soviet military threat in the early postwar period. And whereas during the 1950s, 1960s, and for the most part of the 1970s, Japan's national conversation did not pick up the topic of a Soviet military threat, a Soviet threat discourse did disseminate among the Japanese society at the end of the 1970s, with various securitizing actors involved in the process. During the 1980s, representations of Soviet threat-scenarios in the media increased, and the public had become increasingly alarmed about the danger that Japan would be involved in a war. Yet as the NPT proposition suggests, during the early postwar period, the perception of the Soviet Union as a direct military-threat was not shared

across the defense establishment, let alone outside of it. The political mainstream, media and the Japanese public did not perceive a direct Soviet military threat during the early postwar period. In the early 1980s - as the analysis in chapter 3 suggested - the Soviet Union was perceived as a military threat by an increasing number of people and publicly securitized (although in a limited way). Throughout the 1980s and in the early 1990s, some actors still perceived a "Soviet threat", although in a diminished intensity. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the perception of a Soviet threat gradually diminished.

Context

Whereas Japan's political leadership in the early postwar period did not securitize the Soviet Union in a military context, it did securitize it as a political threat under the broader 'threat of communism'. As chapter 2 demonstrated, the Soviet Union was perceived to pose an existential *political* threat to Japan by members of Japan's political leadership, such as Prime Ministers Yoshida and Hatoyama. The only attempt at securitization of the Soviet Union during the early postwar period was therefore made in the political rather than the military sector: a terminology of necessity, urgency, and threat was applied to denote communism.

The Soviet threat was not confined to the political context throughout the postwar period, either. As chapters 2-5 demonstrated, since the mid-late 1970s, the Soviet threat was increasingly framed in a military context. This finding was substantiated by both macro and micro level data: the investigation of Japan's defense policy, PM policy speeches and other political statements, *Yomiuri* editorials, and public opinion surveys have all indicated that in the late stage of the postwar period (1976-1991), the Soviet Union was increasingly framed in a military-security context.

Intensity

Domestic actors in Japan sustained varying degrees of intensity in their danger-judgements about the Soviet military threat throughout the postwar period. During the early postwar period, the mainstream leadership perceived only an indirect (latent) Soviet threat and some at the defense establishment perceived a direct Soviet threat; to elements in Japan's political left and to its peace activists, a direct danger was associated with the scenario of a nuclear-war between the two superpowers. In the late postwar period, military realists, LDP and DSP politicians associated both a direct and indirect dangers with the Soviet Union. Japan's political left continued to communicate concerns over Japanese entrapment in a superpower conflict, insisting that by itself, the Soviet Union is not dangerous to Japan (but might be in the context of security alliance with the US).

Distribution

Chapter 2-5 substantiated a shift in the distribution of danger-judgements during the postwar period. Compared to the early postwar period (1950-1975), the judgement of a direct (military) danger associated with the Soviet Union and an indirect danger had come to be shared by more Japanese in the late postwar period (1976-1991). This shift in distribution had occurred on the expense of the third, "no threat" judgement; in general numbers, since the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, more Japanese had come to judge that a Soviet-related danger existed, with about 60 percent of the public testifying to either high or low risk-probability that Japan would be involved in a war during the first half of the 1980s. Still, a clear consensus about a direct Soviet military threat had not emerged throughout the postwar period.

8.1.2 The China Case Study

Time

Similar to the Soviet Union case study, Japanese actors avoided securitizing China as a military threat in the 1950s and early 1960s, framing it as a political threat under the broader 'threat of communism' instead. But unlike the Soviet case, China's nuclear development and behavior in the second half of the 1960s were securitized by Japan's leadership behind the scenes, in what I had termed "covert securitization attempt". In the second half of the 1960s, a "China threat" discourse had surfaced in the Diet and in the domestic media; but the rapprochement between the countries in the early 1970s had put an end to this discourse and by 1972, China was neither perceived nor communicated as a military threat.

Context

Although a systematic attempt to securitize China as a direct *military* threat or to frame it as an enemy to Japan on the political stage is lacking throughout the early postwar period, Japan's state leadership did undermine the taboo on military-threat both publicly and privately during the second half of the 1960s. Publicly, Japanese leaders admitted to a Chinese threat, without restricting it to a "political" context like their predecessors had done in the 1950s. Thus, leaders such as Satō paved the way to think of China as a military threat without necessarily *labeling* it as such. Privately, by seeking reassurances about the US nuclear umbrella, and by considering extra-ordinary means such as an independent nuclear program, Japanese leaders took actions to counter the Chinese threat from a military perspective.

Intensity

During the early postwar period, domestic actors in Japan sustained varying degrees of intensity in their danger-judgements about China. In the early 1950s, the mainstream leadership perceived an existential Chinese political threat as part of the broader communist menace; in the second half of the 1960s, Japan's defense establishment perceived a direct Chinese military threat (limited to the nuclear component); Japan's political left and mainstream media, however, did not judge China as a military threat. After 1972 and throughout the remaining of the postwar period, China was no longer perceived to be posing any danger to Japan.

Distribution

While the nuclear component of the Chinese threat had generated grave concerns among Japan's defense establishment, political leadership, domestic media and public, such danger-judgements were limited in their distribution. Although public dislike of China did surge in the second half of the 1960s, danger-judgements of China as an external threat were not shared by the majority of Japanese and the issue was not successfully securitized as a military threat in the political discourse. As the analysis in chapter 6 indicated, the vast majority of references to a "China threat" were made by opposition members: namely Diet representatives of the JSP and Kōmeitō. Subsequently, it was primarily the opposition who used the language of "China threat", insomuch as to deflate it.

Why did Japan's state-leadership perceive a direct military-threat from China in the second half of the1960s, while it perceived the Soviet Union only as a latent threat? I argued that unlike the Soviet case, China's development of nuclear weapons signified a dramatic *change* in existing circumstances. While the Soviet Union had already detonated nuclear bomb in the late

1940s, Chinese nuclear program created a new reality, inducing uncertainty among those in-charge of Japan's national security including the emperor himself. Such views also coincided with a considerable deterioration of the bilateral relationship after the Satō administration had been inaugurated in November 1964; as for PM Satō, he personally became a target for Chinese media in what may have antagonized him even more.[1]

8.1.3 The North Korea Case Study

Time

During the 1970s and 1980s, domestic actors did not perceive or framed North Korea as a direct military threat; during the 1990s however North Korea came to be associated in Japan with a growing sense of danger. By the early 2000s, it was perceived as a direct threat by various domestic actors.

Context

From its outset in the first half of the 1990s, the discourse about North Korea was framed in a military context. Unlike the early postwar period, the political atmosphere placed less constraints on public framing of external entities as military threats: a taboo on concrete military threats was no longer in place. Subsequently, the issue of acquiring BMD weapons was linked with the North Korean threat as a suitable (military-defensive) risk-measure.

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[1] On 25 November, 1964, the *People's Daily* published a critical view of Satō, and his allegedly hostile stance toward China, criticizing his response to China's nuclear test among other items. Another critical editorial appeared on 12 February, 1965, condemning Satō and his policy toward China. See: Clark, 1971.

Intensity

In the first half of the 1990s, North Korea was mostly perceived to be an indirect threat (its nuclear and missile capabilities were still underdeveloped); by the late 1990s, however, it was associated with a direct threat by many among Japan's defense and political establishment, media and the public. Still, some domestic actors maintained a different attitude; JCP members for example consistently communicated a "no-danger" judgement about North Korea and operated to deflate the threat associated with it.

Distribution

While North Korea was not associated with a military threat during the 1970s and 1980s, during the 1990s a growing number of Japanese had come to view it as a threat: first as an indirect threat and by the late 1990s as a direct threat. By the early 2000s, North Korea had been successfully securitized in Japan as negative sentiment, media coverage, and harsh political communication about different components of the North Korea threat have reached unprecedented levels. During the 1990s, external events such as the *Nodong* and *Taepodong* missile-tests had a significant impact over the framing of the North Korean issue in the political and media discourses; the reaction of the Japanese public was so intense, that it even surprised some at Japan's defense establishment.[2]

[2] I would like to thank professor Matsuda Yasuhiro for this comment.

8.2 What were the main 'traditional' security threats in Postwar Japan? How were these threats framed? By Whom?

During the early postwar period, rather than a country specific terminology such as "Soviet attack" or "China threat", military threats were framed in the political discourse in terms of three abstract scenarios: (1) nuclear war between the superpowers that would spill over to Japan (2) 'direct aggression' such as military invasion, and (3) 'indirect aggression' such as revolutionary activities.[3] Different actors prioritized different scenarios: while Japan's left-wing politicians and peace activists prioritized the first scenario and judged it to be an existential danger during periods of tensions between the two superpowers, Japan's mainstream leadership in the 1950s viewed the third scenario as an existential danger. During the late postwar period, military threats were framed in more concrete terms: attention was drawn to country-specific threats as well as to various components of external threats such as Soviet missiles, bombers or North Korea's nuclear and missile programs (see Figure 26 above).

Throughout the postwar period, a range of actors participated in the national conversation about military threats - both publicly and privately - with the following actors playing "inflators role" on different occasions: US and Japanese politicians (LDP, DSP), SDF and JDA officials, Japan's state leadership, former military officials, "military realists", and the media (the *Yomiuri,* from 1983 and on). Generally, the national conversation about military threats has incorporated a growing number of actors with time.

[3] I would like to thank Honma Go, a colleague in the University of Tokyo, for this comment.

Figure 27 - References to Specific Threats in Diet Deliberations 1952 - 2012



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

8.3 Were these threats "securitized" in CS language? What factors determined the *intensity* and *distribution* of threat-perceptions?

Chapters 2 and 6 identified three securitization moves in the early postwar period: the first securitized communism as an existential political threat; the second securitized the threat-scenario of a nuclear war between the US and Soviet Union, and the third securitized China's nuclear program as a direct danger behind the scenes. Chapter 3 further identified two securitization moves in the late postwar period (1976 - 1991) and early post Cold War period (1991-2000): a limited securitization of the Soviet military threat in the 1980s and a full-on securitization of the North Korea threat in the late 1990s.

8.3.1 What factors determine the intensity of perceived threat?

Chapter 1 introduced the ABC model which operates on the perception of threat. I argued that affect, behavioral tendencies and cognitive beliefs form a certain attitude - or rationality - through which actors view the international system, the relationships among its actors, and subsequently, the dangers associated with external actors or scenarios. To recall, 'affect' denotes one's *feelings* about an attitude object (such as dislike or trust), 'behavioral tendency' denotes one's *intention* vis-à-vis an attitude object (such as the propensity to use military force to resist an attack) and 'cognitive beliefs' denote one's *knowledge* about an attitude object (how much an attitude object is dangerous).

To comment on the perceived threat associated with the Soviet Union, then, as chapter 2 demonstrated, early postwar fear of entrapment in a war in the nuclear age (affect), strong intention to disassociate Japan's militaristic past from its future (behavioral tendency), and the belief that the Soviet Union would not use military force against Japan in the form of direct aggression moderated the intensity of the perceived Soviet threat among Japan's political mainstream. In the late postwar period, as demonstrated in chapter 3, stronger prospects of international and regional instability - along with an increasingly realist view of international politics, stronger support for self-defense among state leadership *and* the accumulation of stimuli that suggested that the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly dangerous - had facilitated a growing intensity of perceived threat associated with the Soviet Union.

But as chapter 3 and 5 concluded, Japan's state leadership and the *Yomiuri* still doubted whether the Soviet Union would use military force against Japan and the intensity of the perceived threat still fell short of a direct military threat. Why was it so? In order to explain the empirical record with regard to the intensity of the perceived threats associated with the Soviet

Union, China, and North Korea, I would like to further suggest two "interpretive codes" which underlie how actors infer threat. The first code is related to a relative distribution of perceived threat in space, and the second code to the element of time. I introduce these interpretative codes in greater details below.

Spatial distribution of perceived threat: is it directed at us?

Earlier I have argued that three sets of cognitive beliefs (as well as the AB components of the ABC model) constitute a basic rationality which then informs the perception of threat. Among these basic beliefs were: (1) the nature of international politics; (2a) the prospects of global stability and (2b) the prospects of regional stability, and (3) whether an entity was becoming less/ more dangerous to Japan, meaning that it was perceived to be decreasingly / increasingly (3a) hostile; (3b) had high propensity to use force, and (3c) would not hesitate to use it against Japan.[4] Let's take a closer look at belief (2a) and (2b).

Throughout the period covered by this study, Japanese actors were most sensitive to military developments close to Japan. This finding is in line with previous studies which underlined factors such as the strategical or emotional meaning attached to certain geographical areas, or the sheer geographical distance in providing "criteria for selection" of threat-cues (Cohen 1978; Walt 1985). But rather than a sheer geographical distance or strategical/emotional importance, I argue that Japanese actors - such as the JDA, MOFA, and writers of *Yomiuri* editorials - *interpreted* stimuli related to foreign military-capability and deployment along the

[4] Belief 3 as presented above is suitable for the security rationality. It can also be presented in terms of peace rationality in the following manner: (3) whether a threat-scenario was becoming less/more dangerous to Japan, meaning that it was perceived to be more or less (3a) likely; (3b) had the potential to cause minor or major consequences, and (3) had the ability to gain access to Japan in a direct way.

lines of a 'spatial-distribution' of the threat, or how much of the perceived threat is directed 'at us' and how much 'toward others'.

In the case of the Soviet Union, Japanese actors assessed the intensity of its military threat based on a spatial comparison between components of the Soviet threat (such as capabilities and quality of force) in the Far East region and components of the Soviet threat in other regions of the world: mostly in Europe. To take the Media Framing Analysis of references to a "Soviet threat" in *Yomiuri* editorials as an example (chapter 5), then whereas in 1981 editorial number 8 argued against securitization of the Soviet issue by asserting that, "rather than an Asian outlook, a wide and global perspective is desired", thus referring to the relatively benign situation in the Far East when compared to other regions, editorial number 22 (November 1989) contrasted the improved situation in Europe and the US plans to cut on its defense budget with the persistence of the Soviet threat in the Far East region and in the Northern Pacific, subsequently calling for the GOJ to take a cautious stance when dealing with the Soviet Union. Seemingly, rather than focusing on evidence related to the Soviet Union military threat as a whole, *Yomiuri* editorials were attentive to the relational *spatial distribution* of the Soviet threat between the area near Japan (prospects for regional stability) and other areas (prospects for global stability).

The "spatial-distribution" code may explain why, even though they were faced with mounting evidence of Soviet military build-up in the Far-East in the early 1980s and with US grave assessments of a Soviet threat, Japan's mainstream leadership still did not perceive the Soviet Union to be a direct military threat. As chapter 3 narrated, during the 14th SSC meeting held in Hawaii between August 30 and September 1, 1982, the US side emphasized the Soviet military build-up and urged the GOJ to cooperate in countering this threat. But the Japanese

representatives played down the Soviet threat and responded by saying that, "there are no serious moves in Asia by the Soviet military buildup *as there are in other parts of the world*." (USFJ 1982,71). Evidently, GOJ representatives interpreted stimuli related to the Soviet Union according to the relational spatial distribution of the stimuli between the Far-East and other parts of the world.

The spatial distribution code may also explain why the Soviet intention to shift SS-20 missiles *from* the European front *to* the Far-Eastern front by deploying them east of Ural mountains was especially alarming to the Japanese. To recall, Nakasone strongly communicated to Reagan that, "it was essential that an agreement with the Soviet Union to remove SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe should also prohibit their redeployment to East Asia" (Curtis 2000, 16). Likewise, *Yomiuri* editorials attached strong emphasis on the relative balance of SS-20 missiles between the Asian and the European fronts, and the first time the Soviet Union was framed a a military threat was in 1983, the same year the Soviets had announced that the new positions of the SS-20 missiles East of Ural mountains were meant to cope with developments in Japan.

The spatial-distribution mechanism continues to "work" in the late 1980s and early 1990s too, as the "Soviet threat" in Europe was perceived to be diminishing in a more substantial way than the Soviet threat in the Far East. According to the same logic, one may speculate that since Europe was prioritized in terms of Soviet military power throughout the early postwar as well, Japanese decision-makers did not perceive the threat to be directed at Japan itself: to the Japanese, the Soviets were primarily looking West and not East. To conclude this point in relation to the Soviet Union, an assessment of the spatial distribution of the Soviet military threat

between the area near Japan and other areas was crucial in determining Soviet intentions and subsequently, the intensity of the perceived Soviet threat.

Similarly, the spatial distribution code may explain why China was not securitized across domestic actors in 1960s Japan. Japanese actors generally did not perceive a Chinese threat to be primarily directed at them, as China's main adversary during the early 1960s was the US, and not Japan (although US military presence in Japan did become a source for concern to some, as chapter 6 has showed). Likewise, in the late 1960s and through the 1970s, China's main enemy was the Soviet Union.

Finally, the spatial-distribution code may also explain the perception of a direct North Korean threat in the late 1990s and 2000s. Consider the following statement made by Ishiba Shigeru. In an interview he gave in December 2004, Ishiba asserted that: "Threat is a function of the multiplication of capabilities and hostile intentions towards Japan...For example, although the US has great capabilities, since it has zero intention to invade Japan a multiplication of this would result in zero [threat]." Turning to comment on North Korea, Ishiba's words reveal how the spatial distribution of threat operates:

> ...North Korea undoubtedly has missiles, and to what purpose? It is unthinkable it will use them against China, nor can it soundly deliver them to the US (for now); and while there is no meaning in shooting them towards Southeast Asia, it is reasonable to think it can only use them against Japan. And as for [hostile intentions] towards Japan, it has been kidnapping Japanese citizens, and involved in defying conduct and speech. Since it has the capabilities, even though they are not clear - we absolutely can not rely on its intentions being 'zero'.[5]

While Ishiba had eliminated other potential targets for North Korea's missiles - most important of which is South Korea, his statement testifies to the workings of the spatial-distribution code. Japan, he seems to believe, is the prime target of North Korea's potential (nuclear) attack. To

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[5] *Jieitai Shiraresaru Henyō 2005,* 235.

follow, I explore the second interpretive code which determines the intensity of perceived threat: the "voluntariness" code.

The "Voluntariness" code: Actions as they unfold in time

The second interpretive code Japanese actors used to infer threat (or the malign intentions of an external actor) in the postwar period is related to time, and more precisely to the manner in which an action by a potential adversary unfolded in time and the consequences it brought about.

Linguists distinguish between two ways in which actions unfold in time; this division is between "states", in which change is lacking and is outside of one's control, and "events", in which something happens and that happening can be either voluntary or involuntary. The second category of "events" can be further divided into those events that can unfold for an unlimited time ("building up the military" for example), and those events that have a clear endpoint in our mind (such as "developing a nuclear bomb"). Similarly, the human language distinguishes between events which are "spread out" in time ("developing a nuclear bomb") and those events that are instantaneous and culminate in a certain change in the world, such as "shooting an aircraft" (Pinker 2007, 197-98). The important proposition here, however, is that the human mind attributes the strongest sense of voluntariness to "events" of the latter type, which are both immediate and are perceived to induce change in the real world.

Now let us recall three events from the case studies examined in this study: all three were identified as pivotal in shaping perceptions of threat associated with the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. In the case of the Soviet Union, the shooting of a KAL aircraft by Soviet pilots on September 1, 1983, in which 28 Japanese citizens had died; in the case of China, its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, and in the case of North Korea, the *Taepodong* missile launch over

Japan's airspace on August 31, 1998. All three events were instantaneous and culminated in a change: downed aircraft and loss of Japanese lives in the first episode, a nuclear China in the second case, and a North Korean proven capability to cover Japanese territory with missiles in the third case. All three events are crucial because they were perceived as *voluntary* actions taken by these external entities and hence were interpreted as disclosing the intentions of these actors. But while the first and third incidents directly affected Japanese lives and territories, the second incident of China's nuclear test did not. Subsequently, I argue that immediate events - taken by non friendly entities - which *culminate in a change that directly affect the observer* - have the strongest potential to shape the intensity of the perceived threat; this is so because these type of events are interpreted by the human mind as voluntary. Likewise, the dramatic impact of the abduction of Japanese citizens over Japanese sentiment toward North Korea (apparent mostly in the 2000s) can now be better understood - abducting citizens is an immediate event which culminates in a change directly affecting the observer involved.

8.3.2 What factors determine the distribution of danger-judgement?

As chapters 2 and 4 demonstrated, perceptions of military threats in Japan are politically negotiated, and therefore, can not be explained by neither realist nor ideational factors alone. In chapter 2 we saw how people inside the defense establishment negotiated the official assessment of threat and how military officials were concerned with what they perceived to be a complacent threat-assessment made by civilian officials in the JDA. In chapter 4 we saw that attitudes toward military security were *almost always* consistent with one's organizational or political affiliation.

To recall, just as a JDA official rarely deflated a military threat, an opposition member rarely inflated the Soviet submarine issue.[6]

The political debate regarding national security that divided the country in the decades following the end of the US military occupation was essentially about the nature of Japan's *risk-measures* to secure its position in the world. Debates about military threats were subordinated to a more fundamental debate between two opposing types of rationality: security and peace (the result of which was the consolidation of a third, mainstream 'pragmatist' rationality). After the "risk-measure debate" was mitigated by the weakening of alternatives to the Yoshida doctrine in the mid 1970s and support for Japan's national security framework including the alliance with the US and the SDF had increased, developments related to the Soviet military threat became the backdrop against which several securitizing actors with significant socio-political clout had communicated growing concerns about the nature of that threat. Among these actors were the military realists, defense-oriented politicians, and even the government who admitted to a growing increase in the potential Soviet threat. But such securitization attempts were countered by members of the opposition, who fiercely rejected these moves and advocated different danger-judgements instead: the sharp increase in references to various components of the Soviet threat, as demonstrated across this study, is a result of this political struggle.

Figure 28 presents data about the Soviet threat discourse from 1951 to 1991 as

[6] These findings may - in first glance - seem to offer support for arguments which prioritize models of bureaucratic politics / organizational interests in studying security and military threats (see for example Sebata 2010; Yarhi-Milo 2013). But as I argue below, I believe that it is the rationality underlying the political / organizational affiliations which matters the most.

communicated in the Diet by political actor.[7] The Figure indicates that the majority of references were made by opposition member, and that the most active actor in communicating this term was the JSP, which as we have seen operated to deflate the Soviet issue.

Figure 28 : Number of Utterances to "Soviet Threat" by Political Actor 1951 - 1991



*Source: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (data compiled by the author)

But the political support for Japan's traditional left - with its underlying peace rationality - had decreased during the 1990s. After assuming power in 1994, the JSP had accepted the constitutionality of the SDF and mitigated its opposition to the security alliance with the US; consequently, the party lost many seats in the Diet (Samuels 2007a, 35; Sasaki 2015, 4). And so, by the late 1990s, a strong political actor that would "resist" the securitization of the North Korea threat like in the early and late postwar periods was lacking in Japan. Subsequently, the securitization of military-security threats could have "advanced" with minimal objection and as a

[7] These data include all utterances made in the Diet, including repeated utterances by the same speaker. Since some speakers switched their part during the Diet session, I chose to add their utterances to the main political party. So, for example, a Diet member that left the LDP and joined the New Liberal Club would be included under the LDP.

result, disseminated among Japanese (accept for the JCP as we have seen). To conclude, I argue that two conditions determined the extent of *distribution* of danger-judgements in postwar Japan: one, the presence of a securitizing actor (or a securitization move; a necessary but not sufficient condition) and two, the domestic balance of political power with its shifting equilibrium between peace, pragmatist and security rationalities.

8.4 Are there long-term patterns in postwar Japan's national discourse about military-security threats?

The study presented several findings concerning patterns in Japan's national discourse about military threats. I summarize the findings below and discuss their theoretical implications in section 8.5.

First, the manner in which Japanese actors have conceptualized and assessed 'threat' has evolved during the postwar period. During the early postwar period (1950-1975), threats were mostly analyzed in terms of *capabilities* and *behavior* of the adversary (*intentions* joined the discourse from the late 1960s). The relative balance of material power conditions between actors was perceived, in Japan as in elsewhere, to be of crucial significance when considering external threats in the military sector. The articulation of external threats in terms of capabilities, behavior, and *intentions* among Japanese decision-makers dates back to the early 1970s and is mostly associated with the work of Kubo Tatsuya at the JDA. This 'Singerian' conceptualization has persisted throughout the rest of the Cold-War and is dominant in contemporary discourse as seen in statements made by Nakasone (1980s) and Ishiba (2000s).

Second, the typology of intensity of threats employed by Japanese actors has also undergone changes in the early 1970s. Following Kubo Takuya, Japanese strategists had begun distinguishing between a *possible or latent* threat-scenario and a *probable* threat-scenario. In

April 1970, JDA chief Nakasone claimed that China is not an actual threat but a latent one (since it does not have the intention to attack Japan).[8] In august 1976, JDA DG Sakata asserted that while the Soviet Union build-up of its naval power amounts to a "latent threat" (*senzaiteki na kyoui*), it does not pose an actual threat to Japan at the moment (*tadaima sore ga nanika wagakuni ni taishite genzaiteki na kyoui ni natteiruka…sō dewanai to iu fū ni handan o itashiteoru wake de gozaimasu*).[9]

As we have seen, the term "latent threat" denoting the Soviet Union first appeared in Diet deliberations in 1976 and the first reference to a "North Korea threat" appeared on October 27, 1980, when JDA's external councilor Okazaki had argued that North Korea was a "latent threat"(*senzaiteki kyoui*). During the early 1980s, several figures began criticizing the concept of "latent threat" as employed by civilian JDA and government officials. Inoki Masamichi (1914 - 2012), a leading political-scientist who served as the Chairman of the Comprehensive National Security Study Group and was the former head of the National Defense Academy, made an interesting remark in this context at the Diet "Special Committee for National Security" on November 5, 1980. Inoki opined that the use of the "latent threat" terminology by Defense and Foreign Ministry officials (translated to English by him as 'potential threat') was "strange" as threats are in essence potential. "Once materialized, [threat] become invasion. That is why I think that threat exists." [10]

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[8] National Diet Archives, House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee, 24 April 1970.

[9] National Diet Archives, August 26, 1976, House of Representatives - Cabinet Committee, Correspondence 12.

[10] See: National Diet Archives, House of Representatives, Special Committee for National Security, November 5, 1980. Accessed October 10, 2015, from Kokkai.ndl.go.jp.

Contemporary Japanese defense papers use a different (three-layers) typology of threats to denote danger associated with external entities. The most intense level is "*imminent" or "direct"* threat (such as North Korea's BM and nuclear program); the second level of intensity is "matter for *concern"* (*ken'en*) or "*worry*" (*fuan*; China's military modernization, Ballistic Missiles and lack of transparency), and the third "matter for *attention"* (Russia's future direction).[11] To date, 'threat' was only used to denote issues related to North Korea and global terrorism, and the term 'potential threat' in the context of Soviet Union and more recently to depict both China and North Korea.[12]

Third, the empirical findings of this study indicate that when assessing threats, domestic actors have been selecting different types of external stimuli for further evaluation. As the analysis of oral history interviews with former military officials indicated, military officials focus on military movements and deployment near Japan, while defense officials tend to consider a broader range of stimuli such as the relative spatial-distribution between areas near Japan, the potential adversary's military build-up and doctrine, and the balance of military power between the actors in the system. Civilian defense officials also pay attention to domestic public-opinion, budgetary constraints, and the overall relationship with the US when considering military-

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[11] This typology was used in "The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report" published in 2009. A reading of the report suggests that well into the 2000s, Russia was not perceived to be a military threat for Japan's strategists. Aside from transnational global security threats (terrorism, proliferation of WMD and piracy), the following state based issues were raised: (1) North Korea's nuclear program and BM are a "direct threat" to Japan's security. NK special operation forces is "another threat to Japan". p. 14-15; (2) China's military modernization, BM, and lack of transparency regarding its defense budget are matters for "concern". Chinese activities in Japan's territorial waters and airspace have increased and "their purposes are not clear." p. 16(3) Russia's "future direction draws attention." Although the Russia military is less active in terms of training than during the Cold War, the report asserts, it has re-activated training activities in recent years. See p. 17

[12] I would like to thank Honma Go for this comment.

strategic issues. Japanese politicians, however, are more concerned with the *behavior* and *nature* of a potential adversary. As seen in the analysis of policy-speeches during early and late postwar period, those behaviors that defy the status-quo such as the outburst of the Korean War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are especially salient for political elites. Japan's domestic media tends to consider diverse evidence related to military deployment and build-up, behavior, and the *nature* of a potential adversary. Finally, the Japanese public seem to focus on the nature and behavior of potential adversary. I summarize these findings in Table 13 below.

Table 13: What Type of Stimuli Domestic Actors Select When Assessing Threats?	
Domestic Actor	**Type of stimuli**
Defense Establishment	Military officials: military deployment and movement
	Civilian officials: military, financial and strategic stimuli as well as public opinion
Political Establishment	Behavior , nature
Media (*Yomiuri*)	Military stimuli, behavior, nature
Public	Behavior, nature

Fourth, the empirical analysis identified a shift in the national discourse about military-security threats and more specifically, in the rationality underlying these perceptions. Chapters 5-7 identified differences between the tone and attitude *Yomiuri* editorials took toward China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. The longitudinal Media Framing Analysis of *Yomiuri* editorials indicated that the overall *perspective* has evolved from placing introspective demands on domestic politicians to re-evaluate Japan's attitude toward external entities (such as China and Soviet Union in the 1960s and early 1980s) to an outward perspective, posing demands on external actors (1990s). This finding is in-line with a shift in the rationality of *Yomiuri* editorials'

writers from peace to security (while still maintaining a "defense realist" rationality). To recall, chapter 6 identified that such a shift has occurred in the first half of the 1980s. Table 14 summarizes the empirical findings of this study.

Table 14: Summary of the Main Findings	
Research Question	**Finding**
1.What were the military threat perceptions in postwar Japan?	Early postwar (1950-75): Communism, Soviet threat, Chinese threat Late postwar and Post Cold-War (1976-2000): Soviet threat, North Korea threat
1a. What were the main 'traditional' security threats in Postwar Japan ?	Nuclear war, direct aggression, indirect aggression
1b. Were these threats "securitized" in CS language?	Communism securitized in the political sector; China was covertly securitized in the second half of the 1960s; Soviet Union was securitized in a limited manner in the 1980s; North Korea was fully securitized during the 1990s.
What factors determined the *intensity* and *distribution* of threat-perceptions and their securitization?	*Intensity*: ABC (affect, behavioral tendency, cognitive beliefs) and interpretive codes *Distribution*: 1. Securitization actor/move (necessary condition); 2. Domestic political balance of rationality (security-peace).
1c. Are there long-term patterns in postwar Japan's national discourse about military-security threats?	An overall shift from peace rationality to security rationality, from inward looking-to outward looking perspective and from avoidance of threat-cues to hyper-sensitiveness to threat-cues

8.5 Theoretical Implications

What are the theoretical implications of the findings brought above? Specifically, what are the implications for the ST, the literature about threat-perceptions and the IR-informed debate about Japan's postwar security?

8.5.1 Securitization Theory

As detailed in the introduction, the Securitization Theory (ST) advances three facilitating conditions that affect the likelihood of successful securitization (Buzan et al. 1998, 33): the security language securitizing actors employ, the socio-political resources of the securitizing actor and its relationship with the audience, and the specific characteristics of external objects which are deemed as threatening (such as hostile sentiment of an external actor).

Revisiting the third facilitating condition and the work of scholars such as Singer (1958), Pruitt (1965) and Raymond Cohen (1978), I hypothesized that hostile sentiment held by *an observer* was a necessary condition for a successful securitization of external entities in postwar Japan: Chapter 2 indeed confirmed this proposition (the difference between my argument and Cohen's for example is that I argue that there is no need for an atmosphere of *bilateral* tensions and distrust: one actor demonstrating hostile sentiment toward another is a sufficient condition). Yet I also argued that while it was a necessary condition, hostile sentiment toward an actor was not a sufficient condition. Tensions and distrust characterized Japanese attitudes toward the Soviet Union even prior to the securitization of the Soviet threat in the early 1980s (similarly, animosity toward Russia in the post Cold War era still exists but a Russian military threat has yet to be securitized in Japan).

Revisiting the basic components of the securitization process, the empirical analysis in chapter 3 presented three additional challenges for the ST. From a ST point of view, whether the

Soviet threat was securitized in Japan depends on the language adopted by the securitizing actors ("existential" threat, urgency), the "means" advocated by the GOJ ("extra-ordinary"), as well as an audience accepting both the claim to the legitimacy of a certain referent-object and that it is existentially threatened.

In terms of language, the Soviet Union threat was securitized publicly to *a certain degree* by PM Nakasone; while he employed a sense of 'necessity' and 'urgency' when discussing issues related to Japan's national defense, he did not publicly use terms such as 'existential threat', 'point of no-return', or 'possible solution' to denote a Soviet threat as the ST entails. And so, how can we interpret Nakasone's language toward the Soviet Union during the 1980s?

My own solution was to argue that Nakasone's securitization of the Soviet military threat may be understood as a *limited securitization* in terms of language (as well as in terms of risk-measures and acceptance by an audience; category 3 in the typology of threat-perception).

Likewise, in terms of "extra-ordinary means", chapter 6 found that the GOJ securitized the Chinese nuclear program in the second half of the 1960s by considering extra-ordinary measures - its own nuclear program - in a confidential manner. While these measures were not adopted eventually, the very consideration of them was extra-ordinary. I further suggested that the social taboo on military issues impeded a *public* securitization of a nuclear China. Subsequently, I proposed to term this type of securitization a "covert securitization attempt": while in Japan it was the social taboo on military issues (the "nuclear allergy" in the words of PM Satō) which impeded an open securitization, other factors such as national-security considerations can induce actors to employ this type of "covert securitizations" elsewhere. Therefore, scholars making use of the ST would benefit analytically from the distinction proposed here between a "covert" and "overt" securitization attempts.

In terms of an audience accepting the securitizing move, then, to recall, although both negative sentiment towards the Soviet Union and fear that Japan would be involved in a war had intensified during the 1980s, still many Japanese did not view the Soviet Union as a direct military threat. And so, what accounts for a successful securitization in terms of the distribution of danger-judgements raises a further challenge to the ST. Does a simple majority of the audience accepting a securitizing move would suffice? Or perhaps a more solid majority such as 70 or 80 percent is needed to determine that an audience *accepted* a securitizing move? Based on the empirical record of the securitizations of both the Soviet Union and North Korea in postwar Japan I suggest a threshold in this context: if more than 60 percent of the public reports negative sentiment toward an external actor, then a successful securitization (limited or full-on) is likely to follow.

Finally, based on the empirical findings concerning the "covert securitization attempt" of China and the "limited securitization" of the Soviet Union, I suggest that in postwar societies who had lost a war - such as postwar Japan - the link between military threats and military (risk) measures would be conditioned by various domestic constraints.[13] As a result, any value-judgements about whether a securitizing actor advocated extra-ordinary means should be made in the political context of that specific society. This finding is in-line with criticism made by various scholars who have pointed out that the universal scope of the philosophical variant of the ST ignores the socio-political context in which securitization moves are embedded (Salter 2008; see the discussion in section 1.4.1)

[13] I would like to thank professor Tanaka Akihiko for raising this point.

8.5.2 Threat Perception

In chapter 1, I suggested to approach threat-perception as a three-dimensional phenomenon. That is, the perception of threat is experienced psychologically by the individual (subjective dimension), embedded in a social environment (inter-subjective dimension) and results in certain outcomes in the real-world (objective dimension). By conceptualizing the phenomenon of threat-perception across these three dimensions, this study opens a door for additional studies that would integrate one or more of these dimensions.

The analysis of the language different actors used to denote the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea has shown that the phenomenon of threat-perception is a cognitive process. Although 'perception' evokes an image of a passive observation of external phenomenon, the empirical findings of this study indicated that perception is an active process with three stages: (1) awareness of a certain stimulus, (2) interpretation of it, and an (3) evaluative conclusion about its alleged source (association of danger with either entity or scenario).

Previous studies suggested that the perception of threat is informed by "pre-existing dispositions" (Pruitt 1965), "intervening dispositions" (Knorr 1976) as well as "criteria of selection" of stimuli (Cohen 1978, 96-8). Based on the empirical data presented throughout this study, I suggested that at least in the case of postwar Japan, the perception of threat was informed first and foremost by a certain rationality through which domestic actors viewed the world. This rationality, in turn, was often consistent with one's political or organization affiliation; a finding which corresponds to Yarhi-Milo's emphasis of "individual perceptual biases and organizational interests and practices" in selecting threat-cues (2013, 9). But rather than attributing these differences to organizational interests per-se, the application of the ABC model in chapters 2 and

3 demonstrated that it is the psychological attitude - with the ABC components at its core - which shape these organizational interests in the first place.

Commenting on the type of evidence observers use to infer the intentions of an adversary, Pruitt and Snyder identified the following four types: capability, actions, statements and the benefit benefit state A can derive from harming the state B's interests (1969, 24-25). Cohen argued that ultimately, the interpretation or inference of stimuli is based on the notion of "rules of the game", with which one can account for "the gravity attached by decision makers" to the interpretation of signs in the external environment with two explanations. One, by violating the rules, the behavior of the adversary had suddenly ceased to be predictable and two, that the adversary had abandoned all restraint in his actions and now aimed at a policy of domination and aggression (Cohen 1978, 101,103).This study contributes to this body of knowledge insofar as it accounts for the varying degrees of intensity in perceived threats, further explaining why certain "evidence" induce change in the intensity of perceived threat more than others. It was in this context that I offered two interpretive codes to explain how actors infer threat: the spatial distribution of the adversary's capability and the manner in which the adversary's actions unfold in time.

Dean G. Pruitt argued that threat perception is a function of evidence of threat (capability and intent), and *dispositions* to perceive threat (such as distrust, past experience, contingency planning, and personal anxiety). Pruitt further advanced two propositions: one, the stronger a disposition, the more impact it will have on what is inferred and two, the more ambiguous the evidence of another state's capabilities or intentions, the greater the influence of the disposition on the perception of threat (Pruitt and Snyder 1969, 26). As the case studies of Soviet Union and North Korea indicated, stronger hostile sentiment (or 'distrust' in Pruitt's terminology) and

ambiguity about evidence is indeed correlated with intense perceptions of threat. But unlike Pruitt's conceptualization, which singles out particular types of dispositions such as distrust (a type of feeling) or past-experience (which is translated to a type of behavioral tendency), I argue that the perception of threat is better understood as a function of how an actor estimates evidence of threat (capability and intent) and more importantly, as a function of an underlying rationality, an attitude toward security.

The final stage of the cognitive process involving perception of threat is best understood as a judgement we make about just how much an entity/a scenario poses danger to us. As Charles Coppens has argued, "a judgement may be defined as an act of the mind affirming or denying the agreement of two objective ideas (Coppens 1891, Book I, Chapter 1). And so, an evaluation of the Soviet Union as a threat requires one to equate the idea of "Soviet Union" with the idea of "danger" (whether it is existential, direct or indirect). As the discussion in chapter 5 suggested, once a perception of an entity or an issue as a threat is fixed, namely the judgement had been made, it becomes relatively resistant to change.

<u>How military-threat perceptions change ?</u>

To recall, chapter 1 discerned the concepts of 'perception' and 'attitude'. I suggested to view 'threat perception' as the process of becoming aware of stimulus, interpreting it, and making a judgement about the source of danger, and to view 'attitude' as a more persisting evaluative disposition toward security through which humans become aware and interpret stimulus. How do threat perceptions change? I argued that estimations about the danger associated with external entity or scenario can intensify and even tip with "one-instant", "change-inducing" events such as the North Korean missile test in August 1998 or the shooting of the Korean Airliner in

September 1983. The more instantaneous, dramatic, and televised an event is, the more likely it is to induce change in estimations of the adversary's *intentions* and as a result, in the judgement about a danger associated with an external entity.[3]

But such a tipping-point is often reached *after* a certain context has been already established; for example, were the KAL-007 aircraft would have been intercepted in 1983 by American pilots and not Soviet pilots, then the reaction to the event in Japan would have been very different; most likely, the US would not be judged as a threat to Japan as a result of the incident. And so, both hostile sentiment toward the external entity *and* the type of event are important in facilitating change in threat-perceptions. Further, if the consequence of such event directly affects the observer then the impact would be even larger (as seen in the difference between the Japanese reaction to the Chinese nuclear test on the one hand, and to the KAL shooting incident and DPRK missile launch on the other hand).

That is not to say that changes in the intensity of perceived threats occur solely as a reaction to instantaneous and change-inducing events. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, security is about securing *something* from harm. And so, shifts in the values assigned to certain referent objects can alter perceptions of threat, as actor become more vulnerable to security risks and threats.

8.5.3 IR Theoretical debate: Realist, Constructivist or Radical-Constructivist Explanations to Japanese Threat Perceptions?

The findings of this study shed further light on the theoretical debate among competing IR paradigms, namely the realist, constructivist, and radical-constructivist accounts of Japan's postwar security.

Findings about the factors that determine the distribution of danger-judgements further

undermine realist arguments about the centrality of the US in shielding the Japanese from perceiving military threats (Soeya 1998; Cha 1999; Lind 2004; Dian 2014). Instead of a US commitment to defend Japan operating to mitigate perceptions of threat, it was the attitudinal components which played a leading role in informing threat-perceptions: the strong aversion to war and the military (which corresponded to the widely disseminated peace rationality), and the behavioral tendency to avoid the use of military force hindered the ability of domestic actors to securitize military issues, and "shielded" the Japanese society from perceiving traditional military-security threats. While it is possible to assume that the US commitment and especially the nuclear umbrella did operate to mitigate fears among *some* Japanese leaders in close contact with US leaders, its credibility among the general population was still far from certain. Accordingly, I rejected the realist explanation as to the NPT proposition in early postwar Japan.

Just as the US commitment to defend Japan can not explain the reduced perceptions of threat in the early and late postwar periods, US force reduction in the *post Cold Wa*r era (the US reduced its ground forces deployed in Asia from 135,000 in 1990 to 100,000 in 1994)[14] and its implications on the credibility of US defense-commitment to its allies in the region can not explain the agitated perceptions of a North Korean threat in the late 1990s.

The current study and specifically its findings about long-term patterns in Japan's national discourse about military-security threats (section 8.4) also undermine constructivist arguments. The constructivist tendency to underplay the dis-continuities in Japan's security culture is unwarranted. Both Katzenstein (1996) and Berger (1998) maintain that Japan's normative and cultural inclinations against militarism throughout the second half of the 20th century have

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[14] "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region". *The World and Japan* Database, Tanaka Lab, University of Tokyo. Accessed on January 17, 2016, from http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19950227.O1E.html

remained rather constant. ”Generational effects”, concludes Katzenstein (1996, 116), “have been rather small...the end of the Cold War did not lead to great changes...Japan’s antimilitarist social norms have been remarkably stable.” Similarly, Berger (1998, 194) asserts that, “the same antimilitary themes and rhetoric that were prevalent in the 1950s continue to be voiced in the 1990.” [15]The current study, however, indicates that the domestic political discourse on military threats - with its rhetoric and the distribution of its underlying rationalities - has undergone a dramatic change from early to late postwar years; not only in terms of the distribution of danger-judgements, but also in terms of context and intensity of perceived threats. Simply put, there has been a shift from peace rationality to security rationality, from inward-looking to outward-looking perspective, from avoidance to hyper-sensitiveness toward threat-cues in the external environment.[16]

Finally, this study also diverges with the radical-constructivist approach to Japan’s record of threat-perceptions, which views the perception of threats as deliberate campaigns orchestrated by securitizing actors and designed to reap political benefits. This is so because as ample evidence indicated, Japanese decision-makers among both the defense and political establishments were not immune to the workings of the ABC model: as chapters 2-4 have demonstrated, affect, behavioral tendency and cognitive beliefs shaped the reaction of decision-makers to military-security stimuli.

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[15] A recent edited volume by Vosse, Drifte and Blechinger-Talcott titled “Governing insecurity in Japan: the domestic discourse and policy response” and specifically the chapters written by Vosse and Midford testify to the prevalence of relatively high perceptions of threat in domestic discourse but contends along similar lines that anti-militarist values and fear of military conflicts continue to act as a check against more assertive security behavior (Vosse et al. 2014, 5).

[16] This does not mean that the Japanese have become aggressive or militant, nor that the majority of Japanese discard the defensive realist rationality which still opposes the acquisition of offensive weapons.

Table 15 below summarizes the realist, constructivist, and radical-constructivist approaches to Japanese threat-perceptions. It also outlines the alternative approach this study puts forward in order to explain Japanese threat-perceptions in the postwar period: I term this approach the "psychological paradigm".

Table 15: Competing Explanations to Japanese Threat Perceptions (TP)		
Paradigm	**Factor**	**Evidence**
Realism	US commitment to defend Japan	Strong commitment in the early postwar period mitigated TP; weakened commitment in the late postwar period aggravated TP
Constructivism	Anti-militarism (identity, norms, institutions, culture)	Domestic culture of anti-militarism mitigated perceptions of threat
Radical-Constructivism	Securitizing actors and political-economic context	The "Northern threat" campaign by former military personnel in the late 1970s and early 1980s was used by the GOJ to militarize Japan and to tackle economic frictions with the US
The current study: the Psychological Paradigm	Affect, Behavioral tendency and Cognitive beliefs (ABC model) constitute a certain Rationality, which conditions TP. Interpretive codes play a significant role in further shaping TP	The empirical record of securitizations of military-threats in postwar Japan - and the differences between the three case-studies can not be explained by neither material not ideational factors alone. It is psychological attitudes toward security (referent objects, threats, and risk-measures) which matter greatly in shaping perceptions of military threat

The phenomenon of threat-perception, I argued, is essentially a psychological one. It originates in the individual mind where affect, behavioral tendencies, and cognitive beliefs all interplay to create a certain rationality through which actors view their security in the world. While external

stimuli and domestic circumstances matter, a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon must draw attention to the internal mechanism behind the phenomenon: the rationality and interpretive codes which underlie perceptions of threat.

9. Conclusion

The phenomenon of threat perception is a complex one and therefore, we should be more precise when addressing it. Scholars interested in a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon should aim to examine the intensity, distribution, time, and context of threat-perceptions among clearly defined units-of-analysis.

In terms of intensity, I developed a four-level typology that accounts for the intensity of the perceived danger. By collecting text in all its forms, researchers can now classify data into one of these four levels, further distinguishing between those actors committed to a security rationality and those committed to a peace rationality.

This study also highlighted the role of two "interpretive codes" in how actors infer (the intensity of) threat. Specifically, I made the case for the "spatial-distribution" and the "voluntariness" codes. Interestingly, these interpretive codes evoke the mainstream neorealist conceptualization of threat-perception along the lines of estimated capabilities and estimated intentions. But these interpretative codes also break away from this conceptualization by emphasizing the psychological aspect of the phenomenon: rather than the adversary's capability per-se, actors infer threat - perhaps unwittingly - by evaluating how much of that capability is directed toward them and how much is directed to others. Likewise, rather than merely evaluating the adversary's actions, actors gauge intention from the manner in which the action unfolds in time. By pointing out these two interpretive codes, I call attention to the workings of the internal mechanisms in shaping perceptions of threat.

In terms of distribution, and related to the Securitization Theory, I argued for a 60 percent threshold when considering whether an actor/issue is "successfully' securitized among a certain audience. I also argued for two conditions that determine whether an issue would be successfully

securitized: the presence of a securitization actor/move (a necessary condition) as well as the domestic distribution of the underlying rationality (along the spectrum between peace or security). In societies where the security rationality has the upper hand among domestic actors, it would be easy to securitize external actors as military threats and vice-versa, in societies where the peace rationality has the upper hand (like early 1960s and 1970s Japan, for example) it would be more difficult to securitize external actors as military threats. There is certainly a need to further examine the "spectrum of rationality" - and perhaps identify additional types of rationalities aside from the security, peace, and pragmatist rationalities I have identified in postwar Japan.

The findings above carry substantial implications to international security. The more actors know about the process of threat-inference - and the internal mechanisms which underlie it - the better the chances to avoid unwarranted reactions to external events and mis-calculation among actors in the international arena. While by themselves important, there is certainly a need to explore for additional interpretive codes and extend the inquiry beyond the Japanese case-study.

The focus of this study, however, was postwar Japan. The findings suggested significant changes in the discourse about military security threats. To recall, I offered to explain some of the trends described in chapter 2-7 along the ABC model: a psychological *disposition* of aversion (strong dislike) to war, military, and threats induced a *behavioral-tendency* of avoiding disturbing stimulus related to these issues and a certain rationality through which domestic actors viewed the world and their security in it. The disposition of avoiding/framing military-security stimuli was strongest in the early postwar period: it has been declining since the 1980s. Subsequently, a situation which can be best described as "threat - avoidance" eschewed both the subjective

capacity of many Japanese to interpret stimulus as military threat-cues and the capacity to openly discuss military security threats (intersubjectively). The "avoidance hypothesis" undermines earlier realist contentions the Japanese were "shielded" by the US-Japan security alliance and therefore did not pay attention to defense matters or feel military-security threats to be tangible. As we have seen, to Japan's political left and peace activists, the security relationship with the US was a source of anxiety; the mainstream leadership too was hedging against entrapment in a war with the Soviet Union by disassociating itself from US military strategy in the early postwar periods and less so in the late postwar period.

Japanese aversion to war and its subsequent avoidance of military-threat cues had weakened in the early 1980s. More people became interested in defense matters as old taboos gradually eroded during the 1980s and 1990s. Growing voices also pointed to Japan's abnormal position among the nations of the world, and sought to become "normal".

This thesis proved that perceptions of military threat do not simply follow "objective" developments in the real world; nor they are simply a product of anti-militaristic culture or norms. Psychological attitudes toward security - with its referent objects, threats, and risk-measures - shape to a large extent the perception of threat. This conclusion has several important implications.

First, anyone involved in evaluating potential threats should be at least aware of his or her own attitude toward the international system, the relationships among the actors, and its view of specific actors in the system. One should be able to answer the following question: How does my "security attitude" - with its feelings, behavioral tendencies, and cognitive beliefs - shape the perception of a certain adversary or scenario?

Second, since perceptions of military threat often do not simply "emerge" in the world they require some "source", a securitizing actor. And so one should ask who are the actors involved in the political conversation about threats? What rhetoric do they employ? What is their underlying message and rationality?

Third, the current analysis has indicated that even a society conditioned by a powerful taboo against military issues such as early postwar Japan was not entirely "free" from the perception of military-threats to its security. As the inquiry into the defense establishment revealed, those in charge of defending the country against external threats were often concerned with military threats (albeit mostly behind the scenes). Are perceptions of threat "inherent" to any defense establishment in the contemporary international system? Perhaps so. But as this study argued, when considering the issue of threat-perception one must pay attention to the intensity of the perceived threat. The interesting question is therefore when and under what conditions these "inherent" scenarios gain enough momentum and become diffused among broader audiences.[1]

The situation in contemporary Japan, one may argue, is starkly different from early postwar Japan. Japanese decision-makers and society demonstrate *hyper-sensitiveness* toward the international system and the regional environment with its security threats and risks. The tendency toward stronger perceptions of threat in contemporary Japan has been noted by various

[1] That is not to say that perceptions of threat are always "led" by figures from within the defense establishment : other actors participate and negotiate perceptions of threat.

scholars (Hughes 2009, 311; Dupont 2004, 2005).[2] Whether this tendency toward heightened threat-perceptions is exclusive to military-security context and specific to the North Korea and China cases - or whether it is a symptom of broader fixation with threats and risks - is a sociological question that certainly needs further examination. Whatever the answers are, however, it is clear that military-security threats had come to dominate the contemporary political discourse. The pendulum has swung too far; more than seventy years after the end of the disastrous war, the Japanese society is consumed by military-security threats.

[2] Hughes argues for a disproportion between an "actual" and perceived North Korean threat. He explains this discrepancy with the "multilayered" nature of the North Korean threat, in which (1) an actual military threat, (2) a political threat to the alliance with the US, (3) a domestic threat, and (4) a "catch-all" proxy threat for the longer-term peril stemming from China are combined together to create a "super-sized" North Korea threat. Alan Dupont (2004, 2005, 44) indicates a "sea change" in Japanese attitudes towards security in the mid 2000s, asserting that, "the once-apathetic public is becoming increasingly concerned about deterioration in Japan's security environment, mainly due to the spread of transnational terrorism, North Korean antipathy, and China's burgeoning economic growth and military power"

Appendix 1: *Yomiuri* Editorials Containing "Soviet Union" and "Threat" (1946 - 1990)

Editorial #1: "The Spy Control Law is a threat to [free] speech" (August 24, 1953).

Location: Page 1.

Background: The revelation of a small Soviet "spy" farm in the area of Wakkanai, Hokkaido, earlier that month prompted Japanese high officials to urge legislation of spy-control measures to protect state-secrets (not only military secrets, but also political, diplomatic and economic ones according to one official).

Content: The editorial makes the case against such as law, citing the following reasons:
First, since Japan currently does not have an army, how many serious military secrets we have? (the answer : shouldn't have any). Since secrets related to weapons technology (weapons that originate in the US) are already protected by a different law, and since other aspects of military-security are being deliberated under the SDF basic law, there is no need to legislate a separate law. Second, there is no link between the proposed law and the current incident in which newspapers, maps, and periodicals were found at the "Soviet ranch". Third, there is a danger that such a law, if enacted, would be abused; instead of protecting secrets, it would be used to restrain criticism of the government.
The editorial frames this law as a threat to free-speech and democracy, implicitly cautioning against a return to the war era. It concludes that as long as Japan does not have an army and its own weapons, this law is useless.

Analysis: The editorial does not refer to a threat associated with the spy incident itself nor to the perpetrator behind it (the Soviet Union). In-fact, the Soviet Union is completely absent from the editorial.

Editorial #2: "New Prospects for Europe" (May 31, 1971)

Location: Page 5.

Background: England to join the European Community (EC), a common economic market established in 1957.

Content: The editorial analyzes England's agreement to join the EC and elaborates why it had avoided to do so in the past (including issues of self-identity and French disapproval of such a

move). The editorial asks why France and the UK have changed their position, offering three reasons (of which the third is most important according to the editorial) : first, France wishes that the UK would join in order to balance West Germany's growing economic power in the EC. Second, the UK and the US wish to improve European integration because of defense necessity and third, both the UK and France evaluate future trends in the international arena, including China's rise as a potential third superpower. As a result, they wish to position the EC as another superpower in the international arena. Japan, "an economic superpower by itself", the editorial concludes, should follow these trends and enhance its cooperation with the international arena based on its peace constitution. Finally, the editorial calls for the earlier possible normalization of relations with China.

Analysis: the Soviet Union threat is not the topic of this editorial and is only mentioned as one of the reasons behind the formation of the EC in the first place. It is depicted as superpower (*chōteikoku*).

Editorial #3: "Trends in Asia's significance to America" (August 6, 1978)

Location: page 5.

Background: The US held its first conference with ASEAN countries in Washington earlier that week.

Content: The editorial elaborates on the diplomatic and security situation in SouthEast Asia. It introduces US-ASEAN cooperation in the midst of concerns in SouthEast Asia that the US would redraw from the region after it pulled out from Vietnam; it depicts ASEAN countries as worried about insecurity in Indochina and about Soviet Union's "extremely conspicuous existence" in the region; and it portrays the Carter administration as aiming to curb the perception of American redraw from the region. The editorial also asserts that ASEAN neutral position in the power game between the Soviet Union and China for domination in Indochina would persist; and that rather than political and military cooperation, economic cooperation would be the focus of future engagement between the US and ASEAN. Finally, the editorial concludes that this economic diplomacy stance is welcomed from Japan's point of view.

Analysis: The Soviet Union is not the topic of this editorial. It is not framed as a military threat in this editorial, but its involvement in Indochina in the context of the power struggle with China in

the region is depicted as in-stabilizing factor. "The Indochina threat" is mentioned in the article, and not a "Soviet threat"; any reference to Japan's security is also absent.

Editorial #4: Regrettable 'Basification' of the Northern Territories by the Soviet Union (January 31, 1979)

Location: Page 4

Background: The Soviet Union establishes military bases on two islands: Kunashiri and Etorofu.

Content: The editorial reflects on the report that the Soviet Union had militarized the two islands with "full-scale" military bases, citing JDA Director-General about the details of Soviet deployment which included tanks, artillery, anti-air missiles, and few thousand soldiers. It depicts both islands as Japanese "characteristic territory", highlights just how close they are to Hokkaido and maintains that such military deployment on these islands hurts the nation's feelings. That being said, continues the editorial, this deployment does not mean that we should panic about an impending war. "We have to react to it calmly" (*reisei ni)*; it urges the government to protest the deployment to the Soviets. The editorial then mentions recent Soviet deployments in the area, including the nuclear submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk and their capability to strike US mainland and frames them as part of Soviet strategy directed at the US. Because the Sea of Okhotsk has become vital to Soviet strategy, the editorial hypothesizes, then it became necessary for the Soviets to defend it: it is in this context that they deployed forces to both Kunashiri and Etorofu. In addition to the military-strategic context, the editorial opines that the through the deployment, the Soviets not only put "silent pressure" (*mugon atsuryoku*) on Japan, but also assert their claim on the territories through effective control of the islands. The editorial mentions that the decision to militarize both islands came after the *Mig* Incident (1976) and as a result of Soviet concerns of the rapprochement between Japan China and the US. It claims that if the Soviet Union indeed wishes to improve ties with Japan, then this move is counterproductive; and that frequent Soviet claims that GOJ fabricates a Soviet military threat seem less reliable after this move. The editorial concludes by asserting that although the Soviets criticize the US-Japan security treaty as an anti-Soviet military alliance this move will only gather support for those in Japan that aim for more military buildup.

Analysis: The Soviet Union military deployment to Kunashiri and Etorofu is framed in this article as "regrettable" both politically and militarily. The deployment is interpreted as part of

Soviet strategy vis-à-vis the US, and hence as a threat to the US, and *not* Japan. It also deflates the threat-scenario of war (its likelihood). The editorial outlines the context for the Soviet move and its potential negative consequences; the counter-frame seems to be the securitization of the issue of Soviet military threat. The editorial calls for a well-thought response by the Japanese government and does not mention military risk-measures as a favorable option.

Editorial #5: "Why [the Soviets] establish a base in Shikotan?" (September 28, 1979)
Location: Page 4. This editorial consists of two parts: the first, larger part, deals with Japan's financial policy and the second part with the Soviet military deployment to Shikotan.
Background: The Soviet Union establishes military base in Shikotan.
Content: The editorial opens with a statement connecting previous Soviet military basification of Kunashiri and Etorofo with the most recent development in Shikotan. "It is never pleasant for Japanese [that Soviets repeatedly establish military bases in our territory]". The editorial asserts that many people have doubts as to why the Soviet Union puts "military pressure" on Japan while calling for cooperation on the development of Siberia, and reflects on the purpose of this military deployment. It cites MOFA's official stance according to which the Soviet militarization of the islands is not specifically directed against Japan but rather part of global strategy and that the military posture of the troops is not offensive. The editorial then moves to discuss the Russian nation with its history of wars, domination and aggression. It asserts that in the postwar period, the Soviet Union draws heavily on military force and that especially since the 1970s, the Soviet Union has been "rapidly" improving its nuclear arsenal and the capability of the Warsaw Pact. The most recent deployment of "Minsk" aircraft carriers to the Far-East and the basification of the Northern Territories seems to be another layer in this strategy, alongside policy measures toward Japan that have seem to exceed the anti-Japanese stance and have a certain "devilishness" to them (*mashō*). The editorial then suggests to view recent developments in a situational context of past diplomatic negotiations on a peace treaty between both countries, calling to maintain open channels of communication between leaders of both nations. It concludes with a call for the Soviet Union to take a careful attitude and avoid hampering improvements in bilateral relations (*mizu o sasu koto ni naranai you, soren no shinchō na taido o yōbō shitai)*.
Analysis: The Soviet Union military deployment in Shikotan is framed in terms of *insecurity*, but still not as a direct threat to Japan. Instead, the deployment is seen in the context of recent

developments: it is all part of a Soviet global military strategy. In terms of framing devices, the editorial uses catchphrase ("basification" and "devilishness") to describe both the developments on the Northern Territories and Soviet behavior toward Japan. Although it acknowledges negative trend in both Soviet military capabilities and behavior, the editorial positions those who advocate for a "Northern threat" as a counter-frame and highlights open communication, and improvement of relations as policy goals instead. The editorial does not consider any military response to the Soviet basification, and interprets this development both in the context of Soviet global strategy and the bilateral political relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan, and specifically, past negotiations of a peace treaty and the Soviet agreement to hand both Shikotan and Habomai back to Japan, which was reversed after the US and Japan extended their security alliance in 1960.

Editorial #6: "American budget to counter two threats" (January 30, 1980)

Location : Page 4.

Background: US to approve 1981 fiscal year budget.

Content: The editorial begins with President Carter's statement in Congress that the US budget for fiscal year 1981 was designed to deal with the Soviet threat outside and the inflation threat inside. It mentions that NATO allies had arranged for a three percent increase in defense spending, and the US for a 5 percent increase in order to counter the Soviet threat and address the new military situation that originated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Then the editorial moves to discuss the difficult conditions of US economy, detailing negative indicators such as the 1980 negative annual growth rate of 0.6 percent and US dependence on imported oil, in light of the plan to increase military expenditures in annual 4.8 percent in the upcoming five years. The editorial describes US economy as suffering from "heavy illness" (*byou wa omoi)* and concludes by stipulating that Japan should not remain passive and cooperate with the US where possible, and solve bilateral issues before frictions arise (there is no specifying of what issues but stating the desired general attitude).

Analysis: The Soviet Union military threat is not the subject of this editorial, but rather US fiscal budget for 1981. However, the Soviet Union is depicted in this article as a military threat to the US, and its recent invasion of Afghanistan is mentioned. The editorial also predicts that US increase of military expenditures to counter the Soviet threat will be effective, while the attempt to control inflation will not. In terms of threat position, the editorial remains rather vague. One the one hand, it does refer to a Soviet threat to the US, although in an indirect way, but on the other hand, it maintains that US increase in military expenditures will be effective, hence, it deflates a Soviet threat in the long-run. In terms of risk-measures, the editorial calls for GOJ to adopt an attitude of cooperation and taking-the-initiative in the bilateral relations with the US.

Editorial #7: "Too big too soon [of a] demand" (July 1, 1981)

Location: Page 4.

Background: US-Japan Defense Consultations held in Hawaii in which according to media reports, US representatives urged for more cooperation in this area.

Content: The article begins with a slogan: "faster! bigger!" (*motto hayaku, motto ōkiku)* to describe US representatives "extraordinary" appeals to GOJ to cooperate more closely in defense matters. It elaborates on the demands made by Defense secretary Weinberger and Secretary of State Hague to revise the "anachronistic" 1976 NDPO and increase Japan's military capabilities and budget. The editorial then evaluates US demands in negative terms, suggesting that US representatives made their demands while ignoring the idea of seeking compromise with the Soviet Union from a powerful position (*chikara o haikei toshite, soren ni jyōho o semarou toshiteiru kangae),* and showing no understanding "whatsoever" for Japan's current political and economic circumstances. Alliance relationship, asserts the editorial, should be based on mutual understanding rather than one-sided demands, and the Japanese public is against further increases in defense budget during times of decrease in social welfare and education budgets. In placing emphasis on the Soviet threat and by communicating such demands, suggests the editorial, isn't the US making the situation in Asia more tensed? Because of constitutional restraints and geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, Japan simply can not take the same military policy as the US, but it can and should cooperate with the Western camp to strengthen its forces , not only from military perspective but also from political and economic points of view. The editorial concludes by urging the government to communicate to President Reagan in the upcoming Summit that excessive demands do not only weaken the US-Japanese alliance, but also weakens the unity of the Western coalition as a whole.

Analysis: The Soviet Union military threat is not the subject of this editorial; US pressure on Japan to do more for its defense in the context of the threat *is*. The threat posed by the Soviet Union to the US is taken for granted, but there is a clear distinction between the US and Japanese positions vis-à-vis that threat. In terms of catch-phrases, US demands are described as "too much, too soon"; the editorial does not comment on the magnitude of the Soviet threat per-se but on Japan's desired risk-measures to US pressure. In terms of risk-measures, the editorial calls the GOJ to resist "extreme" demands such as revision of the NDPO and to distinguish Japan's security measures from the American ones. In general, the editorial makes the case for "Comprehensive Security" and advocate non-military measures.

Editorial #8: "Let's calmly construct a perception toward the Soviet Union" (July 5, 1981)
"*reisei ni taisoren ninshiki o kōchiku seyo*"
Location: Page 4.
Background: US-Japan high level consultations held recently and the disagreement about the perception of the Soviet Union threat.
Content: The editorial surveys recent "confusing" statements made by GOJ representatives concerning the Soviet Union and brings two examples in this context. First, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa's retraction of a statement in which he had mentioned that there was "a gap" (*nichibei kan ni zure ga aru*) between US and Japan (concerning the Soviet Union), to a "gap in the degree" (*teido no sa*) is taken as an example of incoherent perception. Second, JDA Director-General's agreement with US defense officials in Washington that the Soviet threat was intensifying and his subsequent call for enhanced anti-submarine capability in the form of P3C aircraft is seemed, according to editorial, as if he was "blowing the trumpet" (before battle). The editorial affirms that the perception of the Soviet Union is at the core of Japan's national security and the biggest issue in [recent] Japan-US negotiations; it also emphasizes the risks of accepting the US perception without reservation on the one hand, and of obscuring remarks previously made to the Americans because they generate considerable negative effect (*mizuwari)* on the other hand. The editorial then points out the prevailing opinions concerning the Soviet Union which defer based on "the country and world views". These opinions include the rumor of a military crisis looming in 1985 and the Reagan administration's attempt to curb the impact of Soviet arms race, the domestic weaknesses of the Soviet regime, the danger of pushing the Soviet

Union to the corner and the desire to extend the detente. The editorial calls for Japan to obtain relevant information, analyze it, and construct its own "objective" perception toward the Soviet Union. "Rather than an Asian outlook, a wide and global perspective is desired." It then brings the JCP position on the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which asserted that it amounts to expansionism, as a proof for a general agreement as to Soviet conduct on the international arena. But, continues the editorial, one must add to the calculus Soviet political and economic strengths and weakness, especially its difficult energy situation, as well as the state of affairs in the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and the Sino-Soviet conflict. "Until now", asserts the editorial, Japan has only seldom shared its judgement of the international situation in bilateral meetings with the US; if a gap in both countries' perception of the Soviet Union exist, then GOJ representatives should openly discuss it with their American counterparts in be frank about it in public as well. Additionally, as an alliance partner, Japan should also be able to point out the Americans' "impatience" and unjustified pressure.

Analysis: The Soviet Union military threat is the subject of this editorial. Although the editorial acknowledges that the invasion of Afghanistan is an indicator of expansionist ambitions, it also calls to bring to the table other factors such as Soviet weaknesses and difficult international position, suggesting that its recent actions should be considered in this context. The editorial calls on the government to formulate a comprehensive independent perception of the Soviet Union, and resist American pressure. Interestingly, the editorial highlights that such a perception should evaluate the situation not with a *regional* focus, but in a *global* focus instead. The counter-frame is the perception according to which the Soviet Union is a military threat to Japan. In terms of risk-measures, the article advocate calmness, objectivity, and fair judgement.

Editorial #9: "Lessons from the 'Missile Launch' incident" (August 30, 1981)

Location: Page 4.

Background: On August 26, A US SR-71 aircraft was shot while flying above the Korean Peninsula. On August 27, US confirmed the plane was intercepted by North Korea but the North Koreans denied.

Content: The editorial recounts the details of the missile incident and asserts that the incident is not likely to increase tensions in the peninsula. It then moves to examine the incident in the international context of establishing the limits of territorial waters and of recent negotiations between Japan and South Korea during which the latter government had asked Japan for national security financial assistance. The latter issue is further explored: the editorial suggests to view the South Korean appeal for Japanese financial aid as a result of both the "northern threat" - the Soviet military expansion in the Far East - and because South Korea was chosen to play a role of a stimulater for US-Japan defense cooperation. The editorial then calls for North-South dialogue and to alleviate tensions in the peninsula; it places the responsibility for such dialogue on Soviet Union and the US. "Soviet Union's military expansion in the Far East" and Reagan administration's severe response makes things in the peninsula worse, and therefore there is a strong necessity for US-Soviet dialogue as well.

Analysis: The Soviet Union is not the topic of this editorial but rather the risks associated with rising tensions in the Korean peninsula. However a "Soviet threat" is mentioned as one possible reason for South Korea's request from Japan for financial aid. The Soviet military expansion (and US response) in the Far East is framed as a de-stabilizing factor. In terms of its stand on threats, the threat of international instability and conflict is positioned above all others; the editorial also implies that Japan can unwillingly become involved (not militarily but diplomatically).

Editorial #10: "For a fruitful Dialogue between Japan and the US" (September 6, 1981)

Location: Page 4.

Background: The 5th Shimoda conference was held earlier that month (*nichibei kankei minkan kaigi*). [1]

Content: The editorial asserts that the bilateral relationship between Japan and the US faces many challenges and that there is a great necessity for more dialogue among both sides. Among the issues discussed at the conference were defense and economical matters. Specifically, the Soviet military expansion and its enhanced capability to dispatch of troops abroad were raised and although "both sides shared more or less the same perception of [both Soviet military trends], opinions greatly differed on how to respond to this threat (*sono kyoui he no taiou no shikata o meguttewa iken ga okiku wakerta*). The editorial then offers three reasons for these differences between both sides' positions on defense and economy. One, while the US has a global view which is focused on meeting the Soviet threat, Japan has a unique position and domestic circumstances. At the conference, the US side communicated dissatisfaction with Japan's limited political and military roles in the international arena, especially since it is a world superpower in terms of economic might and the ruling party - the LDP - has overwhelming majority in the Diet. In the latter case, the US side could not understand why the government is seeking for consensus on defense matters while holding the majority. Two, the Japanese side asserted at the conference that with each change of administration in Washington, US diplomacy and military policy changes as well, and that brings much confusion. Three, both sides do not invest enough time in conducting meaningful policy discussions about matter of concerns, instead insisting on their own policies with no sufficient explanation. This lack of good communication is the reason why, continues the editorial, the Japanese side could not properly explain to the American its view on the Soviet threat according to which there is a difference between the Soviet military capabilities and intentions, and between the Soviet military strength and economic weakness. Similarly, this lack of communication brought the US side to wonder what do Japanese representatives concretely mean when they refer to "comprehensive security" and be confused as to what economic, political and military roles will Japan agree to take on.

Analysis: This is the first time that a *Yomiuri* editorial refers in its report to the Soviet Union as a

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[1] The Shimoda Conference (also known as the Japanese-American Assembly) was launched in 1967 to become the first postwar platform for unofficial discussions of policy matters among Japanese and the American opinion leaders.

threat as if established knowledge (meaning, with no quotation marks), thus actually framing it as such. While the editorial acknowledges that the Japanese view trends in Soviet military power in similar lines to the Americans, there is disagreement about the risk-measures. In addition, the Japanese side emphasizes Soviet intentions and economic weakness as two counter-arguments to the American view. In other words, the Japanese have a more holistic approach toward the Soviet Union: they consider not only Soviet military trends, but also Soviet intentions and its economic challenges at home.

Editorial #11: "Middle East affairs as advanced based on an Arab logic"(March 1, 1982)
Location: Page 4.
Background: Four months have passes since the assassination of Egyptian President Saadat and the Arab world is going through some changes.
Content: The editorial depicts the initiatives Egypt's new president Mubarak have taken since he entered office, including an attempt to strengthen the relationship with the Soviet Union, highlighting similar trends among Arab countries in the Arabian Peninsula. Arab countries, suggests the editorial, seek rapprochement with the Soviet Union because of national security reasons: first, they viewed both the Soviet military assistance to South Yemen and Ethiopia as well as US limitation in protecting its ally in Iran (which had been offset by religious movement) as an evidence of Soviet credibility , and second, believe that rapprochement with the Soviet Union would help them ward off left-wing opposition forces from within their respective countries. The editorial asserts that consequently, US State Secretary's argument that the threat of Soviet's advance into the Middle East seem empty; also, the Western camp is not overly worried about the trends in the Arab world because it is believed that these countries seek to be neutral in the East-West conflict rather than taking one side. The editorial then concludes for the Western world to withhold pressure on the Arab countries and instead keep track on the situation in an attentive way.
Analysis: The Soviet Union military threat is not the direct subject of this editorial, but, it is present in the background, together with US pressure on its allies - Japan included - to do more for its defense in the context of superpower rivalry. The analysis advocates to accept "Arab logic" [in seeking closer relationship with the Soviet Union] instead of imposing "unilateral Western logic" on it. The counter-frame is the belief that a more assertive Japanese stance vis-à-

vis the Soviet Union is needed; the framing technique of the Soviet Union issue is by comparison of Japan's position to the Middle-East (even if this comparison remains unarticulated).

Editorial #12: "Soviet military build-up that [we] can not accept" (March 11, 1983) "*younin dekinu soren no gunjiryoku zōkyo*"
Location: Page 3.
Background: The DOD publishes its second report dealing with Soviet military power (the first report was published in September 1981).
Content: Secretary of Defense Weinberg introduced a new report about the "endless" Soviet military buildup for the year 1983 which includes the Far East, anticipating that the arms race will spill over to the space. The reason why the US made this report public, asserts the editorial, is that the US is seeking its allies' understanding about the scope of the Soviet military threat. The editorial narrates the opposition to Reagan's moves on defense from within the US congress: earlier that month, committees of the US Congress had approved a revised plan to increase defense expenditures in 7.5 instead of 10.5 percent, like the administration had requested; in contrast, a motion to freeze US-Soviet nuclear arms reduction talks was approved despite opposition from the administration. In order to inform the publics of various countries in Europe which oppose the deployment of additional nuclear weapons to their territory, the US has released the reports, which, according to the editorial, is filled with tables, illustrations, and maps. However, asserts the editorial, there is no shocking new military trends in the report; in addition, in the introduction to the report, argues US high official that in terms of nuclear strategy, the US still enjoys superiority over the Soviet Union. But, claims the editorial, the most important point for attention in the report is the unusual nuclear and conventional military expansion of the Soviet Union in the Far East. Of the 351 SS-20 missile-bases, 110 are located in the Far-East. The Soviets also continue their military expansion in Japan's Northern Territories and in the process of deploying nuclear submarines to the Sea of Okhotsk.

The editorial poses the following question: "Why, as no country - including Japan - has the intention nor capability to attack the Soviet Union, has the Soviets pursuing this military build up ? " The DOD report suggests that the Soviet Union wish to use the military expansion to pressure Japan to reduce its contribution to the security of the Western Camp. "Even if this is the Soviets' intention, then [their military activities] have the exact opposite effect" because such moves only shake Japan's trust and friendship toward the Soviets. The editorial moves to discuss other points of attention in the US reports, including the Soviets development of program to use of space for military purposes, in order to achieve superiority in this area over the US. The editorial concludes that these new developments in the use of space for military purposes "can not be left to themselves" (*korera no uchū heiki kaihatsu o, nobnashi ni suru koto ga dekinai)*. An international agreement about the limitation of the use of space for military purposes is urgently needed.

Analysis: The editorial frames the Soviet Union military threat - and specifically, its new dimension of *space* - in terms of something against which we must defend, in an urgent way. The risk measures are working with the international community. The editorial also frames Soviet military buildup in the Far East and specifically near Japan as disturbing, and ineffective as it only leads to growing animosity toward it.

Editorial #13: "ASEAN strengthened by political coloring" (June 30, 1983)

Location: Page 3.

Background: ASEAN summit of Foreign Ministers was held in Bangkok earlier that month, with the participation of Japanese and US representatives.

Content: The editorial asserts that the ASEAN conference was increasingly political, as the participants discussed both the situation in Cambodia and strategy toward the Soviet Union. Secretary of State George Shultz reported on the Soviet presence in the Asia-Pacific, and the participants listened to his "Soviet threat theory" (the editorial puts this expression under quotation marks). The editorial concludes by asserting that Japan received praises for its involvement in Cambodia and called to continue the dialogue with ASEAN and live up to their expectations.

Analysis: The Soviet Union military threat is not the subject of this editorial but rather the report on ASEAN conference and its political debates. While most of the editorial is dedicated to the reporting on Cambodia, the latter parts deals with the deepening relations between ASEAN and the US, and the fact that the issue of Soviet Union threat was mentioned in the conference by Secretary Shultz and drew attention. This fact alone, suggests the editorial, testifies to a certain change. Both sides agreed, continued the editorial, that Soviet military build up in the Far East is a new threat (*soren no gunbi zōka ga ajia ni totte no arata na kyoui)* and called for the Soviet Union to halt its transition of SS-20 missiles from the European front to the Far-East and to an overall reduction in SS-20 missiles in the latter area.

Editorial # 14: "Aiming for a mature Japan-China relationship" (September 9, 1983)
Location: Page 3.
Background: High level meeting between Chinese and Japanese officials in Beijing.
Content: The editorial asserts that while the previous meeting dealt mostly with economic issues, this meeting was mostly political, and diplomatic issues such as Sino-American, Sino-Soviet, Sino-Japanese and Perception of the Soviet Union were discussed among others. The Chinese side also "understood" Japan's defense build up as long as its for self-defense purposes and that Japan maintains open communication with neighboring countries. In relation to Sino-Japanese relations, although the prospects are positive, there are some gaps, especially in the attitude toward the Soviet Union in the midst of the Korean Airliner incident earlier that month. [2]The Chinese side, mentions the editorial, responded only moderately to the incident and took a practical attitude of continuing the dialogue with the Soviet Union in order to improve relations. Gaps also exist in the context of Korean Peninsula and Indochina. The editorial concludes with a call to warm and frank friendship between both nations.

[2] Interestingly, the editorial refers to incident as "the Korean Airline Incident" only. Later in February 1984 (editorial #19) the incident is named "the Korean Airline Shooting Down Incident".

Analysis: This is the second time that a *Yomiuri* editorial refers to the Soviet Union as a threat as if established knowledge (meaning, with no quotation marks) while reporting an issue, thus actually framing it as such. Specifically, the issue of SS-20 was picked by both the Japanese and Chinese government as a sign of a "new threat". The editorial also takes a critical approach toward the Chinese approach to the Soviet Union, which is "practical" and not critical enough. In terms of risk-measures, the editorial also mentions that Japan is in the midst of defense build-up and maintains that the Chinese side have indicated during the meetings that it would not resist such policy (as long as Japan's guidelines of exclusively defensive policy persists). In terms of counter-frame, it seems like the editorial is not advocating for a different approach toward the Soviet Union anymore.

Editorial # 15: "Reflections on the anti-nuclear movement in Western Europe" (October 24, 1983)
Location: Page 3.
Background: The anti-nuclear movement in Western Europe gains momentum.
Content: The editorial depicts the recent developments and demonstrations in Western European countries in positive light, assessing what kind of impact these movements will bring. The movements will not, predicts the editorial, prevent the new deployment of US missile system to the European theater since the political parties that advocate the deployment won the elections in their respective countries. The editorial asserts that the argument of those who oppose the deployment is weak: those who believe that the Soviet Union will respond positively to Western abandonment of its weapon deployment to Europe - along the lines of the "Soviet Union's fundamentally good intentions" (*soren seizensetsu*) are simply wrong, as the recent Korea airliner incident have taught us. The editorial concludes by mentioning that some say that the Soviet Union financially supports the anti-nuclear movements and evaluates this Soviet act as "outrageous" (*tondemo nai koto de aru*), since the anti-nuclear movement targets the Soviet Union as well.
Analysis: The Soviet Union is depicted in this editorial as an opponent of the Western world; rather than commenting on its military aspect, the Soviet Union as an entity is described in negative terms. The editorial advocates for touch policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and seem to have lost any faith in Soviet good intentions in the aftermath of the Korean airliner incident. The

counter-frame is those who seek unilateral peaceful policy measures toward the Soviet Union; the editorial supports a more hard-line approach toward it. Interestingly, it does call to respect the feelings of the German people, who are in the front-line of the East-West conflict and of which the majority opposes this weapons deployment.

Editorial #16: "China-US relationship to enter a new period of maturity" (January 16, 1984)
Location: Page 4.
Background: China's Premier Zhao Ziyang visits Washington for a summit meeting with President Reagan, and becomes the first Chinese premier to visit the US while in office.
Content: The editorial reports on the visit and on the positive evaluation it received by both sides and examines the bilateral issues that still remain, including the "Taiwan problem". Prior to the meeting, Premier Zhao confirmed that both the US and China agrees in their threat assessment, namely, that the "Soviet threat" (like this, under quotation marks in the editorial) is the primary threat. During the summit meeting as well, the Soviet military "expansion" into Asia - including the deployment of SS-20, its military activities in Afghanistan and Cambodia - were taken as signs for concern, according to the editorial's report. "Naturally", asserts the editorial, Premier Zhao will not join the US for an anti-Soviet alliance and will opt to sustain China's independent diplomacy in the region and in the Third World; still, the high level meetings with US representatives testifies to a mutual threat perception focused on the Soviet Union.
Analysis: The Soviet military threat is not the subject of this editorial, but rather Sino-US relations. It is in this context that the Soviet threat is mentioned time and again, although under quotation marks. Soviet military deployment and behavior in Asia are titled "military expansion" and are taken as the main threat-cues mentioned in the summit meeting between the Premier and the President. Japan, on the other hand, is completely left out of the report.

Editorial # 17: "Disappointing Kovalenko statement" (February 10, 1984).

Location: Page 3.

Background: Soviet high official Kovalenko visits Japan at the invitation of JSP for series of meetings with opposition representatives and media interviews.

Content :The editorial reports on the visit, stating that, although there was hope that the visit by Kovalenko, who is considered to be the person in charge of formulating Japan policy, would turn the current trend of cooling down in the bilateral relations, a trend that began after the Korean Airliner shooting down incident, Kovalenko's statements were disappointing. The editorial narrates Japan's attempt to restart high-level dialogue, but maintains that the Soviet policy has not been changed at all, and that "Kovalenko's smiling face" in the interview he gave to the Japanese media and his attempt for dialogue for the sake of dialogue are meaningless. Our strongest interest goes to the Northern Territories issue, asserts the editorial, but Soviet suggestions for the "Friendship Treaty" and "No use of nuclear weapons agreement" do not include this issue. "The nuclear threat to Asia", asserts the article, comes from the Soviet SS-20 missiles. Similarly, Kovalenko's argument that military troops are needed in the Northern Territories for "guarding purposes" (*keibi ni hitsuyou na dake*) seems groundless, as it is said that the Soviets have deployed a relatively large troops, equipped with tanks, missiles, helicopters, artillery, *Mig*-21. This deployment, continues the editorial, significantly increases anti-Soviet sentiment, concluding with a the wish that one day, the Northern Territories would return to Japan, and the Soviet-Japanese relations improve.

Analysis: The Soviet military threat is mentioned in the context of the bilateral relationship. The SS-20 (deployed in 135 bases) are taken to be the source of the nuclear threat to Asia (*ajia no kako no kyoui ha soren noSS-20 kara deteiru to itteyoi darou)* and the intention behind the Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories is strongly questioned. The editorial uses harsh language toward Soviet policy, demonstrating sarcasm and implicit hostility toward the Soviet regime, and especially to the genuineness of Kovalenko's statements and Soviet actions. It rejects the Soviet position that the military expansion on the Northern Territories is for guarding purposes only. In terms of policy-measures, the editorial calls GOJ to put the Northern Territories issue on the table in future meetings with Soviet leaders. In terms of framing techniques, the editorial used "Siberian mass of Cold War" to describe the impact of the Korean Airliner incident on the bilateral relations. The editorial inflates the Soviet military threat, but other than political measures it does not advocate for military measures against the Soviet Union; US counter-

weapon deployment to the region is painted in lines of the security dilemma, whereby each side reacts to the other's military deployment and vice-versa.

Editorial #18: "Soviet military build in the Far East and Japan's stance" (May 13, 1984).
Location: Page 3.
Background: Soviet military build up in the Far East.
Content: The editorial asserts that as long as our country wishes to continue preserve the peace, it is vital for us to maintain dialogue with the Soviet Union; but when negotiating with the Soviet Union, it is important to bring to the table Japan's integrated strength including its political and economic might. Without this position of strength, it would be extremely difficult to maintain effective dialogue. One of the aspects of "integrated strength", asserts the editorial, is the existence of a defense force that can restraint / deter the opponent (*aite no shin'ryaku o yokushi suru tame no bōeiryoku no sonzai da*). It would be only after the Soviet Union could not disregard our very best efforts to build-up our defense force that a true dialogue toward peace can be established between both nations. This point was made clear by the recent visit of Defense Secretary Weinberg and during his meeting with PM Nakasone. This defense build-up does not mean that Japan is on its way to become a military superpower or that it would change the current exclusive defense oriented policy. During his visit to Japan, Weinberg had emphasized the enlarged threat from the [recent] Soviet military buildup in the Far-East; no matter what the Soviet intentions are, this [reality] is "extremely regrettable" (*kiwamete ikan)*. In light of Soviet military expansion, it is unavoidable that Japan would increase its defense power, too. Those who think that defense build-up will harm peace (and relatedly, those who advocate surrender in case Japan was to be invaded) are wrong, as the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan demonstrates: the Soviet use military power against weak countries. In other words, the existence of defense force improve the chances for peace and not vice-versa. The editorial mentions Nakasone's new emphasis in military strategy that was caused by a realization that the SDF suffers from low supplies in the rear front and Japan's strict financial condition. It concludes by reiterating that Japan's defense power would not be put to use for offensive purposes.
Analysis: The subject of this editorial is Japan's risk-measures and its military component. The Soviet military is framed as a potential adversary. For the first time in *Yomiuri* editorials, Japan's risk measures are framed in terms of defense power, in addition to the economic and political

dimensions. Defense force is a key for peace is this editorial's main message: the counter-frame is that which believes that defense power only hinders peace and those who advocate for a passive surrender. The Soviet Union is depicted in negative terms, an entity driven by power calculations as the invasion of Afghanistan had "shown"; hence, it is necessary to develop a position of power toward it.

Editorial # 19: "Compound eyes consideration that do not miss on defense and diplomacy" (January 19, 1986)
Location: Page 3.
Background: Positive signs for deepening of the dialogue between Japan and Soviet Union were reported in the morning edition of the *Yomiuri* after the Soviet Foreign Minister visits to Japan.
Content: At the same time the editorial mentions positive signs for dialogue, the US-Japan security meeting held in Hawaii concludes that due to the Soviet military build-up, both sides agree that the situation in the Far East and the Pacific continues to be "difficult as before". "Friendship and threat" - the editorial frames the topic of this piece by referring to the two "seemingly opposite" dimensions of the current picture of the Soviet Union. In Japan's history, asserts the editorial, there has been no other time when a comprehensive, "compound eyes outlook" (*fukugan shikō*) on defense and diplomacy was needed as now. On the one hand, it is desirable to advance the friendship among Japan and the Soviet Union; on the other hand, it is crucial to respond to the [Soviet] threat with resolve and proceed in both directions in a logical manner. Japan as an independent country has to balance between the need to indicate [to the Soviets] our intent to protect our territories (land, sea and air) with our defense force along with the make efforts to advance the friendship between both countries. The editorial evaluates Japan's security pillars - both the SDF and the security alliance in a positive way - and calls to strengthen them further; it mentions that both sides discussed the Over-The-Horizon (OTH) Radar and asserts that such a capability would be indispensable for Japan in order to provide early warning of Soviet bombers' movement. Although high expectations to diffusion of tensions between both superpowers is felt after the summit meeting of US and Soviet Union's leaders, there is no change in the trend of Soviet military buildup in the Far East, and "this is regrettable." Since our country does not have any military aspirations or offensive plans, and would only use its force to protect itself after it was attacked, the editorial concludes with a desire that the Soviet

Union would acknowledge this fact as well and redrew its forces from the area. For this reason, an open dialogue with the Soviets is necessary.

Analysis: The Soviet Union military is framed as a threat, to which Japan should respond with resolve; at the same time, the editorial highlights the opportunity to improve the bilateral relationship and therefore, a comprehensive and logical attitude is needed when considering Japan's defense and diplomacy. Japan's defense power is emphasized again as a deterrence and a leverage to improve relations with the Soviet Union. In terms of shared belief, the editorial seem to endorse a realist view of world politics. It indicates that the current international politics is such that a "compound eyes outlook" is needed; in other words, defense power and diplomacy should go hand in hand when considering the Soviet Union.

Editorial # 20: Expectations for US-ASEAN Cooperation" (May 4, 1986).

Location: Page 3.

Background: President Reagan's trip to South East Asia in which he participated in the ASEAN summit held in Bali, Indonesia.

Content: The editorial reports on Reagan's visit to South-East Asia and the issues on the agenda, including measures to enhance free trade, Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, and growing concerns among ASEAN countries about the conservative trend among the "advances nations" (that is, economic conservatism). The final paragraph of the editorial discusses perceptional gaps between ASEAN and US concerning the Soviet threat but asserts that both sides recognize that the US plays a role in deterring external threats to the region.

Analysis: The Soviet Union is not the subject of this editorial but rather the bilateral issues on the agenda between the US and ASEAN. Still, the editorial frames Soviet military expansionism as a threat to US and to some extent, to ASEAN countries (Soviet threat is not under quotation marks). In that since, the editorial inflates the Soviet threat, although not necessarily in the context of Japan's national security.

Editorial #21: "Agitated Europe's difficult challenge" (April 5, 1989).

Location: page 3.

Background: Patterns of change are observed in Europe.

Content: The editorial asserts that two reformations engulf Europe at the moment: from the East, Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union, and from the West the attempt to finalize a unified market by the EC countries. The editorial depicts Gorbachev's new thinking a "shock wave" coming from Moscow, in which both a desire for disarmament and deep changes in Anti-Western attitude can be traced. In West Germany, the "front-line" of the East-West conflict, where the majority of people had felt a strong Soviet threat until few years ago, about 70 percent declared in recent poll that they do not feel a Soviet threat. As a result of the decrease in the "psychological threat" posed by the Soviet Union, West Germany resists US and UK's moves on toward modernization of their short-term nuclear arsenal, calling both countries to pursue disarmament talks instead. Coupled with this sense of alleviated threat, there is a movement in West Germany to promote peace and reach-out to the east and assist the Soviet Union in its reforms. The editorial then moves to discuss recent developments in Hungry and Poland and the movement there toward democratization and liberalization; it contrasts the Soviet military response in 1956 to similar trends with the current open-ness of the Soviet regime toward these developments, adding that although there is still no guarantee that the Soviet Union would approve a complete neutralization of both countries. The editorial then moves to survey recent developments in the EC and concludes with a call to Western countries to formulate a comprehensive policy toward the Soviet Union, based on the analysis of "national security, diplomacy, and economy."

Analysis: The Soviet Union threat is described in the editorial in the context of recent developments in Europe. The editorial mentions that there is a dramatic decrease in the perception of Soviet threat in Western Germany as a result of the recent policy changes in Moscow.

Also, Soviet response to movement toward democracy in Hungry and Poland is framed in positive terms. Still, the editorial communicates certain skepticism (there is no guarantee that the Soviet would allow for a full neutralization of these countries) and to formulate a policy shared by the Western countries as a whole, which takes into account national security aspect of the East-West relations; by stating so, it seems to call for composedness in the attitude toward these changes, and not to be carried away. Interestingly, the editorial makes an implicit distinction between real and subjective ("psychological") threat, referring for the first time to a reduction in the psychological Soviet threat (*soren no shinriteki kyoui)*.

Editorial # 22: "US moves toward sharp decrease in military expenditures" (November 24, 1989)
Location: Page 3.
Background: It was reported that the Bush administration finalized a plan to reduce mid-term and long-term defense expenditures.

Content: The editorial asserts that US allies (Japan and European countries) should pay close attention to developments following the American plan to reduce defense expenditures. The editorial mentions that the defense budget grew dramatically during Reagan administration and that prospects for reduction include cutting the number of troops, weapon systems, and facilities of forces stationed abroad. The editorial asserts that several reasons are behind this decision: first, the Soviet Union continues its one-side redraw of its forces from Eastern Europe and a large-scale reduction in forces has been confirmed by the US. Second, the movement of Eastern European countries toward democratization voids the Warsaw Pact of its military strength. "While it is too soon to open the champagne, its OK to start cooling it" is the dominant mood in the US regarding the developments in Europe. Third, one fourth of US budget is consumed by defense expenditures, and therefore there is pressure to reduce such expenses. The editorial welcomes the reduction in US defense budget as a way to improve US financial situation. "However", continues the editorial, there is a need to acknowledge several potential problems in the enforcement of the plan. First, the Soviet threat (like that, under no quotation) in the Far East and the Northern Pacific has not reduced, and therefore we should evaluate the possible impact of US defense cut on the Western network of national security. The editorial then contrasts the alleviating tensions in Europe with the persistence of tensions in the Far East and asks how to reconcile both trends. In addition, wouldn't the reduction of US forces in Europe lead to the weakening of the US-Europe security relationship ? ponder the writers. Second, there is strong possibility that US pressure on its allies in Europe and on Japan to do more for their defense would increase as a result of the new plan. "We would like to avoid" a situation in which anti-Soviet attitudes in the US alleviate and anti-Japanese attitudes become stronger.
Analysis: The Soviet military threat is not the subject of the editorial but rather US plan to reduce its mid and long terms defense budget. The editorial frames the Soviet military presence in the Far East and North Pacific as a threat, and maintains that while there is reduction of tensions in Europe the situation in the Far East continues to be tensed. Here we clearly see the working of the relative spatial distribution of threat; the easing of tensions in one front only are not taken as signs of composure by the *Yomiuri*. The question why reduction of arms in the Far East is not happening becomes a reason for concern. The editorial advocates for caution action vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and warns against certain risks as a result of the US plan. However, it does offer basic support for the plan.

Appendix 2: *Yomiuri* Editorials Containing "China" and "Threat"

Editorial # 1: "Regrettable Chinese Nuclear Test" (May 16, 1965)

Location: Page 2.

Background: China's second nuclear test conducted recently.

Content: The editorial comments on the recent nuclear test conducted in Western China in which the nuclear bomb was dropped from an aircraft. Even if this technology has yet to become operational in combat, the editorial asserts that it causes "heavy concerns" for us (*wareware ni ooki na fuan o hikiokoshita koto ha jijitsu de aru*). After the first nuclear test, we strongly protested to China saying that it is a "threat to peace" and that China's actions runs the risk of inducing Japan to develop its own nuclear arms. The editorial mentions that the international situation had changed both politically and militarily since the last nuclear test in October 1964: Khrushchev was "released" from his role and the new Johnson administration in the US was inaugurated; the war in Vietnam seems to escalate. It evaluated the possible negative implications of the Chinese test on the situation in Vietnam and other regions in the world. The editorial continues to explore the reasons why China had gone nuclear, namely, to cope with the nuclear threats posed by the nuclear powers (that is, the US and Soviet Union). The biggest problem, poses the editorial, is how the US will react to this test as it faces a very difficult situation in Vietnam. In this context, US Secretary of Defense McNamara's recent statement that the US would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons to protect its interests is especially worrisome, argues the editorial. Tied together, the editorial contemplates, the issues of China's nuclearization, US propensity to use nuclear weapons, and the war in Vietnam - causes anxiety. As a country who has undergone the disaster of nuclear weapons, we should protest once again to the Chinese government against the development of nuclear weapons.

Analysis: China's nuclearization is framed in terms of in-security; so is US future response to this move. The editorial inflates the threat-scenario of nuclear war between US and China in the context of the war in Vietnam. Japan, however, remains largely outside of the analysis and a direct threat to Japan from the recent Chinese development is not implied. The editorial advocates for political protest, indirectly restating its stance against Japanese development of nuclear capability (advocated in an editorial after the nuclear test in October 1964).

Editorial #2: "Chinese Nuclear Weaponry and Japan's Security" (August 7, 1967)

Location: Page 2.

Background: Reports in the US senate and congress about China completing the development of ICBM by 1971-72 among other military forecasts.

Content: The editorial cites the reports in the US about the prospects of Chinese military development, asserting that its nuclear capability was achieved faster than anticipated. It argues that a nuclear China reshuffles the cards of international politics, the nuclear balance between both superpowers and the relationships between China and US, China and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union and the US. In addition, China's development of MRBM (Middle-Range Ballistic Missiles) enable us to say that the day that China will pose an "actual threat" to Japan from a (purely) capability-based point of view has nearly come (*chūgoku kakusenryoku ga, sukunakutomo sono nōryoku ni kansuru kagiri, wa ga kuni ni taishi genjitsuteki na kyoui to naru hi ga madjika ni semattekita to ieru kara de aru*). China's neighbors and US strategy in the Far Eastern (including those who host American bases for the purposes of US strategic advantage in the Far East are "shaken" by this development. Next, the editorial moves to introduce the second part of its analysis with the title "falling short of a military threat" (*gunjiteki kyoui ni ha narumai*), posing the question: "will Chinese nuclear missiles become a serious threat to our country?". Judging from China's nuclear strategic point of view, the editorial suggests that a serious "actual threat" to Japan would not unfold and therefore, the policy which advocates to answer nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons should be ruled out. As justification to this conclusion, the editorial brings two reasons : first, China developed nuclear weapons essentially in order to gain nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the US and Soviet Union; second, since the purpose behind its nuclear program was to deter the two superpowers, and because nuclear weapons were originally thought of as a "response weapon", the likelihood that China would be putting nuclear weapons to use against Japan is almost unthinkable (*hotondo kangaerarenai*). This is especially so since Japan does not pose a threat to China."But", continues the editorial, there is one scenario in which Chinese nuclear weapons can pose actual threat to Japan: when Japan either develops nuclear weapons itself, or provides for a large nuclear weapon base for other nations (US). Next, the editorial moves to explore countermeasures to the "psychological threat" (*shinriteki kyoui he no taiōsaku*). Although nuclear weapons have an important role in deterring adversaries, we can not forget the slight possibility of nuclear weapons being put to use. The editorial repeats its

stance against deploying nuclear weapons to Okinawa and concludes that while China's nuclear weapons do pose a political and psychological threat to Japan, they do not pose an actual threat. The editorial compares this situation to Soviet nuclear missiles deployed to Primorsky Krai (*enkaishū)*, which after the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union do not generate a feeling of dread among the Japanese.

Analysis: China's nuclearization is framed in terms of insecurity but not as a military threat. The editorial acknowledges a political and psychological threat but maintains that China does not have a reason to target Japan and that as long as Japan does not go nuclear itself or allow nuclear bases in its territory, then an actual threat to its security would not unfold. The counter-frame is clear: Japan's independent nuclear program or nuclear basification in Okinawa. The editorial attempts to deflate a Chinese military threat and although it acknowledges that from a purely capability-based point of view, then China would soon pose a threat to Japan, it rules out the possibility that China would strike Japan with nuclear weapons under the current security policy. Interestingly, China is not framed in this article as a villain nor a "bad state" but rather as a rational actor.

Editorial #3: "Let's look straight ahead to the China problem" (April 11, 1969)

Location: Page 2.

Background: An LDP politician returns from a trip to China and reports that there is a deterioration in Chinese attitudes toward Japanese government.

Content: In this context, the editorial makes three points. First, "China problem" is connected to a problem of biased subjective perspectives of China among politicians in our country; Second, we do not understand what China wants from us, and third, we are forgetting that the situation after the Sino-Japanese war has not been properly settled. The first issue is sectarianism among the big political parties in Japan and conflicting perspectives of China. The editorial calls Japan's politicians to form attitudes based on the big picture (forest) and not on individual trees; based on logic and not on immediate benefits and losses. Similarly, it calls to refrain from impolite statements such as that made in a recent US-Japan joint statement communique which contained the expression "China threat". As for the second point, the editorial maintains that although PM Satō probably sincerely seek for improving ties with China, he is also affected by a subjective perception of it and is not aware of what China really wants from Japan. In addition, there is no

real attempt to try and understand what China seeks. In order to improve Sino-Japanese relations, asserts the editorial, we should first acknowledge that the China problem is related to Japan's future well-being / safety (*anpi*). The editorial concludes in a call to PM Satō to reflect on the need to address Sino-Japanese relations with good will and attentiveness.
Analysis: China is framed in terms of insecurity.The editorial does not inflate a China threat, calling to avoid statement such as "China threat" instead. It analyzes three challenges for Sino-Japanese relations, by taking an introspective approach to explore for Japan's failures to address the bilateral relationship in a positive way.

Editorial #4: "Public opinion poll results on Japan-US Security Treaty and China's perception" (May 31, 1970)
Location: Page 5.
Background: The *Yomiuri Shinbun* conducted public-opinion surveys about Japan-US Security Treaty and attitudes toward Japan's China policy.
Content :The editorial reports on the results of public opinion surveys and offers its interpretation to the trends in public attitudes about security issues, including the tendency toward neutrality (more than half of the Japanese public). Asking about whether they feel a threat from China's nuclear development, about 19 percent of the respondents mentioned that they did feel a big threat and about 40 percent felt small of a threat. The editorial summarizes these results and asserts that while more than half of the public feels insecurity as a result of China-related development, compared to a similar survey done two years ago after China had detonated a hydrogen-bomb in which 72 percent of the public reported that they "felt a threat" (*kyoui o kanjita*), then the public seem to have been responding to China's nuclear program with growing "calmness". Next, the editorial reports on the results about the preferred China policy, suggesting that the majority of the public (about 70 percent) would like to see the government adopting a more positive policy toward China.
Analysis: The editorial analyzes public opinion polls, suggesting that the public has come to view China with greater calm. It takes a clear pro-China stance, interpreting the results as to deflate a China threat and advocating for improvement of bilateral relations.

Appendix 3: *Yomiuri* Editorials Containing "North Korea" and "Threat"

Editorial Number 1: "Lessons from the missile launch incident" (August 30, 1981).

Location: Page 4.

Background: According to Pentagon officials, US reconnaissance aircraft "SR-71 Blackbird" was targeted by a surface-to-air missile on August 26 near the demilitarized zone in the Korean Peninsula.

Content: The editorial begins with citing both US's and North Korea's responses to the incident, asserting that currently it looks like this incident will not bring escalation in military tensions on the Peninsula. It calls for both sides to show self-restraints "more than anything else". It then moves to two interesting points as a result of the incident: first, North Korea's action invokes the aerial combat that happened the previous week, in which two US fighter aircraft intercepted two Libyan fighters over Libya's claimed territorial waters. North Korea, too, claims the territorial waters above which frequent US aircrafts had been flying. The second point, according to the editorial, is related to South Korea's request for Japanese financial aid for "national security reasons"; The editorial suggests that North Korea, which objects this move, avoided taking responsibility for the missile launch so as not to appear belligerent in lights of efforts by both the US and South Korea to link between the Soviet military build-up in the Far East and the North Korean threat, and their attempt to persuade Japan to help meet those threats with financial aid.The editorial claims that the responsibility to promote the dialogue between the Koreas lie with the Soviet Union and the US. Instead, recent actions taken by the superpowers (Soviet military build up in the region and US severe reaction) only undermine the stability of the Korean Peninsula; as a conclusion, the editorial calls for great dialogue between the US and USSR.

Framing: The editorial does not frame North Korea as a threat, arguing that the ultimate responsibility lie with the US and the Soviet Union.

Counter-frame: Use of force, logic of security. The editorial emphasizes dialogue as means to reduce military tensions in the region.

2. Editorial Number 2: "Maintain Principles in the Diplomatic Negotiation with North Korea" (January 29, 1991).

Location: Page 3.

Background : The first round of normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea to open on 30-31 of January in Pyongyang.

Content: The editorial asserts that both the Northern Territories issue and the lack of diplomatic relations with North Korea are the two important problems that still persist in the post Cold War era. The editorial asserts that, "Basically, the fact that both countries aim for normalization of relations is desirable". It recommends that GOJ would apologize to North Korea for Japan's colonial rule, but takes a negative attitude that Japan would pay compensation to North Korea 45 years after the war has ended. It also cautions against harming the relationship with South Korea, and concludes by saying that North Korea has to abide by international agreements and law, and that a nuclear North Korea would be a "serious threat to Japan's security". Subsequently, the editorial calls for North Korea to accept UN nuclear-inspection teams.

Framing: North Korea is framed as a potential future threat (if it becomes nuclear).

3. Editorial Number 3: "An Appeal to North Korea to Reconsider" (March 13, 1993).

Location: Page 3.

Background: North Korea notices its intention to withdraw from the NPT.

Content: The editorial asserts that "no other country has ever withdrawn from the NPT" and framed North Korea as a "challenge to international society" and the attempt to build a peaceful order in the post-Cold War era. The editorial calls for North Korea to receive IAEA inspection team and to relent its decision to withdraw from the treaty; if it still preserves its stance, then economic sanctions should not be ruled out. After describing the exchange between IAEA and North Korea, the editorial evaluate the implications of a nuclear DPRK. "If North Korea becomes nuclear, then it would pose a serious threat not only to South Korea, but also to Asia's security, and international peace. Needless to say, the international society can not neglect the suspicion about North Korea's nuclear [development] as is." The editorial concludes with a call to prevent nuclear proliferation around the world.

Framing: North Korea is framed as a potential threat to Asia's security (no direct reference to Japan however, but to Asia in general).

Counter-Frames: no action by the international community; military action. The editorial only calls to consider diplomatic channels and economic sanctions.

4. Editorial number 4: "Calling into question the response to the 'North''s missiles" (July 31, 1993).

Location: Page 3

Background: North Korea's first *Nodong* missile test on May 30 and 31.

Content: The editorial begins by asserting that new threats have surfaced in the post Cold War period, and the successful *Nodong* missile test is one of them; currently, Japan does not have a defense capability to deal with the missile, and that constitutes a problem. The editorial then quotes the recently published Defense White Paper and the "alarm bells" it rung in relation to North Korea, criticizing the JDA for not having mentioning in the document a proper plan to respond to this threat. The editorial mentions that the JDA will start deploying PAC missiles in 1996, but this capability is not sufficient to effectively deal with the *Nodong* missile without the establishment of an early warning system (based on satellite technology). Subsequently, the editorial calls the government to amend the resolution that limit the use of satellites by the SDF for communication purposes, maintaing that this move is "necessary". The perceptions according to which peace and military do not go hand in hand has been disproved, like the Gulf War has demonstrated (*heiwa to gunji ga aihan suru mono da to iu ninshiki wa kokusaiteki ni wa tsūyō shinai*). The editorial concludes by calling the next administration to consider acquiring this capability, asserting that as long as Japan maintains its exclusive defense policy, then having a satellite in order to collect information is desirable.

Shared Beliefs: The editorial evaluates the international environment in the post Cold War era as characterized by the emergence of "new threats" and growing uncertainty.

Frame: North Korea's missile capability is a threat. Japan should develop a defensive military capability to deal with it better;

Counter-Frame: (1) Offensive capability for the SDF; Nuclear development for Japan; (2) countering North Korea in diplomatic/economic means alone.

5. Editorial number 5: "After-all, [Japan] should hasten TMD research"(September 2, 1998).

Location: Page 3

Background: North Korea's *Taepodong* missile on August 31, 1998.

Content: The editorial begins with a description of the missile test, which according to American sources, had two stages: the second of which saw the missile flying over the Japanese airspace and landing in the Pacific ocean. The editorial highlights that unlike the *Nodong*, the new missile - currently under development - will be able to cover all of Japan and its development hinders the efforts of the international community to bring peace and stability to the region.

Shared Beliefs: The threat of proliferation of WMD - including both development of nuclear weapons and means of delivery - "continues to spread" (*sekaiteki na kakusan ga susundeiru*) in the post Cold War era; this is an urgent matter to deal with for the international community as a whole.

Risk-Measures: The editorial asserts that the first thing Japan should do is to assertively pursue initiatives to enhance disarmament and prevent proliferation of such weapons. The second risk-measure is of military nature; while maintaing its nonaggressive defense, Japan should be prepared to deal with attacks and threats. Concretely, the editorial argues that the joint research with the US about BMD system should be further pursued. Since the JDA did not include a proper R&D budget for the next financial year, the editorial asserts, GOJ should approve additional budget "as soon as possible". The editorial suggests that behind the postponement of additional budget for BMD research stand over-sensitivity toward China. This is because China's formal and informal objection to the joint research on BMD prompted Japanese leaders to postpone the approval of the budget ahead of the Japan-China summit meeting planned to autumn 1998. The editorial concludes that GOJ should not let non-allied countries to influence its security policy, and pursue this policy while seeking the understanding of neighboring countries including China.

Frames: North Korea is framed as a threat - the nuclear and missile programs as two components of this threat.

Counter-frames: non-military means; offensive capabilities for the SDF.

6. Editorial number 6: "Firm Response to the North's Reckless Action!" (September 3, 1998).

Location: Page 3

Background: North Korea's *Taepodong* missile on August 31, 1998.

Content: The editorial describes the reaction the missile test in terms of "shock" and "strong anger", mentioning that although the GOJ tried to stop this test through diplomatic channels, the DPRK ignored its request and went on with its defiant action (*kore wo mushi shite misairu wo hassha shita chōsenteki na kōdō ni aratemte tsuyoi ikari wo oboeru*), subsequently calling North Korea to explain its behavior and to apologize. The editorial mentions that North Korea's technology has drastically improved, and the risk that it will export this technology to other Asian countries and to the Middle East is another cause of concern. "Coupled with its suspected nuclear development", this missile technology poses a grave threat to the region and the world's peace and stability. Japan and the international community must respond with resolution.
The editorial moves to discuss Japan's response and maintains that past means of diplomatic negotiations and humanitarian aid are proved insufficient to solve issues such as the kidnapping issue (*rachi mondai*), and that the North's violent behavior in terms of the "problematic kid in the international arena" (*kokusaiteki na mondaiji*) must be checked. The editorial stresses the importance of cooperating with South Korea and the US on this matter, as well as the UN security council and general assembly. But the most important thing, claims the editorial, is Japan's flawless defense vis-à-vis the missile threat: it amounts to a great deterrence. Naturally, claims the editorial, we have to pursue the research about TMD urgently, as well as independent air-defense and satellite capabilities, all in line with the basic policy of exclusively defensive defense.

Frames: Coupled with nuclear development, a grave threat (*jūdai na kyoui*). Problematic, violent kid.

Risk-measure: flawless defense - most important; diplomatic measures - secondary importance.

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