博士学位論文

The Integration of Foreign Residents into the Japanese Society: A Case Study on the Filipino Residents in Nagoya City

（在留外国人の日本社会への統合化 : 名古屋市の在日フィリピン人の事例研究）

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List of Abbreviations

AIMIS	Aichi Medical Interpretation System
CPFA	Chubu Philippines Friendship Association
ELCC	Ecumenical Learning Center for Children
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
FMC	Filipino Migrants Center
ICRRA	Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act
ICTs	Information and Communication Technologies
JET	Japan Exchange and Teaching
JLPT	Japan Language Proficiency Test
JPEPA	Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LINC	Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada
MCPs	Multicultural policies
MIAC	Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
MHLW	Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
NCR	National Capital Region
NIA	Nagoya International Association
NIC	Nagoya International Center
NPO	Non-profit organizations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFW	Overseas Filipino Workers
OPA	Overseas Performing Artists
OWWA	Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
POEA	Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
PSJ	Philippine Society of Japan
UN	United Nations
UR	Urban Renaissance
3D	Dirty, Demeaning, Dangerous
3K	Kitanai, Kitsui, Kiken

Part I.

This part is the first of the three parts of this research project. This is composed of two chapters. The goal of this part is to introduce the problem, situate it within the bigger literature of migration and inform of the possible contributions of this project.

The first chapter will focus on providing a broad introduction and a review of the literature. I do this to be able to locate the concept of integration in a field that is *as old as time*. Migration has been an exercise that people have undertaken since time immemorial and because it is people that social scientists study, the literature is replete with contradictions and paradigm shifts. What I aim in this part is to establish where I am coming from.

The second chapter then looks at the gaps in the literature, expounds on the theoretical and conceptual framework that I utilize in the project, explains the research questions and the significance of this project and introduce the methodology. The last part of the chapter also provides an introduction to the data collected.

Chapter 1: Broad Introduction and Review of Related Literature

A. Introduction

Japan has often been seen as “new” to the immigration of foreign people. However, people have moved in and out of Japan even before the economic boom in the 1980s. Though relative to other OECD countries, Japan has a fairly small population of foreign residents, we see that population growing and growing each year. The continuous increase in the number of long-term and permanent residents in Japan which by 2016 is at 2.38 million suggests that contrary to existing beliefs, migrants are coming and are staying longer than they are expected to. Foreseeing a bigger need for workers for the upcoming Tokyo 2020 Olympics, Japan is poised to open its doors for more foreign workers. What the country fails however to recognize is that time and again, it has seen that many people do not simply go back once their contracts end—many of the foreigners who came to Japan during the 1980s stayed. In light of the continuous increase in the number of foreign residents, a pressing issue has come to light: integration of foreign residents. The Japanese government has taken a particular way of trying to address this issue—that is devolving tasks to local municipalities to provide services and implement policies aimed at promoting multicultural co-existence among foreign residents and Japanese locals. Amidst the celebration of the hope of a more accepting Japan through the efforts of the localities, one question remains unanswered: How integrated are foreign residents?

This is the question I aim to answer. I situate this question in the context of the Filipino residents in Nagoya City. Filipino residents constitute one of the biggest foreign resident population in Japan. Nagoya City is comparable to a microcosm, reflecting the distribution of foreign residents at the national level. Further, Nagoya City is among the biggest and most populated cities in Japan, and the role of cities are becoming more highlighted as they are the first point of contact for many migrants and tensions between native-born and foreign-born residents are most felt in urban areas. Yet Nagoya City has been fairly unstudied compared to bigger cities such as Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto.

This project is divided into three parts and into nine chapters. The first part of this project sets out the framework by which I approach the research question. The first part includes Chapter 1 and 2. In the first chapter, I set out to do the much-needed task of locating integration in the literature of migration. Doing so will assist me in defining and clearing out any misconceptions and convolutions to be able to utilize the concept as an analytical tool. Locating it will also tell me where this project comes in and in what fields of research this project can contribute to. In

Chapter 2 I present the conceptual framework with which I will set out to analyze and understand migrant integration. Building on the work done by integration researchers and filling in the gaps, I present a definition that I will be utilizing to answer the research questions that I also present in this chapter. I also specify my goals and the limitations of this project. Chapter 2 will also provide an account of the methodology that I utilize. Knowing the extent of integration of a group of migrants is a daunting task as there are so many facets and elements that have to be considered. I specify all these in this chapter.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 form the second part of this research. These chapters provide the context whereby I examine the integration of Filipino residents. Chapter 3 details the development of Japan's immigration policy, while Chapter 4 provides the historical foundation in understanding the Philippine migration to Japan. It is argued that the movement of people from Philippines to Japan is a reflection of the compounding effect of specific labor demand from Japan, and the labor export policy in the Philippines which helped shape a culture of migration. And in Chapter 5 I introduce the case study of Nagoya City. What Nagoya City has been doing in terms of migrant integration is discussed in this chapter. It is argued that integration policy and goals provide the baseline with which integration outcomes of foreign residents are assessed. Integration policies and goals also provide the "playing field" where foreign residents are; it sets the areas where foreign residents are allowed and not allowed. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I discuss the contextual factors that I argue impact the specific outcomes and patterns of integration that emerge.

Finally, the third part of the project presents the findings. In Chapter 6, the data collected from the survey is presented to establish the individual characteristics of the respondents. This is important in understanding the individual characteristics of the Filipino residents and how these can possibly affect their outcomes and patterns of integration. Chapter 7 continues this by discussing the outcomes of integration in four different dimensions of integration. In this chapter, I argue that Filipino residents are experiencing an uneven integration, as they are more integrated in some dimensions than others. I argue that the numbers and statistics presented indicative of the integration levels of the respondents are a product of many contextual and individual factors including but not limited to the integration policies and approach of the local government, the context by which the Filipino residents came and settled in Nagoya City and the individual characteristics of the foreign residents. And finally, Chapter 8 utilizes the integration outcomes in the four dimensions of integration discussed in Chapter 8 to uncover patterns of integration. I explore how different factors impact pattern membership. Chapter 9 presents conclusions and ways forward.

Any discussion of integration begins with the much-needed task of locating the concept of integration in the development of migration theories. Locating integration in the literature will assist in clearing out any misconceptions and convolutions to be able to utilize the concept as an analytical tool. After locating the concept, I set out to disentangle the many definitions and measures that have already been discussed in the literature. This chapter will proceed as follows: first, I discuss the three main strands of theories in migrant integration and discuss how each of these strands develops as a response to the happenings in their time. The changes in migration and the continued influx of people led strands to be replaced by other strands of theories. The development in the literature of migration showed that there is no one path to migration. The purpose of this section is to explain how each of these strands is but one of the many possible paths to integration, paths that are shaped by the migrants' agencies and histories and the host societies' approach and ability to limit or expand migrants' opportunities.

In the following sections, I endeavor to assess the existing definitions of integration as well as measures already utilized in the literature. I look at two important components of integration: outcomes and patterns. Further, because migration is ever changing, I also take note of the recent developments in the literature including transnationalism, ethnic social ties and migrants' agencies and work to understand how these can possibly impact integration. At the end of this chapter, I endeavor to point out the gaps and provide a definition of integration that I will be utilizing in this project.

B. Literature Review

Assimilation Theory

Assimilation, as a concept used in the discussion of immigrant incorporation, has fallen largely out of favor for many researchers. It is used to explain the "melting pot", a metaphor to describe a heterogeneous society becoming more and more homogenous as time progress. Initial conceptions of the concept have utilized it to mean "unlearning" the "inferior" cultures of the minorities, or as the final stage of the "race-relations cycle" (Park and Burgess 1969) which postulates that assimilation, as the eventual melting of the minor race into the host society's race, is inevitable (see Park and Burgess 1969, Alba and Nee 1997).

Developed during the context of the racial segregation in the United States, it works from the assumption that there is an "inferior" and a "superior" culture. While the more racially-charged words used in the early conception of the concept of assimilation have been toned down, it is generally taken to mean as the process where members of immigrant groups will begin to reflect

the norms, values and various characteristics of their host countries. To understand better the development of the concept of assimilation, as well as to understand more thoroughly its meaning, I will discuss the three major theories of assimilation.

The canonical theory of assimilation is associated with Milton Gordon's 1964 work titled "Assimilation in American life: the role of race, religion, and national origins". Gordon (1964), an American sociologist, is credited to have devised a "systematic dissection of the concept" (Alba and Nee 1997). The canonical theory of assimilation postulates that assimilation follows Gordon's seven dimensions of assimilation namely:

1. Acculturation or cultural or behavioral assimilation, which pertains to the change of cultural patterns to those of the host society
2. Structural assimilation, or large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs and institutions of host society which operates on primary group level
3. Marital assimilation, which refers to large-scale intermarriage
4. Identificational assimilation, or the development of sense of peoplehood based exclusively on host society
5. Attitude receptional assimilation, absence of prejudice
6. Behavior receptional assimilation, or the absence of discrimination
7. Civic assimilation, refers to absence of value and power conflict

Gordon's seven stages of assimilation begins at acculturation, adopted cultural patterns of which are not limited to and extend beyond "acquisition of English language, to dress and outward emotional expression and to personal values" (Alba and Nee 1997). When a minority group enters into the "social cliques, clubs and institutions of the core society" then structural assimilation begins, according to Gordon, and once this begins all other stages of assimilation will follow. Simply, what Gordon's work postulates is that minority and majority groups follow a "straight-line" convergence.

Gordon's work on assimilation has received considerable criticism, mainly because of first, the unit of analysis remains ambiguous in that while "the measurement of assimilation was put at the individual level, the hypothesis has been interpreted as applying literally to groups" (Alba and Nee 1997). Second, Gordon's conception works in a two-group framework. Since the conception of the canonical assimilation theory, the immigrant groups in the US have diversified and the society became more heterogeneous. Immigrants from Asia and the South America have compounded the racial divide.

The strength, however, of Gordon's assimilation theory according to Alba and Nee (1997), is when the dimensions of assimilation he theorizes about are taken as stages. This changes the rather static conception of assimilation into a dynamic process, a process that follows a "straight-line" convergence. This term, popularized by Herbert Gans (1992, 2007), sees assimilation as a process happening through many generations of immigrants, with each generation taking a step farther away from their ethnic culture and a step closer to the host society's culture to eventually be unrecognizable from the host society.

What the straight-line convergence model of assimilation does not consider is that minority cultures are not static, in that in response to the various migration contexts and conditions, minority cultures can change (Alba and Nee 1997). In response, Gans (1992, 2007) proposed the "bumpy-line theory of ethnicity" to accommodate for these tangents while retaining the general concept of the intergenerational move towards assimilation. What Gans' modifications in the cannon suggest is that there are variations in the process of assimilation, and that the so-called "bumps" represent that different adaptations minorities utilize to adapt to the circumstances. These can result from different structural circumstances such as discrimination, or access to resources or even interaction among these (Deaux 2006).

However, such revisions on the theorization of the assimilation framework did not really stop researchers from declaring it dead (Glazer 1993). Times have changed and more and more ethnic groups are coming in and settling in. The assimilation theory seemed to not be adaptable to the American context anymore. Further, the assimilation theory has been criticized for being "Anglo-conformist" and in light of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, assimilation has been deemed not applicable anymore.

In response to this, Alba and Nee (1997) proposed an extension of the assimilation theory to include the concept of "social distance" drawing from Shibutani and Kwan (1965)'s extension of the race-relation cycle. Alba and Nee (1997) noted that when social distance, or the "subjective state of nearness felt to certain individuals" are low, there is a feeling of common identity. They argue that assimilation is continuing and evidenced by the continued blurring of ethnic divides in terms of ethnic economy, participation in the open labor market and spatial patterns. What they argue is that overtime immigrants still assimilate and slowly resemble the host society.

Portes and Zhou (1993) and Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) build on Gans (1992) work in their discussion on the assimilation of the so-called "new second generation" or the children of the new immigrants. New immigrants came from a much more varied socio-economic

background, during the period when demand for low-skilled and semi-skilled labor has dwindled down due to the changes in the economy of the United States (Xie and Greenman 2005). Portes and Zhou (1993) proposed the theory of "segmented assimilation" arguing that there are segments which the immigrant population can assimilate into. Following this, Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) recognized three paths of acculturation: Path 1 which follows the classical assimilation theory evidenced by increased acculturation; Path 2 is acculturation and assimilation into the urban lower class suggesting a downward assimilation as opposed to Path 1's upward assimilation; and Path 3 is selective acculturation which combines economic assimilation with the deliberate preservation of the minorities culture and norms.

The main difference between Portes and Rumbaut's (2001, 2005) segmented assimilation theory and Alba and Nee's (1997) new assimilation theory, according to Waters et al (2010) lie in which mechanisms can lead to successful outcomes. Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) notes that non-white poor immigrants would be better off maintaining their ethnic connections while Alba and Nee (1007) argue that over time, as both host society and immigrants begin to share similar historical processes, the differences between them will blur.

Much of the empirical studies on assimilation theory have based their measures on the conceptualization of Gordon (1964) and on the succeeding revisions of theory by Alba and Nee (1997), Gans (1992, 2007) and Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) (See for example, Williams 1990, Dustmann 2000, Hum and Simpson 2000, Meng and Gregory 2005, Waters 2005, Greenman and Xie 2006, Xie and Greenman 2011). It is among these researches that canon measures about how certain outcomes can predict overall incorporation were developed.

Early immigrant incorporation scholars working within the framework of classical migration theories that highlight the economic push and pull factors of migration have focused on the economic outcomes of immigrants in predicting successful integration (See for example Borjas 1985, Dustmann 2000, Hum and Simpson 2000, Meng and Gregory 2005). For instance, measures of employment and earnings had been commonly utilized to determine how economically integrated immigrants are, and how different immigrant groups fare in comparison to locals. Studies show that earnings among immigrants are generally lower than those by locals and their earnings increase the more they assimilate (Borjas 1985, Dustmann 1993). Human capital measures such as language proficiency and educational attainment of immigrants had often been cited as significant in predicting successful economic integration. Studies such as Dustmann (1993) look at how immigrants' human capital can influence earnings and participation in the labor force. There was also a focus on using citizenship and intermarriage as

important indicators of successful assimilation (Kantarevic 2004, Meng and Gregory 2005, Meng and Meurs 2006, Geurts and Lubbers 2017, di Belgiojoso 2016). Naturalization has been a common feature of many assimilation studies owing from Gordon's (1964) stages of acculturation. Naturalization and intermarriage signal successful assimilation of immigrants, especially in terms of economic assimilation, as these indicate that cultures are on the path to resembling each other. However, as studies show, naturalization does not necessarily mean the blurring of the distinctions of cultures nor does intermarriage mean complete assimilation. Many migrants are opting to lead more and more transnational and transcultural lives.

The older strands along with the two new theories of assimilation have been tested extensively empirically as has been shown, and each time an extension of the theory is offered, suggesting that there is still no coherent umbrella explanation of the assimilation process of migrants.

Multiculturalism

In response to the growing number of immigrants, and to the more varied ethnic groups such as Mexicans, Asians and other non-white groups coming into the United States, researches have turned to multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is seen as a rejection of the "melting pot" metaphor arguing an ideal wherein members can maintain their distinct ethnic collective identities and practices. By underlining the importance of ethnicity in the formation of identity, it disputes the claim of the assimilation theory that as the distance between the minority and the majority culture diminishes ethnicity will cease to be a factor in identity formation.

Among the earlier proponents of multiculturalism is Charles Taylor (1992). He argues that the struggle for recognition can be resolved only through reciprocal recognition among equals (Taylor 1992). He pushes forward the idea that identity is always shaped and defined in relation to others and that therefore non-recognition is a serious injury to identity formation. He therefore sums up that people should adopt the presumption that all cultures are worth equally. Following Taylor (1992) is Will Kymlicka, a Canadian political philosopher, who to this day leads the multiculturalism discourse. According to Kymlicka (1995, 1999, 2007, 2013), cultures are valuable to individuals for two reasons: first, cultural membership is a precondition to personal autonomy in that cultures serve as contexts of choice. Cultures are the contexts by which people frame and pursue their goals. Second, echoing Taylor (1992), Kymlicka argues that culture has an important role in people's identities. Celebrating culture and diversity is often considered the hallmark of multiculturalism, focusing often on ethnic groups' familiar cultural markers (Kymlicka 1999, 2007) such as clothing, cuisine or music.

With this is as the center of his argument, he establishes that minority groups are disadvantaged in terms of access and are therefore entitled to special protections. He bases this claim on "luck egalitarianism" that states that individuals, while responsible for inequalities resulting from their own choices, should not be held accountable for those inequalities that arise from unchosen circumstances. Kymlicka (1999, 2007) argues that being born in the majority culture is "luck" and that therefore the majority culture should contribute to rectifying the inequalities experienced by those in the minority culture by virtue of them being born into a minority culture. He further notes that anti-discrimination laws do not work because states are always going to be biased and never neutral towards other cultures. It is important however to note at this point that he does not argue that all types of minority groups are the same. For instance, he sees indigenous groups as needing the most recognition and migrants on the other hand have voluntarily relinquished their access to their native culture when they chose to migrate. And that a demand for fairer and just terms of integration rests on granting exemptions and accommodations.

By the 1970s to mid-1990s, there was a clear trend among Western countries towards "increased recognition of diversity" evidenced by multiculturalism policy and minority rights (Banting and Kymlicka 2013). As assimilation theories started failing to explain immigrant incorporation in the wake of more diverse immigration, multiculturalism theorists looked at more human development-centered and social justice policies, highlighting the need for more government interventions to protect minority and immigrant rights. A host of multicultural policies (MCPs) have been implemented by governments in Europe in particular to address the increasing number of diverse immigrant groups coming to the continent (Banting and Kymlicka 2013).

However, multiculturalism is not without criticisms. Even before national governments in Europe including Germany and Britain have declared the failure of multiculturalism, theorists and researchers have already begun discussing the inherent flaws in the theoretical conception of multiculturalism. First, critics argue that multiculturalism theories are premised on an "essentialist view of culture", in that cultures are not isolated, distinct nor self-contained wholes but have since time immemorial been affected by interactions, influence through wars, trade and migration and technology. Jeremy Walden (1995) provides a very good illustration of this point by saying that "to immerse oneself in the traditional practices of, say, an aboriginal culture might be a fascinating anthropological experiment, but it involves an artificial dislocation from what actually is going on in the world" (1995, p.100). To aim to preserve a "pure" culture runs the risk of essentializing that culture, making it unable to adapt experience changes in the world. Further, Walden (1995) rejects earlier claims by Kymlicka (1995) that culture provides the context of

choices by arguing that many meaningful choices may come from other cultures. Many can also fall victim to the 3Fs multiculturalism (fashion, food, festival) (Carruthers 2004). By essentializing culture and putting focus on the "pure" culture that is often depicted as that which is different from the majority culture through fashion, food and festival, we run the risk of objectifying and consuming cultures.

The second critique to multiculturalism theories is that what toleration requires is indifference not accommodation. This suggests that the idea of toleration of different cultures will lead not to accommodation but indifference. According to Kukathas (1995) there are no group rights, only individual rights and if the states, following multiculturalism theories of recognition, recognize group and cultural rights then it oversteps its role and undermines individual rights of association. Further, focusing on the group rather than on the individual may ignore the possible discrimination within the group and that therefore this politics of indifference stemming from tolerance will permit abuse of vulnerable members of the group and will create "communities which bring up children unschooled and illiterate; which enforce arranged marriages; which deny conventional medical care to their members (including children); and which inflict cruel and 'unusual' punishment" (Kukathas 2003, 134). Among these are the concerns brought up by Germany and Britain when they declared that multiculturalism has failed.

The third criticism points to multiculturalism's argument on the need for recognition. Critiques have argued that this shifts the view from a "politics of redistribution" to a "politics of recognition". What it does is while it does indeed challenge inequality, it only asks for a simple remedy and that is cultural and symbolic change. This ignores the actual problem of economic inequality and exploitation of which the remedy is economic restructuring (Miller 2006, van Parijs 2004). In a way, this can be seen as shifting the focus from a fight towards "quantity of life" to "quality of life" in that for many minority groups, the most basic needs that should be addressed are those that pertain to shelter, housing, subsistence and that by putting the focus on "quality" or recognition, multiculturalism runs the risk of skipping over addressing the more basic issues. Issues of which pertain to more basic needs that are important to be able to negotiate fairer terms and positions vis-à-vis the majority culture.

The biggest challenge to multiculturalism however may not be philosophical. Those criticisms aside, there was a massive political retreat from multiculturalism, even a backlash against immigrant multicultural policies. While there are no empirical evidences showing that governments have retreated and removed multiculturalism policies for immigrants (Banting and Kymlicka 2013), this backlash is most salient in terms of concerns about lack of social unity and

increasing tensions among diverse groups as what is currently unfolding in many countries in Australia and in Western Europe including Germany, Britain and France. Western European governments have called multiculturalism as promoting division and separation, contrary to what it was conceptualized to stand for, for integration and unity.

Integration

The supposed failure of multiculturalism has led many migration theorists to rethink what they know of the integration process. The shift from assimilation to multiculturalism has also shifted the way the integration of migrants is understood—for one, from economic-focused outcomes to more human-centered outcomes. However, as we saw, the focus on “recognition” of differences has taken for granted the need for “redistribution” to facilitate fairness and justice and break economic inequalities. And on the other, it also showed that an over-emphasis on outcomes at the level of either the micro (migrants) or the macro (relations between migrants and host society) can be counterproductive.

As what we have seen, assimilation with its discriminatory undertones has fallen out of favor. Further its inability to explain the increasing variety of minorities coming into the United States after 1965 have rendered assimilation somewhat useless. The following years saw the increase in popularity of multiculturalism, however the backlash against the concept spurred by the increasing income divide between minorities and native-born residents in the West such as in the United Kingdom and Germany, as well as changes in the world that saw younger people finding it hard to keep jobs and buy properties, created somewhat a negative sentiment against minorities as foreigners who are coming in to take away jobs. Further, the heightened negative ideas about Muslims have changed the way many countries approach immigration. What policymakers and researchers point to is the inability of multiculturalism as both a concept and as a methodology guiding policymaking to be adaptable to current circumstances. In response, researches have shifted to the usage of integration as a way of understanding the incorporation of migrants.

One big problem however with the usage of integration is how to define it and its components. Recently, migrant integration researchers have been putting emphasis on the importance of both macro and micro approaches and that by understanding integration from this perspective, assimilation and multiculturalism become two of the possible trajectories or approaches to integration (Schunk 2014, Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx 2015). Hartmut Esser (2004), a German sociologist and head of the Mannheim Center for European Social Research, offers in response a general model of immigrant integration. His approach is a combination of economic

and sociology and he has contributed significantly in the field of empirical social research. Esser (2004) notes that integration has three key components. The first component specifies the individual migrants' courses of action. The second component links these actions to the structural conditions that migrants may face in the host society. In short this refers to the inclusion (or exclusion) to social subsystems and patterns of social differentiation that are reflected in the integration outcomes of individual migrants. While the third component indicates what and how specific patterns of integration arise given how individuals act in different situations with different opportunities and restrictions (Schunk 2014). The assumption of this model is that migrants are individuals who migrated to improve their outcomes, whether it be economic, educational or any type of outcome. Migrating, they choose to integrate or not to integrate into a "core" referring to the host society depending on whether they think that integrating is going to improve their outcomes or not. Therefore, in this view, integration is an investment decision. As such, opportunities and restrictions at the contextual level become crucial factors that will determine the outcomes and patterns of integration of the individual migrant. And as such contextual factors constitute the "structural frame for individual actions" (Schunk 2014, p.32).

All three components are highly related. Actions specified by the first component are linked to the structural conditions defined in the second component, and the access to these structural conditions can determine the specific patterns of integration as shown in the third component. Therefore, this theory claims that assimilation and its variants such as segmented assimilation are but among the many possible patterns that can come up because of different circumstances which include both structural and agential circumstances. Schunk (2014) notes that by understanding integration in this way, the door is open for a more analytical approach to immigrant integration, relieving it of its normative image.

The recent literature saw an explosion of debate regarding whether integration is an outcome or a process. This debate fails to acknowledge that it can be both, as Esser (2004) argues in that integration as an outcome pertains to the first component or the inclusion or exclusion of a migrant into certain social subsystems and that as a process pertains to the second component or the specific patterns of social differentiation that can arise given the inclusion or exclusion into the subsystems.

While researchers do agree that integration is two-way, meaning that it involves both migrants and the receiving society, there is still a debate whether it is an outcome or a process. Knowing now that these are linked, let us assess these studies in turn. Researches understanding

integration as policy outcomes have sprouted recently including Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx's (2015) dimensions of policies for integration, Koopman et al's (2005) citizenship index and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX 2004). On the other hand, those understanding integration as a process that is affected by both individuals and structures include theoretical works from Portes and Rumbaut (2006) study on modes of incorporation, Berry's (1992, 1997, 2007, 2011) dimensions of integration and the subsequent work of Bosswick and Heckmann (2006) adapting it to the context of Europe, as well as the empirical works from Joppke (2007) comparing integration models among the Netherlands, France and Germany, Sheringham (2009) on Brazilian immigrants in Ireland and Hellgren (2015) on immigrants in Sweden and Spain.

Studies that focus on integration policies, or as an outcome of migrants' inclusion or exclusion into social subsystems, often put focus on the existence and effectiveness of policies for immigrant integration. More often than not integration policies include basic legal and social protection, formal naturalization and citizenship rights or in the absence of such rights residence-based rights, antidiscrimination laws, laws on equal access to opportunities, rights to organize, policies on public housing, law and order, multicultural education policy, laws on tolerating cultural practices, and language and cultural courses (Favell 2003). We see these reflected in big indices assessing policies of different countries. For instance, the MIPEX, first published in 2004, measures 167 indicators in eight policy areas in 38 countries. MIPEX measures outcomes in terms of labor market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, family reunion, health, permanent residence and anti-discrimination. On the other hand, the European Commission (2011) looks at four policy areas including employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship and assesses progressiveness of integration policies based on 14 indicators including but not limited to employment and unemployment rates, education attainments, income and naturalization rates.

What we see given those lists is a conflation of individual outcomes with supposed policy outcomes. This is exactly what Goodman (2015) and Helbling (2013) note in their critique towards integration policies. Individual outcomes such as employment rates or drop-out rates may be affected by policies but may also be affected by many other circumstances such as physical disability, motivations, preference among others. While a low employment rate among migrants may suggest a discriminatory labor market to migrants, such a suggestion is incomplete. At the same time, policies may have "unintended consequences" which indices looking at policy measures cannot assess.

While still being widely used and becoming bases for Europe's assessment of its approach to migrants, and recently refugees, there is a call for a focus on the process rather than on outcomes. A focus on process, or on the specific patterns of integration according to Hellgren (2015) takes into consideration the many actors involved in the integration of migrants, the policies and programs that either facilitate or limit their participation into different areas of the society, including migrant organizations that may have more mobilizing resources to campaign for recognition and representation, while at the same time a focus on process can see the agencies and histories of migrants and how these impact their integration. However, to be able to study integration as a process is an ambitious endeavor and even integration scholars (Penninx 2005) recognize this, hence the lack of empirical studies.

Understanding integration in terms of dimensions and its corresponding outcomes is important in describing an actor's inclusion or exclusion from social subsystems. This is important in providing nuances in the extent of integration based on the migrants' experiences. Esser (2004), Bosswick and Heckmann (2006) and Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2015) offered ways on how to utilize integration as an analytical concept. Though differing in the terminologies used, all agreed that integration is multi-dimensional. While slightly differing in labels, the dimensions that they suggest are comparable. Esser's (2004) Placement, Berry's (2011) Structural and Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx' (2015) Socio-economic integration dimensions refer to the access to the core institutions of the host society such as the labor market, housing systems, welfare and social protection systems, citizenship and residence. These, as we have seen previously, are among the most commonly measured outcomes in various policy indices including the MIPEX (2004) and the European Commission index (2011). These are considered core structures according to the European Forum for Migration Studies (2006) because "participation in them determines the socio-economic status, the opportunity structure and the resources of a person in a modern market society" (p. 15). The table below compares the dimensions of integration as discussed by Esser (2004), Berry (2011) and Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2015).

Table 1.1. Dimensions of integration

Esser (2004)	**Berry (2011)**	**Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2015)**
Placement	Structural	Socio-Economic
Culturation	Cultural	Cultural/Religious
Interaction	Interactive	
Identification	Identificational	Legal/Political

On the other hand, Esser's (2004) Cultural, Berry's (2011) Cultural and Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx' (2015) Cultural/Religious integration dimensions represent changes in mindset and behavior towards the host society often seen in language acquisition and perceptions about the host society and the migrant's position in the host society. However cultural integration also has an economic function. Algan et al (2012) note that, "cultural integration facilitates trade across individuals" in that "the incentives for an individual belonging to the minority cultural group to assimilate and adopt the culture of the majority are then directly related to the expected gains from trade that such a strategy provides".

Interactive integration in Berry's (2011) terminology and Interaction in Esser's (2004) refer to the inclusion or acceptance of foreign residents into the primary relations and various social networks in the society (Bosswick and Heckmann 2006). Bosswick and Heckmann (2006) note that these relations include friendships, partnerships and memberships in different organizations. Interactions can help revise and shape prejudices and stereotypes and slowly allow the creation of a collective that can represent the minority group in the host society to be able to negotiate better the terms of their membership (Nagel and Staeheli 2008). Interactions can help revise and shape prejudices and stereotypes and slowly allow the creation of a collective that can represent the minority group in the host society to be able to negotiate better the terms of their membership. Such interactions at different levels become important especially in cases when a foreign resident is not employed, not studying or not involved in any activity where he or she can meet people from different ethnic backgrounds and understand more about the host culture.

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And finally, the last dimension refers to identification with a certain social structure, whether it be with the host society, or the ethnic community or other ethnic communities. In terms of immigrant integration however, the focus is on the perception of belongingness or the degree to which the migrant identifies with the dominant culture. Hence identificational integration is crucial in identity formation, and its role in interacting with gains and losses is associated with integrating into the host society (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Developing identificational integration then is seen as an investment, an investment resulting from the weighing of gains and losses of the individual when he or she makes the choice to either integrate or not. The concept of identificational integration becomes doubly important when it comes to oppositional cultures. Talking about cultural identity, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) note that there are two concepts lying at the heart of oppositional cultures: social exclusion and lack of economic opportunities. Beginning from the well-argued sociological fact that majority define themselves by differentiating and excluding others, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) note that it is within this that minority cultures try to make their way in without betraying their own culture and belief systems. However complete opposition to

the majority culture may result in lack and loss of economic opportunities.

While mostly similar, the main differences in the dimensions as discussed by Esser (2004) Berry (2011) and Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2015) lie in their usage. Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2015) for instance focus heavily on the structure side or the host society side of the two-way process. Penninx (2015) put focus on the policy directions and hence his focus on citizenship in the legal/political dimension. On the other hand, Esser's (2004) focuses heavily on the micro or on the migrant and Berry's (2011) dimensions put equal focus on the policies and how such policies may impact migrant outcomes. This has been demonstrated in Nagy's (2012) adaptation of Berry's dimensions of integration.

As a process, we also see a number of studies offering classifications of paths to integration. Integration as a process can be understood in terms of Esser's (2004) third component. The third component that Esser (2004) mentions in his general theory of integration involves patterns of social inequality and social differentiation as described by their inclusion of exclusion from the social subsystems. Inclusion or exclusion in social subsystems which may rely on the approaches a state adopts in dealing with migrants can produce particular patterns of social inequality and differentiation, such as assimilation, or exclusion among others. Researchers have also tried to establish typologies of these patterns including Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005), Esser (2004) and Berry (2011).

Table below shows the correspondence among these typologies. We have previously discussed Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) three patterns or paths of assimilation: Path 1 pertains to fully assimilated migrants, those who follow the classical assimilation theory. Path 2 are those migrants whose assimilation can be described as downward who experience full assimilation but engage with low socio-economic standing ethnic communities whose cultures are in opposition to the host society. Path 3 are those that are partially assimilated, in that while engaging with the host society they are still engaging with the ethnic community. This is still worth noting even though Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) conceived of these typologies more in terms of the integration of second-generation immigrants. On the other hand, Esser (2004) and Berry (2011) offer related typologies. Esser (2004) discusses four patterns: multiple inclusion which refers to migrants who are integrated successfully to both ethnic community and host society; assimilation, those that are integrated into the host society and are not engaging with the ethnic community; segmentation, those who do not integrate into any "cores"; and marginalization, those who integrate into the ethnic community and not into the host society. And Berry (2011) labels the four patterns Assimilation, Integration, Marginalization and Separation.

Table 1.2. Paths/Typologies of integration

Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005)	Esser (2004)	Berry (2011)
Path 1 (Consonant acculturation)	Assimilation	Assimilation
	Multiple inclusion	Integration
Path 3 (Selective acculturation)	Marginalization	Marginalization
Path 2 (Dissonant acculturation)	Segmentation	Separation

The matching that I have done may be called crude as these typologies have different units of assessments and that their conception somewhat differs among themselves. As what was earlier mentioned, Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) conceived their typologies more in the context of second-generation migration, Esser (2004) on the other hand comes from a sociological point of view while Berry (2011) comes from a psychological discipline. What this shows however is that conceptions had been done, but that they are not coherent and not extrapolated clearly. These can be because of the criticisms below.

First, the lack of empirical studies as recognized by the proponents of the literature (Penninx 2005) has not clearly established how non-membership in social subsystems can impact patterns of social differentiation. In that, there is no clear established connection between individual outcomes and their paths or trajectories of integration. Knowing the outcomes of migrants based on indices does not provide nuanced and sufficient information as to how they experience the integration process. Stopping at outcomes defeats the purpose of utilizing integration as an analytical concept devoid of the normativity of the literature. What this only tell us in which social subsystems migrants are not integrated, but does not inform us how this impacts their overall integration, running the risk of boxing immigrants into stereotypes of unintegrated burdens of the economy.

Second, in light of recent trends in the literature, it leaves many questions unanswered. This approach only assumes that there is one “core” in which migrants integrate into, hence the similarities in the typologies presented by Esser (2004) and Berry (2011). What these discussions however fail to consider are the changing patterns of migration. These typologies presuppose that the choice to integrate is only made between two choices: to integrate into either the host society or into the ethnic community in the host society. While useful it

immediately forgets possibilities of integrating into various groups. Further, the typologies remain limited in that the measures by which individuals are cast into the types are based on their engagement only with these two groups. What these typologies assume is that immigrants only settle in one place. While both acknowledge the possibilities of engaging with other "core" aside from the host society, it does not acknowledge the possibility of having more "cores". Given the increasing ease of border-crossing and communication with the development of technological innovations, immigrants have broader choices of where they choose to "invest". Migrants have engaged in newer forms of migration such as transnationalism (Glick-Schiller 1999, Vertovec 2004, Schunck 2014). What these recent developments implies is that there are more patterns of integration beyond those that have already been discussed in the literature, especially if we understand patterns of integration as arising from the interplay between individual and contextual factors. Taking into account possibilities of increased transnational activity in light of the changing nature of migration, there may be more types that have not been explored. In the succeeding sections I discuss these new trends and discuss the possible implications they pose in acquiring a more holistic understanding of integration.

Recent trends

In the existing literature on integration the assumption is that the individual migrant left his or her home country to migrate to a different country to improve his or her outcomes. Therefore, the integration process is seen as an investment. The individual may or may not choose to integrate based on how he or she sees integration as able to facilitate an improvement in his or her outcomes. If he or she sees integration as positive investment, he or she is most likely to integrate, but if he or she does not see this as a positive investment, he or she is most likely to not integrate. What this assumes however is that the choice to integrate *into* just involves a choice to integrate into one "core" which is the host society. However, advancements in information and communication technologies have changed the nature of migration. As Manuel Castells' (2004) notes, people are becoming more and more connected. Distance is just a click away as they say. Communication is easier with the development of the internet, and travel has become more accessible and much affordable. What we see are more and more people migrating, moving around and not simply settling down. What we also see are more and more people engaging with more and more places all at once.

Studies have shown that people are more likely to migrate if they know someone in the destination country; hence we see a build-up of ethnic communities all over the world. As people migrate more and more, ethnic communities flourish and as such they become viable "cores"

where migrants can integrate into. On the other hand, the ease with which we travel and communicate in the wake of the developments of information and communication technologies (ICTs) have allowed for continued and real-time interactions with people from all over the world (Castells 2004). Migrants can continuously interact with their families and relatives in the home country and as such this constitutes another viable "core" where people can integrate into. Integration as an investment decision then can be affected by other such factors as engaging with the ethnic community and with the home country.

Ethnic social ties constitute an important social capital for migrants. It has been said in the literature that people are more likely to migrate to a certain place if someone they knew is already there. Further as mentioned earlier, existing typologies cast migrants into types based on their engagement with either host society or with the ethnic community. This stresses the importance of ethnic ties. Above typologies immediately places host society on one end and ethnic ties on the other as if engaging with both is not a possibility. Ethnic ties are categorized as homophilious ties in contrast to heterophilious ties, which are ties among dissimilar people. Ethnicity, often being a mark of similarity, can be a source of social capital which "represents an enabling capacity or resource possessed by any individual attached to a social group" (Li 2004).

The literature has recognized two possible impacts of strong ties with the ethnic community on integration. First, which provides a more positive view, argues that ethnic communities, in particular ethnic community-based organizations are able to provide support to migrants especially during the settling in period. Further, ethnic communities can act as buffers in cases when the labor market is competitive and difficult to penetrate by providing an area where support can be accessed and where ethnic businesses can flourish. The second one, which highlights the disadvantage, notes of the so-called ethnic mobility entrapment. A scenario wherein a migrant remains economically immobile because of his or her developed dependence on the ethnic community. In this case, there is no incentive to go beyond the community and integrate since most of what is needed is available and accessed through the ethnic community.

The first group of studies espousing a more positive view of ethnic ties, pushes forward the immigrant enclave thesis theorized by Wilson and Portes (1980, cited in Li 2001) and Wilson and Martin (1982, cited in Li 2001) and suggest that ethnic ties can be a source of economic success. In immigrant societies with limited resources, ethnic enclaves can provide positive returns. What this means is that immigrants can use ethnic ties, resources and connections to overcome blocked mobility "to consolidate a sheltered economy" (Li 2001, p.295).

On the other hand, the other group of studies argues that ethnic ties promote ethnic immobility (Wiley 1967, cited in Li 2008). The ethnic mobility entrapment thesis suggests that over reliance on the ethnic community can result in missed opportunities. This entrapment thesis has been evidenced by studies showing the huge income disparity between native-born and foreign-born population, as well as the ease of penetration of the labor market by foreign residents.

Empirical studies however found mixed and even inconclusive evidence. Goris-Rosario (1994) found no evidence that Dominicans working inside the ethnic community have lower integration levels than those working outside. However, this is only true in so far as the working conditions of the two groups are the same. Goris-Rosario (1994) found that the workplaces inside the ethnic community are being reproduced in that Dominicans who work outside tend to mostly concentrated in the manufacturing sector and work alongside other Hispanics and speak Spanish on a regular basis. Musterd and Ostendorf (2007) in their study on spatial segregation in the Netherlands found no evidence that more contact between very diverse groups of ethnicities leads to higher levels of integration and increased individual opportunities. While in a similar fashion Andersson (2007) in a study on ethnic residential segregation in Sweden also note that while they see low earnings and low outcomes in other economic indicators among migrants who live in ethnic neighborhoods, it might be because more a result of policy failure than anything else.

But nuances should be taken into consideration. The literature on social capital has differentiated between weak or loose and strong or tight social ties. Often tight ties are seen as sources of norms, values and family-mediated benefits (Portes 2000, Putnam 2000) that people often use to “get by” (Woolcock 1999). On the other hand, bridging social ties refers to the more expansive social capital often called loose or weak ties that includes ties with work colleagues, acquaintances, and organizations that people often use to “get ahead”. Putnam (2000) provides a clearer distinction between tight (strong) and loose (weak) ties by stating that while both types of ties provides resources, emotional support is often provided by tight ties. According to Woolcock (1999) different combinations of bridging and bonding social capital can bring about different outcomes. This networks-view of social capital according to Woolcock (1999) suggest that social capital is a double-edged sword in that while it can provide access and services, it can “place considerable non-economic claims on members’ sense of obligation and commitment that have negative economic consequences” (p.8).

On the other hand, transnationalism began being used as concept to explain the process of migration in the 1990s in the works of Glick Schiller et al (1999), Portes et al (1999), Levitt and

Glick-Schiller (2004) and Guarnizo et al (2003) after noticing the increased interactions between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. Proponents of transnationalism studies have argued that migration processes are changing and that the assumption that people will stay and live in only one place no longer holds. What transnationalism researchers argue is that migrants exist in many contexts at once and have various affiliations that are not contradictory to each other. Therefore, the core of transnationalism lies in the continued interaction of migrants with their home country while they settle and establish new relations in their destination countries. To be a transnational migrant then is to “live across international borders” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999).

Transnationalism can be seen in the various transnational practices that migrants engage in. Transnational practices according to Portes (1999) refer to an individual migrant’s border crossing activities. These activities can be economic, political or socio-cultural. Further, these activities can be categorized as those that involve the physical movement of people such as visits to home country, and those that do not, such as sending remittances. In light of these developments, two strands of opposing beliefs have come up: on the one hand transnationalism scholars argue that there is nothing to be feared and that transnational practices have long been an exercised practice among migrants. An increasing number of empirical researches celebrate these transnational practices as helping to facilitate a much more connected world (Portes 1999; Sheringham 2009; Van Bochove et al. 2010). While on the other hand, some researches warn that migrant integration and transnational practices can be a recipe for disaster arguing that living in two different societies can create conflicts of interest between home and host countries (Snel et al. 2006), and more especially when the host country becomes the home country through naturalization and permanent residency.

Studies linking these two concepts together tend to be limited. While studies such as Snel et al. (2006) on migrant groups in the Netherlands, Sheringham (2009) on Brazilian immigrants in Ireland, de Haas and Fokkema (2011) on African immigrants in Spain and Italy, Schunk (2014) on migrants in Germany and Carling and Pettersen (2014) on immigrant groups in Norway shed some understanding on how these two concepts interact, their results demand further investigation.

And finally, more recently, there has been a tendency to look at the agency of migrants and to try to understand how their agency can impact integration. While factors measuring individual outcomes such as employment and intermarriage rates had been part of integration research for a long time as we have previously discussed, newer additions to individual outcomes look at

more variable factors such as intentions.

Skepticism regarding the use of intent to stay can be expressed in the same way that skepticism on the use of intent to return abounds in the literature. Researches suggest that intent to return is an intent that often never gets fulfilled. Studies have shown that intentions are being revised again and again. Intent to stay can be read in the same way, however, Carling and Pettersen (2014) argues in their paper that first, “intentions can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient criterion for action”, meaning that though many of those who intend to return end up not returning, among those who will return will always be included those who intended to return. The same argument can be made for intent to stay—among those who will stay will be those that initially expressed intent to stay.

Luthra et al (2014) note that regardless of whether a migrant actually stays or not, their intention, especially at the beginning of their migration, can have impact on their integration outcomes. They argue that different intentions are associated with different patterns of integration (p.5). They found that for instance circular and temporary migrants “tend to show weaker levels of subjective orientation towards the receiving society and perceptions of its hospitality and have lower levels of social and residential integration” (p.5).

In the same way, a migrant expressing no intention to stay permanently can create for him or herself no incentive to invest in integration. What having such a mindset does is deter a person from investing in relationships and in human capital that can improve his or her outcomes in the destination country. This argument lead to Carling and Pettersen’s (2014) second argument in that “return intentions are significant in their own right: they represent summary attitudes to the migration experience, and can affect behaviour other than return itself – for instance about investment in relationships, skills or assets”. This can be useful in arguing for intent to stay, as intent to stay can affect behavior and experiences related to migration, such as integration and developing affinities with the host country.

Third, complementing earlier argument on intention as a possible predictor of behavior, intention to either stay or return can inform us of the possibilities of a smoother and easier integration as staying can encourage development of affinities with the host country. A spate of research has argued that staying permanently and eventually naturalizing in the host country have big impacts on migrant integration (Penninx 2005, Geurts and Lubbers 2016, Belgiojoso 2016). Belgiojoso (2016) notes that intentions are related to attachments in the host and home countries and Geurts and Lubbers (2016) found that migrants who decide to stay permanently invest better in

the language. Bijwaard et al (2011) found that intentions to stay are shaped by experiences in the host country. Intentions to stay can thus be seen as a summary of the experiences of a foreign resident in the home country. Understanding it in such a way, the intention to stay of a permanent resident who has lived a long time in the destination country thus becomes doubly important as it can inform us of how he or she has experienced the country so far. What is not being argued here is that intent to stay is equal to actual staying. What is being argued is that it is precisely because intent to stay can change that it becomes important to study. A foreign resident may intend to stay one day and intend to not stay the next, but what it means is that following Bijwaard et al (2011) this change can be attributed to what is happening to him or her in the destination country and thus can inform us of the complexities of the processes of integration.

And fourth, looking at intent to stay can also help address another problem in the literature of migrant integration – that migrant integration "implies the existence of a cohesive structure or system into which immigrants integrate" (Sheringham 2008; Joppke and Morawska 2003). Intent to stay accepts this implication of a cohesive structure, because it is in this structure which migrants decide to stay with, while accepting that this cohesive structure is not "static" (Joppke and Morawska 2003). This ties in with what Bijwaard et al (2011) that intentions to stay can inform us of the experiences in the destination country. What this means is that intention to stay can be seen as anchored to the cohesive structure into which the foreign residents integrate.

C. Gaps

It has been mentioned already that the proliferation of concepts in the field of migration and specifically migrant integration has made understanding the process of integration very difficult. Concepts, at the outset, always seem as if they are measuring different ideas that have no relation to each other and as such wading through the literature can be a daunting task. I have endeavored in the previous section to make sense of the many interesting and at times confusing researches that had been done on migrant integration, both empirical and theoretical. Though migration is an old concept, migrant integration is not. In light of this, two major shortcomings have been noted. The first one involves a theoretical and conceptual gap in the literature and the second one involves a methodological problem. In terms of a theoretical and conceptual gap, we have seen concepts after concepts being discussed in the literature. And as such a general model of integration seems fairly lacking in the field except for one that we have previously discussed (see Esser's (2014) general theory). I agree with Alba and Nee (1997) in

saying that the migrant integration literature is already teeming with concepts and that what we need is not a new one, but a configuration of how we understand existing concepts. Many theories have been offered and though at first glance these theories may seem contradictory, subsuming them in Esser's (2004) general theory helps to understand how initial theories in migrant integration can fit together and how previously stated specific gaps can be addressed. However due to the "newness" of the general model, it has not been extensively tested empirically, and though some studies have adopted it, (for instance see Schunk's (2014) extensive work on immigrants' integration in Germany), further empirical testing needs to be done to establish how components of the general model are linked, how the historical context of the migrants' migration to the host society impacts their integration and how recent changes in the nature of migration affect migrant integration. Knowing the limitations of the general theory of integration then, we can now proceed with laying down a clear methodological path on how to understand migrant integration. This is where this study comes in.

There are two limitations to Esser's (2004) theory however. For one, while it does highlight the importance of both contextual and individual factors, we see a limitation in what factors are being pertained to. Esser (2004) mostly pertained to government policies on immigration and while this can influence tremendously the path and patterns of immigration, it doesn't consider why certain groups of migrants can have different outcomes given similar conditions. We see these classification in an interesting work by Portes and Zhou (1993) and Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) however not much was provided beyond mere classification of why one group follows a straight-line assimilation and the other does not. What I argue here is the importance of understanding the contexts whereby migrants integrate. This has been the focus of more qualitative works such as Sheringham (2009) and Zellgren (2015). Adding this component to Esser's (2004) general theory will enrich the findings.

Another shortcoming found in Esser's (2004) theory is that it has not been adopted to include more recent trends that consider transnational engagements of migrants, stronger ethnic communities in light of advancements in ICTs as well as intents for the future. I have previously discussed some studies which have looked at the impacts of these new trends in integration and I argue that as ICTs continue to advance what we will see are more mobile migrants, giving rise to questions of rootedness, belonging and identification.

On the other hand, the shortcomings in the literature in terms of methodological approaches seem to be more problematic. Let me describe more specific gaps in terms of the methodological shortcomings found in the literature. First, we found two sides competing about the unit of

analysis. On the one hand, some argue that policies and host societies should be the focus of the integration process, after all, integration is an unequal relationship where the host society has the capability to expand or limit opportunities. While on the other, there is a recent trend towards bringing down the discussion to the level of the immigrant whose experiences are unique and cannot be simply measured by outcome indicators. A focus on either one cannot provide a holistic view.

The second issue pertains to normativity. The evolution of theories and conceptual discussions and measurements on what constitutes integration has been normative. The problem with the recent literature is that there is an effort to be overly non-normative, losing the ability for social science research to have policy implications. Esser's (2004) general theory notes that contextual factors make up the frame by which we decide to carry out our individual actions. In this sense, integration is non-normative, but accepts that contextual factors such as, for instance, policies against wearing head scarves, or banning people against certain religious practices, are among the frames by which migrants make the decision to integrate or not.

Third, there is confusion between micro and macro approaches which I am putting forward as both necessary to understand the process. There are two main concerns that have to be addressed in terms of this confusion with micro and macro approaches. First, focusing on the need to understand and measure integration as a process and not as an outcome convolutes the process of measuring, as outcomes are rarely detachable from the process. What I argue here is that macro and micro approaches cannot be separated from each other. Second, while it is true that a focus on outcomes limits our understanding of the process, I argue that this limitation is brought about by the confusion on where these outcomes come from. Many of the existing indices on integration measure policy outcomes. It is what Goodman (2015) in her paper calls "integration policies for integration's sake". What is measured usually is whether policies targeting certain integration outcomes exist. The actual take-up however is often left unmeasured, as well as how the existence or non-existence of policies affects the actual intended integration outcomes at the level of the migrants. Policy outcomes, however, can be a good baseline for how we can measure unintended consequences and ultimately how we can understand integration as a process at the level of the migrants. And as has been mentioned before, outcomes tell us of the inclusion or exclusion of migrants into different social subsystems and this inclusion or exclusion can give rise to specific patterns of integration as Esser (2004) notes in his general theory.

Fourth, there is a lack of discussion in the historical and institutional aspects of migration and

how this can complicate and impact migrants' integration outcomes and processes. What this means is that the shift from a purely economic approach to a human development approach is merely a shift on how integration process is understood, but not a shift on the more fundamental understandings of what drives immigrants to move across borders, as well as what drives migrants to migrate to certain destinations. While recent researches have made contributions by focusing on migrant experiences, there is a tendency still to highlight migrants as recipients of policies rather than as agents that can direct their own integration experience while being governed by existing institutional and historical limitations. Existing historical and institutional ties of sending and receiving countries can greatly impact integration experiences and outcomes, as well as impact how a migrant will integrate into his or her host society. Even Esser's (2004) theory does not touch upon this. I argue that the historical context of migration can impact the outcomes and process of integration, in that the context whereby migrants come into the host society can immediately situate them in areas of the society that may be beneficial to them or not. Further, acknowledging the historical context brings to the fore the importance of the nation-state and the collective experience of the country. In this light, nation-states, in the time of increased migration, is more important than ever, as nation-states set the frames by which migrants integrate contrary to Appadurai's (1990) claim that nations and states are disjunctive. At the face of migration, what we currently see is a stronger sense of nation-state, which sets the boundaries and areas allowed for migrants. Further, we also see a stronger sense of nationhood, as shown in the increasing practice of transnationalism and presence of ethnic communities. Further, acknowledging the relationship of the migrant-sending country and the migrant-receiving country further enriches our understanding of why do we have stereotypes or certain images of, for instance in the context of Japan, Brazilian migrants as working in factories, of Filipino migrants as entertainers, of Indians as ethnic restaurant owners among others.

And fifth, in light of recent developments in the migration literature, there should be more focus on the agential capacities of migrants to dictate their own integration process. There is still a dearth in the literature looking at the motivations, capacities, intents and practices of migrants and how these agential capacities can impact their integration overall. In the first place, integration should be a question of whether migrants migrated with the intention to integrate. Further complicating this are recent trends such as transnationalism. As mentioned earlier, different motivations can mean different levels of integration, as a migrant who sees the host society as step to another migration experience may only integrate into the labor economy. Further with increased access to information and communications technology, more and more migrants are living double lives in the host and home country and sometimes even more as they can simultaneously communicate with different people from different places. Such transnational

practices and creation of transnational capital, as discussed earlier, may impact a migrant's integration extent, positively or negatively the literature is still at odds.

These are the gaps the research aims to address. By addressing these, this research can contribute to a better understanding of how different institutional actors can have intended and unintended outcomes on migrants' integration and how migrants' agential capacities can impact the process of integration. More importantly, by approaching integration as both an outcome and a process, we can have a better understanding of how migrants integrate. Understanding how they integrate can provide us important information on how to craft better policies that can facilitate a better integration process.

Chapter conclusion

In this chapter, I presented a broad introduction to the research endeavor. As the first chapter of Part I of this research, I endeavored to make sense of the murky literature of migrant integration. In this chapter, I first located the concept of integration in the literature of migration. I argued that initial conceptions of assimilation and multiculturalism are no longer applicable and this is acknowledged by the literature. I traced the inapplicability of these mainstream concepts and note that it is the changing dynamics in the area of migration as well as the changing understandings of countries regarding the reasons for migration which have slowly shifted the focus of migrant integration literature. From an approach that focuses on straight-line convergence to a politics of recognition, the understanding of integration has expanded to include not just economic integration issues, but cultural, interactive and identificational integration issues. I also introduced the debate in the literature on whether integration is a process or an outcome and I argued that it is both. I discussed how outcomes cannot be detached from the process and vice versa and utilizing integration as both process and outcome can help rid the concept of normativity while allowing it to be measurable. Further, I also discussed how the literature has seen a drive towards a need to understand and analyze the outcomes and process of integration more holistically, expanding the analysis to include both host societies, migrants, local governments and various stakeholders.

After pinpointing the location of the integration in the literature, I discussed the theoretical and conceptual shortcomings of the literature as well as the methodological gaps. I endeavor to address these gaps in this research which will be discussed in the next chapters.

Chapter 2 joins this chapter in Part I and serves to establish the conceptual and methodological underpinnings of this research. Part II, composed of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are dedicated to discussing the contextual factors that serve as frames whereby foreign residents integrate. Finally, Part III composed of Chapters 6, 7 and 8 shows the individual factors, as well as the integration outcomes and patterns of integration that arise from these outcomes. Parts I, II and III together provide a much more holistic understanding of the integration of the Filipino residents in Nagoya City. Chapter 9 provides conclusions and discusses ways forward.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework, Research Questions, Goals and Methodology

A. Theoretical Framework: Integration as an analytical concept to describe both process and outcome

I build on Hartmut Esser's (2004) general theory of integration. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Esser's (2004) theory has three components. As was previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the first component specifies the individual migrants' courses of action. The second component links these actions to the structural conditions that migrants may face in the host society, in short, the inclusion (or exclusion) to social subsystems and patterns of social differentiation that are reflected in the integration outcomes of individual migrants. And the third component indicates what and how specific patterns of integration arise given how individuals act in different situations with different opportunities and restrictions. Adopting these components of Esser's (2004) theory addresses the following issues: normativity, holistic understanding of integration, and debate regarding integration as either process or outcome. Let us look at each of these in turn.

First, following Esser's (2004) argument by suggesting integration is this general concept in which assimilation and multiculturalism are but only two of the possible patterns and approaches, relieves the concept of its normativity. The usability of integration as an analytical concept devoid of normativity lies in the concept's assumptions: first, it assumes that migration is a process that is conducted by individuals who wanted to better their outcomes (Esser 2004). And that by coming in to a host society, they assume a position in an unequal relationship. In short, for individual migrants, integration is seen as an investment and becoming an accepted part of society entails the understanding that there are socially defined and shared meanings of success. Therefore, integration outcomes of foreign residents in different areas and dimensions should be assessed against what is set as the "socially defined and shared meaning of success" in the destination country. For instance, a country which assumes an assimilationist approach to integration would have different socially defined and shared meaning of success than a country which utilizes an exclusionary approach to integration. Normativity is therefore removed from the discussion when outcomes are measured against these socially defined and shared meanings of success in a host society that migrants enter.

Second, Esser's (2004) theory as a general approach to the concept of integration highlights the roles of both contextual and individual factors and argues that these factors can impact the integration of individual migrants. As discussed in Chapter 1, opportunities and restrictions at the

contextual level become crucial factors that will determine the outcomes and patterns of integration of the individual migrant. And as such contextual factors constitute the "structural frame for individual actions" (Schunk 2014, p.32). And at the same time, individual factors refer to the agential capacities of migrants that can impact the direction and pattern of integration.

Third, Esser's (2004) addresses the ongoing debate as to whether integration is a process or an outcome. The answer is both, as looking at just one can greatly limit our understanding of integration. Therefore, this project treats integration as both a process and an outcome. As Esser (2004) notes, as an outcome, integration refers to the inclusion or exclusion of migrants into social subsystems, and as a process, integration refers to the specific patterns of integration that arise because of migrants' inclusion or exclusion into social subsystem. It is a process which can only be assessed by looking at the outcomes of the individual migration given the individual and contextual factors that may impact integration.

However, because of the relative newness of this conception there are a number of shortcomings that have been recognized. First, the importance of the historical relations between the migrant sending country and the migrant receiving country has not been taken into consideration. While Esser (2004) notes of institutional factors, he mostly looks at the institutions that can impact integration within the host society. In many cases, especially in the case of the Filipino migrants to Japan, the relationship between Japan and the Philippines has played a huge role in the highly gendered and rather low-skilled Filipino migration to Japan. This historical context has a big implication on the current and future integration of Filipino residents.

Second, considering that not so much empirical studies have been made both in the field of integration and utilizing Esser's (2004) theory, the methodological implications and operationalization of the concept have not been fully understood. I offer in this project a methodology that links Esser's (2004) three components and provide a perspective of integration that is holistic and takes account of both institutional and individual factors. What constitutes the outcomes that have to be measured that will inform us of the patterns of integration? We have discussed in Chapter 1 how the literature has agreed that integration outcomes are multi-dimensional. Looking at it from a multi-dimensional lens that takes into account structural, cultural, interactive and identificational dimensions (Berry 2011) can provide a richer and more nuanced understanding of the foreign residents' integration outcomes and therefore a better discussion on the what's and why's specific patterns of integration arise. Acknowledging these factors, I look at the individual outcomes of the migrants vis-à-vis the host society's "socially defined and shared meaning of success". From these outcomes, I try to understand the specific

patterns of integration that arise given their inclusion or exclusion into the social subsystems or dimensions that I looked into.

And third, Esser's (2004) does not take into consideration the possible existence of "cores" beyond the host society that foreign residents can integrate into. We have discussed in the previous chapter that recent literature on migration suggest an ever-changing flow of migration where migrants are engaging more and more with their home countries and other communities beyond their destination countries because of the developments in ICTs. Now, more than ever, migrants can choose where to integrate. As individuals who migrated to improve their outcomes, migrants can choose to invest in integrating into the host society, into the ethnic community and or into their home countries if they think that their outcomes would improve by doing so.

In general, I see integration as both an outcome and a process of becoming an accepted part of society (Penninx 2005). Specifically:

1. It is assumed that the very process of migration is conducted by individuals who wanted to better their outcomes (Esser 2004)
2. For individual migrants, integration is seen as an investment.
3. That by coming in to a host society, they assume a position in an unequal relationship.
4. But this relationship, though unequal, has spaces for migrant agency and that the host society is not static and can change (Esser 2004, Penninx 2005, Nagy 2008)
5. Societies are heterogeneous, but regardless, there are still socially defined and shared means for success (Esser 2004)
6. Individual and institutional factors impact the way migrants choose to invest in their integration. The sending country's relationship with the receiving country also conflates this.
7. Integration is both an outcome and a process. As an outcome, it provides information into which social subsystems is a migrant excluded or included. As a process, it provides information on what patterns of integration arise given the inclusion or exclusion into social subsystems.
8. Recent developments in the literature open possibilities of having more "cores" where they can choose/invest to integrate. (See recent trends)
9. That having more "cores" where they can choose/invest to integrate can affect the outcomes and process of integration that may give rise to specific patterns of integration.

Having established the framework, I endeavor to use in this project I present my research questions as well as the objectives and significance of this research project.

B. Research Questions, Objectives and Significance

Using this framework therefore, I ask in this study: To what extent are Filipino residents integrated in the Japanese society? Simply, how integrated are Filipino residents in Japan? This is a big question, one that I aim to address by breaking it down into questions that can be operationalized. To be able to answer this, I investigate the following:

1. How do we measure integration as both an outcome (inclusion/exclusion into social subsystems) and a process (patterns of social inequality and differentiation that arise from inclusion/exclusion into social subsystems) that takes account of the interplay between individual and contextual factors?
2. Understanding that Filipino residents are individuals with agential capacities who make choices within the context of different institutional factors in terms of immigrant acceptance and integration, what then are their integration outcomes? In which social subsystems are their included or excluded and to what extent? And how do contextual factors such as the context of Japan and the history of Philippine migration to Japan and individual factors such as the foreign residents' drive and migration intent and their engagement with other cores impact this?
3. From these integration outcomes, what patterns can be seen? In that knowing their inclusion or exclusion into social subsystems that had been brought about by a conflation of individual and contextual factors, what specific patterns of integration arise? And again, what are the possible impacts of the contextual and the individual factors on their integration patterns?

In this research, I aim to assess the extent of integration of the Filipino residents in Japan and provide nuances and a better understanding how a conflation of individual and contextual factors impacts the level of integration of the foreign residents. By looking specifically at Filipino foreign resident experiences in Nagoya City, I aim to provide a more thorough and more holistic understanding of the outcomes and processes of integration. Further, by conducting this research, I would have tested a methodological approach to assessing and measuring integration which can be utilized to look at and study the integration extent of other migrant groups in various other contexts. These have significant policy implications in that being able to empirically explain and assess integration of foreign residents can facilitate evidence-based policy making. This can improve what and how policies are implemented to facilitate better ways of integration that can benefit both host society and migrant community. All these, I aim to achieve and demonstrate in this research.

The significance of this research on the other hand is two-fold, one that is conceptual and theoretical and the other methodological. In light of the first aim, this research aims to contribute

to knowledge production. By delving into such a current topic, this research will contribute to the literature on migration, migrant integration, transnationalism, and ethnic social ties. More than ever more research is needed to be done in the field of integration as migration is increasing and becoming easier to do. Migrants are also staying longer and longer and more women are embarking into this endeavor. This brings to the fore issues that include global householding, intermarriage, child rearing and culture sharing, issues that go beyond inflows and outflows of people.

Further, this research addresses the gaps in the literature previously discussed. By acknowledging the merits of both approaches of integration as outcome and process, this research can provide a more holistic understanding of integration while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls detailed in the previous chapter of approaching integration using just one lens. Secondly, such an approach rids the concept of normativity which has plagued previous theories such as assimilation and race-relations cycle. By assuming that migrants migrate to improve their outcomes, their outcomes are assessed against shared meanings of success, meanings of which are often detailed by host societies. This also addresses the empirical problems of the concept.

And as an externality of this research, I aim to make a commentary on the continued importance of nation-states as the frames by which we, as agential actors, conduct our individual actions. Increased migration was predicted to diminish the purpose of nation-states and state boundaries. What we see however, in light of the recent events pertaining to the refugee crisis from Syria and the announcement of the failure of multiculturalism among Western European countries is a stronger sense and purpose of nation-states which may be either for the better or for the worse. Regardless, what this shows is that nation-states continue to be important factors in the analysis of human relations, especially in the field of migrant integration.

Further, this study is timely. With Japan poised to possibly admit more foreign workers to address its preparation needs for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, we can just expect the number of foreigners to increase. This necessitates more than ever a better approach to integration and to be able to implement policies and programs that can benefit both foreign residents and the host society; a proper, more holistic understanding of integration should be conducted.

In terms of the second aim of this research, I aim to present a systematic way of understanding integration as both an outcome and a process. This research can contribute to the call for empirical studies on integration. This study offers a methodological frame for operationalizing

integration, something that has been missing in the literature. Building on the existing literature and taking into account criticisms on previous studies and the strengths from past researches, this project offers a way to understand integration as both outcome and process in an empirical way that can be replicated and adapted to various contexts and even to intergenerational migrants.

At this point I would like to point out the limitations of this study. Due to resource constraints, this study only looks at the specific circumstances of one migrant group in one city. Regardless, I argue that this methodology can be adapted to analyze other groups as this project builds on Esser's (2004) theory which takes into account agency and structure, hence the methodology can be revised and adapted depending on the circumstances and context. Further I only look at the first generation of migrants as the migrant group that I study in this project is fairly young and though there is already a second generation, the population is still not that substantial.

C. Methodology: Approaches in the literature

I have previously discussed how integration is a multi-dimensional and multi-way process involving many stakeholders. Migrant integration researchers such as Penninx (2005), Helbling (2013), Goodman (2015) have noted the variety of approaches that have been done in understanding the complex process of migrant integration. So far, researches in migrant integration have used mainly two types of approaches: quantitative and qualitative approaches. The choice between the two usually relied on the unit of analysis. We have previously discussed how integration looks at both migrants and host societies. Most studies utilizing quantitative approaches look at the outcomes of migrants in terms of various integration indicators. This has been the favored approach since the assimilation theory became a popular theoretical framework to understand and analyze integration. Studies including Portes and Zhou (1993), Alba and Nee (1997), and Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) have relied on surveys to compare outcomes of foreign-born and native-born respondents in certain economic outcomes. This was because during this time, migration as an economic endeavor still dominates the discussion. And hence if migration is seen as an endeavor undertaken by individuals to improve their economic outcomes, then it becomes intuitive to look at employment rates and income disparities to measure how well migrants have adjusted to their host societies. After the increase in second generation migrants and the subsequent acknowledgment of the changing nature of migration, more and more researches have started utilizing factors that go beyond earnings such as educational attainment, intermarriage, naturalization, among others (See Williams 1990, Dustmann 2000, Hum and Simpson 2000, Meng and Gregory 2005, Kantarevic 2004, Waters

2005, Greenman and Xie 2006, Meng and Meurs 2006, and Xie and Greenman 2011 for such studies).

However, criticisms to these abound, in that quantitative approaches may tend to generalize findings without acknowledging the personal experiences of migrants. In response, qualitative studies in migrant integration started sprouting, though it did not really take hold. Most of the earlier qualitative studies have been done in the field of transnationalism such as those conducted by Glick-Schiller et al (1999), Landolt (2001), Guarnizo et al (2003), and Vertovec (2004).

In light of the recent surge of refugees, foreign workers and issues relating to Islamic extremism, there has been a renewed interest in the role of governments in facilitating integration as has been mentioned in the previous chapters. We have seen from the review of related literature how the nation-state has always been present as variations of the integration theories dominate, fade and was replaced. During the height of assimilation theory, most governments were limited to the inflows and outflows of people as migration was seen as an individual actor's endeavor to maximize his potential and gains. At the height of multiculturalism, we see a role for the government as assuring recognition of different cultures and minority rights but never before has governments been the focus of migrant integration until recently. Goodman (2015) notes of the sudden explosion of researches looking at integration as being impacted by state policies. This renewed interest on the role of the nation-state in ensuring rights and better outcomes of people arrived at the heels of the supposed failure of multiculturalism. It failed when governments confused recognition with indifference.

In this light, two strands of how integration studies are conducted became apparent. The first one includes quantitative approaches to integration (Koopmans et al 2005, Koopmans et al 2012, Banting and Kymlicka 2013, MIPEX 2004). The second one, acknowledging that host societies and migrants are both responsible for the integration process involved more qualitative approaches (Sheringham 2009, Hellgren 2015, Fernández-Suárez 2017). Contrary to the surge of quantitative researches during the reign of assimilation theory that focuses on individual outcomes, current quantitative researches assess integration from a policy analysis perspective. These studies tend to favor quantitative approaches which include construction of composite indices. What these indices do is try to exhaust all possible indicators of integration to be able to assess whether existing government policies facilitate this process.

The recent years saw an explosion of indices measuring migrant integration. Notable examples

of such studies include the MIPEX (2004) and the Multiculturalism Policy Index (Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Helbling (2013) and Goodman (2015) provide a very good review of existing indices measuring integration policies' capacity to facilitate integration. The criticism however is that such indices only measure what the policies are intended to measure (Helbling 2013, Goodman 2015). Measuring only what policies are conveyed to do disregard the way policies are received and the circumstances of those supposed to receive these policies.

On the other hand, more qualitative approaches such as case studies have been utilized by Sheringham (2009) and Hellgren (2015). The main reason according to researchers who utilized such qualitative approaches is that integration as a process cannot be simply captured in numbers and that there are too many facets that have to be assessed to be able to understand the integration process as a whole.

Understanding and noting of the advantages and disadvantages of using either approach, I employed a mixed-methods approach to be able to look at many different facets of integration while at the same time providing concrete measurements that can be useful in policymaking. I conduct mixed-methods because of the following reasons: first, integration is an issue that is important at the policy-making level and thus an understanding of what constitutes the "shared meanings of success" is required to be able to assess the situation at the ground level to be able to come up with policies that are tailored, useful and that would yield solutions and improve the integration process.

Second, while acknowledging that, I also understand that integration is a multi-faceted process that involves migrants, host societies, as well as the histories between the receiving and sending countries. By acknowledging the plurality of the actors, I acknowledge that while the relationship between the migrants and the host societies are unequal, such an approach that treats migrants as among the many actors that can impact the integration process, but who ultimately is the focus of this process, allows a better and more holistic understanding of the process. That this process is a process that is being affected not just by the openness or the closeness of the host society, but by the agential capacities of the migrants, as well as the history that connects the migrants with the host society. Such a perspective is especially useful for the main focus of this study: Filipino residents in Japan. The Philippines have a long history of migration to Japan due to their proximity with each other, and the Philippines' culture of migration combined with Japan's labor shortage facilitated this movement of people.

Third, while aiming to tailor the methodology to a particular group, I also aimed to construct a

methodology that can be replicated and utilized to fit other contexts. Migrant integration, especially in the context of the sudden increase of migrants and refugees in Western Europe from conflict areas in West Asia, and in the context of increasing focus on Islam phobia, is more important and urgent than ever before. An approach such as this brings down the analysis of the integration process to the level of human migrants, treating them as individuals with agency, capacities and motivations, while also allowing governments to come in and implement policies that will facilitate better outcomes for people.

In this study, I utilized a mixed-methods methodology. Mixed-methods approach is becoming a popular and preferred method recently with the acknowledgement of the shortcomings of pure quantitative and pure qualitative approaches. It has even been argued as the “third paradigm” after the quantitative and qualitative paradigms (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003, Denscombe 2008). According to Denscombe (2008) it can be traced to the works of “Campbell and Fiske (1959). Following Campbell and Fisk’s pioneering work, Webb et al. (1966), then Denzin (1978) and Jick (1979) tend to get cited in relation to developments around the notion of triangulation”. Denscombe (2008) lists the characteristics of mixed-methods as:

1. Usage of both quantitative and qualitative methods in the same research project;
2. A research design that clearly specifies the sequencing of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the project
3. An account of how these two aspects relate to each other
4. Pragmatism as the philosophical underpinning for the research which welcomes fusion of approaches to be able to answer the current question.

The literature of mixed-methods approach acknowledges four broad rationales why researches undertake mixed-methods approach: to improve the accuracy of their data, to produce a more complete picture by combining information from complementary kinds of data or sources, to compensate specific strengths and weaknesses associated with either quantitative or qualitative methods, and to develop the analysis and build upon initial findings.

Mixed-methods, according to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) employ a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods not just in the study design, but also in the analysis and inferences. This mixed-method study involved three stages: a first stage which is identified as the qualitative stage, and the second and third stages which are identified as the quantitative stages. These stages will be discussed in detail in the next section.

In short, the goal of using mixed-methods for this project is very simple. On the one hand, I want to be able to provide a more general picture of the integration extent of the Filipino residents in Japan while at the same time provide more nuanced discussion and offer explanations of why such results come up. The quantitative component of this project aims to provide the latter and precisely because I acknowledge the limitations of the quantitative approach I proceeded to incorporate a qualitative element to the research. I humbly note that we can only generalize as far as our data is concerned, and contradictories, while the data may seem to show a coherent whole, exist and I discuss and highlight these contradictions in the course of this project. I do this in an effort to underscore the importance of balance. On the one hand, a general picture is what is needed for improved policymaking, while on the other, a more nuanced discussion is needed to better understand and humanize the research.

D. Mixed-method approach

Stage 1. Establishing the baseline information

In order for my understanding of integration to be holistic, I decided to first see what is already being done in the field. Conducting a thorough review of the literature has shed light on how I will approach this topic. Integration, as a field of study, has not yet caught up with migration, considering that these two should go hand in hand. The literature review in the earlier section showed the theoretical and methodological challenges of investigating foreign resident integration. As part of this first stage, I also conducted at the same time initial contact with the study site.

To first understand the context of the Filipino residents in Japan, I began contacting key informants from September to December of 2015. From February 2016 to November 2016, I conducted visits to the field to simultaneously conduct both the qualitative and quantitative parts of my research. I conducted an interview with Mr. Keita Suzuki from the Multicultural Co-Existence Promotion Office of the Aichi Prefectural Government, as well as I participated in the Nagoya Regional Seminar that aimed to open discussion and prepare stakeholders for the launch of a new multicultural plan in 2018. I had interviewed representatives of various Filipino migrant organizations in Nagoya City such as the Philippine Society of Japan (PSJ), the Filipino Migrants Center (FMC), and the Chubu Philippines Friendship Association (CPFA).

I also got involved with their activities. I translated some documents for some of FMC's events, including their "Know Your Community Series" a series of talks designed to get opinions and relay experiences of Filipino residents in different prefectures in Aichi. This series has been

conducted in a number of prefectures always in coordination with non-profit organizations based in the prefecture. I also observed in a consular event by the Philippine Embassy held in the Aichi Prefectural Government building that was assisted by the PSJ, as well as took part as audience in a national singing competition called *Utawit* which has regional finals in Nagoya. The event was co-organized by the PSJ along with the *Utawit* organizing committee. I also joined a Bingo event held by PSJ in November. I also had continuous conversations with my key informants from PSJ from February to November 2016, as well as correspondence with Mr. Kyle Serra of the International Relations Division of the Bureau of Tourism, Culture and Exchange of the City Government of Nagoya.

Interviewing key informants, as well as having casual conversations with the Filipino residents in Nagoya City, as well as participation in the events that they hold in the community have allowed me a better, if not holistic, understanding of the context of their experiences. I utilized information gathered from this part of the methodology to feed into the survey instrument that I will be using for the second step of the research.

Stage 2. Constructing the survey instrument and pre-test

Preparing the Survey Questionnaire

The first stage of the study informed me how the research is going to move forward. From my interviews and from the literature review, I constructed an integration policy rubric to understand how the data fits within the framework of integration that I am utilizing. This rubric showed in what dimension of integration the policies and programs of Nagoya City fall into. The information from this rubric showed the “shared meanings of success” which served as the baseline data by which I constructed the survey instrument to measure the extent of integration of my target population. The integration rubric will be discussed in a later section.

Further my discussions with my key informants as well as my review of the literature highlighted the need to look at the individual trajectories of the would-be respondents. This included the need to look at their educational attainment for instance as well as their motivations for migration and their intents for the future. While from the literature we can expect that many came as entertainers, it is very interesting to also know other instances of individuals who moved to Japan as dependents or as students.

Also because of the idea that integration is an investment, I also looked at various employment questions. From my discussions with my key informants, I learned that many still work as entertainers and to my surprise, even those who are already holding permanent resident visa. I

decided then to ask more detailed questions about their jobs. While the results, as what will be discussed much later on, support this, I also saw from the data various other jobs that the respondents engage in, implying that though the market seems limited to certain low-skilled industries, the respondents are still engaging in more varied jobs than expected.

The instrument was constructed in an electronic platform. Doing so allowed the survey to progress faster as well as data encoding and transmittal to be conducted much faster than if I used paper questionnaires. I drafted this questionnaire in the Google Docs platform. With this I can simply use an electronic device such as a mobile phone or a tablet to find respondents and enter their responses while I interview them.

The survey is composed of 71 questions. It was divided into eight sections complementing the literature review I have conducted as listed below:

1. Demographic section
2. Pre-migration and settling-experience section
3. Employment and labor section
4. Housing and health section
5. Language proficiency section
6. Civic participation section
7. Transnational practices and ethnic ties section
8. Intentions for the future section

The demographic section asks respondents to provide information on their demographic characteristics such as age, sex, length of stay in Japan, current visa status, as well as their province in the Philippines. The second section looks at the pre-migration and settlement experiences of the respondents and as such asks question on their visa status upon arrival, whether they knew anyone when they arrived in Japan, whether they received any help from anyone in Japan when they arrived, as well as the problems they experienced when they arrived.

The next four sections look at the integration outcomes of the respondents. The section on employment looks at whether they are engaged in any income-generating activity within the last three months and if they are not what they are doing. This is important to establish the activities of the Filipino residents because in Japan the visa categories of foreigners are based on what activities they are engaged in. Also in this section, I ask about working conditions, if the respondents are employed in a permanent job, if they earn the same amount monthly, if they feel that they earn enough, and if they feel that they are using the skills that they learned and

acquired in their current occupation. The next section looks at access to housing and health and asks about whether respondents have any problems with their current housing, whether they have access to any health insurance and if they have had to go to the hospital for some health concern, whether they experienced any difficulty getting treatments or consultations. In the next section, I look at their self-rated language proficiency, whether they are currently studying Japanese and what hinders them from studying the language. The sixth section looks at the civic participation of the respondents. In this section, I ask their level of participation in various organizations as well as their participation in local government events and what stops them from being more active in terms of civic participation.

The last two sections look at transnational practices and intents for the future. I included these because of recent discussions in the literature which focus on the changing nature of migration. As has been noted and as will be noted in succeeding chapters, more and more people are migrating and more and more people are staying and engaging more than one place at the same time. With the advancements in ICTs, migration is becoming an endeavor that more and more people are engaging in. ICT advancements are allowing migrants to engage with their home and host countries at once. While arguments regarding the importance of national boundaries are many, I argue here that national boundaries still exist and are definitely important as we have seen in recent years. Increased migration also saw increased involvement of national and local governments, not just in monitoring the inflows and outflows of people, but in facilitating the improvement of the outcomes of these people, because improving their outcomes can positively impact the outcomes of the collective. I also previously discussed this in Chapters 1 and 2. In this regard then, I have asked questions on whether the respondents engage in various transnational activities such as sending remittances, visiting the home country and saving in the home country. Further I inquired about the regularity of these practices to be able to gauge the depth of their engagement. And finally, I inquired about their future intentions, as, what will be discussed later, future intentions, while not necessarily predicting what is going to happen in the future, can impact mindsets and help predict behavior and efforts respondents put in the task of integrating themselves into the host society.

Administering the questionnaire took on the average 20 to 25 minutes. The original questionnaire had about 100 questions but pre-test rounds suggested cutting down the questionnaire as some of the questions did not work well and did not serve the purpose of the study.

The draft questionnaire was circulated to a Filipino migrant organization for feedback in June 2016 and after the initial comments were received, were revised and resent again. The final

version for pre-test became available in September 2016. I pre-tested a version of this survey instrument in September on two occasions. First was on September 23, 2016 during an event hosted by the Philippine Embassy in Osaka held at the Aichi Prefectural Government. The consular event was meant to assist Filipinos in their filing of birth and marriage certificates and in renewing of passports and changing of status. The event drew a number of Filipino residents from the Chubu region. I tested the survey instrument on ten respondents and revised that version and pre-tested it again on September 24 during the *Utawit*, a national singing competition for Filipinos and Japanese in Japan which was initiated by three Filipino groups namely, Jeepney Press, *Samahang Pilipino*, and *Teatro Kanto* in cooperation with the Philippine Embassy. It has become an annual event ever since and has regional finals in Hokkaido, Morioka, Nagano, Shizuoka, Nagoya, Kyoto and Fukuoka. Winners of the regional finals compete in Tokyo. Events such as this always draw big numbers of Filipinos and this is where I conducted my second pre-test.

After these two pre-tests, I established the first group of respondents which I utilized to initiate the snowball sampling method. I met with a member of the PSJ who I enlisted as an enumerator. I conducted enumerator training on September 25 and we officially began data collection on September 26.

Stage 3. Conduct of survey operations

The survey, excluding survey development, ran from September to November 2016. I conducted data checks twice a week to check the consistency of the responses. The enumerator filled in or guided the respondents in completing the survey questionnaires, responses of which directly goes into an online repository which I can access and check. My enumerator consistently provided me feedback regarding the implementation and I provided her feedback as well regarding the quality of the data through September to November until the data cleaning and processing period from November 2016 to April 2017.

The survey operation was completed on November 06, 2016. Data checking and processing has been continuous since the beginning of the survey operations, as processing and making sense of the data helped me checked the consistency of the values I am getting. Data cleaning and processing was deemed officially completed by the end of April 2017. I exported the Comma Separated Values file from the online repository and exported it into a Stata file. I used Stata 12 and 14, a general-purpose statistical software package by StataCorp to process and analyze my data.

E. Data

A total of 491 individuals were approached to answer the questionnaire. A snowball sampling method that approximates random sampling was utilized. What it means is that the sampling method first proceeded as a normal snowball sampling method[1]. Given the specifications of the project, I had to conduct snowball sampling to be able to identify the target population of the project which are Filipino residents who have stayed for more than three months in Japan. In Japan, the difference between short-stay visas and long-stay visas is that short-stay visas are allowed to stay for a maximum of only 3 months in Japan.

After identifying key informants with the help of Filipino migrant organizations I then proceeded to recruit participants through a snowball sampling method. I recruited the first group of participants through participating in events organized by Filipino migrant organizations. I picked out key participants from that group who recruited participants living in different wards in Nagoya. This approximated random sampling method and by the end of the survey operations, I have a map of respondents that look like this:

[1] At this point it is important to note of some issues encountered during the sampling process. Due to the nature of the survey, not everyone that we approached to answer the questionnaire had been very cooperative. Further, in the very first step, there had been an issue as to how to collect respondents. As I will discuss in more depth in the next sections, there are two main groups of Filipino migrant organizations in Nagoya City. While both groups were very accommodating, one group did make an effort to accommodate my research in their activities. Partly because of the differences in their approach towards migration issues as well as differences in their membership, I had formed more connections in one of the groups. Though of course there are overlaps in membership in both groups, I tended to include in my snowball sample people who tended to be more active in the activities of the group that had been accommodating me. Though at the end of the survey and upon comparison with the distribution of the Filipino population in Nagoya City, it can be said that the snowball sampling method resembled a random sampling method.

Chart 2.1. Map showing distribution of Filipino respondents by ward



This map reflects the distribution of the respondents. Comparing this with the actual distribution of Filipino respondents in Nagoya City by ward as of July 1, 2017 as is shown in Chart 2.2, we can say that it is a good enough approximation and is well-represented.

Chart 2.2. Actual distribution of Filipino residents by ward



Source: Nagoya City, 2016

As was mentioned, pre-tests began in September and data collection was initiated in the same month and was completed in November 2016. An average of 11 respondents was surveyed completely per day.

Table 2.1. Data collection schedule and number of responses collected

Month	Magnitude	Proportion
September	31	6.31
October	393	80.04
November	67	13.65
Total	491	100.00

Table 2.2. Response rate

Response rate	Magnitude	Proportion
Agreed	480	97.76
Refused	11	2.24
Total	491	100.00

Table 2.3. Classification of respondents

Classification	Magnitude	Proportion
Not eligible	18	3.75
Missing	3	0.63
Complete	459	95.63
Total	21	4.38

From the 491 respondents approached to take part in the project, a little over two percent refused. 480 respondents were initially taken to be completed. But out of the 480 respondents, about 18 respondents were deemed ineligible, as some were less than 15 years old, and some have stayed in Japan for less than three months. After this initial process of cleaning and sorting, about 463 respondents were considered for the data processing but during the data processing, it was found out that three observations have incomplete responses and was therefore removed from the sample leaving 459 observations deemed complete and clean for data processing and analysis.

Chapter conclusion

In this chapter, I endeavored to explain the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of this research. Through this discussion, I explained how the framework being utilized in this study will address the gaps, both theoretical and methodological, that have been discussed in Chapter 1.

To reiterate, this research aims to investigate the process of integration at the level of foreign residents, to understand how the interplay of individual and contextual factors can give rise to specific patterns and outcomes of integration, to know their integration outcomes and uncover patterns of integration. I argue that this research is timely as foreign residents, though constituting a relatively small percentage of the entire population in Japan, are continuously increasing. Most importantly, this research has significant policy implications. Understanding how a host society's approach on migrant integration can impact the levels of integration of foreign residents provides baseline information needed for evidence-based policy making.

Further, I explained the methodology utilized in this project. I first delved into a discussion of the methodological approaches that have already been done in the literature. Doing so allowed me to assess the pros and cons of every approach. This led me to mixed-methods approach, an approach that combined both qualitative and quantitative approaches. I argued in this chapter that this approach fits the goals of this research which is to provide a more holistic understanding of the integration extent, including outcomes and processes of Filipino residents in Japan. I argued that doing so will have significant policy implications, facilitating possibilities of evidence-based policymaking.

I also argued in this section that by doing mixed-methods I acceded to the limitations of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. On the one hand, what I want is to be able to provide a more general understanding of the integration extent of the Filipino residents while trying not to go down the route of overgeneralization which can put people at risk of being type casted. On the other hand, I want to be able to provide nuances within the discussion and show that while the data may show a coherent story, there are contradictions within that are important to note of while trying not to get bogged down by details. At the end of the day what I really wanted to be able to do is provide baseline information that can facilitate better policymaking.

In the next sections I outlined how I carried out my research. Being that the methodology that I utilized is mixed-methods, the research has two components, qualitative and quantitative, that were implemented in three stages. In summary, I conducted key informant and stakeholder interviews, participant observation, archival research and policy analysis to understand the

context by which I will assess integration outcomes and patterns. From this I implemented a survey among Filipino residents in Nagoya City aiming to measure their integration outcomes as well as to gather information on various individual factors. This chapter concludes Part I of this research. In Part II, I will proceed with a discussion of the various contextual factors including the Japanese government's approach to immigration, the context of the Philippine migration to Japan and the approach, policies and programs currently being implemented by Nagoya City.

Part II.

This part is composed of three chapters. The data presented in this part was gathered during the first stage of the methodology. As such this part of the research project serves to establish the context, or the structural frames by which agential outcomes come about.

The first chapter will focus on the immigration in Japan. The second chapter will focus on the Philippine migration to Japan and the last chapter of Part II will provide a discussion on the specific context of Nagoya City, the focus of this study.

The goal of this part is very simple. It aims to set the scene whereby I conduct my research. Doing so will allow me to present a more thorough and exhaustive illustration of the integration outcomes and process of the Filipino residents.

Chapter 3: Immigration in Japan

Japan has often been seen as "new" to the immigration of foreign people. However, people have moved in and out of Japan even before the economic boom in the 1980s. Though relative to other OECD countries, Japan has a fairly small population of foreign residents, we see that population growing and growing each year. Foreseeing a bigger need for workers for the upcoming Tokyo 2020 Olympics, Japan is poised to open its doors to more foreign workers. What the country fails however to recognize is that time and again, it has seen that many people do not simply go back once their contracts end, many of the foreigners who came to Japan during the 1980s stayed and never came back to their country.

In this section, we look at the growth of the foreign population to Japan to better understand the weight of the issue of immigration in a country often seen as "inexperienced" when it comes to matters of immigration. In the first section, we will look at the growth in numbers and compare its foreign population with that of other migrant-receiving countries. We will trace how this growth came about and discuss the two categories of foreign residents: the so-called old comers and the new comers. In the next section, we look at the evolution of policies in relation to Japan's experiences with the foreign population to shed light on its current approach to foreign resident integration. And finally, we look at the roles national and local governments take in addressing the issues of the ever-growing foreign resident population in Japan.

A. Immigrants to Japan in numbers compared to other migrant-receiving countries

Among the OECD countries, Japan is still considered as having a relatively small proportion of foreigners relative to its population (Chart 3.1). In terms of number it seems that Japan has more foreigners as compared to other European Union countries such as France and Germany but the density of the population in Japan makes the share of foreign resident population considerably small. Interestingly, the rise in the numbers of the foreign population in Japan follows the same pattern as in other OECD countries. The chart below shows the gradual increase in the stocks of foreign population in Japan. While Chart 3.2 shows that in terms of share in the population, foreign residents in Japan comprise a little over one percent in 2005 (1.6%) and has not increased that much in the next ten years (1.8% in 2015). This is the same as in South Korea regardless of the constant increase in the foreign resident population from 2005 to 2015.

Chart 3.1. Stocks of foreign population into selected OECD countries (in thousands)



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
France	3541.8	3696.9	3731.2	3773.2	3821.5	3892.8	3980.6	4083.9	4177.7	4351.0	4399.7
Germany	6755.8	6751.0	6744.9	6727.6	6694.8	6753.6	6930.9	7213.7	7633.6	8153.0	9107.9
Japan	2011.6	2083.2	2151.4	2215.9	2184.7	2132.9	2078.5	2033.7	2066.4	2121.8	2232.2
Korea	510.5	660.6	800.3	895.5	920.9	1002.7	982.5	933.0	985.9	1091.5	1143.1
United Kingdom	3035.0	3392.0	3824.0	4186.0	4348.0	4524.0	4785.0	4788.0	4941.0	5592.0	5951.0
United States	20836.0	21696.3	21843.6	21685.7	21641.0	22460.6	22225.5	22115.0	22016.4	22263.4	22426.2

Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2017

The issue often raised however is Japan's depopulation and aging population. There have been arguments pointing to this depopulation and aging as an important reason why immigration laws should be tightened, as the share of the foreign resident population can suddenly shoot up and overtake the rapidly declining local population. However this is also the same reason often cited by proponents of heightened immigration, that issues of depopulation and rapid aging bring with it other issues such as labor shortage and local public finace crisis that a foreign resident population can help address. However, up to now, the Japanese government remains ambivalent about accepting foreign residents permanently as a measure to tackle depopulation and rapid aging issues. But that it remains open to foreigners who will stay temporary (Akashi 2009, Oishi 2013).

Chart 3.2. Proportion of foreign population of the total population of selected OECD countries



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
France	5.8	6.0	6.0	6.1	6.1	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.5	6.8	6.8
Germany	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.6	9.0	9.5	10.1	11.3
Japan	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8
Korea	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3
United Kingdom	5.0	5.6	6.3	6.8	7.0	7.2	7.6	7.5	7.7	8.7	9.2
United States	7.0	7.3	7.2	7.1	7.0	7.2	7.1	7.0	6.9	7.0	7.0

Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2017

We see this play out in the relatively small inflow of permanent immigrant in the case of Japan. As of 2013 Japan has 57,317.0 total permanent resident inflows to the country. This is about one fourth of the inflows to countries such as Germany (468,822.9), France (255,584.0) and Canada (262,773.0). About five times less than the United Kingdom (310,504.0) and about 17 times less than the United States (990,753.0) (see Chart 3.3).

Chart 3.3. Total permanent resident inflows, 2013



Source: OECD (2017), Permanent immigrant inflows (indicator). doi: 10.1787/304546b6-en (Accessed on 22 August 2017)

Comparing the types of inflows, we see that work-related inflow dominate the total number of total inflows. In 2013 there are more work-related inflows to Japan (25,050.0) than to Germany (24,293.0) and France (20,831.0). Japan in fact ranks seventh among the OECD countries in terms of work-related inflows. We see that family-related inflows are much less at 20,639.0 compared to France (105,208.0) and Germany (56,046.0) (see Charts 4.4 and 4.5)

Chart 3.4. Work-related permanent immigrant inflows, 2013



Source: OECD (2017), Permanent immigrant inflows (indicator). doi: 10.1787/304546b6-en (Accessed on 22 August 2017)

Chart 3.5. Family-related permanent resident inflows, 2013



Source: OECD (2017), Permanent immigrant inflows (indicator). doi: 10.1787/304546b6-en (Accessed on 22 August 2017)

B. Foreign population in Japan over time

In Japan, the foreign population is generally categorized into two: old comers and new comers. Old comers pertain to entrants before the industrialization and economic booms of the 1980s. Mostly Koreans, Chinese and nationals from former Japanese colonies, the migration of the old comers were driven by various factors: colonization, labor, family reunification among others. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the so-called boat people or refugees from the Indo-Chinese region began arriving in Japan. Though rather small in number, compared to the succeeding arrival of foreign workers, it is said that it is the arrival of the boat people which prompted Japan to begin changing discriminatory parts of its constitution (Kawakami et al 2014).

Those previous arrivals are in comparison with the almost purely economic drive behind much of the 1980s migration to Japan. The arrival of half a million foreigners by the late 1980s is often called the "second Black Ship" (Yamanaka 2008) as Japan saw an influx of workers from Southeast Asia, South Asia and South America (Yamanaka 2008). It was only in the first half of the 1990s that Japan began to accept foreign workers officially as temporary workers under the so-called "rotation system" (Tezuka 2005). This system posits that workers allowed to work in Japan will eventually go back to their home countries. The 1990s saw 100,000 Nikkeijin (foreigners with Japanese ancestry) from South America "to work as casual laborers in manufacturing industries in Japan" (Yamanaka 2008, 188) which was brought about by the 1980s recession in South America. On the other hand, Asian migrants came to Japan "as company trainees, pre-college language students, or female entertainers" while others "arrived as tourists, who then sought employment by over-staying their visas" (Yamanaka 2008).

Chart 3.7 continues this and shows that from 2006 to 2016 the story is not as consistent. We see that from 2006 to 2008 there was a rapid increase from less than 2.1 million to more than 2.2 million. However, we see this increase disappear after 2008 when numbers dropped from 2.2 million to less than two million in a span of four years. This decrease can be attributed to the global financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent Tohoku earthquake in 2011 which saw the return of a number of the foreign resident population back to their home countries. Further, changes in regulations, introduction of new policies all contributed to the changes in the foreign resident population in this period as we will discuss in a later section.

By 2012 however, we see a sharp increase in the total number of foreign residents from leading up to 2016. The increase from 2012 to 2016 had been steep and rapid and is half of the total increase from 1991 to 2007 which in terms of time is just one fourth of the period from 1991 to 2007.

Chart 3.6. Foreign residents in Japan, 1991-2007



Source: Ministry of Justice 2016. http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html

Chart 3.7. Foreign residents in Japan, 2006-2016



Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	2,084,919	2,152,973	2,217,426	2,186,121	2,134,151	2,078,508	2,033,656	2,066,445	2,121,831	2,232,189	2,382,822

Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016

http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html

Looking at the nationalities of the foreign resident population, we see that majority are still comprised of foreign residents considered old comers. In 2016, Chinese (695,522) and Koreans (453,096) make up majority of this population and recently Filipinos (243,662) have overtaken Brazilians (180,923) as among the most populous foreign resident population in Japan. We see that most of the nationalities experienced a decline in numbers by 2008 which continued until 2012 when most of the population numbers picked up again. We do not see the same pattern however with Koreans as Koreans continue to decrease until 2016.

Chart 3.8. Foreign population by country



Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Philippines	193,488	202,592	210,617	211,716	210,181	209,376	202,985	209,183	217,585	229,595	243,662
China	560,741	606,889	655,377	680,518	687,156	674,879	652,595	649,078	654,777	665,847	695,522
Korea (N&S)	598,219	593,489	589,239	578,495	565,989	545,401	530,048	519,740	501,230	457,772	453,096
Brazil	312,979	316,967	312,582	267,456	230,552	210,032	190,609	181,317	175,410	173,437	180,923

Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016

http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html

What makes up most of the foreign resident population? Chart below shows the increase in the foreign population in Japan from 2006 to 2016. We see that almost all categories of residency increased over time except for special designated activities, a group of visa categories that

pertain to very specialized activities such as sports, research and information processing and individuals who came to Japan through Japan's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with other countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines.

The most interesting group or groups of categories however involve categories that pertain to more long-term stays in Japan such as permanent residents, long-term residents, special permanent residents, spouses of Japanese Nationals and permanent residents and dependents. We see these categories increase gradually but consistently from 2006 to 2016. In fact, we see that permanent residents make up majority of the foreign population by 2016, and that overall permanent-stay categories of visas make up about 60 percent of the total foreign population.

Chart 3.9. Foreign population in Japan, by visa categories, 2006-2016



Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Permanent resident	394,477	439,757	492,056	533,472	565,089	598,440	624,501	655,315	677,019	700,500	727,111
Spouse of Japanese	260,955	256,980	245,497	221,923	196,248	181,617	162,332	151,156	145,312	140,349	139,327
Spouse of Permanent resident	12,897	15,365	17,839	19,570	20,251	21,647	22,946	24,649	27,066	28,939	30,972
Long-term resident	268,836	268,604	258,498	221,771	194,602	177,983	165,001	160,391	159,596	161,532	168,830
Special permanent resident	443,044	430,229	420,305	409,565	399,106	389,085	381,364	373,221	358,409	348,626	338,950

Entertainers	21,062	15,728	13,031	10,966	9,247	6,265	1,646	1,662	1,967	1,869	2,187
International students	131,789	132,460	138,514	145,909	201,511	188,605	180,919	193,073	214,525	246,679	277,331
Trainees	-	-	-	-	100,008	141,994	151,477	155,206	167,626	192,655	288,588
Intra-company transfers	14,014	16,111	17,798	16,786	16,140	14,636	14,867	15,218	15,378	15,465	15,772
Engineers, international relations	92,458	106,447	119,564	119,888	115,059	110,488	111,994	115,357	122,794	137,706	161,124
Family stay	91,344	98,167	107,641	115,081	118,865	119,359	120,693	122,155	125,992	133,589	149,303
Special designated activities	97,476	104,488	121,863	130,636	72,374	22,751	20,159	22,673	28,001	37,175	47,039

Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016

http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html

This provides a very interesting backdrop for how Japan approaches immigration and the corresponding issues related to settlement, rootedness, householding and livability. We see based on earlier assertions that Japan is rather hesitant when it comes to accepting foreigners though its doors have been open for work-related flows. However, what we see is that most of the foreigners staying are staying not so much for work-related and temporary reasons but more for family-related reasons and seem to be more permanent in duration. In the next section, we look at how Japan has historically approached its foreign resident population.

C. Immigration policies and approaches to foreign resident integration

Kondo (1995) argues that the Japanese attitude towards immigration is twofold: "foreign workers who are to be employed for their special skills are admitted as much as possible, while various issues concerning the admission of unskilled labors are to be carefully studied" (p.2). Further he mentions three tenets which act as bases for Japanese laws on immigration. First, admitting foreign workers should be a last resort; second, unskilled workers should not be admitted; and third, all foreigners are admitted on a temporary basis only. Kondo (1995) further notes that Japan is one of the few countries which maintain strict rules on immigration.

According to Kondo (2002), even though Japan has had a foreign population after it opened up after the seclusion period in the 1850s Japan has never had an immigrant policy before that period. The first immigration-related policy is the Immigration Control Order promulgated in 1951 which was heavily influenced by the United States. Interestingly, the Immigration Control Order had a visa category for permanent residents, which is comparable to the immigrant category in the immigrant policy system of the United States though no one had been given this residency until the Immigration Control Order was replaced with the 1982 Immigration Control and Refugee

Recognition Act (ICRRA).

Kondo (2002) notes that the development of policies pertaining to immigration control and integration can be divided into three periods. The first period characterized by "*douwa"* which literally means assimilation governed most of the period from the Second World War to the beginning of the industrialization and economic booms. The second period is characterized by "*kokusaika*" or internalization, covered the period from the economic boom of the 1980s to the 1990s. The third period, which has often been the focus of much of Western scholars studying immigration in Japan saw the emergence of the concept of "*tabunka kyousei*" or multicultural co-existence. In this section, we look at each of this period and the associated approaches in turn.

Douwa and the aftermath of the Second World War

Though "*douwa*" as an assimilation policy has been utilized before the Second World War, it has been utilized more for internal assimilation in the context of the Burakumin and the Ainu people and other ethnic minorities such as the Ryukyuan. The pre-war government referred to the *Youwa* or conciliation policy as a policy for internal assimilation until in 1940 when the name was changed to Douwa. According to Weiner (2000), "*Douwa* is an abbreviation of *Douhou Ichiwa*—all citizens should assimilate—a phrase devised for the wartime environment" (p. 77).

The same concept was also then eventually deployed in the context of external assimilation during the period after the War to the beginning of the industrialization period. It was during this time when the 1951 Immigration Control Order was renamed the Immigration Control Act in 1952 (Kondo 2015). This period has been heavily characterized by assimilation, exclusion and discrimination. Foreign residents, most of them old comer Koreans and Taiwanese who were previously granted residency, lost their citizenship after the end of the Second World War and were considered "aliens". The residence statuses of these aliens were very uncertain and the uncertainty removed access to many social rights and services. For many *Zainichi* Korean old comers, to be able to work in public office they had to naturalize and change their names which many did not want. The term *zainichi* itself implied impermanence of their stay in Japan as after losing their citizenship they were treated as foreign residents who were temporarily staying in Japan. There was widespread discrimination during this period stemming from the assimilation policy that aims to present Japan as homogenous (Weiner 2000).

Kokusaika and the 1980s

In the 1980s however, the approach shifted. This period is still characterized by strict immigration but the economic booms and Japan's accession to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1981 saw a marked improvement in the way the national government approached migration. Indo-Chinese refugees, or so-called boat people, are often compared with the American "Black ships" in 1853 which brought the opening of Japan to the world (Kondo 2015). The arrival of the Indo-Chinese refugees made the accession of Japan to the UN Convention on Refugees almost a natural progression[2]. Acknowledging that ratifying the UN Convention on Refugees would require the country to amend various social security laws pertaining to foreigners[3], Japan enacted in 1981 and enforced in 1982 the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA, Kondo 2015). Interestingly, the enactment of the ICRRA "was influenced by G7 summit member states calling for the reception of Indochinese refugees" and most importantly, "a concern with improving Japan's international identity and solidifying its international position" (Kondo 2015). This period brought to the fore the concept of internationalization or *kokusaika* (Komai 1999, 2006).

According to Flowers (2012) in the 1980s, the Japanese government promoted the term *kokusaika* or literally internationalization, "as a way to improve international understanding of Japan and to expose Japanese people to foreign cultures". For Kondo (2015), *kokusaika* became somewhat an excuse of a substitute for Japan's integration policy in that while there is no actual integration policy as amendments in the Citizenship act to acknowledge principle *patrilineal* and *matrilineal jus sanguinis* instead of just the former had a "by-product in the abolishment of the assimilative naturalization procedure to waive ethnic names".

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[2] According to Kawakami et al (2014), the initial status given to the so-called boat people were Special Landing Permissions, specifically "Landing Permission Due to Disaster at Sea", as the lack of readiness of Japan upon their arrival prompted them to treat the refugees as people being rescued at sea. As their numbers increased, Japan started building government-supported infrastructures in order to provide immediate medical treatment. Further, Kawakami et al (2014) claimed that "Japanese government acted passively and reactively to the unfolding situation rather than proactively in finding solutions to the problems, due in part to the government's lack of "know how" about providing assistance to refugees (p.16).

[3] According to Kawakami et al (2014), "Japan's legal system has historically contained various laws and regulations that provide for differential treatment between Japanese nationals and non-Japanese. Such discriminatory laws and regulations included restrictions on eligibility of applications, eligibility for social security allowances, as well as eligibility for public funds and public office" (p.17)

By the end of the 1980s however, Japan's bubble economy began, encouraging debates as to whether more foreign workers should be allowed. At the same time *kokusaika* as the concept governing immigration has been riddled with criticisms. In terms of national policies for foreigners, Kondo (2015) notes that indeed citizenship requirements were eliminated from the National Pension Act, the Child Allowance Act among others, "but the national government's initiatives for improving aliens' rights were weak". As an approach, *kokusaika* was "not meant to diversify Japan, to address the diversity that already existed or to confront questions of difference". All these programs made under the banner of *kokusaika* shared the same understanding that the movements of people that were being encouraged were temporary. Further, *kokusaika* has been used interchangeably with the Japanese word for globalization on the belief that Japan needed to internationalize itself to remain competitive in an economically connected world (Lovell 2010).

Tabunka kyousei and the 1990s period

The end of the 1980s has sparked a debate about whether the labor shortage brought about by the economic boom in the 1980s should be reason enough to allow entry of more foreign workers. In response to the ever-growing labor shortage problem stemming from the unwillingness of many Japanese to work "at tasks described in Japan as the "Three K's": kitsui, kitanai and kiken also known as Three D's (demanding, dirty and dangerous)" (Yamanaka, 1993) created a demand for unskilled labor (Vogt 2007). The government gave in and while it did retain strict immigration laws, it has allowed loopholes. Vogt (2007) illustrates this perfectly in saying that Japan's policies on immigration are like a "door wide shut". Though in general, rules had been strict and regulatory, policies "had been ad hoc and mixed" (Yamanaka, 1993). Side doors and backdoors allowing entry of unskilled foreign workers were both intentionally and unintentionally created even though entry of unskilled workers goes against the pillars of immigration mentioned earlier (Yamanaka 1993, Kondo 2015, Vogt 2007). Kondo (2015) notes that three loopholes were established: first *Nikkeijin* mostly from South American countries were allowed through the front door and were given unrestricted access to work; second, side door for trainees who came mainly from China and other Asian countries and; third back door for irregular migrants from South Korea and the Philippines.

Despite the increasing number of foreigners, the national government remained ambivalent. Initially viewing foreign workers as temporary, the national government remained in denial even as these foreign workers began staying longer and longer than expected. The Immigration Bureau in the Ministry of Justice is the central agency on matters relating to immigration whose functions include general affairs, policy, entry and status, adjudication, enforcement, registration (Kondo 1995), all relating to inflows, outflows and labor issues. Under the Employment Security

Law discrimination based on the citizenship is prohibited in occupation introduction and vocational counselling, however companies cannot be policed one by one (Kondo 1995). Further, we see that even if citizenship clauses were eliminated from the National Pension Law, the Child Dependency Allowance Law, the Special Child Dependency Allowance Law and the Child Allowance Law, among others, Kondo (1995) argues that there are still problems within the welfare system in terms of foreigners' welfare. The Livelihood Protection Law covers permanent residents, or spouse or children of Japanese residents and children of permanent residents or quasi-permanent residents for medical care but other foreign residents which do not fall under said categories are "allowed to stay in Japan under the condition of not becoming a burden on the Japanese government, and they often leave their property and family in their home country" (Kondo 1995).

Japan has established social integration policies for foreign workers in the Comprehensive Policy on the Lives of Foreigners under the Liaison and Coordination Committee of the Ministries Related to the Lives of Foreigners (Kitawaki 2010). However, as Kitawaki (2010) argues, "this policy is not a true social integration policy for coping with the structural inequality that foreigners are confronted with, but rather an adaptation of the present policies and institutions to individual foreigners" (p.3).

These developments implied two key issues: first, there is still a restrictive national government who does admit that it is accepting foreigners, ignoring the increasing number of foreigners, many of whom are unskilled given the loopholes in ICRRA. In 2008, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), headed by then Secretary General Nakagawa Hidenao submitted a new immigration plan that aims to accept 10 million immigrants in the 50 years after 2008[4]. It was an ambitious plan, and a plan that held so much potential according to migration scholars but the plan was largely ignored (Lam 2009).

Secondly, foreigners who increase in number because of these loopholes and become immediate issues for local governments who, without a more comprehensive integration policy coming from the central government, may be inexperienced but have started introducing policies

[4] Nakagawa's plan aimed to increase the number of incoming foreign students and increase the number of accepted asylum seekers to 1,000. The plan also focused on immigrants, not on foreign residents and it was this shift that signaled the plan's acceptance of the fact that foreigners are staying longer and longer than expected. Further, the plan included family reunification programs which were key features of many immigrant receiving countries in the West such as Canada, the United States and Germany (Roberts 2013).

to address foreign resident lives.

Given these two issues, local governments have stepped in and began rallying around the concept of *tabunka kyousei* or literally multicultural co-existence (Yamawaki 2002, Menju 2003, Flowers 2012). We have begun seeing multicultural plans as common fixtures in local government websites (Baba and Fukuda 2009). This catchphrase promises "a broader and deeper engagement that goes beyond consumption of the exotic", a promise that simply means going beyond *kokusaika*. Ashley Carruthers (2004) makes a distinction between consumed and lived multiculturalism. On the one hand, consumed multiculturalism looks at the consumer as the agent and the migrant subjectivity as denied. This according to Flowers (2012) had been the effect of many *kokusaika* policies. Researchers have criticized Japan for its *kokusaika* policies, thus a shift to a more socially just concept promoting diversity, *tabunka kyousei*, has been adapted as part of policy discussions. The concept puts the focus on foreigners as the central element (Flowers 2012).

In 2006, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIAC) created a Model Plan for the Promotion of Intercultural Cohesion (Multicultural Co-existence) in Local Communities highlighting the role of local governments in promoting *tabunka kyousei* as the government's platform for migrant integration (MIAC 2006). The MIAC report specifies that local governments are (Nagy 2008):

1. Immediate interface for foreign residents and thus the locus of multicultural coexistence policy implementation.
2. The communiqué stressed the importance of securing the human rights of foreign residents in an effort to abide by all international conventions.
3. As a tool to revitalize local municipalities.

The ultimate goal of the report according to Nagy (2008) is "to build cities that are easy to live within, and convenient for people of multiple cultural backgrounds". The national government has acknowledged the capability and need of local governments to address contacts and clashes between migrants and local Japanese residents. These contacts and clashes between locals and foreigners are mostly felt at the local level and local governments are left with a task they themselves cannot seem to define.

What we have seen here are the shifts in how Japan approaches immigration and integration. Interestingly, we note that these shifts coincide with the earlier paradigm shifts that we have noted from the literature review in Chapter 1. We saw that while *douwa* was used initially in the

context of internal assimilation, during the process of assimilating colonized subjects such as Taiwanese and Koreans, it had evolved to mimic the concept of assimilation as used in the West when it became popular in assessing the integration of "white" minorities such as the Irish and the Italians. As with the West, the negative connotations of *douwa* made many allergic to the terms and with Japan's accession to the UN Refugee Convention, *douwa* lost its appeal and paving the way for *kokusaika* to become the buzzword when referring to all things international. Though slightly different in terms used, *kokusaika* reflected the key ideas about multiculturalism, and with it, its negative connotations. Both used in the context of an increasing diversity in the world, both *kokusaika* and multiculturalism fell prey to the problems of diversity left on its own. In the West, there has been seen a backlash against multiculturalism, and in Japan *kokusaika* was replete with negative meanings that soon many saw the increasing movement of local governments under the banner of *tabunka kyousei. Tabunka kyousei,* a rather more grounded and more diversity-centered approach is currently being utilized and has resulted to a number of municipalities releasing multicultural co-existence plans. This coincided with the call for a new concept in the West to describe this process of migrant incorporation. Recently then there has been a lot of debate as to how integration can be measured, as measuring it has the been the first thing on the agenda in the hope that it will help avoid the pitfalls of multiculturalism.

Understanding the parallels between Japan's experience with immigration and integration with much of migrant-receiving states in the Western part of the world, understanding integration becomes a much more bearable undertaking.

D. Local governments and the integration of foreign residents

What we have done so far is to examine the development of Japan's immigration policy and how it relates to the integration of the foreign residents. What we have seen is that while Japan opens doors, albeit reluctantly, it assumes that all foreigners it lets in will eventually leave once they fulfill their contracts. However, that is not what is happening. The numbers of permanent and long-term residents continue to increase, and not everyone came through proper channels. Many of them are foreigners who were categorized as so-called unskilled.

Not acknowledging that many foreigners are staying longer and longer and more permanently as we have seen allows the government an excuse to not initiate a comprehensive integration policy. It has used the "mono-ethnic" and "inexperienced" excuses time and time again to deny the existence of immigrants. What this led to is the passing off the responsibility to local governments whose jurisdiction and legal powers may not be enough to address the livability

issues of foreign residents.

Local governments have begun to implement multicultural policies in response to the growing number of foreign residents, promoting tolerance and co-existence between foreigners and local residents (Yamamoto and Matsumiya 2007). Since the 1990s, particularly after the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995, "the term *tabunka kyousei* has often been used by some local governments in Japan to support foreign residents in areas such as Japanese language, education and health" (Shimizu 2011, p.101). Municipalities began actively supporting the concept of *kokusaika* and *tabunka kyousei* and by themselves established the "Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Population of Foreigners" (Kitawaki 2010). This Committee was formed in 2001 in response to the call made by Hamamatsu City. Hamamatsu City houses globalized companies such as Honda, Yamaha and Suzuki, and has attracted *Nikkeijin*. This Committee adopted the Hamamatsu Declaration which called for "the establishment of a truly symbiotic society based on the respect of rights and fulfilment of duties that are mandatory for healthy urban life, amid deepening of mutual understanding, and respect for each other's cultures and values between Japanese and foreign residents" (Kitawaki 2010, p.5), the intention of which is to promote a "multicultural social integration policy" (Kitawaki 2010). Local governments have also established various consultation services for foreigners such as labor consultation centers and medical translation services (Shipper, 2011). Baba and Fukuda (2009) also note of the proliferation of English translation of local government websites in response to *tabunka kyousei*. Language classes for adult and children learners became a normal feature for many local governments adopting *tabunka kyousei*, as well as recently, foreign advisory committees.

As the initial applause for *tabunka kyousei* begins to die down, speculations as to how lasting such an arrangement could be start sprouting. While some local governments want a more progressive integration policy—such as allowing foreign residents local voting rights as in the case of Kawasaki City (Green 2013)—its limitations prove that at the end of the day what is needed is an integration policy from the central government.

Chapter conclusion:

This chapter is the first chapter of the second part of this project. Part II discusses in-depth the contextual factors that may impact foreign resident integration. In this chapter, we looked at the changing landscape of Japan in terms of immigration. What we see is that numbers do change, suggesting a continuous increase in the stock of foreign population in the country. While the increase is not so dramatic, it is steady and for a country that is supposedly "inexperienced" when it comes to foreign population, having almost two percent of its entire population as foreigners already warrants a discussion.

We saw in this chapter how Japan fares compared to other OECD countries. It was noted that most of the migration into Japan are work-related as was shown by the OECD statistics, which is contradictory to countries like France and Germany of which majority of inflows involve family-related migration.

In this chapter, I also outlined the development of the immigration approach in Japan. What we saw is that regardless of the increase in numbers, the national government still refuses to acknowledge that many foreigners are staying longer and more permanently. What this led to is a lack of governing policies at the national level. This reluctance by the national government opened a role for local governments and take charge of livability issues. What we see is that in the absence of services and policies aimed to address livability issues of foreign residents at the national government, local governments are trying to fill in this role to facilitate a more harmonious co-existence between foreign and local residents. However, to create a lasting harmonious co-existence, simply delivering services may not be enough. We see from the development of the approaches to foreign-related issues that immigration is something that if can be avoided should be avoided. Issues therefore ran much deeper than simply providing services.

It becomes interesting then to see how these contextual factors impact the integration of foreign residents based on their own individual experiences. More so, how this particular approach to integration as it interacts with the histories and individual factors of foreign residents impact their integration extent and levels. In the next chapter, we will look at the specific focus of this project: Filipinos in Japan and specifically, Filipinos in Nagoya City.

Chapter 4: Filipinos in Japan

In this chapter, I illustrate the magnitude of the Filipino resident population in Japan by providing recent statistics. I also map the migration of the Filipinos to Japan and trace the many different occupations and roles that Filipinos have assumed in the Japanese society.

A. Statistics Filipinos in numbers

According to the Ministry of Justice as of 2016, there are 243,662 Filipino residents currently living in Japan. As mentioned in previous chapters, Filipinos are among the top three foreign population in Japan, preceded by Chinese with 695,522 residents and Koreans with 453,096 residents. We saw from the previous chapter that their numbers have increased constantly from 2006 to 2016, except for a slight dip in 2012. It should be noted however that the number of foreign residents in Japan have overall decreased in 2012, mostly attributed to the aftermath of the Tohoku Earthquake in 2011. However, numbers continue to increase after 2012 and by 2016 the numbers have been the highest it has ever been.

This is the same for Filipinos. Chart 5.1 below shows the available data from the Ministry of Justice. The available data dates from 2006 and 2016 and shows the changes in the number of Filipino residents in Japan from that period. The year 2016 records the highest number of Filipinos at 243,662. This is about 26 percent increase since 2006.

Chart 4.1. Filipino residents in Japan, 2006-2016



Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	193,488	202,592	210,617	211,716	210,181	209,376	202,985	209,183	217,585	229,595	243,662

Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016

http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html

Filipinos fall into the newcomer category. Filipino residents are scattered unevenly all over Japan, with majority centered in high-density population areas such as Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Aichi, and Gifu, cities that have historically attracted migrants such as Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto and Nagoya (Ministry of Justice 2016).

We also see from the chart below that the Filipino migrants are aging. Comparing 2012 to 2016 we see that Filipino residents aged 55 years old and above have grown while those aged 35 to 44 years old have shrunk. This population is being replenished, however. But even though the population aged less than 15 years old seem to remain constant suggesting a continuous replenishment, the replenishment cannot seem to catch up to the evening out of the age groups. However, in general, from earlier statistics, we see that Filipino residents in Japan continue to grow.

Chart 4.2. Filipino residents, by age groups, 2012-2016



Year	Less than 15 years old	15-24 years old	25-34 years old	35-44 years old	45-54 years old	55-64 years old	Above 65 years old
2012	19,677	21,025	52,300	64,434	38,894	5,969	686
2013	20,366	21,865	51,351	63,002	44,517	7,264	817
2014	21,136	23,219	51,596	61,621	50,157	8,890	963
2015	22,090	25,244	54,308	60,671	55,083	11,023	1,175
2016	23,193	27,268	58,352	60,857	59,362	13,156	1,473

Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016

http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html

In terms of gender, statistics from the Ministry of Justice from 2012 to 2016 show that Filipino women continue to outnumber men at 177,205 versus 66,457. We see that the number of males continue to grow, however, the number of females also continue to grow. The difference between the two sexes seems to remain consistent from 2012 to 2016. We see however that the number of males has grown by almost 46 percent and that the number of females only grew by about 12 percent from 2006 to 2016. Now looking at the composition of the Filipino residents, we see that over 60 percent of the total foreign residents are permanent and long-term stayers which raise issues related to population, reproduction, householding and integration. Permanent and long-term stayers grew by almost 45 percent in ten years. Most of the Filipino residents in Japan seem to be in Japan for the long haul, though of course some of them may eventually leave. But what the numbers tell us is that contrary to what has been expected, most of the foreigners, at least in the Filipino residents' case, are staying longer and longer and more permanently.

Chart 4.3. Filipino residents by sex, 2012-2016



Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Male	45,423	48,275	52,508	59,309	66,457
Female	157,562	160,908	165,077	170,286	177,205

Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016

http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html

Chart 4.4. Permanent and long-term stayers compared to the total Filipino resident population, 2006-2016



	Total	Permanent and long-term stayers	Permanent resident	Spouse of Japanese national	Spouse of Permanent resident	Long-term resident
2006	193,488	140,936	60,225	49,195	1,570	29,907
2007	202,592	153,613	67,131	51,076	2,032	33,332
2008	210,617	164,017	75,806	49,980	2,472	35,717
2009	211,716	170,375	84,407	46,027	2,765	37,131
2010	210,181	174,823	92,754	41,255	2,899	37,870
2011	209,376	180,575	99,604	38,249	3,347	39,331
2012	202,985	183,930	106,399	33,123	3,648	40,714
2013	209,183	188,606	111,952	30,561	3,889	42,156
2014	217,585	193,280	115,857	29,150	4,229	43,997
2015	229,595	198,365	120,390	27,701	4,546	45,680
2016	243,662	203,708	124,477	26,687	4,834	47,663

Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016

http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html

We see that compared to the total number of Filipino residents, permanent residents make up majority of the population. We see that as other visa status relating to permanent and long-term residency decline, the number of residents with permanent resident visas increase. For instance, the number of Filipinos with Spouse of Japanese National reached its peak in 2008 and slowly declined from there. The increase in permanent residents can be attributed to the changing of residency status of other Filipino residents.

B. Mapping the Philippine Migration to Japan

According to Tullao and Corez (2003), “Japan is the Philippines’ leading commercial partner”, as well as, “in terms of official development assistance (ODA), the Philippines draws from Japan a considerable amount to finance various infrastructure and human development efforts in the country”.

Japan continues to be the major source of ODA contributing approximately 45 percent of the total ODA received by the Philippines from 1992 to 1999. By 2008, ODA received by the Philippines is at 914 Million of which 33 percent or 302.54 Million is from Japan (Embassy of Japan in the Philippines, 2008). Also, in 2002, of the total 667,226 OFWs deployed by the Philippines, some 77,870 OFWs went to Japan (POEA 2016). Out of the significant foreign exchange remittances in 2002, OFWs from Japan sent approximately USD 443 million (BSP 2003).

Chart 4.5 below shows the stock estimates of Filipinos in Japan by category from 1997 to 2013.

We see it peaking in 2004 and experienced a decline until 2007 which peaked again in 2010. In 2013 there was about 182,917 Filipinos in Japan both permanent and temporary. The important thing to notice is that while the numbers of temporary and irregular stocks experience sharp declines and continue to declines, the number of permanent stocks continues to increase. The numbers more than tripled from 1997 to 2013.

Chart 4.5. Stock estimates of Filipinos in Japan, by category, 1997-2013



	Permanent	Temporary	Irregular	Total
1997	36,262	116,000	48,000	200,262
1998	48,939	128,465	48,000	225,404
1999	53,158	105,308	39,235	197,701
2000	59,626	133,631	16,369	209,626
2001	65,647	138,522	36,379	240,548
2002	71,381	138,522	76,573	286,476
2003	77,310	197,268	30,100	304,678
2004	83,303	238,522	31,430	353,255
2005	114,980	139,791	30,619	285,390
2006	124,722	103,555	30,700	258,977
2007	133,528	38,329	30,700	202,557
2008	141,210	60,020	30,700	231,930
2009	146,488	29,559	34,570	210,617

2010	150,254	127,264	12,840	290,358
2011	154,219	57,333	9,330	220,882
2012	158,978	77,248	6,910	243,136
2013	163,532	12,475	6,910	182,917

Source: Commission on Overseas Filipinos 1997-2013

On the other hand, Chart 4.6 shows OFWs who travelled to Japan by sex. We see that while the number of females decline, the number of males increase. We see a sharp decline by 2005, coinciding with the release of the Trafficking In Persons (TIP) Report of the United States. We will have a more detailed discussion on that as we go along in this chapter. As of 2016, female OFWs travelling to Japan are 28,800 while males are almost double the number at 48,880.

Chart 4.6. Overseas Filipino Workers who travelled to Japan by sex, 1997-2016



	Total	Male	Female
1997	71000	45000	26000
1998	67000	38000	29000
1999	82000	49000	34000
2000	86000	51000	36000
2001	94000	49000	45000
2002	87000	41000	46000
2003	103000	49000	54000

2004	97000	42000	54000
2005	112710	53440	59130
2006	90900	51068	39728
2007	97832	63190	35137
2008	102102	64108	37752
2009	86040	60600	26129
2010	89892	68352	21450
2011	90636	66434	23736
2012	75480	53956	21440
2013	78030	47314	31948
2014	67280	49407	16380
2015	85645	61047	23750
2016	78400	48880	28800

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority 1997-2016

In this section, I will address how there eventually came to settle a significant number of Filipinos in Japan as shown in the previous section. To be able to do this, I will map the Filipino migration to Japan. I will begin with a discussion on how a culture of migration was created in the Philippines following the labor export policy issued by the Marcos government in the 1970s. I will then discuss how Japan became a leading destination for many of the Filipino migrants, in particular women. I will then trace the changes in the work Filipinos engage in Japan to show that these occupational changes are often a reflection of what Japan needs – in the 1980s to 1990s, because of a shortage of unskilled labor in the entertainment and construction industry following the economic booms; in the 2000s, the increase in migrating nurse trainees and caregivers following rise in the number of aged population and decrease in birthrate; and how this feminization of migration to Japan have led to an increase in the number of Filipino women holding spouse visas and in the increase of Filipino-Japanese children.

Philippines' culture of migration

The literature on Filipino migration shows that migration between the 1970s and 1980s were generally undertaken by few people and were more permanent in nature (Paul 2011). The migration of Filipinos abroad was in waves: first in 1903, which reached its peak in the 1920s and 1930s (Tolentino, 1996), second was from 1945 to the 1960s (Tolentino, 1996); and the third which was more "massive" (Tolentino 1996), began in the 1980s and is continuing up to the present.

The export of Filipino labor became an official government policy in the 1980s (Semyonov and Gordzeisky 2004). According to Battistella (1999), the Philippine labor export policy “began with the well-known intent of participating in the construction projects in the Middle East in the early 1970s” (p.230). In 1974, it found its way to the Labor Code of the Philippines via President Ferdinand Marcos’ Presidential Decree 442 “which was clearly aimed at promoting overseas employment and implicitly at expanding the market for overseas Filipinos” (Battistella 1999). The labor export policy was formulated “as a measure to combat deflation and to increase dollar remittances in the country” (Docot 2011, p. 5).

According to Asis (2006) a culture of migration has developed in the Philippines. Paul (2011) argues that this was spurred by four major factors: the Philippines’ economic difficulties, the institutionalization of the migration industry through the labor export policy, the large volume of remittances sent back each year and the substantial Filipino diaspora spread throughout the world.

Patterned after South Korea’s strategy on exporting labor temporarily to build a skilled and experienced work force, the labor export policy was supposedly a temporary measure. However, researchers lament that what started as an interim strategy for debt payment and response to inflation became institutionalized as a permanent government program for development (Asis 2006, Paul 2011, Docot 2011)

What it did was to entrench the culture of migration, it developed the mindset that it is acceptable to want to migrate and work, especially if it is for the betterment of the family since there is no available opportunity in the home country, forgetting that opportunities should be made by the government within the home country and not outside. By 2005, in a survey asking adults whether they want to migrate abroad, Paul (2011) notes that about 33 percent of adults expressed intent to migrate abroad.

Who wouldn’t want to migrate? The promises of migration are many. In a country where people believe that there are no opportunities available, with a government that promotes out migration, add to this the continuous heralding of overseas workers by the government through tagging of various heroic names, years since the first wave of migration began, more and more people have gone abroad. Currently the Philippines are among the top sources of migrant workers all over the world.

Back in the home country, migrants are often lauded with praises since the 1980s by different

government administrations. From “modern-day heroes” in the 1980s, “economic saviors” in the 1990s, “citizens of the world” and “overseas Filipino investors” in the 2000s. What these did is to further entrench migration as a source, not just of economic development, but as pride and honor. However, this does not take into account that majority of the Filipino migrant workers are engaged in low-skilled jobs, jobs many would not otherwise do given their educational attainment and skills. According to the results of the 2016 Survey on Overseas Filipinos, one in every three Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) is engaged in elementary occupations, occupations which consist of simple and routine tasks.

Filipinos’ occupations in Japan

We have seen earlier that Filipinos have constituted a big bulk of the foreigners coming to Japan. In the 1970s to the 1990s, many came in as entertainers, tourists and trainees. The introduction of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Japan and the Philippines saw the arrival of Filipinos coming in as nurse trainees. While, the extension of the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme to Filipinos saw the increase of Filipino Assistant Language Teachers, and through various scholarships provided by the Japanese and Philippine Governments, as well as other private and international organizations, more and more Filipinos have been coming in as students. In this section, we discuss the various occupations available to Filipinos. I argue in this section that the compounding and meeting of the demand and supply sides of migration have allowed the stocks of Filipino residents in Japan to increase. On the one hand, on the supply side, given the culture of migration, a big bulk of Filipinos aspired to migrate and became available and willing to take up occupations that other Japanese people would not. While on the other, the economic boom in the 1980s in Japan has opened up doors for the Filipino labor export supply. The succeeding concerns with age and depopulation have continued to create a market for Filipino labor. However, I note that the relationship is never equal and that the occupations allowed to Filipinos is a reflection of the different needs of the demand side. Coupled with restrictions and ambivalence of the national government to accept and recognize the many foreign bodies coming into the country, this created a very particular context to integrate into for Filipinos who stayed and became residents.

Amid increasing structural impediments and economic crises, the recent years saw a continuous increase in Filipino migration. New trends have become salient, one of which is the increase in women migrants. Dubbed as the feminization of migration, more and more women have been employed as overseas domestic workers, caregivers, nurses and entertainers in the United States, Middle East, Europe, Japan and Singapore (though feminization goes beyond the increase of women migrants for it also include the increase in men migrants engaging in work

considered feminine). In particular domestic and entertainment work proved to be lucrative and easier to penetrate because of lesser skill requirements. From 1979, Filipina entertainers under contracts as Overseas Performing Artists (OPAs) began entering Japan and in 1989, Filipina entertainers who were admitted to Japan reached over 100,000. The year 1989 became known in Japan as Japayuki Year One. While on the other hand Filipinas began entering Japan as *hanayome* or docile brides in 1987.

The entry of *hanayome* and the *japayuki* are often seen as a response to a reproductive need. The economic boom in the 1980s in Japan saw massive out-migration of many rural young women from agricultural municipalities to urban areas to work in more diverse industries. This lead to a "bride famine" and in general a decline in the number of women in rural areas. According to Satake (2000), this prompted Japan to allow recruitment of women, as brides and as entertainers, from Asia, mainly from the Philippines, Korea, China and Vietnam. This became resembled an official policy, as local governments began organizing trips to the Philippines to find women willing to be brides. And at the national level, the amendments in 1989 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, enacted in 1991, allowed entry of entertainers by adding it in the new ten categories of visa given to foreigners, bringing the total to twenty-eight under which foreigners could enter and remain in Japan legally as mentioned in a previous section. It also simplified visa application procedures while instituting criminal penalties for the recruitment and hiring of illegal unskilled foreign workers (Yamanaka 1993). Included in the added categories which are considered professional is the entertainer visa. The length of stay allowed for a foreigner with an entertainer visa is three months to one year according to the new law passed in 1989.

By the 1980s, Japanese sex tourism was at its peak in Asia "and tourist spots like beach resorts and golf courses in the Philippines catered to a group that Ventura (2006, cited in Docot, 2009) has called the "Japanese underground" (Docot, 2009, p.6)[5]. Sellek (1996, cited in Docot, 2009) argues that the development of tourism to facilitate the needs of sex tourists was established in response to the internationalization of the sex industry. These forms of local entertainment were hidden under the guise of international migration and cooperation during the Marcos period (Docot, 2009). This deployment of Filipino workers became a pillar of foreign policy and the immigration of women workers became rhetoric for female empowerment (Docot, 2009).

[5] It is also argued that the increase in the number of entertainer in Japan is in response to the limiting to sex tourism abroad.

Filipino entrants to Japan more than tripled from 1982 to 1990 and “the largest visa category, entertainers “jumped from 3 percent of the total workers worldwide in 1975 to 19 percent in 1990 [with] Japan being their almost exclusive destination” (Anderson 1999). Entertainment work specifically proved to be desirous for many women as requirements were less (Suzuki 2003; 2005; 2008; 2011).

As demand for cultural dancers, singers, entertainers, and brides grew so did the number of Filipina entertainers and brides coming to Japan. Filipina entrants to Japan with entertainer visas ballooned from 8,505 in 1980 to 51,252 in 1992. In 1982, Filipina entertainers comprise 24 percent of registered Filipinos in Japan. The proportion of Filipina entertainers against all registered Filipino migrants grew to 42 percent in 1987, to 48 percent in 1988 until the category comprised more than half of registered Filipinos in Japan in 1990 (51%) to as much as 66 percent in 1992 (Office of the Labor Attaché, Philippine Embassy, 1991, cited in Anderson 1999). Further, the number of intermarriage between Japanese men and Filipino women toped the number of intermarriages between 1992 to 1996 and continued to do so until the early 2000s (Satake 2004).

In 2001, there were more than 120,000 entertainers in Japan, and it almost reached its 140,000 mark by 2004. It dropped to 100,000 in 2005 and was halved by 2006 after the US government’s criticism of Japan engaging in human trafficking through the entertainer and trainee visas (Yamashita 2008). In response to the US government’s listing of Japan in its yearly Human Trafficking Report as the only economically developed country involved with human trafficking, the Japanese government implemented stricter screening and requirements for incoming entertainers. Coupled with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) also tightening its regulation, by 2005 the number of Filipinos leaving with entertainer visas dropped significantly. We also saw this effect in the Chart 4.7 showing the number of female OFWs travelling to Japan. Chart 4.7 below shows that from 2006’s 14,149 entertainers, the numbers went down to only 548 entertainers in 2016.

Chart 4.7. Population of entertainers from 2006-2016



Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	14,149	11,065	9,199	7,465	6,319	4,188	344	367	436	388	548

Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016

http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html

Filipina entertainers in Japan were often labeled *japayuki* or *japayuki-san* (Fuwa 1998). Created at the beginning of the 1980s, it recalls the *karayuki-san* or literally, one who has traveled to China, a derogatory term coined to refer to Japanese women who, from the end of the 19th to the early 20th century, were prostitutes in China (Mihalopoulos 1994). What the label attaches to the entertainers is the use of sex (Faier 2007, Suzuki 2005) for often Filipino women in hostess bars in Japan are often suspected of using "sex to achiever their unsavory ends" (Suzuki 2005).

Sensational reports of Filipinas' working conditions "created an image so shameful that the general public questioned the reputations of all *Japayuki*…[while]…at the same time they are lauded in public as heroes and saviors of the nation by presidents and labor secretaries, in private many of the higher classes often scorn entertainers" (Anderson 1999, p.11). Isolated cases of those like Maricris Sioson were highlighted and are often used to generalize to create shameful images of Filipina entertainers in Japan.

Also in Japan, the Filipina entertainers are also viewed negatively through reports showing the increasing number of apprehended Filipina migrants. Morita and Sassen (1994) notes that "in the mid- and late 1980s the data for apprehended immigrants show that the largest single country of origin was the Philippines" (p.154) and that two thirds of the apprehended Filipino migrants were

Filipinas. In 1980, 8505 Filipina entertainers were apprehended, in 1985, along with the increase of entertainer entrants, apprehended entertainers also increased to 17,834. It reached 32,636 in 1989; 42,738 in 1990 and 56,851 in 1991.

These images are in contrast to the “docile” bride image of the *hanayome*, who in the beginning of their arrival enjoyed positive portrayal as “the good ones” when compared to those coming in as entertainers. However, in the later years, derogatory depictions “influenced negative sentiments among Japanese to include undifferentiated discrimination”. This negative image came from the commodification of the marriage process, where in later years increasingly became institutionalized with different actors involved such as professional fixers, marriage agencies and even local governments (Satake 2004). Interestingly, the “bride procurement” process was incorporated in the rhetoric of internationalization which looked at the recruitment and export of brides as export of “human goods”.

Entertainers and spouses made up most of the earlier bulk of Filipinos who came to Japan. It is worth noting that the circumstances of their arrival and stay have impacted the way Filipinos are often viewed in Japan. Their role was to fulfill a sexual and reproductive need, and as such has implications not just in terms of householding but of child-rearing and integration. The issue of the Japanese-Filipino Children (JFC) is a field that is being given attention recently by scholars studying Philippine-Japan relations. The largely feminized migration of the 1980s has resulted to an increase in intermarriage and reproduction. From data collected by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), as of 2013 Filipino women-Japanese men marriages comprise the second most numerous mixed marriage in Japan (20.1%), preceded only by Chinese women-Japanese men marriages (40.4%). With intermarriages come also the increase of Japanese-Filipino children, live births of which counted to 2,138 in 2013 which is less than one percent of the total number of live births in that year. This does not count however the number of children that have been born in the Philippines and those who may or may not be recognized by their Japanese fathers. Especially those who were born out of wedlock and were born in the Philippines, the fight to be recognized by their Japanese fathers to either gain citizenship or to receive child support is very difficult (Celero 2015, Suzuki 2015).

If entertainers and *hanayome* were admitted to Japan because of a reproductive need, it is argued that Japan’s superaging created a need to import nurses and careworkers and how Japan’s thrust towards internationalization opened the job market for English as Secondary Language teachers to Filipinos and other various jobs.

Japan's superaging status by 2007 prompted the migration of careworkers from the Philippines and Indonesia under their economic partnership agreements (EPA) with Japan. The first batch of candidate nurses and careworkers consisting of 93 nurses and 217 careworkers were deployed to Japan in 2009. Numbers dropped by 2010 due to the worsening economic conditions in Japan and by 2011, many have cancelled their commitment to be deployed because of concerns regarding the Great East Japan Earthquake. In 2011 a total of 569 Filipino candidates were already deployed in Japan (Ohno 2012). In June of 2016, 60 nurses and 276 careworkers were deployed as part of the 8th batch, while 333 Filipino candidates were deployed in hospitals in November 2016 (Embassy of Japan to the Philippines 2016).

In June 2016, the POEA released a call for applicants citing Japan's International Cooperation of Welfare Services (JICWELS) need to fill up vacancies for 48 nurses and 585 careworkers. Qualifications needed are high and requirements are considerably strict. Needed qualifications for nurses include having passed the Nursing Board Licensure Examination in the Philippines with at least three years of hospital experience, while qualifications for careworkers include degree holders and certification by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA). Accepted candidates are to undergo a six-month language training in Japan, on-the-job training in a hospital in Japan, and are required to pass the licensure examination before they can start working as registered nurses. In total, nurse candidates have three chances to take and retake the licensure examination in Japan. While carework candidates can only take the exam once in every four years (Ohno 2012).

One oft-cited criticism of this program is that since the Japanese government does not regulate the hours spent on learning versus the hours spent on daily work, conditions for each foreign nurse or carework candidate vary. Further, conflicting interests within the organizations involved in the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) often hinder higher passing rates for Filipino candidates. For instance, Ohno (2012) cites the negative attitude of the Japan Nursing Association towards foreign candidates, depriving Japanese nurses a number of opportunities. Licensure passing rates are shown in Chart 4.9.

Chart 4.8. Number of Filipino candidate nurses and careworkers, by takers and passers, by batch, 2009-2016



Notes:

1. Careworkers:Takers and Careworkers:Passers data from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare "Nyuukoku nendo betsu kouho-sha no ruiseki goukaku-ritsu accessed from http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-12004000-Shakaiengokyoku-Shakai-Fukushikibanka/0000157129.pdf
2. Nurses:Takers and Nurses:Passers data from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare "Keizai renkei kyoutei (EPA) ni motozuku gaikokujin kankoshi kouho-sha no kangoshikokkashiken no kekka" accessed from http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-10805000-Iseikyoku-Kangoka/0000157982.pdf
3. Data for 2014 for both nurses and careworkers may change, data for nurses batch 2014 are only for three trials, one more chance for batch 2014 to take the exam (appeal) while corresponding batch for careworkers are still under trainings
4. Data for batch 2015 for nurses only for two trials, careworkers still under training
5. Data for batch 2016 for nurses only for one trial, careworkers still under training

On the other hand, the Philippines was not initially tapped as a source of assistant language teachers or ALTs for the JET Programme. The JET Programme was part of the *kokusaika* initiatives launched by Japan with the goal of globalizing the country. There is not much data available on the number of Filipino ALTs in Japan. The Philippines only began sending ALTs in the early 2000s (San Jose and Ballescas 2010).

According to San Jose and Ballescas (2010), the rapid increase in Filipino ALTs in Japan was

only seen in the mid-2000s. This can also be attributed to the increase in ALTs hired by private companies. They note that overall, the increase in the number of Filipino ALTs can be attributed to four factors. First, Japan's policy to continue its internationalization polices; second, expanding compulsory English education in elementary school; third, local governments' decision to award placements to private organizations with the lowest bids; and fourth, the aggressive recruitment of Filipino ALTS by placement agencies, even paying shokai or introduction fees amounting to as much as 30,000 yen (300USD) to participants who can introduce other Filipino ALTs to the agency.

Statistics from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) as shown above showed that OFWs travelling to Japan are increasingly being dominated by males. This is in contrast to what has been previously discussed that majority who first migrated were females. More males are travelling to Japan to work as intra-company transfers, trainees and construction workers. Indeed, less and less females are travelling to Japan as OFWs, but we also see in the data that more and more females have become permanent and long-term stayers.

This is the context whereby Filipino residents integrate. It is a context where Filipino women have dominated the scene, since most of the first Filipino foreign workers to Japan were entertainers, and *hanayome,* if being a bride is to be taken as an occupation. This context is also replete with stereotypes, stereotypes that may work against the Filipino residents in Nagoya City.

Chapter conclusion

This chapter has shown the history of migration of the Filipinos to Japan. On the one hand, we saw from the supply side the various needs that arose during Japan's changing economic conditions. The boom in the 1980s created a need for workers willing to work in jobs considered as 3Ds. Coupled with reproductive and aging needs, Japan has allowed entry of thousands of Filipino women to work in Japan as entertainers and to be *hanayome*. Aging and internationalization needs further opened the market to careworkers and English teachers allowing possibilities to diversify industries where Filipinos are. However, problems in passing examinations still prevent many from entering these fields and many still remain in jobs considered as 3Ds.

What is shown in this chapter is that many of the Filipinos in Japan entered the country to work in one of the many 3D jobs that were made available during the 1980s and that many of them worked as entertainers. The argument that entertainer jobs are classified as unskilled and involved in prostitution created a not-so-savory image of the Filipino women in Japan. Together with those who migrated to marry, these women were often accused of marrying for the yen and this has contributed to the negative stereotypes of Filipino women in Japan. This is made much more complicated by the addition of Filipino-Japanese children in the equation.

This, again, is the context whereby Filipino residents integrate. Having stereotypes such as this can complicate the integration of the Filipino residents and may impact their integration outcomes which may give rise to specific patterns of integration.

In the next chapter, we look at the policies and programs at the level of Nagoya City. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 complete Part II of this project which focuses on the contextual factors that may impact integration.

Chapter 5: Nagoya City

According to Penninx (2005), urban cities are where the friction and tension between native-born and foreign residents are mostly felt because it is the urban areas that become the entry point for many foreigners. Nagoya City, one of the most important port cities in Japan, with its increasing foreign resident population, as well as the host to majority of the Filipino residents, is in the middle of this friction and tension. Before I proceed, let me reiterate the reasons why Nagoya City is the focus of this research. The first reason pertains to the importance of the City in the experience of the Filipino residents. Nagoya City, with its large entertainment district and it being a port city, has naturally attracted foreign workers. Currently, Filipinos ranked third in the most populous number of foreign residents in the City, third only to Chinese and Koreans. Further, as of 2016, there were more Filipinos in Aichi prefecture than in Tokyo which is in itself very interesting considering that Tokyo is the capital of Japan. The second reason is more for the improvement of the literature, as migration studies on Japan has attracted scholars to study migrant populations in more popular cities such as Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto and thus understanding the issue as it happens in Nagoya City will help further enrich the literature[6]. In this chapter, I look at the context of Nagoya City and discuss the policies and programs being implemented by the City. This is important to set the stage or the context where Filipino residents integrate. We have mentioned again and again that contexts are frames whereby individuals exercise their agency. Understanding this will provide us important information in understanding the Filipino residents' integration outcomes, how these outcomes come about and what patterns of integration arise specifically from these.

In this chapter, I will first discuss the increasing number of foreign residents in Nagoya City with a particular focus on the Filipino residents. I trace the changes over time to understand the context by which the City government began implementing policies and programs aimed at facilitating multicultural co-existence. In the next part of this chapter I discuss the policies and programs in terms of the dimensions of integration they facilitate.

[6] There are also other areas in Aichi prefecture that have significant number of Filipinos such as Komaki and Toyota City, but the majority of the foreign residents there are different. For instance, in Toyota City, even though there were many Brazilians who left in 2012, Brazilians still outnumber Filipinos. Further, the literature suggests that cities are the first point of interaction between foreign and native-born residents, and though Toyota City is indeed a big city, it is Nagoya City which is the capital of the prefecture and thus the frictions that may arise between native-born and foreign residents are made observable more saliently.

A. Foreign resident population and the Filipino resident population

Nagoya City is the largest city in the Chubu region. It is among Japan's most populous urban areas along with Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto. Nagoya City is the capital of Aichi prefecture and is one of Japan's major ports. The main industry in Nagoya City is automotive and the City houses headquarters of big automotive brands such as Toyota and Lexus. Nearby cities house factories for different companies such as Toyota City and Okazaki City. As of 2016, there are 2,311,553 people living in Nagoya making up about 1,085,067 households, of which 74,180 are foreign residents. This makes up 3.21 percent of the total population of the City (Nagoya City 2017).

The position of Nagoya as a port area has ensured that it is aware of international influences. Since the late 1980s statistics from the Aichi prefectural government tell us that there were more or less 5,000 foreign residents living in Aichi. Most of these foreigners were Koreans who have mostly settled during the colonization period until the end of the Second World War. By 1991, we see a dramatic rise in the increase of Brazilians, mostly Japanese descendants or *Nikkeijin* as a result of the amendment to the ICRRA in 1991 allowing entry of Japanese descendants commonly from South America. By 1997 we see that the number of Brazilians in Nagoya City have doubled from 24,296 to 42,917. Interestingly, Chinese foreign residents, one of the biggest population of foreigners in Japan and among the oldest together with the Koreans, have not increased in numbers dramatically until 2005. By this time, we see a slight drop in the number of Koreans in the prefecture but this drop was being compensated by an increase in the number of Filipinos and Peruvian *Nikkeijin*. This is most noticeable in the case of Filipinos whose numbers grew from 6,431 in 1997 to 19,771 in 2005 (Chart 5.1).

Chart 5.1. Growth overtime of different foreign population in Aichi Prefecture, 1988-89, 1991, 1995, 1997, 2005-2016



	Brazil	China	Korea	Philippines	Peru	Vietnam	Others	Total
1988	248	3,219	55,396	1,208	15	-	2,881	62,967
1989	1,626	4,477	55,315	1,638	89	-	3,484	66,629
1991	24,296	6,711	55,207	3,273	3,262	-	5,614	98,363
1995	29,787	10,389	52,407	4,650	3,366	-	7,332	107,931
1997	42,917	11,999	50,180	6,431	4,040	-	9,180	124,675
2005	71,004	30,532	43,434	19,771	7,532	-	22,375	194,648
2006	76,297	35,522	42,922	21,844	7,957	-	23,972	208,514
2007	80,401	41,605	42,252	24,065	8,292	-	25,569	222,184
2008	79,156	46,167	41,598	25,829	8,542	-	27,140	228,432
2009	67,162	47,099	40,643	25,923	8,067	-	25,922	214,816
2010	67,162	47,099	40,643	25,923	8,067	-	25,922	214,816
2011	48,475	46,787	36,454	25,968	6,983	-	27,374	192,041
2012	48,475	46,787	36,454	25,968	6,983	-	27,374	192,041
2013	48,730	46,680	36,569	27,519	7,279	-	31,031	197,808
2014	47,695	45,914	35,114	29,095	7,315	9,140	26,400	200,673
2015	48,008	45,481	34,185	31,171	7,479	13,130	29,897	209,351

2016	51,171	46,283	33,436	33,390	7,571	17,882	34,691	224,424

Source: Aichi Prefectural Government, Aichi ken'nai no gaikokujin juumin-suu no joukyou 1988-2016

By 2005, most of the foreign resident populations have reached their peaks. For Filipinos, the rise was continuous but minimal. This slow down can be attributed to the 2005 TIP Report of the United States. Most of the foreign resident population gradually increased again after 2005 until 2008 when, as we see in the chart below, the number of Koreans dramatically decreased as well as the Brazilians. These declines however were compensated by increases in the population of Chinese and Filipino residents. By 2011, there was an overall drop in the number of foreign residents in the prefecture owing to the 2011 Tohoku earthquake which saw many foreign residents from all over Japan going back to their home countries, most notably Brazilians whose numbers dropped to 48,475 in 2011 from 67,162 in the previous year. However, the numbers picked up again the following year and by 2016 we see the differences in the number of the foreign residents decline as Koreans and Brazilians constantly decrease, while Filipinos, Chinese and Vietnamese increase in number.

Zooming in on Nagoya City, we see the same scenario. The City houses majority of the foreign resident population in Aichi prefecture. In Nagoya we see that the main foreign resident population include Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos and Brazilians. Both the Chinese and the Filipino population started to overtake Koreans and Brazilians in 2008, and this continued until 2011 when both groups reached their peaks and slightly dipped at the end of the year. The population of Koreans continued to decline while the Brazilian population began increasing again in 2015. As of 2016, the most populous groups is Chinese, followed by Koreans, Filipinos and Brazilians. There are other groups of foreign residents composed of a growing number of Vietnamese and Peruvians, who are mostly *Nikkeijin*.

Chart 5.2. Growth overtime of different foreign population in Nagoya City, 2005-2016



	Total	China	Brazil	Philippines	Korea
2006	61,060	17,271	5,989	6,425	21,383
2007	64,482	19,552	6,213	6,842	21,217
2008	66,983	21,352	6,187	7,129	20,934
2009	67,819	22,670	5,740	7,378	20,433
2010	67154	23,250	5,016	7,446	19,928
2011	64,355	23,630	4,589	7,563	19,313
2012	64,355	22,652	4,109	7,207	19,105
2013	66,289	22,454	3,989	7,409	18,769
2014	67,122	21,944	3,935	7,620	18,158
2015	69,320	21,764	3,897	8,011	16,501
2016	74,180	22,478	5,530	8,568	16,165

Source: Aichi Prefectural Government, Aichi ken'nai no gaikokujin juumin-suu no joukyou 2006-2016

Focusing particularly at the Filipino foreign resident population, we see that they are mostly concentrated in Nagoya City, the most populous city in Aichi prefecture. However, the chart below shows us that there are also relatively big concentrations of Filipino residents in other

cities in Aichi such as Toyohashi City, Okazaki City, Toyota City, Komaki City, Ichinomiya City and Anjo City. Interestingly we see a sudden increase in the number of Filipino residents in Toyohashi City from 2012, the same year when we see a dip in the population of Filipino residents in Nagoya City. However, by the end of 2012 we see the population of Filipino residents in Nagoya City picking up and increasing until 2016. Currently, Filipinos are the third biggest population of foreign residents in Nagoya City, and comparing Tokyo City with Nagoya City, there are still more Filipinos in Nagoya City than in Tokyo City.

Chart 5.3. Top seven cities and municipalities populated by Filipino residents, 2006-2016



Year	Total	Nagoya	Toyohashi	Anjo	Okazaki	Toyota	Ichinomiya	Komaki-
2006	21,429	6,425	1,319	838	1,081	1,003	1,255	685
2007	23,701	6,842	1,715	989	1,223	1,087	1,275	723
2008	25,341	7,129	1,867	1,111	1,315	1,162	1,300	751
2009	25,457	7,378	1,880	1,071	1,306	1,233	1,229	818
2010	25,781	7,446	1,896	1,129	1,384	1,216	1,240	845
2011	26,436	7,563	1,967	1,247	1,529	1,254	1,232	893
2012	26,246	7,207	2,025	1,386	1,504	1,227	1,163	894
2013	27,519	7,409	2,209	1,446	1,511	1,335	1,210	946
2014	29,095	7,620	2,426	1,532	1,546	1,425	1,271	1,022
2015	31,171	8,011	2,794	1,589	1,610	1,593	1,340	1,102
2016	33,390	8,568	2,996	1,729	1,696	1,678	1,437	1,209

Source: Aichi Prefectural Government, Aichi ken'nai no gaikokujin juumin-suu no joukyou

2006-2016

There are a number of foreign resident associations in Nagoya City. In terms of the Filipino residents, there is a considerable number of Filipino migrant organizations in Nagoya City. The Chubu Philippine Friendship Association (CPFA) and the Filipino Migrants Center (FMC) are considered the biggest and are often contacted by the City and Prefectural governments to address certain issues regarding Filipino migrants. A number of other organizations also exist but are usually connected to one of the two organizations. For example, the Ecumenical Learning Center for Children (ELCC), a school that teaches Japanese to Filipino children who were brought to Japan by their parents, have connections with FMC. Another organization linked with FMC is the Philippines Society of Japan (PSJ), which provides consultation for Filipinos in need, visa programs and domestic violence. On the other hand, the Nagoya International Association (NIA), Ikebana International Nagoya Chapter and other cultural clubs have linkages with CPFA. Usually, lead organizers of the two organizations also act as resource persons and officers of other organizations.

In terms of the goals of the organizations, it can be said that the organizations can be grouped into two depending on the majority of the issues they address. While the FMC, the ELCC and the PSJ deal with more legal and political issues such as illegal migrants, documentation, assisting victims of domestic violence among others, the CPFA and NIA deal with the more cultural aspects such as cultural exchange and internationalization. The FMC, established in 2000, was created as a support group for Filipino women who are victims of domestic abuse and violence. Aside from legal consultations they provide help to those Filipinos who feel isolated from their families and communities. They are also active in coordinating with other Filipino organizations in addressing various problems experienced by Filipinos in Japan such as disaster and emergency needs especially during the 2011 earthquake.

On the other hand, the oldest among those groups, CPFA was initially created in 1981 as the Association of Intermarried Couples. It later changed its name to its current name in 1984. According to former CPFA chairman, Mrs. Linda Taki, who is married to a Japanese man, the organization was initiated mainly to bring together intermarried couples to share their experiences in dealing with cultural differences. As the membership grew to include students and professionals, and as the issues that they have to address also grew, they decided to change the name. The CPFA annually holds the Philippine Festival and usually gets sponsorship from Philippine government agencies and embassies as well as the Aichi Prefectural Government and

the Nagoya City Government. The governor and mayor of Aichi and Nagoya City respectively even gave speeches during the 31st annual event. The CPFA also regularly conducts outreach programs in coordination with the municipal and prefectural governments.

B. Local government plans and policies

The focus of this project is Nagoya City. As has been outlined previously, the most number of Filipinos in Japan can be found in Nagoya City. And has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the way most Filipinos came to Nagoya mirror the way most of the Filipinos came to Japan. What this means is that Nagoya acts as a microcosm of Japan in terms of the Filipino migration experience to Japan. Understanding now the importance of focusing on Nagoya, it becomes important to understand fully the context of Nagoya City to understand better the integration experiences of the Filipino residents. We have previously argued that when migrants come into a host country, they assume an unequal relationship. Host societies can be accommodating or restrictive, and whether they are welcoming or not are reflected in their policies and programs. The succeeding sections will set the scene whereby Filipino residents experience integration by looking at how the City government of Nagoya understands integration and what policies and programs are being implemented in terms of structural, cultural and interactive integration.

In this section, I aim to look specifically at multicultural co-existence plans and policies. Before I proceed to discuss the plans being implemented by the City government of Nagoya, I first discuss the plans and policies being implemented by the prefectural government of Aichi because structurally, Nagoya City remains under the jurisdiction of the Aichi Prefectural Government and as such, the multicultural plans that are implemented at the prefectural level also affect migrants at the city level.

The Aichi Multicultural Society Promotion Plan was first established in 2008 in response to negative impacts of the Great Hanshin Japan Earthquake and the Global Financial Crisis on the foreign resident population in Aichi. While a number of foreigners in Aichi left due to the effects of the two crises, many stayed and the number of foreigners holding permanent resident visas increased and is constantly increasing as we have seen from the charts above. The Aichi Government, through their plan, notes of the fact that foreigners are living in the prefecture permanently and acknowledges that a number of issues that come with this have to be addressed. The prefectural government notes that the key areas where intervention is important are on work, education, disaster prevention and on health and hospitalization. The 2013 Multicultural Plan has three policy objectives:

1. Build a community in which everyone can participate

2. Foster awareness of the significance of multiculturalism
3. Build a community that everyone can comfortably live in

The prefectural government emphasizes the active roles foreign residents have to play in the community. To be able to be actively engaged with the community, the plan highlights the need to study the Japanese language to better communicate with the locals. Further, the plan emphasizes the need to include more players such as non-profit organizations, companies, universities, schools, neighborhoods, international associations, and both foreign and local residents.

On the other hand, the Nagoya City has also launched the Nagoya Multicultural Coexistence Promotion Plan in March 2012. The plan is effective from April 2012 to March 2017. Compared to the definition of the Aichi prefectural government of the multicultural society which focuses on encouraging active participation from foreign residents, the Nagoya plan highlights the need to acknowledge each other's cultural differences to build equal relationships. The Nagoya plan highlights the importance of communication in creating bonds in the community. It has three policy directions which are:

1. Communication support
2. Livelihood support
3. Creating a multicultural communal society.

As with many other cities and prefectures in Japan there is no overarching integration plan. This is because there is no such integration plan at the national level. All the plans and programs being implemented under this multicultural co-existence plan are outlined in a rubric in Table 5.1 below. Given the definitions of the dimensions of integration we have outlined in previous chapters, I have categorized the plans and programs into structural, cultural, interactive and identificational dimensions. We will discuss each in turn.

Table 5.1. List of programs and policies implemented by the City Government of Nagoya, by dimension of integration

Structural	Cultural	Interactive	Identificational
Charter to Ensure the Appropriate Employment of Foreign Workers and to Encourage their Adaptation to Japanese Society	Elementary Japanese Language Concentration Classes and Japanese language guidance classes	Exchange student participation in the Ward Festival	Ward-level Multicultural Coexistence Promotion Association
Employment Service Center for Foreigners	Children's Japanese Class	Hosting and support of foreign exchange students at City Universities	Multiculturalism promotion model projects and internationalization seminar in the community
Human Rights Counseling Center for Foreigners	Japanese Language Education Consultation Center	Foreign Resident Discussion Meetings	Nagoya Regional Seminar
Legal Consultation for Foreigners	Creating foreign language versions of notices for entering school and enrollment support	Projects to increase awareness among foreign residents of the mechanisms of neighborhood and resident associations	
Counselling and consultations specific to women and children	Radio for foreign residents		
Projects to raise awareness of disaster-prevention among foreign residents			
Information about private rental housing, etc.			
Multilingualization of fundamental medical information			
Dispatching and placing interpreters			

Source: Multicultural Co-existence Promotion Plan 2012-2017

Structural integration

The goal of the City to structurally integrate the foreign residents can be seen in one of its policy directions, which is livelihood support. In terms of this policy direction, the Nagoya City government's main thrust is providing support for finding information on employment, housing, the education system, the improvement of the working conditions of foreign residents and information on health care.

Most important of all the policies that the City government implements in terms of structural integration is adhering to the "Charter to Ensure the Appropriate Employment of Foreign Workers and to Encourage their Adaptation to Japanese Society". What this does is facilitate entry of foreigners into the labor market. By having this charter, the labor market is open not just to native-born residents but to foreign residents as well, provided their residency permits them to work. As we will see later in the next chapters, most of the Filipino residents do not find it hard to look and secure a job that can provide them a stable source of income. Further, the Nagoya Employment Service Center for Foreigners provide various job information to foreigners, facilitate language classes for employed individuals, and provide support to foreigners in writing their *rirekisho* (employment history) which is a big hurdle to many foreign workers who cannot read and write *Hiragana* or *Katakana*, let alone *Kanji*. Foreign residents can consult with the Nagoya Employment Service Center in various languages including English, Portuguese and Chinese.

There are also consultation centers for legal and human rights concerns that foreign residents can go to. Foreign residents can go to the Nagoya Legal Affairs Bureau to consult on legal and human rights concerns. While consultations on human rights are free and are available in English, Portuguese and Chinese, consultations on legal issues are only done in Japanese and the City government advises foreign residents to bring a Japanese friend or someone who can translate. Legal consultation services require some fee—5,400 or less for half an hour.

The Nagoya City government also provides consultation services specific to certain sectors such as women and children. For women, to address issues of domestic violence and abuse, the Nagoya City Domestic Violence Consultation Support Center is being operated by Nagoya City Child and Youth Affairs Bureau and provides consultation only in Japanese. There is also a domestic abuse hotline but is available only in Japanese. Various centers providing protective care against child abuse, consultation for child delinquency and truancy are being provided through different Child Guidance Centers situated in various wards. The Nagoya City Child and Youth Affairs Bureau also manage the Nagoya Children SOS which is a hotline for reports of

child abuse. Again, consultations are only available in Japanese in these services. The health centers of every ward in Nagoya City also provide counseling and guidance for parenting and child raising but as the case with many of the consultation services, this is available only in Japanese.

In terms of housing, the City provides in its website some information on finding housing in Japan. It also provides information on how to be able to rent municipal housing. Compared to regular apartments rented through real estate agents, municipal housing managed by the Nagoya City Housing Supply Corporation, along with Urban Renaissance (UR) housing and prefectural housing managed by the Aichi Prefecture Housing Corporation, mostly called *danchi*, are often cheaper as these do not require hefty amounts of key money and rents are usually considered cheaper than going through private real estate. The City provides information on how to apply for municipal housing through the Tenancy Application Guide which is available in English, Chinese, Korean, Portuguese and Spanish. There is also a private real estate that is endorsed by the Aichi Prefectural Government because it accepts foreign residents. Information is also being provided by the City government on this however it is only available in English.

In terms of health services, the Nagoya City government provides medical translations through the Nagoya International Center (NIC), a non-profit organization that is working closely with the Nagoya City government for all issues related to foreign residents. The NIC provides information on emergency clinics in Nagoya that are open in the evenings, on Sundays and on holidays as well as information on pregnancy tests, costs of these tests and delivery. Beginning April 01, 2009, the City increased subsidies for health checks for women who already registered their pregnancy and have a Maternal and Child Health Handbook from their local Public Health Center. Subsidized health checks increased from five to 14. Further in 2012, the City also added subsidies for additional ultrasounds providing two more ultrasounds to the already subsidized two before 2012. Also, foreign residents who are covered by the Japanese health insurance system are also given lump-sum reimbursements of ¥350,000 to ¥380,000 in cases of delivery.

The NIC also provides information on English-speaking dental clinics in Nagoya and provides useful phrases in Japanese related to dental problems. Also, the Nagoya City provides to all, both local and foreign women residents, vaccination against cervical cancer since October 1, 2010.

These programs support the much larger medical interpretation program of the prefectural government. The most important program of the prefectural government is the AIMIS, or the

Aichi Medical Interpretation System which provides telephone interpretation services, on-site interpretation services and translation of medical referrals and other medical documents. AIMIS was launched in October 2011. This service is available in English, Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish and Filipino. The charges for the interpretation are divided between the patient and the medical institution and, in case of interpreter dispatch services (on-site interpreters) the fee ranges from ¥1,500 to ¥2,500.

The Nagoya City, through the NIC, also provides important counseling services to various foreign residents including counseling for refugees and asylum seekers, educational and personal counseling sessions that are available upon appointment and that can be conducted in English and in some cases Portuguese.

Summing it up what we see is a very comprehensive list of programs that facilitate structural integration that are available not just to native-born residents but to foreign residents as well. What this implies are two things: first, that having such a comprehensive and developed approach to structural approach can positively impact the structural integration outcomes of the foreign residents, and in the case of this study, of the Filipino residents. Second, what this implies is that the efficiency and comprehensiveness that we see is because of the fact that these services are already in place because these services are the same services offered to native-born residents and that delivery is simply extended to the foreign residents. Except for making available some counseling services in various other foreign languages and the medical interpretation services, most of these services are nothing new.

I argue that the efficiency and comprehensiveness stem from two things: first, rationally, foreign residents need to be structurally integrated to be able to contribute to the society. As per my correspondence with Mr. Kyle Serra from the International Relations Division of the Bureau of Tourism, Culture and Exchange of the City Government, the City has the responsibility to "provide safety, peace of mind, and equal services to all of its foreign and non-foreign residents". While it treats the residents equally, it also extends its services by providing some of it in various languages. In this way then we see it approaching the issues of foreign residents from a multicultural lens but only in so far as the language differences are acknowledged and some efforts to bridge these differences have been done. Further discussions will be provided as we progress in this chapter.

Second, the provision of services to integration foreign residents structurally are in line with the MIAC's platform on *tabunka kyousei*, that it is a tool to revitalize local municipalities. As

mentioned, depopulation and aging have brought to the fore issues of local public finance crises in many municipalities and cities in Japan. The most famous case is Yubari City in Hokkaido which bankrupted in 2007. The national government, in one way or another, acknowledges some of the benefits of integrating foreign residents and sees this as a way to revitalize municipalities, therefore putting the task of structurally integrating them to local governments such as Nagoya City.

Cultural and interactive integration

The City also aims to integrate foreign residents culturally and interactively as can be seen from its policy direction of providing communication support. The plan highlights the importance of making information multilingual and providing Japanese language support "so there will be no cases of people being unable to receive necessary information and governmental services because of difficulties in communicating in Japanese". Complementing the aim of the prefectural government's goal of improving the participation of foreign residents, the city government aims to encourage foreign residents to participate in exchange events and projects in the community "in which foreign residents are not in a position of always being supported but rather become enablers within the community".

The foci of the programs implemented to facilitate cultural and interactive integration dimensions are twofold: first, to promote communication by language support; and second, to facilitate interaction by providing venues and opportunities for interactions between foreign and native-born residents. Let us look at each of these in turn.

We have seen from the previous discussions that the City government makes a number of services available in different languages to improve access to various services by foreign residents. Complementing that, the City also aims to improve access to more services and to improve communication among foreign and native-born residents by offering language classes for different age groups. Classes for both young and adult learners are made available through the NIC. Various lessons are offered for varying fees. For instance, Japanese Conversation Classes held at the NIC can cost up to ¥3,900 for 13 lessons, while private lessons can be had for ¥2,800 for five hours. There also group lessons that are free but these are rather few and when offered are only for basic Japanese. Most of the language classes being offered are held on weekdays, mornings to afternoons and in cases when they are offered on weekends, are usually held from mornings to afternoons.

Language is seen to be very important for the children of foreign residents hence various

guidance counseling and notices as well as intensive language classes for children are being offered, usually at certain fees that are still more affordable than regular private classes. Elementary and high school education is accessible for children of foreign residents however, the big hurdle is language. Many foreign children, knowing nothing of the language, when they come to Japan are immediately enrolled to public schools based on their age. This can be a big challenge to children and their parents, most of whom also do not know the language very well, and so doing homework, school projects and attending parent-teacher meetings can be a difficult task for both parent and child.

To improve the participation and social inclusion of foreign residents, the Aichi prefectural government has created the Opinion Exchange Meeting for Foreign Residents in Aichi. It is a forum that aims to encourage foreign residents to participate in planning, examining and implementing relevant and pertinent measures and programs. According to my interview Mr. Keita Suzuki, representative from the Aichi Prefectural Government Multicultural Promotion Office, there are two ways by which foreign residents can participate in the planning of programs aimed at addressing the needs for foreign residents. The first way is open to all foreign residents. They can simply go to the prefectural government and submit their opinions and recommendations at a given time. The second one is more sophisticated. A group of foreign residents are invited to form the Opinion Exchange Meeting to discuss with representatives of the local governments. This meeting has been held since 2002, with the number of meetings varying in a year. Last 2014, four meetings were conducted in total. In 2015, nine foreign residents were invited by the prefectural government. According to the Multicultural Promotion Office, each year, the themes are arbitrarily decided and for 2016 the theme was on disaster management. Disaster drills have been conducted aimed at informing the foreign residents where to go during the instances of earthquake and fire. A video promoting the importance of joining these drills were uploaded in different languages by the prefectural government in the internet which is easily accessible. One informant who was then a member of the Opinion Exchange Meeting said that basically during the meeting everything is already prepared, including the talking points so there is really nothing that foreign residents should do or can do.

Nagoya City on the other hand, has implemented the Foreign Resident Discussion Meetings and has encouraged foreign residents to participate in neighborhood and resident associations. As with the Aichi Opinion Exchange Meeting, the themes are decided beforehand by the City government and participants are asked about their opinions in the case of the Foreign Resident Discussion Meetings. Interestingly, there is promise of going beyond being a simple discussion meeting as the City notes that opinions brought up during the meetings will be considered for

implementation in city policies. The Foreign Resident Discussion Meetings are held only thrice a year and are conducted in Japanese though the City can provide interpreters if necessary. Residents who cannot speak Japanese that well but want to participate are encouraged to bring their own interpreters. Remuneration is available at ¥4,000 per meeting.

In terms of facilitating civic participation and mobilization of groups, the Nagoya City government hosts a greater number of programs for foreign residents compared to the prefectural government, including support for foreign resident organizations through networking and renting out facilities that they can use for their events. According to the Multicultural Promotion Office, the Aichi prefectural government's plan is more general, aimed at all foreign residents in Aichi. It complements the city government plan. For example, the AIMIS program is something that only the prefectural government can implement, since most hospitals are managed at the prefectural level.

What we see here is that regardless of the strong indication to provide communication support, we see that the programs are not enough. For one, language classes, even those provided through the NIC, require some money and for many foreign residents, in particular Filipino residents, the enrolment fees are still considered high. Further, we see that the schedules for language classes may be difficult to accommodate for working foreign residents since foreign residents cannot afford to not work and go to classes and have money to pay for these classes. This is highly related to the lack of an overall integration program at the national level. Migrant-receiving countries such as France, Italy, Germany and Canada make language learning a priority and provide language classes for free for a specific period of time. In Quebec, Canada for instance, the government is investing in proper classrooms and materials to be used to teach French language to arriving immigrants.

On the other hand, the interaction that we see is mostly unequal. The Foreign Resident Discussion Meetings and the Opinion Exchange Meetings show how this relationship is unequal. With themes being set by the local governments, meetings held few and far in between and the language of the discussion being set to Japanese it immediately limits, first, the kind of foreign residents who can participate and second, the concerns that can be raised. As was shown in the previous chapters foreign residents come from different countries and are engaged in different occupations in Japan. Their connections with Japan vary and hence when we put all these together we can say that their concerns would most probably be different from each other. This is understood by the City government and that is the reason why they propose themes that are very general and applicable to all such as disaster management or children's education to be

able to cater to most. Representation then is not the main goal of these discussion meetings. While the current programs aimed at improving communication and interaction exist, the impacts may not be maximized in the absence of an integration framework at the national level.

Identificational integration

Identificational integration is being facilitated by the policy directions pertaining to promoting and creating a multicultural communal society. As we see from Table 5.1, the policies tend to be outlined in very broad strokes. The focus of the City government is first, to increase awareness of multicultural co-existence and to facilitate an environment where people who perceive that they belong can co-exist harmoniously. The word “harmonious” and “co-existence” however, from what we will see in the succeeding discussions are confused as to whether non-conflict means the same as non-engagement.

Participation in the planning of policies and programs is key in creating perceptions of belongingness which is what identificational integration stresses. It puts focus on representation and how representation is important in creating an identity as a member of a community. There are two trends in how the City government try to facilitate this: first through internationalization seminars and holding of multicultural events such as festivals; second, through inviting foreign residents to participate in events that will give them voice in relation to planning and crafting policies and programs and third, tapping foreign resident associations in disseminating information and in holding events.

The City holds events that facilitate interactions between foreign residents and native-born residents such as various internationalization seminars. As well as particular programs such as Children’s Story Book Time where foreign volunteers read through a selection of children’s books in their native language as Japanese residents listen, or exhibits showcasing foreign residents’ art works. Also included here are expositions and events that showcase traditional cuisine, costumes and festivals of foreign resident groups.

On the other hand, more substantial participation and representation is aimed to be facilitated by programs that involve foreign residents expressing their opinions and making suggestions on what should be done. Aside from the Discussion Meetings, the Nagoya Regional Seminar is something that can help facilitate interaction and representation of foreign residents in the community. The current multicultural plan of Nagoya City was set to be effective for five years, from 2012 to 2017. In preparation for the drafting of the 2018 plan, they held the Nagoya Regional Seminar in February 6, 2016 attended by both foreign and local residents to discuss

the future of the City in terms of diversity issues.

Among the problems cited by the Nagoya City government during the Nagoya Regional Seminar when it comes to addressing migrant needs is the lack of local government facilities needed to accommodate and provide the needs of the children of foreign residents. Because many of these parents have problems with their visas, many of them encounter problems with their work therefore creating a need for local governments to provide children a place for when their parents have to work. Further, many of them lack information about existing programs for learning Japanese. Further they note that different groups of foreigners have different concerns and thus knowing how the local government can address everything becomes much more challenging. Therefore, they noted that there is a need to work with migrant organizations to more sufficiently address the varied issues that are important for foreign residents. However, contrary to this the theme for the Regional Seminar and for the next multicultural plan has already been decided. The focus of the workshop was how to properly address the education of foreign children, especially those so–called 1.5 generation who arrive as children and adolescents in Japan.

And finally, the City government, as well as the prefectural government, has tapped into foreign resident associations to assist in disseminating information, recruiting participants and organizing events. As was previously mentioned, in the case of the Filipino residents, migrant groups can be divided into two categories. One of the groups, mostly led by PSJ and FMC, focuses more on the situation of the Filipinos in Nagoya City and concerns itself with negotiating for the rights of different sectors such as illegal migrants, children and women. They tend to have more activist agenda. While on the other hand, the second group with the CPFA as the center, focuses more on the relationship between Filipinos and the Japanese and as such endeavors to change the image of the Filipino which is often to be understood low-skilled and “bad girls” owing to the large number of Filipino women entertainers who entered the country in the 1980s to the 1990s. To do this, the second group holds their events in upscale venues and treats this image as a stain that has to be “erased”. It is precisely because the organizations have different agenda that the City government also separately coordinates with them depending on a case by case basis. For example, when it comes to problems with documentation and illegal work permits, the Nagoya City government and the Aichi prefectural government direct the migrants to the FMC. When it comes to multicultural promotion then the local governments coordinates with the CPFA.

For instance, during the Nagoya Regional Seminar, the City government invited representatives from different migrant organizations to speak about their experiences and their organization, how they work and what they think about their communities’ standing in Japan. As a representative of

the Filipino community, they invited Mr. Nestor Puno as a representative from ELCC and PSJ since he is currently the head of PSJ and a teacher at ELCC.

From the above example, we can see that the local governments coordinate with migrant organizations based on the issue that has to be addressed. In an interview with Mr. Puno, he said that they act as *madoguchi* or literally “ticket window” or “contact person” where Filipino migrants can inquire about certain issues on visa procedures, working permits, and other similar issues. As a *madoguchi* they relay this to the local government and inquire about possible solutions. Conversely, when the local government receives inquiries regarding such matters, they direct them to the FMC.

The Nagoya City government and the Aichi prefectural governments have also tapped them when it comes to cultural activities. The CPFA have established links with the NIC. Mrs Taki, the founder of CPFA, is one of the founding members of NIC. They hold seminars, workshops and various cultural events that introduce Filipino culture, cuisine and fashion at the NIC complex. The events that the CPFA holds are aimed at an international audience who wants to know what Filipino culture is. When I asked Ms. Abigail Principe, current president of CPFA, as to why they conduct cultural events, she said that it is to change the “bad image” of Filipinos, and Filipino women specifically so they can be accepted more easily into the Japanese community. This image, one of my interviewees said, is mostly limited however to those actively working in Sakae Entertainment District. She calls them “*mukhang pera”* which can be translated as “after the yen”.

On the other hand, the local governments have also asked migrant organizations to facilitate information dissemination, for example, when it comes to interpretation needs, such as recording of Filipino versions of educational materials on disaster management. According to Mr. Puno they are also tapped to invite more Filipino residents when the local government hosts seminars and workshops on important community issues such as waste segregation, what to do during earthquakes, and events pertaining to the Japanese school system. The FMC and its connected organizations are also recruited for cultural events. Mr. Puno remarked during our interview, “If they want us to dance, we dance”.

On the other hand, Mr. Puno also works closely with the *chounaikai* (neighborhood association) in Sakae-Higashi. It is important, according to him, to help those who are working in the Philippine pubs in the Sakae-Higashi area to develop good connections with the local community through the *chounaikai*. Further, it is the *chounaikai* which regulates the use of certain public spaces such as parks which are often used by Filipino migrants for cultural events.

Through these programs we see a step-by-step method of facilitating identificational integration. Programs aimed at promoting multiculturalism and awareness of having different cultural groups existing in the City is the first step. In here, native-born residents and foreign residents are made to acknowledge each other's presence in the City. Through festival and internationalization seminars, residents, both foreign and native-born, are made to acknowledge that their cultures are different and that respect is necessary to be able to create a multicultural communal society. This is the very basic approach to multiculturalism. By focusing on the different aspects of culture which are often showcased through festival, food and fashion native-born residents are encouraged to understand cultures. But this runs the risk of essentializing a culture into simply a sum of its festival, food or fashion, or what is called 3Fs multiculturalism (Carruthers 2004).

The second and third steps show us a more inclusive approach, an approach that is supposed to go beyond the 3Fs. By providing venues where foreign residents can express their opinions and concerns and by involving foreign resident organizations, the City somehow aims to go beyond the 3Fs and address actual issues that foreign residents are experiencing. However, we see two issues come up: first, the relationship is unequal; and second, the migrant organizations themselves are somehow divided.

We have argued time and again that the relationship is unequal. In the case of the Foreign Resident Discussion Meetings and the Opinion Exchange Meetings, we have seen that it is the local government who set the agenda regardless of whether this is considered the most urgent issue by the foreign residents or not. We also saw this again in the Nagoya Regional Seminar where, while representatives from different foreign resident groups have been invited and were allowed to express their issues, the theme of the seminar has already been decided. For instance, the Chinese representative of a Chinese migrant group talked about the problems of Chinese wives in Japan; an American representative talked about business opportunities and the need to develop more, and Mr. Puno, the Filipino in the panel talked about the Filipino children and the difficulties they face in studying. Regardless of the diversity in their topics, the seminar topic has already been decided even though the topic that they decided on is indeed very important, especially for Filipino residents.

The current unpublished draft of the 2018 multicultural plan actually puts in as policy direction the need to involve foreign residents in the planning process. This suggests a move in the right direction, but we would have to wait and see how this will play out and if once implemented whether it will have the desired outcome.

Chapter conclusion

In this chapter, I endeavored to discuss the policies and programs of Nagoya City using a multidimensional approach. As has been shown, the policies and programs can be assessed in four dimensions: structural, cultural, interactive and identificational. What we see are varied results. In terms of structural integration policies, it would seem that Nagoya City has a comprehensive list of policies and programs it implements. It was argued that the relative ease and efficiency was brought about by two reasons: first, that the services needed by foreign residents in terms of structural integration do not differ from those needed by native-born residents and hence delivery is only a matter of extending the services to the foreign residents. And second, integrating foreign residents structurally is recognized as contributing to the revitalization of municipalities.

On the other hand, in terms of cultural and interactive integration, we see that regardless of the strong indication to provide communication support, the programs are not enough. The lack of an overall integration program at the national level has affected the accessibility of language classes. Having a national program may free up some budget to improve access, especially for foreign residents who may have lower earnings. And the interaction that we see being promoted in programs supposed to facilitate interactive integration is mostly unequal. In terms of identificational integration, we saw a step-by-step method of facilitating identificational integration. First is acknowledgment of culture and the second pertains to improved representation. However, while the City does promote cultural exchange, I argued that this exchange stops at the first step. This runs the risk of essentializing cultures, a problem we have previously raised in discussing multiculturalism and its variants. There is a tendency to conflate non-conflict with non-engagement.

This is the context where foreign residents integrate. Chapter 5 is the last chapter of Part III. And together with Chapters 3 and 4 I have endeavored to establish the contextual factors where individual foreign residents exercise their agency. In the next chapters, we see how, given this context whereby Filipino residents exist, it impacts their integration process by looking at their outcomes in terms of the different dimensions of integration and how these outcomes can give rise to specific patterns of integration.

Part III.

This part is the last of the three parts of this research project. This is composed of three chapters. The goal of this part is to present and analyze the data collected. As previously mentioned, I will be presenting both qualitative and quantitative data convergently. What it means is while I did my data collection for both the qualitative and quantitative elements of my research, I am going to be discussing the results side by side. All statistical data that is going to be presented from this point on comes from the quantitative element of the project while anecdotes come from the qualitative aspect of the design. I do this in an effort to evaluate the results of both methods and provide explanations and nuances as to how possibly such data from the qualitative and quantitative aspects arise. Further, I do this to show inconsistencies within the two types of data that I gathered. By jointly displaying the data side by side I show that what may be depicted in numbers and that suggest a particular interpretation can be understood differently when we look at the anecdotes of the foreign residents themselves.

The first chapter of this part will focus on detailing the demographic characteristics, individual trajectories and various other characteristics of the respondents. In the next chapter, I will discuss the integration outcomes and in the last chapter I will discuss the patterns of integration and what can possibly impact pattern membership.

Chapter 6: The survey respondents

In this chapter, I present the findings of the research. In the first part of this chapter I will introduce the survey population, focusing on their demographic characteristics such as age and gender. In the following section, I will discuss the respondents' individual trajectories which include pre-migration experiences and reasons for migration. Then I will focus on ethnic social ties, transnational practices and intents for the future. The purpose of this chapter is to display the individual characteristics of the respondents and discuss how this can possibly impact integration outcomes and patterns of integration.

A quick note on the presentation of data from this chapter to the succeeding ones: how I present it follows the convergent style of mixed-methods research design. All statistical data that is going to be presented from this point on comes from the quantitative element of the project while anecdotes come from the qualitative aspect of the design. I do this in an effort to evaluate the results of both methods and provide explanations and nuances as to how possibly such data from the qualitative and quantitative aspects arise. Further, I do this to show inconsistencies within the two types of data that I gathered. By jointly displaying the data side by side I show that what may be depicted in numbers and that suggest a particular interpretation can be understood differently when we look at the anecdotes of the foreign residents themselves. However, for this particular chapter, as this is more on the survey respondents I present more quantitative data.

A. Demographic characteristics

A total of 459 Filipino residents living in Nagoya City were covered in the survey. All 16 wards were covered. Majority of the respondents reside in Naka (22.7%) and Nakagawa (14.6%) wards. These two wards have the most number of Filipino residents in Nagoya City. While Naka ward draws a big number of Filipinos because it is where majority of the jobs are, Nakagawa ward, on the other hand, has cheaper housing blocks. While other wards provide cheaper housing than Naka ward, Nakagawa ward's proximity to Naka ward makes it an ideal area to reside in (refer to Chart 3.1. in Chapter 3).

The respondents covered in the survey come from different locations in the Philippines. Majority of the respondents however come from the Luzon group of islands, which makes up the northern part of the country. About 32 percent come from the National Capital Region (NCR, Manila Area), located in Luzon. About 15 percent come from the Southern Tagalog region, located immediately south of Manila and about 18 percent come from the Central Luzon region, which is located

immediately north of Manila area. The survey is limited to understanding more the respondents' current outcomes in the host society rather than when they were still living in the Philippines. Therefore, from what we can glean from the information regarding their hometowns, we can say that many of them came from the capital or areas near the capital of the Philippines. One informant said that she came first to Manila to look for a job and there she met her promoter who eventually helped her secure a job as an entertainer in Japan. The literature has talked about two-step migration, in that many would-be migrants first move to the capital and from there migrate to the destination country. Probably perhaps because of the costs associated with such two-step migration, we can see that most of the respondents originated from areas near the capital, considerably lowering migration costs. Further, as what we will see from the succeeding discussions, many had been able to work in the Philippines before leaving for Japan. However, one limitation of this study is to focus more on the occupations that they have in Japan rather than on the occupations that they had in the Philippines.

The qualitative part of the study however showed me that many of the respondents may have had experience in various types of jobs from the Philippines. There were some who had experience working as sales clerks, as office workers and as professionals. Therefore, we can say, at least for this group of people, we cannot generalize their background.

Majority of the respondents coming from these regions are concentrated in Naka and Minato wards. Further, while respondents from the National Capital and the Central Luzon regions have concentration of population in Nakagawa ward, respondents from the Southern Tagalog region seem to also settle in the Chikusa ward.

About three-fourths of the respondents have visas granting them long-term residency such as permanent and long-term residents, spouses.

Table 6.1. Visa status, N=459

Current visa status	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Permanent	140	30.50	39.31	10.64
Spouse	4	0.87	1.26	0.00
Entertainer	100	21.79	30.19	2.13
Long-term	96	20.92	13.52	38.30
Trainee	69	15.03	7.55	31.91
Working	21	4.58	3.14	7.80
Student	18	3.92	3.77	4.26
Citizen	5	1.09	0.94	1.42
Overstay	6	1.31	0.31	3.55

Age

The literature noted of how important it is to look at age at migration. Studies such as Safi (2008) Aslund et al (2009) and Erdal and Ezzati (2015) suggest that migrating at a younger age has a correlation with better integration outcomes, supporting the arguments that show that special attention have to be given to migrants who migrate at a young age, as more often than not these young migrants face multiple risks compounded by other factors such as gender, lack of educational attainment, lack of skills and blurry motivations for migration.

Looking then at the age of the respondents, we see that majority are below 45 years old. The bulk of the respondents are in the age group 25 to 34 years old. This implies two things: first that majority of the population are young adults and have consequences for reproduction and that second, majority of the population are in the working age category.

Table 6.2. Age in years, N=459

Age in years	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
15-24 years old	91	19.83	25.47	7.09
15-18 years old	4	0.87	1.26	0.00
18-24 years old	87	18.95	24.21	7.09
25-34 years old	178	38.78	36.48	43.97
35-44 years old	120	26.14	22.64	34.04
45-54 years old	57	12.42	12.58	12.06
55 years old and above	13	2.83	2.83	2.84

Majority of those who reported arriving as entertainers during the 1990s are in the 35 to 54 years old age groups, while those that are in the younger age groups arrived after most of the previous generation of entertainers have already settled in the City. Majority of those in the younger age groups came as dependents. Some are newly arrived entertainers working in the entertainment industry in Nagoya City.

Table below shows at what age groups respondents were in when they travelled to Japan. These values were stipulated based on the length of time they reported to have spent living in Japan. Table below shows that majority have begun their migration process to Japan at a relatively young age. Mean age at migration is 25.78 years old. This finding coincides with the discussion on the profile of Filipino immigration to Japan. Many of those who travelled to Japan in the 1980s to 1990s were young women in their early to mid-twenties working in the entertainment industry.

Table 6.3. Age at migration, N=459

Age at migration	**Magnitude**	**Proportion**
Less than 15 years old	11	2.40
15-25 years old	205	44.66
25-35 years old	203	44.23
35-45 years old	36	7.84
45 to 55 years old	4	0.87
Total	459	100

The data also showed that the minimum age at migration captured by the survey was zero and that about two percent have migrated to Japan before they turned 15 years old. The assertions in the literature regarding the effect of age on integration outcomes vary. Therefore, we test how age impacts integration outcomes in the succeeding chapters.

Gender

The importance of gender in the literature of migration and migrant integration has never been stressed enough (Joppke 2007, Scholten et al 2012 and Kofman et al 2013). In many migrant-receiving countries, women make up a substantial proportion of the migrant population. While men and women do share integration hurdles, according to studies, women can significantly face more hardships because of three important considerations:

First, Kofman et al (2013), summarizing the literature, argues that with women migrants come issues such as transnational marriages, sexual relations, reproduction and child rearing. What

studies show us is that women migrants who usually come from poorly educated groups of societies do not necessarily have the skills to educate their children on how to succeed in society (Joppke 2007). Aslund et al (2009) for instance found out in their study on the integration outcomes of migrant youths in Sweden that their parents' integration outcomes can be inherited. This is a pressing issue in the context of Japan as women are often viewed through the ideology of the *ryousai kenbo,* literally "good wife, wise mother" whose role is central to the rearing of children who can contribute to the economic development of the country (Nocedo 2012).

Foreign women, majority of whom came through visa categories considered as unskilled, are often described as unable to emulate this ideology. Suzuki (2011) notes that there are two prevailing images of the Filipina in Japan: as an entertainer (*Japayuki*) and as an Asian bride *(hanayome*) both of which were discussed in Chapter 5. Women who have come to Japan through these visa categories are often seen as lacking skills to educate and bring up their children in a way that would help them succeed in the Japanese society.

Second, especially in the case of many European countries, gender issues have "become significant in the backlash of multiculturalism" (Kofman et al 2013). Migrant women in particular have served to "demarcate the boundary between the civilized Westerner and the uncivilized outsider". This is parallel to the case of the Filipino women in Japan. Studies such as Suzuki (2003, 2005, 2008, 2011) have situated Japanese men and Filipino women relationships as a developed North- undeveloped South divide, suggesting the inequality and rather economic nature of these relationships which have been raised previously in Chapter 5.

Establishing the importance of gender in the discussion of migrant integration in the global literature as well as in the literature of Filipino migration to Japan, it becomes important then to look at the distribution of the population by gender in the data. As expected given the population distribution in Nagoya City, more females participated in the survey than males. While females account for about 69 percent of the respondents, males account for about 31 percent.

Majority of the female respondents are single. This is also the same case for male respondents. Married respondents also make up a big chunk of the data. Females who are either married or in cohabitation with a partner make up about 43 percent of all female respondents. The remaining 57 percent are either currently single or have never been married.

Table 6.4. Selected demographic variables, N=459

Characteristics	Magnitude	Proportion
Sex		
Female	318	69.28
Male	141	30.72
Civil status		
Single/Never married	227	49.46
Married	191	41.61
Divorced	14	3.05
Widowed	13	2.83
Cohabitation/Live-in	14	3.05

On the other hand, about 50 percent of the respondents reported having children and about 67 percent of those with children have children studying at various education levels. Majority of those with children who are attending school have children aged below 15 years old as about 65 percent of those children are in junior high school and below.

Table 6.5. Selected demographic variables for respondents with children, N=229

Variables	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
With children	229	49.89	48.74	52.48
With studying children	153	66.81	67.10	66.22
Level of schooling				
College	22	14.38	14.42	14.29
Elementary education	44	28.76	22.12	42.86
High school	28	18.30	20.19	14.29
Middle school/Junior high school	31	20.26	23.08	14.29
Preschool/Day Care	25	16.34	18.27	12.24
Technical/Vocational	3	1.96	1.92	2.04

Given the assertions in the literature, we would expect that gender would impact the integration outcomes of the respondents. We can also expect a significant impact of gender based on the highly gendered migration that has happened between the Philippines and Japan as was previously discussed.

B. Motivation and individual trajectories

In this section, I discuss the results of the survey in terms of the variables linked to the respondents' motivation and individual trajectories.

Length of stay

Classical assimilation theories have postulated that as length of stay and residence increase, the differences between foreign and local residents decrease. While as we have discussed earlier, most of the arguments presented by classical assimilationists have been proven inapplicable to current migration flows, many studies still see a correlation with length of stay and better integration outcomes. For instance, de Palo's (2006) study on various migrant groups in Europe show that length of stay can impact a migrant's social assimilation, especially in terms of increased social relations with local residents. Safi's (2008) study on the immigrant integration process in France also echoes this result. Further, di Belgiojoso (2016) on her study among immigrants in Italy found that longer length of stay is associated with attachment to the host country.

Majority of the respondents have stayed in Japan for more than five years (50.32%). As stipulated earlier, many of the respondents who have stayed for more than ten years have arrived in the 1990s as entertainers and have eventually settled down in Nagoya City. From the data, we can also see that 23 percent have been in Nagoya City for less than a year during the time of the survey. Majority of these respondents are entertainers, many of whom are 21 to 24 years old.

Table 6.6. Length of stay in Japan, N=458*

Stay in Japan in years	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Less than a year	106	23.09	24.21	20.57
1 year to less than 3 years	83	18.08	17.61	19.15
3 years to less than 5 years	39	8.50	8.49	8.51
5 years to less than 10 years	84	18.30	14.47	26.95
10 years to less than 20 years	97	21.13	23.27	16.31
20 years and above	50	10.89	11.95	8.51

*One missing value

Looking at proportion of life spent in Japan, we see that the mean proportion of life spent in Japan is about 20 percent, suggesting that majority of the respondents have spent less than half of their lives in the country.

Table 6.7. Proportion of life spent in Japan, N=458*

Proportion of life spent in Japan	Magnitude	Proportion
Less than a quarter	301	65.72
A quarter to less than half	121	26.42
Half to less than three-quarters	33	7.21
Almost whole	3	0.66

*One missing value

Following assertions in the literature, it is hypothesized that lesser time spent in Japan and consequently, lower proportions of life spent in Japan can predict lower integration outcomes.

Education and work experience

There is a general agreement in the literature that education can impact integration positively (Safi 2008, Aslund et al 2009, Luthra et al 2014). Higher educational attainment levels are significant in predicting better integration outcomes. Luthra et al (2014) note that higher educational attainment can provide a migrant with more human capital to be able to be more economically mobile in their destination country. In their study, they found that circular migrants tend to have lower educational levels, implying that education can lead to better and more stable jobs. This is also confirmed by the OECD-European Union (OECD/European Union 2015) report on the settling in process of migrants. They note that having a higher educational attainment makes it easier to penetrate the labor market, though compared to local residents, many foreign

residents still struggle more.

In terms of education, more than half of the population has college undergraduate and graduate degrees. Respondents aged 25 to 44 years old seem to have higher educational attainment than those in the older age groups. This is affirmed if we look at the length of stay. Respondents who have stayed the longest tended to have lower educational attainment than those who had just stayed for less than three years. However overall, majority of the respondents can be considered highly educated, as more than 50 percent have spent at least one year in college.

Table 6.8. Educational attainment, N=459

Highest educational attainment	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
High School	145	31.59	35.53	22.70
Technical Vocational	68	14.81	15.41	13.48
College	244	53.16	48.74	63.12
Grad School	2	0.44	0.31	0.71

The impact of pre-migration experiences to the integration process has not been extensively researched. While Luthra et al (2014) note of the possible relationship between work experience from the home country and better integration outcomes, they note that this may vary depending on other variables such as motivations for migration. They found out that many temporary migrants, those who do not intend to stay, are most likely to have some work experience before coming to the host country, and while they are integrated economically, their integration levels in terms of the other dimensions of integration vary.

Given this it becomes interesting to see the relationship between work experience from the home country and integration outcomes. From the data, we see that majority of the respondents have some form of job experience before leaving the country to either work or join spouses or relatives in Japan. About 82 percent reported having experienced working in the Philippines, with majority of those with work experience aged 25 to 44 years old. More males, about 89 percent, have experienced working in the Philippines prior their migration to Japan, while about 79 percent of females had such experience.

Table 6.9. Work experience from home country, N=459

Has work experience from home country	Magnitude	Frequency	Female (%)	Male (%)
Yes	377	82.14	78.93	89.36
No	82	17.86	21.07	10.64

Though I was able to collect data on the availability of their work experience from the home country, due to the limitations of the survey, I was not able to extrapolate the actual jobs the respondents had been engaging in the Philippines before they left for Japan. As was previously discussed, many of the respondents do have high educational attainment which is kind of the norm during the 1980s, 1990s in the Philippines as majority of Filipino then have higher educational attainments compared to its neighbors in the Southeast Asian region. From here then we cannot really say what kinds of jobs the respondents have engaged in. From the qualitative interviews with key informants, we can say that they did a variety of jobs, from sales clerks, office workers to professionals. Again, the data limited in knowing the kinds of jobs that the respondents did before travelling to Japan. This can be something that can be added later on as a way forward or as a continuation of this project. What we do know however is that salaries in Japan, and the promise of a better life for them and for their families most probably exceeded the salaries they were getting from their jobs in the Philippines hence the move to Japan. This is most probably the case for those who moved to Japan mainly for economic reasons.

Reasons for migrating

A recent shift towards a more agential rather than institutional approach to migrant integration has provided more insights in understanding how the integration process happens. For instance, Cerdin et al (2013) notes that among highly qualified migrants, their success is dependent in large part to their motivation to integrate which is largely explained by their reason for migration. This is also demonstrated to be applicable to other migrant types. Dustmann (2000) notes that a migrant whose goal is to accumulate resources fast are less likely to invest in their social integration in the destination country. Luthra et al (2014) also note that a migrant wanting to accumulate resources fast are less likely to be concerned about gainful employment.

Luthra et al (2014) further notes that migrants migrating because of family reunification purposes will tend to have lower economic integration outcomes than those who migrated for work. They argue that this is because of two things: first, they are less likely to be selected based on their labor market characteristics and second because of their actual reason for migration. Other non-economic reasons can also contribute to lower integration outcomes as described by Guo and DeVoretz (2006) in their study on Chinese immigrants in Canada. They note that non-economic reasons have led to poor economic performances. However, they are quick to note that this happened coupled with the devaluation of the immigrants' acquired Chinese education qualifications and experiences.

From the dataset, we see that majority travelled to Japan because of economic reasons. As was

previously mentioned, the institutionalization of migration in the 1970s has instilled the idea that working abroad can help in improving lives back home. This culture of migration has imprinted an economically-driven migration. It is no wonder then that majority of the respondents in the survey reported that the main reason for their migration to Japan is to work or to look for work. Looking at the table below we also see that about 17 percent migrated to Japan because of family reasons, either to be with relatives or to be with spouses.

Table 6.10. Reasons why migrated to Japan, N=459

Reasons	Magnitude	Frequency	Female (%)	Male (%)
To work/look for work	339	73.86	72.96	75.89
To train/study	42	9.15	6.92	14.18
To marry/be with spouse	27	5.88	7.86	1.42
To be with relatives	50	10.89	11.95	8.51
Tour	1	0.22	0.31	0.00

These reasons for migrating are reflected in the visa status the foreign residents received upon arrival to Japan. About 45 percent came as entertainers, 22 percent came as trainees and some seven percent came with various working visas such as intra-company transfers, humanities and engineers among others.

Table 6.11. Visa status variables, N=459

Status upon arrival	Magnitude	Frequency	Female (%)	Male (%)
Spouse	12	2.61	3.77	0.00
Entertainer	205	44.66	59.75	10.64
Trainee	103	22.44	11.01	48.23
Working	31	6.75	3.77	13.48
Student	18	3.92	3.77	4.26
Dependent	60	13.07	12.58	14.18
Japanese	4	0.87	0.63	1.42
Tourist	26	5.66	4.72	7.80

There is no available data at the national level on the profile of Filipino who became permanent residents. From the data however, comparing current visa status with status upon arrival we can say that majority of the current permanent residents entered as entertainers and dependents, at least in the case of Nagoya. We see that those who are current permanent residents who arrived

as entertainers have stayed in Japan for more than ten years, confirming that majority of those who arrived as entertainers in the 1980s eventually became permanent residents. Chart below shows this.

Chart 6.1. Previous visa status of current permanent and long-term residents



On the other hand, those who are currently permanent residents who arrived as dependents have stayed in Japan for about five to ten years, suggesting that most of them arrived after the migrants who arrived during the 1980s to 1990s have settled down and have started bringing relatives from the Philippines under dependent residency statuses.

The chart below on the other hand show the visas received upon arrival vis-à-vis current visa. We see that many of the Filipinos who arrived as entertainers are currently permanent residents. These are those who arrived much earlier, before 2005. While those that are still currently entertainers are those who arrived recently. On the other hand, we see that those who arrived as dependents either become long-term or permanent resident visa holders. Interestingly, those who came with working visas tend to not apply for permanent nor long-term visas. As compared to those who came with tourist visas majority of whom had already secured permanent residents.

Chart 6.2. Current trajectories of visa status received upon arrival



C. Transnational practices

We have previously discussed in Chapter 1 how the literature of transnationalism developed. Reiterating, proponents of transnationalism studies have argued that migration processes are changing and that the assumption that people will stay and live in only one place no longer holds. What transnationalism researchers argue is that migrants exist in many contexts at once and have various affiliations that are not contradictory to each other. Therefore, the core of transnationalism lies in the continued interaction of migrants with their home country while they settle and establish new relations in their destination countries. To be a transnational migrant then is to "live across international borders" (Glick Schiller et al 1999, Portes 1999, Portes et al 1999, Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004, Guarnizo et al 2003).

Transnationalism can be seen in the various transnational practices that migrants engage in. Transnational practices according to Portes (1999) refer to an individual migrant's border crossing activities. These activities can be economic, political or socio-cultural. Further, these activities can be categorized as those that involve the physical movement of people such as visits to home country, and those that do not, such as sending remittances. In light of these developments, two strands of opposing beliefs have come up: on the one hand transnationalism scholars argue that there is nothing to be feared and that transnational practices have long been

an exercised practice among migrants. An increasing number of empirical researches celebrate these transnational practices as helping to facilitate a much more connected world (Portes 1999; Sheringham 2009; Van Bochove et al. 2010); while on the other hand, some researches warn that migrant integration and transnational practices can be a recipe for disaster arguing that living in two different societies can create conflicts of interest between home and host countries (Snel et al. 2006), and more especially when the host country becomes the home country through naturalization and permanent residency.

Studies linking these two concepts together tend to be limited. While studies such as Snel et al. (2006) on migrant groups in the Netherlands, Sheringham (2009) on Brazilian immigrants in Ireland, de Haas and Fokkema (2011) on African immigrants in Spain and Italy and Carling and Pettersen (2014) shed some understanding on how these two concepts interact, their results demand further investigation.

In this project, I aim to look at how, given the context of the Filipino residents in Japan, can such transnational practices impact integration outcomes in the host country. To be able to do include this in my analysis, I looked at economic and socio-cultural transnational practices. The table below shows the proportion of respondents who travels to the home country. Majority of the respondents travel back to the home country (67.54%). About 30 percent travels regularly, whether it be every half year, every year or every two years.

Table 6.12. Visits to the home country, N=459

	Magnitude	Frequency	Female (%)	Male (%)
No	149	32.46	28.93	40.43
Not regularly	172	37.47	39.94	31.91
Every 2 years	39	8.5	5.35	15.60
Every year	33	7.19	18.24	5.67
Every 6 months	66	14.38	7.55	6.38

The spatial proximity of Japan and the Philippines makes it easier and more affordable for many Filipino residents to regularly travel to the home country. The recent proliferation of Philippine low-cost carriers (LCCs) such as Cebu Pacific Air and Philippine Airlines Express (PAL Express), as well as other LCCS such as Air Asia and JetStar have made travelling much more affordable. Fare prices have gone down by almost half since the introduction of Cebu Pacific Air flights from Manila to Tokyo and Osaka as compared to when Philippine Airlines was the only Philippine carrier flying to Japan. The expansion Cebu Pacific Air did in the recent years have also made it

much more affordable for Filipino residents living outside Tokyo. The carrier has introduced direct flights from Manila to Nagoya City in 2014 and direct flights from Manila to Fukuoka City in 2015 where many Filipinos reside. This has reasonably lowered the costs compared to previous years when Filipino residents have to travel from Nagoya City to Tokyo to be able to board the plane.

The table below shows whether the respondents have savings in the home country. We see that of the 87 percent who reported having savings, about 89 percent of this maintains savings either exclusively in the Philippines or in both Japan and the Philippines. Only about 10 percent saves exclusively in Japan.

Table 6.13. Savings in the home country, N=459

Savings	Magnitude	Frequency	Female (%)	Male (%)
Yes	399	86.93	86.48	87.94
No	60	13.07	13.52	12.06
Where?				
Japan	41	10.28	11.64	7.26
Philippines	147	36.84	37.82	34.68
In both Japan and the Philippines	211	52.88	50.55	58.06

On the other hand, we see that, as with savings, about 83 percent send remittances to the Philippines. Of these, about 56 percent send regularly either monthly or every one to three weeks. We see in the table that among those who are sending remittances both regularly and irregularly, 87 percent of them send remittances for the daily consumption of their families back home. About 41 percent send it for education and about 39 percent send it for savings.

Table 6.14. Remittance variables

	Magnitude	Frequency	Female (%)	Male (%)
Remit?				
No	79	17.21	18.55	14.18
Yes	380	82.79	81.45	85.82
How often				
Every one to three weeks	5	1.32	1.93	0.00
Monthly	209	55.00	51.35	62.81
Irregular, only when needed, when there is money	166	43.68	46.72	37.19

Why remit			
Daily consumption	331	87.11	
Education	154	40.53	
For celebrations/birthdays/fiesta	114	30.00	
To pay for loan	81	21.32	
Savings	150	39.47	
To pay for land, house	53	13.95	

*Reasons for remittance by sex all 100 percent

It is important at this point to raise some key ideas about these two practices. In the literature of remittance and savings, when remittances are used to fund for education of other household members, remittances are often seen as a form of investment because of the potential human capital it can add to the household (Lopez et al. 2007; Calero et al. 2009). Further, utilizing remittances to fund for housing construction or to fund enterprises are seen as a form of capital accumulation (Osili 2004). What these suggest is that accumulating capital in the home country can create incentives for migrants to go back eventually and not incorporate fully into the host country.

The role of remittances in the context of the Philippine migration has been stressed enough (Alburo 1993, Asis 2006, Docot 2009, Reyes et al 2014). The role of remittances in spurring local development is still largely in dispute—on the one hand, researches have shown that because most recipient households use remittances for consumer goods, remittances cannot spur long-term development; while on the other hand, especially in the Philippine context, remittances when used to invest in education and housing hints at the potential use of remittances in acquiring better human capital (Reyes et al 2013).

Regardless of whether remittances can spur development or not, the literature agrees that remittances serve a role in reconnecting migrants with their home country. Remittances in cash and in kind have been argued to play a "great role in the returnees' reconnection with their families and communities" (Alburo 2005). As gifts, remittances signal their "re-entry into Philippine society since gift-giving implies a relationship between the giver and the recipient" (Alburo 2005). Suzuki goes further and connects this to the idea of *utang na loob* (Suzuki 2005). She notes that "every interaction between Filipinos potentially renders a site in which they engage in the reciprocity and redistribution of power" (2011, 57) therefore *utang na loob* is not simply an economic exchange but a social bond (Ileto 1982).

In the context of the Filipino women who travelled to Japan to work as entertainers, Suzuki (2011) of the "dutiful daughter", or those who still have to send remittances to support their families back in the home country regardless of whether they have their own families or not in the host country. Supporting families back home is seen as a duty, for it is this duty that was the driving force behind their migration. Migration is still an expensive endeavor and in most cases families had to sell or loan assets to be able to fund the endeavor. This is often seen as a sacrifice, a sacrifice by the family to be able to give at least one member a chance to migrate and experience a better life. This is where *utang na loob* comes into play. To pay back the sacrifice given by the family, the migrant member sends back remittances.

The literature has often pointed to the disconnection between how migrants and remittance recipients understand the work done and effort given just to be able to send remittances. Often seen as living the better life, migrants are often assumed to have more resources than their counterparts back home. Japan is often seen as the America of Asia, modern and developed. What this view often disregards is the fact that many of these dutiful daughters are engaged in jobs categorized as 3D and to be able to accumulate resources and send back remittances, many of the Filipino respondents continue to work regardless of job conditions. This ties in with the argument made earlier citing Dustmann (2000) that a focus on resource accumulation can impact integration outcomes. This becomes much more interesting when coupled with the possible impacts of transnational practices.

D. Ethnic social ties

The literature suggests that aside from human capital, there is another form of capital that migrants can mobilize to overcome hardships in the host country. While the literature has put emphasis on different forms of social capital such as trust, group solidarity and networks and ties, there is an agreement that social capital "represents an enabling capacity or resource possessed by any individual attached to a social group" (Li 2004). Therefore, social capital can be measured by looking at the membership of an individual to various groups (Woolcock 1999, Portes 2000, Li 2004).

The literature differentiates between homophilous and heterophilous social ties (Lin 2001). While homophilous social ties pertain to social connections among people that are similar, heterophilous social ties refer to social capital among actors that are dissimilar. Often used as a basis for similarity is ethnicity. In the case of the Filipino migrants, this ethnic social tie is their ties to their "*kababayan*" as was previously discussed. The usefulness of attachments based on

ethnicity has been discussed in the literature, though findings have not been conclusive and have been actually contradictory. Researchers drawing from the more classical assimilation perspective notes of the ethnic mobility entrapment (Wiley 1967, cited in Li 2008). The ethnic mobility entrapment thesis suggests that over reliance on the ethnic community can result in missed opportunities. This entrapment thesis has been evidenced by studies showing the huge income disparity between native-born and foreign-born population, as well as the ease of penetration of the labor market by foreign residents.

On the other hand, the immigrant enclave thesis theorized by Wilson and Portes (1980, cited in Li 2001) and Wilson and Martin (1982, cited in Li 2001) suggest that ethnic ties can be a source of economic success. In immigrant societies with limited resources, ethnic enclaves can provide positive returns. What this means is that immigrants can use ethnic ties, resources and connections to overcome blocked mobility “to consolidate a sheltered economy” (Li 2001, p.295).

At the outset, these two theses are conflicting, but further investigation suggests that the ethnic enclave thesis is an extension of the entrapment thesis. What this means is that since migrants are given access to certain resources through their ethnic social ties, there is no incentive to go beyond the community. What this leads to is entrapment within the ethnic community, as migrants stay longer and rely on their ethnic enclaves they become further entrenched in their own community. Further, what this suggests is that in one way or another, ethnic social ties can impact

In the data, I only measure ethnic social ties which limits the discussion to homophilous social ties. This is to further understand how possibly existence of ethnic social ties can impact integration outcomes. Given the limitations of this project I focused on existence of social ties and not how deep or to what extent foreign residents rely on their ethnic social ties. To further deepen the discussion, I utilize the differentiation between bonding and bridging social capital ties.

In the case of social ties, homophilious bonding social ties refer to tight or strong ties, or those ties that people have with their family members, relatives, friends and neighbors. Often tight ties are seen as sources of norms, values and family-mediated benefits (Portes 2000) that people often use to “get by” (Woolcock 1999). On the other hand, bridging social ties refer to the more expansive social capital often called loose or weak ties that include ties with work colleagues, acquaintances, and organizations that people often use to “get ahead”. Putnam (2000) provides a clearer distinction between tight (strong) and loose (weak) ties by stating that while both types

of ties provides resources, emotional support is often provided by tight ties. In the context of the Filipino residents, the ethnic social ties pertain to *"kababayan"* or literally, "co-nationality". Outside of the Philippines, to be referred to as *kababayan* means one is seen as coming from the same country, that one is a Filipino. This is what is referred to here as co-ethnics, hence ethnic social ties. Given the distinction based on capability to promote emotional and psychological support on the one hand and as sources of norms and values, I distinguish between strong/tight ties as composed of ties that include family, close friends, neighbors and church, while weak/loose ties are composed of ties that include co-workers, organization members and acquaintances. In short, both types of ties being discussed here only refer to Filipino ties, the only distinction is that strong ties pertain mostly to blood-related co-ethnic ties but that also include very close friends and neighbors and even church members as these are sources of emotional and psychological support while weak ties pertain to more expansive co-ethnic ties which can include Filipino acquaintances, workmates or organizations.

According to Woolcock (1999) different combinations of bridging and bonding social capital can bring about different outcomes. These networks view of social capital according to Woolcock (1999) suggest that social capital is a double-edged sword in that while it can provide access and services, it can "place considerable non-economic claims on members' sense of obligation and commitment that have negative economic consequences" (p.8). In this project, I do not aim to argue in what way ethnic social ties can affect integration outcomes. The purpose is to simply understand whether ethnic ties can impact integration outcomes, whether it be positive or negative, or no impact at all.

The impact of ethnic social ties is much more pronounced at the settling in stage. Studies have shown that the settling in stage can affect the direction of the integration process (OECD-EU 2015). Following earlier arguments, very tight ties can impact integration outcomes from the settling in stage. The settling in stage is among the hardest stages of the migration process. Studies have shown that migrants often choose a place based on whether they already know someone in that place. And those people that they know serve as resources and assets that help them to have a smoother transition from immigrant to settler.

In the data, we see that majority of the respondents already know someone upon their arrival. Majority of these respondents know people that can be categorized as tight ties. About 41 percent of respondents who already know someone upon arrival reported having family, relatives and or friends already in Japan when they arrived in Japan. Further, about 24 percent reported that someone being acquaintances and former co-workers.

Table 6.15. Social ties upon arrival, N=459

	Magnitude	Frequency	Female (%)	Male (%)
Strong/tight ties	188	40.96	42.45	36.17
Weak/loose ties	110	23.97	19.50	34.04
None	162	35.07	38.05	29.79

Though the respondents have accessed help from different types of social ties such as family, friends, organizations among others, upon categorizing the ties accessed, we see that respondents only exclusively received help from one type of tie. Majority of the respondents' primary help came from family members, close friends, and church mates, social capital ties that are categorized as strong or tight ties. On the other hand, about seven percent pointed to organizations and acquaintances as their primary help during the settling in period.

Table 6.16. Primary help

Received help from:	Magnitude	Frequency
Strong/tight ties	282	61.44
Weak/loose ties	30	6.54
Both strong and weak ties	0	0.00
None	147	32.03
Total	459	100.00

The help received during the settling in period had been useful in the face of many problems a foreign resident who is not yet accustomed to the life in the destination country may face. For instance, we see in the data that majority of the respondents pointed to language (91.72%) as the main problem experienced upon arrival and during the settling in stage. Having another person who knows what words to use in specific circumstances encountered during the settling in stage is very important. For instance, language is very important in finding a job, looking for a house or even in understanding the transportation system.

Table 6.17. Experienced problems upon arrival, N=459

Experienced problems upon arrival on:	Magnitude	Frequency
Language	421	91.72
Looking for housing	77	16.78
Looking for a job	62	13.51
Looking for a friend	29	6.32
Transportation	14	3.05
Culture	1	0.22
Homesickness	1	0.22

We see from the table below how ethnic social ties are important in the settling in stage. Majority of the respondents received information on daily life from both bridging and bonding social ties (56.64%), as well as psychological and emotional support which is very important for a foreign resident who is away from his or her family (53.16%). It would seem that for foreign residents who received help from weak/loose ties, more received support such as information on daily life and job during the settlement as compared to other types of help. On the other hand, for foreign residents who received help from strong/tight ties, more received emotional and psychological support that any other support. This supports Putnam's (2000) distinction between strong/tight and weak/loose social types.

Table 6.18. Distribution of respondents living in areas with many Filipinos, N=459

	Magnitude	Frequency	Female (%)	Male (%)
Not many Filipinos	93	20.26	19.81	21.28
Many Filipinos	366	79.74	80.19	78.72

Further, I look at whether the respondents live in area where there are many Filipinos. Neighborhood and small communities are often seen as places where tight social capital thrives. The existence of small enclaves can suggest a tighter community. The table above shows that about 80 percent live in areas where there are many Filipinos.

Table 6.19. Selected variables on help received upon arrival, N=320

Type of support received	Magnitude	Frequency
Monetary	91	19.83
Information on daily life	260	56.64
Housing information	141	30.72
Job information	138	30.07
Psychological and emotional support	244	53.16

After settling in, having access to ethnic social ties is considered still very important. It is accepted that while there may be possibilities of ethnic entrapment, ethnic social ties can still help respondents in "getting by" and "getting ahead" depending on what types of ethnic social ties they have. In terms of existing social bonding social ties, we see that 98 percent of the respondents have either Filipino relatives and family members in the same area, live in a neighborhood with many Filipino residents, or who have friends they met in their neighborhood and in the church. While about 92 percent of the Filipinos have access to weak ties characterized by friends they met at work, at organizations and at other various ways such as through the internet or through other friends. About 90 percent of the respondents have access to both loose and tight social ties.

Table 6.20. Existing social ties by type

Access to:	Magnitude	Frequency	Female (%)	Male (%)
Strong/tight social ties	452	98.47	97.80	100.00
Weak/loose social ties	420	91.50	89.94	95.04

According to Woodcock (1999) the different combination of social ties can have significant impact on the different outcomes of an individual. Thus, I look at the possible combinations of ethnic social ties and found that while about 90 percent have access to both strong and weak social ties, about nine percent have access to exclusively strong ties and about two percent have access exclusively to weak ties.

Table 6.21. Combination of social ties accessed by respondents

	Magnitude	Frequency
Only strong/tight ties	39	8.50
Only weak/loose ties	7	1.53
Both	413	89.98
Total	459	100.00

It becomes interesting how the existence of strong and weak ties can impact their integration outcomes and how the depth of these ties can affect the integration process.

E. Intents for the future

Skepticism regarding the use of intent to stay can be expressed in the same way that skepticism on the use of intent to return abounds in the literature. Researches suggest that intent to return is an intent that often never gets fulfilled. Studies have shown that intentions are being revised again and again. Studies have shown that different factors can impact intention to stay such as job and residence, and even policies relating to integration (Waldorf 1995, Carling and Pettersen 2014, Luthra et al 2014, Geurts and Lubbers 2016, Belgiojoso 2016)

Intent to stay can be read in the same way, however, I refer to Carling and Pettersen's (2014) arguments in their paper regarding return migration. First they argue that, "intentions can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient criterion for action", meaning that though many of those who intend to return end up not returning, among those who will return will always be included those who intended to return. The same argument can be made for intent to stay—among those who will stay will be those that initially expressed intent to stay.

Luthra et al(2014) notes regardless of whether a migrant actually stays or not, their intention, especially at the beginning of their migration can have impact on their integration outcomes. They argue that different intentions are associated with different patterns of integration (p.5). They found that for instance circular and temporary migrants "tend to show weaker levels of subjective orientation towards the receiving society and perceptions of its hospitality and have lower levels of social and residential integration" (p.5).

In the same way, a migrant expressing no intention to stay permanently can create for him or herself no incentive to invest in integration. What having such a mindset does is deter a person

from investing in relationships and in human capital that can improve his or her outcomes in the destination country. This argument lead to Carling and Pettersen's (2014) second argument in that "return intentions are significant in their own right: they represent summary attitudes to the migration experience, and can affect behaviour other than return itself – for instance about investment in relationships, skills or assets". This can be useful in arguing for intent to stay, as intent to stay can affect behavior and experiences related to migration, such as integration and developing affinities with the host country.

Third, complementing earlier argument, as somewhat a possible predictor of behavior, intention to either stay or return can inform us of the possibilities of a smoother and easier integration as staying can encourage development of affinities with the host country. A spate of research has argued that staying permanently and eventually naturalizing in the host country have big impacts on migrant integration (Penninx 2005, Geurts and Lubbers 2016, di Beligiojoso 2016). Belgiojoso (2016) noted that intentions are related to attachments in the host and home countries and Geurts and Lubbers (2016) found that among migrants who decide to stay permanently invest better in the language. Bijwaard et al (2011) found that intentions to stay are shaped by experiences in the host country. Intentions to stay can thus be seen as a summary of the experiences of a foreign resident in the home country. Understanding it in such a way, the intention to stay of a permanent resident who has lived a long time in the destination country thus becomes doubly important as it can inform us of how he or she has experienced the country so far. What is not being argued here is that intent to stay is equal to actual staying. What is being argued is that it is precisely because intent to stay can change that it becomes important to study. A foreign resident may intend to stay one day and intend to not stay the next, but what it means is that following Bijwaard et al (2011) this change can be attributed to what is happening to him or her in the destination country and thus can inform us of the complexities of the processes of integration.

And fourth, looking at intent to stay can also help address another problem in the literature of migrant integration – that migrant integration "implies the existence of a cohesive structure or system into which immigrants integrate" (Sheringham 2008; see also Samers 1998, Joppke and Morawska 2003). Intent to stay accepts this implication of a cohesive structure, because it is in this structure which migrants decide to stay with, while accepting that this cohesive structure is not "static" (Joppke and Morawska 2003). This ties in with what Bijwaard et al (2011) argue that intentions to stay can inform us of the experiences in the destination country. What this means is that intention to stay can be seen as anchored to the cohesive structure into which the foreign residents integrate.

In the data we see that about 87 percent have no intention to stay. What this implies, following arguments made, is that this non-intention has been shaped by their experiences so far. Only about 13 percent has intention to stay.

Table 6.22. Intent to stay

Intent to stay permanently	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Has no intent	400	87.15	86.48	88.65
Has intent	59	12.85	13.52	11.35

Among those who do not intend to stay permanently, majority intend to stay for more than five years. About 32 percent intend to stay for five to ten years and about 31 percent intend to stay for more than ten years. What this means is that even if majority of the respondnets do not intend to stay permanently, majority of the respondents still want to stay for much longer. Whether this desire to stay for a longer period of time will give the respondents the incentive to invest in their integration into the host society is one thing this project problematizes about.

Table 6.23. Intended length of stay

How long will stay?	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Less than a year	1	0.25	0.36	0.00
1 year to less than 3 years	40	10.00	10.55	8.80
3 to less than 5 years	110	27.50	29.82	22.40
5 to less than 10 years	127	31.75	29.09	37.60
More than 10 years	122	30.50	30.18	31.20

On the other hand, intention to stay is expressed much more strongly among those who already applied for citizenship. Only a small proportion of the respondents have applied for citizenship (3.92%). This proportion account for 31 percent of those who plan to stay permanently.

Table 6.24. Citizenship

Applied for citizenship	Magnitude	Proportion
Yes	18	30.51
No	41	69.49
Why not apply?		
Not going to live forever in Japan	11	26.83
Would need to give-up being Filipino	19	46.34
Process is very difficult	4	9.76
No difference from current visa status	6	14.63
Others	1	2.44

The literature on classical assimilation theories informs us that citizenship is one of the most important indicator of a successful assimilation. However, as recent developments in the fields of transnationalism (Portes et al 1999, Guarnizo et al 2003) show less and less foreign residents are naturalizing. The International Migration Outlook released by OECD this year ranks Japan as 14th among the OECD countries in terms of naturalization rates. The report shows that majority of these naturalizations however still include only Korean *tokubetsu eijyuusha* (special permanent residents) but recent years saw the increase of naturalization among Chinese residents and other foreign groups. However, naturalization in Japan is still seen by many as a hard and long process.

Among the respondents who expressed intent to stay permanently but does not want to apply citizenship, majority reasoned that they do not plan to naturalize because it would entail giving up their being Filipino (46.34%). This is the same finding discussed in Ehrkamp and Leitner (2006). They argue that citizenship "remains meaningful" even as migrants negotiate between and among multiple affinities and identities. Ehrkamp and Leitner (2006) argue that "the outcome of these complex negotiations is conditioned by migrants' subjects positions and lived experiences, leading to differences among migrants in allegiances and dispositions towards acquisition of citizenship in the state of residence" (p. 1626).

In the data we see about 14 percent saying that they do not want to change their citizenship because naturalization would have no difference with their current residency status. One important difference that the respondents did not seem to see is that once they have a Japanese citizenship they would be able to vote. What not acknowledging this difference entail is the possibility of being unattached to the current happening in Japanese society. Another possible

implication of this lack of acknowledgment is, as Ehrkamp and Leitner (2006) argue, that they do "remain skeptical about whether formal citizenship will result in equal treatment" (p.1629).

Given these arguments it becomes interesting to know and dig deeper as to how such intentions and plans for the future influence and impact their integration outcomes.

Chapter conclusion

This chapter is the first chapter in Part III, the focus of which are the outcomes and patterns of integration based on the survey data. In this chapter I presented the individual characteristics of the respondents. I first discussed how important it is to look at demographic characteristics such as age and sex as these, the literature have shown, can impact the integration outcomes. We have seen from the data that most of the respondents are women and middle-aged. This confirms previous discussions in Chapter 3 regarding the Filipino migration to Japan.

I have also looked at individual trajectories such as reasons for migration, work experience from the home country, length of stay in Japan and changes in visa. These factors have been discussed in the literature though as I have shown, there are disagreements in the impacts of these factors in the integration outcomes and patterns of foreign residents. The data showed that majority of the respondents have migrated for economic reasons, have stayed for almost ten years in Japan and that majority of those who are currently permanent and long-term residents initially entered Japan as entertainers. As we have previously discussed in Parts I and II, knowing these can help explain the outcomes of integration that we will later discuss in the next chapters.

Finally in this chapter we looked at the transnational activities of the foreign residents, their ethnic social ties and their intents for the future. We saw from the data that majority engage in some form of transnationalism, both regular and irregular. We also saw that many have strong ethnic social ties and that a surprising majority do not intend to stay permanently in Japan.

These are individual factors that may impact integration outcomes. Compounding contextual factors that we have previously discussed, it becomes interesting how the confluence of such factors can impact integration as both an outcome and as a process.

Chapter 7: Outcomes and Dimensions of Integration

In this chapter, I present the integration outcomes of the respondents in terms of the four dimensions of integration. I discuss in this section the integration outcomes vis-à-vis the integration policies and approach of the local government discussed previously in Chapter 3 and 5. I also situate the outcomes in the context of the Philippine migration to Japan as was previously discussed in Chapter 4. Again, as was previously mentioned, I present quantitative and qualitative findings jointly to provide a more wholistic understanding of the integration outcomes of the Filipino residents in Japan. At the end of this section, I would have argued that the numbers and statistics presented indicative of the integration levels of the respondents are a product of many contextual and individual factors including but not limited to the integration policies and approach of the local government, the context by which the Filipino residents came and settled in Nagoya City and the individual characteristics of the foreign residents.

A. Structural integration outcomes

Structural integration refers to the access to the core institutions of the host society (Heckmann 2005) such as the labor market, housing systems, welfare and social protection systems, citizenship and residence, because "participation in them determines the socio-economic status, the opportunity structure and the resources of a person in a modern market society" (p. 15). Following then the definition of integration utilized in this research, integrating into these core structures become doubly important in improving the migrants' outcomes, the very reason why they decided to migrate in the first place.

At the outset, the survey data reveals very high rates of employment among the respondents. Among the 459 Filipino residents in Nagoya who responded to the survey, majority of them reported having jobs (91.72%, see Chart 7.1). Among those without jobs only three individuals are currently studying, some are either retired or waiting for rehire and majority are stay-at-home persons. Among those who are employed, jobs tend to be concentrated in the service sector where majority work as factory workers (45.84%) and as entertainers (30.64%). About 20 percent work as professionals (such as engineers, nurses and caregivers, information technology specialists and assistant language teachers). Often, they get information about available jobs through their personal networks (54.16%).

Though access to jobs is high and majority of the respondents feel that the amount of money

they receive for their wages are sufficient for their daily needs (97.39%), only about 72 percent of the respondents receive the same salary every month (Table 7.1). This informs us of the seasonality of jobs that many of them engage in. About 85 percent reported being gainfully employed meaning those who perceive that the skills they learned from school or from previous jobs match their current jobs, this is about seven percent less than the figures we got if we only look at those with jobs. This seven percent reported being employed but feel that their skills do not match with their current job.

This is actually surprising and is actually very contradictory to what I got from the qualitative part of the study. My key informants from migrant organizations did say that many Filipino residents feel that their current jobs do not match their skills and that being engaged in such short-term unskilled jobs are kind of detrimental to the overall image of the Filipinos in the City. However, the data shows that many respondents feel that their skills match their current jobs, in that they are actually gainfully employed. Perhaps one possible reason is the untranslatability of the question, another probable reason is income has an effect on their responses because for a certain skillset a certain amount of income is associated with it, and in the Philippines the values are much lower compared to what they can get in Japan. Regardless, this is something that should be focused more in the future as an extension of this research project.

Chart 7.1. Employment



Employed	Magnitude	Proportion
No	38	8.28
Yes	421	91.72

Table 7.1. Selected economic variables, N=421

Job type	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Entertainer	129	30.64	40.28	10.87
ALT	22	5.23	6.36	2.90
Nurse/nurse assistant/carework	35	8.31	8.13	8.70
Engineers/Professionals	27	6.41	3.53	12.32
Factory work	193	45.84	37.10	63.77
Various services	15	3.56	4.59	1.45

Table 7.2. Selected economic variables, N=421

Variables	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Receives same salary every month	303	71.97	66.78	82.61
Feels that salary is sufficient for daily needs	410	97.39	96.11	100.00
Feels that skills match with current job	390	92.64	91.17	95.65

Table 7.3. How found current job, N=421

How found current job	Magnitude	Proportion
Philippine agency/company/POEA	45	10.69
Personal connection	228	54.16
Job advertisement	119	28.27
Local government	26	6.18
Migrant organizations	3	0.71

What the high employment rate seems to imply is that the labor market is easily penetrable. We see the same findings from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX 2004) in that the current system is favorable for foreigners in finding work, but this only true for short-term work. Changing jobs and sectors for temporary workers is extremely difficult. This is exactly what is found out using the data as we will discuss in the next paragraphs.

One contradiction that I noticed is that while my key informants told me that the most common job worked by respondents is being entertainers, we see that actually majority engage more in factory work. Though of course a very substantial group of respondents still work as entertainers and a sizeable number are permanent residents. One informant told me that many permanent residents still work in the entertainment industry because it still is very lucrative and compared to before clubs are less strict and allow more horizontal mobility across clubs.

In terms of demographic characteristics, the data shows some interesting differences. In terms of sex, it would seem that more males are more involved in the labor market than women (Chart 7.2). About 90 percent of males reported being employed in jobs where they can utilize their education and skills. Looking at the types of jobs where both sexes are involved in, more males (58%) are involved in jobs requiring more specialized skills such as engineering, information technology, nursing and carework, while only about 19 percent of females are working in such jobs. More females are working as entertainers, about 64 percent compared to 30 percent of males; and as assistant language teachers, about ten percent compared to eight percent of males. Age and civil status indicators on the other hand do not seem to have significant differences in terms of being gainfully employed.

On the other hand, looking at differences by individual trajectories the results become more salient. Accounting for length of stay in years and proportion of life spent in Japan yield interesting findings. It would seem that being employed has a negative relationship with length of stay and proportion of life spent in Japan suggesting that those who have stayed longer in Japan and those who have spent a bigger proportion of their lives in Japan reported being not gainfully employed as compared to those whose length of stay is shorter and those who have spent less portion of their lives in Japan (Charts 7.5 and 7.7).

It would seem that being active in the labor market has stronger correlations with indicators pertaining to individual trajectories suggesting that the human capital the Filipino residents have when they came to Japan can impact their structural integration. The differences are more glaring when we look at the differences in reasons for coming to Japan. Those who came to work and to train or study reported being employed, while there are more respondents that came to marry and to be with relatives and family members that were not employed during the survey (Chart 7.9). This ties in perfectly with the discussion in Chapter 7 regarding the integration into the labor market of those who came to the destination country because of family reunification purposes. In terms of educational attainment levels (Chart 7.6), the differences are more defined. We see the values gradually increasing as educational levels move from high school to technical vocational to college levels. Consequently, the proportion of respondents saying they are not employed also decreases as their educational level increases.

Further, more respondents with previous work experience seem to be employed as compared to respondents who did not previously have any work experience from the Philippines (Chart 7.8). In terms of their transnational practices on the other hand, most respondents who engage in transnational practices seem to be employed in jobs that match their skills more than those who

do not engage in transnational practices. In particular, sending remittances and having savings in the home country seem to create an incentive or a drive to be active in the labor market, as to be able to continuously and regularly send remittances and savings, a foreign resident needs to be able to find a job that can provide sufficient income (Charts 8.10-8.12).

While in terms of their ethnic social ties, interestingly, majority of those with jobs have found jobs through personal connection. In terms of numbers, more respondents who have jobs reported having strong ties than weak ties, but looking at proportion it would seem that more respondents who have jobs tend to have weak ties than strong ties (Chart 7.13).

On the other hand, in terms of intentions for the future, interestingly, more respondents who have jobs tend to not have intent to stay permanently (94.25%). Further, more respondents who are gainfully employed also tend to not have any intention of staying in Japan permanently (87.75%, see Chart 7.14).

What the data showed us are two things: first, that though access to jobs is high and though initial high rates of employment suggest a permeable labor market, many of the foreign residents are working in low-skilled short-term labor and may find it hard to be economically mobile. While demographic characteristics do not seem to have a relation with whether they are employed or not, their motivations and individual trajectories seem to have some interesting impacts on being employed. The perception of being not integrated into the labor market is expressed mostly by those who came to Japan because of family-reunification purposes. Recall from the previous chapter how Luthra et al (2014) claim that those who migrate for family-reunification purposes tend to be the least economically integrated because of first, they are less likely to be selected based on their labor market characteristics and second because of their actual reason for migration. We see these same dynamics at play in the survey results. Interestingly, following what I said regarding the contradictory results regarding gainful employment, those who migrated to work or to find work seem slightly content with engaging in their current jobs, though when looking at their contentment levels we see more variance.

Further, regardless of length of stay, many of those who have stayed the longest are still engaged in low-skilled labor and in jobs that do not match the respondents' learned skills again confirming the difficulty in changing jobs and sectors as found out by MIPEX (2004). This is contrary to expectations that length of stay can improve a person's skillset that can allow him or her better job opportunities. Contrary to expectations that skills can be developed over time in the host country and thus can facilitate economic mobility, many of the respondents seem to be

trapped in a very particular economic activity which in the long-run can lead to them being inhibited or trapped in certain positions in the society. These activities comprise of activities that were initially opened for them during the Heisei boom by the Japanese government. It would seem however that regardless of the length of time they have stayed, there are still no new economic activities that had been opened and had become easily penetrable for them. Further, it would seem that there is a danger in being entrapped in the same low-skilled industry for respondents who always find jobs through personal connections. More than half of the respondents reported finding their current job through personal connections. Among these respondents, majority are employed as factory workers (53.07%) and as entertainers (35.96%). Also, interestingly, even though job advertisements, most of the jobs found were in the low-skilled category. Interestingly, one possible reason for the reliance on personal connections to find jobs is because *rirekisho* or curriculum vitae is something that many of the foreign residents do not know. For instance, one of my informants said that she has never written a *rirekisho* in her entire life. Even the jobs that she engaged in back in the Philippines she found through personal connections and she has never needed to write a CV. When there came a time that she decided to try apply for a full-time job in Japan that is different from her then current job as a factory worker, she had to write a CV and she complained how difficult it was.

Second, the devaluation of their human capital in general has compounded this entrapment. Parreñas (2010) calls this 'contradictory class mobility', which refers to "a simultaneous improvement in their financial status and decline in social status" (Fresnoza-Flot 2005).

The data has shown that qualification and language problems remain to be barriers in looking for better jobs. Table 7.4 below shows that language (43%) and qualification (43%) seem to be big problems in looking for jobs. What this means is that while respondents have in general high education levels, it would seem that their educational qualifications from the home country are unusable when it comes to finding better jobs in the host society, suggesting devaluation of their human capital (Guo and DeVoretz 2006). While educational qualifications can be assessed to be matched with educational requirements in some jobs in Japan, technical qualifications are still not recognized. This is further made much more difficult by language qualifications. Many high-skilled jobs, where Japanese is required, entail some level of language proficiency and some knowledge of jargon used in specific fields, also in many cases knowledge of *keigo* (honorific, polite) speech and etiquette is required. Incompetence in the language can affect economic mobility.

Chart 7.2. Employment by sex, in percentage



Chart 7.3. Employment by civil status, in percentage



Chart 7.4. Employment by age groups, in percentage



Chart 7.5. Employment by length of stay, in percentage



Chart 7.7. Employment by proportion of life spent in Japan, in percentage



Chart 7.6. Employment by educational attainment, in percentage



Chart 7.8. Employment by work experience from home country, in percentage



Chart 7.9. Employment by reason for migration, in percentage



Chart 7.10. Employment by having savings in home country, in percentage



Chart 7.11. Employment by remittance practices, in percentage





Chart 7.12. Employment by travel to the home country, in percentage



Chart 7.13. Employment by ethnic ties, in percentage



Chart 7.14. Employment by intent to stay, in percentage

Table 7.4. Problems encountered when looking for a job, N=459

Problems	Magnitude	Proportion
Discrimination	21	4.99
Personal constraints	27	6.41
Language	182	43.23
Qualification	184	43.71
Visa	27	6.41
Temporary contract	24	5.70
Illegal	2	0.48

This is illustrated by an experience one of my key informants relayed to me. She was scheduled for a job interview at the Bureau of Immigration in Nagoya City. While she was excited for a career change—she was a university graduate after all and with her current work in a vegetable factory, she felt that she was not using skills and knowledge she had learned—she was also hesitant to go. While she can speak and understand Japanese, she said her Japanese is very colloquial and casual, as she only learned some words when she arrived in Japan after marrying her Japanese husband. She eventually went to the interview but decided not to pursue it anymore as she felt that she was not qualified in terms of language fluency.

It does not mean however that the human capital foreign residents brought with them from their home country are useless when they moved to Japan. The same informant, after she did not continue on with her application at the Bureau of Immigration in Nagoya City, went to get a job as an office worker at a mobile phone carrier. Her Filipino language proved useful as she was hired to manage Filipino clients. Some Filipinos also capitalized on their own ethnicity to improve their economic outcomes. One of my informants runs a restaurant where she cooks and serves Filipino food to a diverse clientele. She serves not just Filipinos but also Japanese customers as well, as well as other nationalities.

Such examples show that by capitalizing on their being Filipino can improve their outcomes, though it is hardly the case for everyone. While in general jobs are easy to access, jobs that are accessible remain to be categorically low-skilled and short-term jobs. The market, while accepting foreigners, is not yet open for more foreign workers in more skilled positions.

The story is slightly different for those already involved in high-skilled jobs. It would seem that for those in high-skilled jobs, their education and work experience from the Philippines matter more.

Language of course is still a concern but less so when compared to the situation of those in low skilled jobs. In fact, the language proficiency levels of those in high-skilled and low-skilled jobs are comparable. The main concern however for those in high-skilled jobs are the temporary contracts that they get. This can be attributed to two reasons: first, working visas have to be renewed usually every three years; and second, many Japanese companies are hesitant to sponsor a foreigner's working visa. While the City has enacted a charter ensuring fair treatment of workers, it still cannot police each and every company.

While finding any income generating activity does not seem to be a problem, being gainfully employed and findings jobs offering long-term contracts seems to be much harder. The data shows that being gainfully employed can be affected by such factors as motivation and individual trajectories because of how the host society, while accepting low-skilled workers, do not really recognize the need for them and their existence and in fact only accepts them for low-skilled short-term positions, and rewards those in high-skilled jobs but remain lukewarm to them.

In terms of access to health facilities, about 96 percent have access to health insurance, whether it is through the *kokumin kenkou hoken (*National Health Insurance Program or NHIP), or through the shokuba kenkou hoken (Work Place Health Insurance System WPHIS) (see Table 7.5). The NHIP and the WPHIS are the two types of health insurance provided to residents in Japan. Defined by the National Health Care Act of 1958, being enrolled in either of these two health insurance schemes ensure that members can be protected from expenses incurred because of sudden illnesses, major medical operations, long term care and hospitalization. While WPHIS is for members employed by registered companies, NHIP is for members that cannot be covered by WPHIS (Nihon Kaikei Kiko 2017). NHIP members aged 69 years old and below excluding preschool infants pay 30 percent of medical costs incurred, while preschool infants pay 20 percent and adults aged 70 to 74 years old pay 10 percent. Consequently, NHI pays 70 percent of costs for members aged 69 years old and below excluding preschool infants, 80 percent of costs for preschool infants and 90 percent for members 70 to 74 years old. NHIP premiums as computed by the municipality where he or she lives in, based on the member's income, net worth and number of household members.

NHIP is accessed by majority of the respondents (58.17%). The NHIP covers individuals not eligible for any employment-based insurance schemes. The premiums paid are dependent on the income of the individual. What the numbers imply is that many of the respondents are not eligible for WPHIS. This may be associated with the nature of work these respondents engage in. In many cases factory work and entertainment work are often considered as part-time jobs or

arubaito, and are usually paid by the hour. A worker is not enrolled in the WPHIS if his or her condition applies to one of the following: if his or her weekly working hours are less than 20 hours, or the employment is not expected to be longer than a year, or his or her monthly wage is less than 88,000 yen (800 USD), or he or she is a student, or the company does not regularly employ 500 workers. If the worker falls in one of those categories then he or she is not covered by WPHIS and is then mandated by law to enroll to NHIP. However, what this implies is that, still, majority of the respondents are integrated into the social protection and insurance system.

Table 7.5. Access to insurance, N=442

Access to insurance	Magnitude	Proportion
No	17	3.7
Yes	442	96.3
Type of access		
NHIP	267	58.17
WPHIS	112	24.4
Dependent	61	13.29
Seikatsu hogo	2	0.44

Access to insurance, regardless of type, does not really rely on the kind of job the respondent has as we have seen from the data. As discussed before access to the insurance system is immediately provided to foreign residents who are staying in Japan for more than three months since all residents, both local and foreign residents are required by law to have health insurance coverage. Not abiding by this law is punishable by law. Being part of the insurance then is a function of the residency permits. We see that those without either NHIP or WPHIS are those who are not eligible because of the stay qualifications. What this means is that in assessing the actual extent of structural integration, including insurance access can skew the assessment as enrollment and payments is required by law.

Looking at their actual experience in using health facilities, we see that less than half of the respondents have experienced going to the hospital for any medical needs (Table 7.6). Among those, 60 percent experienced some difficulty, mainly because of language (52.40%). Here again we see the effect of language. Some respondents who have some language capability still reported experiencing difficulties in accessing health facilities because of language. Japanese medical terms are very specific which makes it extremely difficult for foreign residents to explain illnesses and pains to Japanese health care workers. This is the primary reason why Nagoya City includes in its programs deployment of medical interpreters to assist foreign residents. I was

not however able to access data on the take up rate of these medical interpretation services.

Table 7.6. Experienced going to hospital, N=208

Experienced going to hospital	Magnitude	Proportion
No	251	54.68
Yes	208	45.32
Problems experienced		
None	83	39.90
Lack of information	52	25.00
Problems related to documents/visas	20	9.62
Language	109	52.40
Discrimination	7	3.37

In terms of access to another core structure, housing, on the other hand, the data show that majority of the respondents seem to have no problems with their current housing. Everyone has access to housing, as foreign residents are required to register their address when they are issued their *zairyuu kaado* (resident card). Their addresses are also important when registering for insurance and for the recently introduced "My Number System", a 12-digit identification number issued to all local and foreign residents. According to the Japan Agency for Local Authority Information Systems (n.d.), an organization operated by prefectures and municipalities in Japan, the *kojinbango* or the individual number card "My Number" is designed to facilitate, first, a fairer and more just society by national and local governments by ascertaining individuals' incomes to prevent evasion of taxes and insurance payment responsibilities. Second, it facilitates improved administrative efficiency and third, enhances convenience on the part of the public by limiting required documents for various administrative procedures.

With this in mind, we can say that access to housing is a function of their resident permits. In the data, we see that many Filipino residents live in *danchi*, a type of residential complexes managed by the prefectures. Rents are usually lower for such types of housing as compared to others. Because they are managed by the municipalities, there is usually no key money or contract renewal fees involved which lower the rents considerably. To be able to live in a danchi, residents have to apply to the municipality. Nagoya City for instance provides translations of guides in filling up housing application forms. Danchi housing units are also usually bigger than other private apartments, making them ideal for Filipino residents who often live together with relatives (28.98%, see Table 7.7). One informant explained to me how moving to a *danchi* has helped them. He lives with a number of relatives, as he himself has migrated to Japan as a

dependent. He said the rents are definitely much cheaper and the sizes are bigger which are more suitable for bigger Filipino households.

Many Filipinos seem to congest in similar areas. Majority of the respondents found their current housing through personal connections (43.36%). This is in particular very true for those who are overstayers. They cannot look for housing through real estate or through other formal channels as their resident cards would have to be checked. That is why for all overstayers in the data, they found housing through personal connections. This is a common practice especially among foreign students. One Filipino friend of mine who is currently a student does not know for whom his current housing contract is addressed to. He said he got the apartment from a previous Filipino student who already moved out and he just continued the contract. That student who moved out also just continued the contract from someone else. This is a common practice because it avoids the need to pay various other moving in payments such as key money, thank you money, and additional deposits. What we see is that while access to housing can be a function of residency permits, it can also be a function of the existing ethnic social ties. And we see from Chapter 7 that majority of the respondents have access to ethnic social ties or to ties with *kababayan*.

About 80 percent live in areas where there are many Filipino residents. One limitation of this research is that I do not touch upon housing segregation in a much deeper level. Some studies such as Tsuzuki's (2000) study on interactions among Nikkei and local residents suggest that some form of housing segregation have happened in other *danchi* housing complexes in other municipalities, and this is being attributed to the lack of engagement of the local and neighborhood associations with the foreign residents. I would suspect that there would be some sort of housing segregation as according to one of my informants, they usually get information on available apartments from other Filipinos who are moving out. Further, during one of the events of the "Know Your Community", a series of events being held by Filipino migrant organizations in cooperation with some Japanese NPOs which I have introduced in a previous chapter, one of the speakers mentioned that in a housing complex with an attached nursery, about 80 percent of the children are Filipinos while there are five Japanese children. This illustrates how in many *danchi* the number of Filipinos and other foreign residents are increasing.

Table 7.7. Selected housing variables, N=459

Variables	Magnitude	Proportion
How found current housing		
Living with family/spouse	133	28.98
Through personal connection	199	43.36
Provided by work company	80	17.43
Through own's effort	20	4.36
Through local government	23	5.01
Through migrant organizations	3	0.65
Problems experienced		
None	411	89.54
Lack of information	29	6.32
Problems related to documents/visas	2	0.44
Language	23	5.01
Money	8	1.74
Discrimination	1	0.22
Distance	9	1.96

It would seem from the results of the survey that access to the basic social structures was made easier by a combination of factors. On the one hand, the policies and programs of the City facilitate a situation where foreign resident engagement in such social structures is generally accepted. The thrust towards the participation of foreign residents in the labor market complements the goal of *tabunka kyousei* as the tool to revitalize local municipalities in light of depopulation, aging and local public finance crises. The migrant population has the potential to bring in income in the form of taxes and businesses and their active participation in the labor market can reduce economic burden on the host society (see Parkes & Pryce 2007; Heath & Demireva 2014). Further, service provision for foreign residents, if seen as an extension of service provision for local residents, is considered efficient. Structural integration policies involve the same services provided to Japanese citizens and are simply extended to foreign residents. Of course, there are some instances when new policies and programs are introduced that are specifically tailored to foreign residents' needs such as the use of medical interpreters or translation of notices. But it is in such instances when specific policies are required that we saw from the data that foreign residents experienced more difficulties.

On the other hand, the respondents' ethnic social ties seem to have contributed significantly in

their structural integration, especially in the case of respondents who are employed in low-skilled jobs. Chapter 6 showed that respondents already knew someone when they arrived in Japan who provided them help not just in monetary but in emotional and psychological terms. And the role of their ethnic social ties is further affirmed when majority reported finding jobs and housing through their personal connections. This is especially true for those who came as dependents as discussed by one of my key informants. He did say that if he did not know anyone then in Japan, he probably would not have made the move since Japan is a very foreign place with a very different language.

What complicates the scenario however is the specific context of the Filipino residents. As we saw from the data, majority of the respondents are in low-skilled jobs. Jobs found through personal connections seem to be more concentrated in low-skilled sectors than jobs found through job advertisements, local government and migrant organization fairs. Most of the respondents who found jobs through personal connections are in jobs that run the risk of entrenching such negative images of the Filipino resident as low-skilled or "bad-girl". Many permanent residents still engage in entertainment work arguing that the job is a lucrative source of income since a permanent residency allows them more movement in terms of choosing a *mise* (pub) where pay and working conditions are better. What we see here corresponds to what has been called ethnic mobility entrapment (Li 2010) which impacts can be much more detrimental in the long run because in a way what it does is inhibit the value of any skill they have which somehow puts them at a disadvantage when they negotiate the terms of their position and membership in the society.

Respondents in low-skilled and in high-skilled jobs both experience immobility which is very surprising. For low-skilled respondents, regardless of how long they have been in Japan, it seems that breaking into different sectors is difficult. Language and qualifications seem to be the biggest hurdle, entrenching them into jobs that are considered 3D and are often short-term. On the other hand, for high-skilled respondents, visa and temporary contracts are the biggest issue which hinders their mobility. Knowing that visa is one of the major hurdles seem to be actually surprising, as compared to those in low-skilled jobs those working in professional jobs should have been valued more as they considered high-skilled. But as what has been mentioned, many of those who continually engage in low-skilled jobs are already holders of permanent visas and hence they are less concerned about their visa status. Further, because in Japan the visa is dependent on the activity, if a foreign resident who has an Engineer visa then he or she cannot decide to just change jobs and start working as a teacher because this would require him or her to change his or her visa status. Immobility seems to arise from this interplay between policies

and the specific context of the Filipino residents in terms of structural integration. This devaluation of their qualifications contributes to their immobility.

In short, while jobs, housing and social protection are easily accessed, the more nuanced situation is seen in the discussion of access to employment. It was argued that housing and social protection is accessed by almost all as those two are often associated with documents required for respondents to be allowed to legally stay in Japan. On the other hand, access to job would seem to rely on a more diverse group of factors, both institutional and agential. It would seem then that among the variables looked at in terms of structural integration, the variable that seems to give us the most information regarding extent of structural integration is access to job as was also confirmed in the literature (Fokkema and Haas 2015).

B. Cultural integration

Cultural integration, according to Berry (2011) represents changes in mindset and behavior towards the host society. However cultural integration also has an economic function. Following the definition of integration that is followed in this project, that individuals, deciding to migrate to improve their outcomes can choose to invest or not to invest in integration based on whether they view integration as going to help improve their outcomes. Algan et al (2012) also note this in terms of cultural integration in that, "cultural integration facilitates trade across individuals" in that "the incentives for an individual belonging to the minority cultural group to assimilate and adopt the culture of the majority are then directly related to the expected gains from trade that such a strategy provides". Following this we can expect three implications: in that the smaller the minority group and the more dispersed they are the higher the degree of cultural assimilation is to be expected; the more incentives and benefits to be gained in being integrated, the more an individual is likely to integrate; and third, the more important it is to share a common culture to "enjoy social interactions" (Algan et al 2012) then the higher degree of integration can be expected.

In the literature, cultural integration is generally agreed to be measured by migrants' language proficiency (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010, Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007). Gijsberts and Dagevos (2007) note that cultural integration measures the "cultural distance between the ethnic minority and the indigenous majority" (p.806). This is also affirmed in Esser (2004) and Berry (2011). This distance pertains to the distinction between the local and the foreign residents and is often operationalized using language proficiency. Therefore, following what has been said above, this

distance that is operationalized through language proficiency can be said to be shorter if there are more incentives to learn the language. Language learning is in itself an investment. Time, energy and money, in cases where language learning is free, are often invested to be able to reach a certain level of proficiency. What is being argued here is that if the individual feels that learning the language will better his or her outcomes in the host society then he or she will most likely invest time, energy and most likely money in learning the language.

In the survey, we asked respondents to rate their own perceived proficiency in the Japanese language. The respondents were asked to rate their perceived proficiency in a scale of one to five, with five corresponding to the highest level of the Japanese Language Proficiency Test (2012), the most common proficiency test among foreigners. Levels one and two correspond to N5 and N4 levels in the JLPT, while three and four correspond to N3 and N2 and level five corresponds to N1. The JLPT website offers explanation of linguistic competence necessary to be in every level. According to the JLPT, N1 corresponds to “the ability to understand Japanese used in a variety of circumstances”. N2 on the other hand pertains to the “ability to understand Japanese used in everyday situations, and in a variety of circumstances to a certain degree”. N3 refers to “ability to understand Japanese used in everyday situations to a certain degree”. N4 is the “ability to understand basic Japanese” and N5 refers to the “ability to understand some basic Japanese”.

Chart 7.15 below shows the self-rated proficiency levels of the respondents. It shows that majority of the respondents rated themselves as either Level 2 or Level 3 or in JLPT terms N4 and N3. What this means is that majority of the respondents have below average to average proficiency in their language. In a country such as Japan where not everyone can speak English, language becomes a really big hurdle. What this implies following earlier definitions is that while respondents realize the advantage of learning the language, they do not seek to learn it much more to have better proficiency. What is pushed forward here is that the language is important only in as much as it can help an individual be structurally or economically integrated and is abandoned once these goals have been met.

Chart 7.15. Self-rated language proficiency levels



Language proficiency	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Level 1	33	7.19	6.92	7.80
Level 2	184	40.09	45.60	27.66
Level 3	176	38.34	33.96	48.23
Level 4	59	12.85	12.58	13.48
Level 5	7	1.53	0.94	2.84

In terms of group differences, there is not much variation seen in terms of age groups, though it is worthy to note that as age increases the tendency is to have Level 3 proficiency than Level 2. And that the proportion of respondents who have higher levels than Level 4 increases as age increases. In terms of sex, more females rate themselves as Level 2 as compared to men who rate themselves more as Level 3. Further, more married, divorced and widowed respondents rated themselves as Level 3 than Level 2 which is often the self-rated proficiency among singles and cohabiting individuals. While the differences in terms of these variables are not so pronounced it is still interesting to note of these. On the other hand, in terms of individual trajectories, we see that surprisingly, there is no discernible pattern when it comes to educational attainment (Chart 7.20). Language levels vary among the different educational levels. Higher educational level does not translate to higher language proficiency in this case. There is as much respondents who are high school graduates (37.24%) who have Level 3 proficiency as College graduates (36.59%). On the other hand, language proficiency seems to correspond with length of stay. As the length of stay increases language proficiency levels also increase (Chart 7.19). Compare for instance the six percent of respondents who have stayed in Japan for less than three years who rated themselves as Level 4 with the 26 percent of those who stayed for more than 10 years who rated themselves as Level 4. The same is reflected when we look at

proportion of life in Japan (Chart 7.21). The higher the proportion of one's life one spent in Japan, the better the language proficiency it would seem.

What is striking I think is the difference in language proficiency by reasons for migration (see Chart 7.23). We see that interestingly, those who migrated to be with relatives seem to have better handle on the language than those who migrated for more economic reasons. About 32 percent of those who migrated for family reunification purposes reported having Level 4 proficiency while only about 10 percent of those who migrated for work reported having the same level. This also corresponds to the finding in terms of having work experience in the home country. If, based on the earlier discussion, language is very important in economic mobility, then from the findings we can say that the assertion that their current human capital and skills are being devalued holds especially among low-skilled workers.

Interestingly, in terms of transnational practices the results are more mixed (see Charts 7.24-7.26). More respondents who regularly send remittances home seem to have better language proficiency than those who do not send remittances regularly as well as than those who do not send remittances at all. On the other hand, there seems to be no variation in terms of those who regularly travel to the home country as compared to those who do not. The most distinct variation however is when language proficiency is compared among those who save in the home country and among those who do not. It would seem that those who save money in Japan or those who save in both Japan and the Philippines have better self-rated language proficiency than those who save only in the home country and as compared to those who do not save at all. On the other hand, there is no particular trend in terms of ethnic social ties.

Chart 7.16. Language proficiency levels by sex, in percentage



Chart 7.18. Language proficiency levels by civil status, in percentage



Chart 7.17. Language proficiency levels by age groups, in percentage



Chart 7.19. Language proficiency levels by length of stay, in percentage



Chart 7.20. Language proficiency levels by educational attainment, in percentage



Chart 7.21. Language proficiency levels by proportion of life spent in Japan, in percentage



Chart 7.22. Language proficiency levels by work experience, in percentage

Chart 7.23. Language proficiency levels by reason for migrating, in percentage



Chart 7.24. Language proficiency levels by savings in home country, in percentage



Chart 7.25. Language proficiency levels by remittance practice, in percentage



Chart 7.26. Language proficiency levels by travel to the home country, in percentage



Chart 7.27. Language proficiency levels by ethnic ties, in percentage



Chart 7.28. Language proficiency levels by intent to stay, in percentage



Regardless of the very small proportion of the respondents who reported having high levels of language proficiency, only a very small proportion of the respondents are currently studying the language. Learning it is not mandatory and there is no comprehensive government program for learning the language which is in contrast to other migrant-receiving countries which implement government-run language programs whose credits can be used towards gaining permanent residency and citizenship (see for instance Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC), or the integration courses provided by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany). In Japan, while there is no comprehensive national strategy for integration, classes provided by the local government are free. However, regardless, it is surprising to find that most of those studying the language are taking them from migrant organization. Majority reported "time" as being the major reason why they cannot continue learning the language from formal institutions. Which is expected given that majority of the respondents are working and are with children.

Table 7.8. Selected language education variables, N=27

Japanese language education	Magnitude	Proportion
Currently studying language	27	5.88
Where		
Classes provided by local government	8	29.63
Classes provided by migrant organizations	10	37.04
Private institution/University	3	11.11
Self-study	6	22.22
Problem encountered with studying		
None	5	18.52
Lack of information	2	7.41
Motivation	4	14.81
Time	20	74.07

Language is important for adult learners. As we have seen from the discussion in the earlier section, language along with qualifications are important to be able to be more economically mobile. Having better proficiency of the language can help curb the effects of the devaluation of qualifications experienced by those in higher-skilled jobs and can facilitate better mobility of Filipino residents who are trapped in lower-skilled jobs. One of my informants who came on a spouse visa said she initially attended for a half a year straight the language classes offered by the City but after half a year of intensive Japanese she just could not attend classes anymore because she had other stuff to do and the language have become progressively harder.

Aside from adult learners, there is a much bigger issue that the City aims to address when it comes to language competency. The so-called 1.5 generation who arrive as children and adolescents in Japan was the proposed focus of the multicultural plan for 2018 discussed during the Nagoya Regional Seminar. According to Asuncion Fresnoza-Flot (2015) in her study on 1.5 generation Filipinos in France, the term "1.5 generation" refers specifically to migrants' children who themselves "migrate and arrive in their receiving country between the ages of five and eighteen and have therefore experienced schooling successively in both their country of origin and their host country". Not uncommon are stories of Filipino women who worked as entertainers in Japan and upon coming back to the Philippines learned that they are pregnant. Recognition of the children by their Japanese fathers often takes time and are usually traumatizing. Upon recognition, children are moved to Japan after having spent some part of their childhood in the Philippines. They constitute a big portion of the 1.5 generation children in Japan. According to Takahata (2011), the number of 1.5 generation Filipino children in Japan is increasing though there are no specific numbers, as many of them are often categorized into long-term residents.

In the series of programs called "Know Your Community" which I have introduced in a previous chapter, most of the complaints of Filipino residents in the mothers' and the children's inability to understand the school roles. Many of the Filipino mothers congregate among themselves to create some sort of a self-help group to educate themselves about the school rules. One mother actually raised an issue regarding one teacher hitting her child on the head which is a big no-no in the Philippines. It created a traumatic experience for the child who wanted to either go to another school or go back to the Philippines to study. But transferring is impossible as the next available school is the next school district and is too far from where they live. There was another issue where a teacher wanted to cut the hair of a child and the mother said that she will have this done when she gets her salary but the teacher could not wait and so cut the kid's hair herself. Another big issue was the issue of packed lunch or *obentou*. One mother bought McDonald's for her child and she got a scolding from the teacher saying that this is not allowed. However, if she was to remove the food from the packaging and put it in a proper *obentou* then it would be fine. That was something that mother could not understand.

Another issue is that many Filipino parents cannot send their children to the daycare because the children cannot understand Japanese yet and would not be taken cared of properly. This problem with not being able to catch up in school was much harder for older kids. One mother asked where she can go for consultation because some of the children who could not cope up with their lesson end up joining *bousouzoku* or bike gangs.

One of the biggest problems with regard to the education of children is the difference in the Philippine and Japan education systems. Though the Philippines has recently implemented the K-12 system which adds two more years of education to be at par with other educational systems in the world, there are still differences in culture and rules. The language difference that children have to overcome to be able to integrate stands out. Takahata (2011) notes that children aged five years old or more will have a difficult time catching up with lessons, as Japanese and Filipino language differ greatly. Further, since school year levels are determined by age in Japan, this creates problems for teenagers who are suddenly thrown into junior and senior high schools whose Japanese ability is elementary at best. This can set off a series of complicated problems: not properly learning the Japanese language will hinder these children from going to higher education, and ultimately into the labor market.

What we see here is that in terms of cultural integration, many respondents do have some knowledge of the language but they are not proficient. There are two conclusions that can be made: first, what is stipulated here is that the average to below average levels of proficiency point to the fact that many Filipino residents only invest in learning the language up to a certain extent, and that is when certain goals have been met. We see from earlier discussions that there is very little difference in terms of language proficiency among men and women, or among younger and older respondents, or even among high-skilled and low-skilled individuals. What this implies is that incentives are not too high, at least in the perspective of many of the respondents. As mentioned in the previous section, jobs are easy to access, many jobs do not require knowing or speaking Japanese language at all, while some jobs require only a basic knowledge of Japanese. What this leads to is disincentivizing learning the language especially for foreign residents who do not think of staying permanently in the country. And second, the increase in the number of Filipino coming to Japan suggests the possibility of the Filipino community becoming thicker and tighter as mentioned in Chapter 7 in which we see that many of the Filipinos tend to live together. As mentioned in the opening of this section, Algan et al (2012) notes the extent to which cultural integration can happen is going to be wider and deeper if the minority culture is more dispersed. What is implied therefore is that language learning is disincentivized not just because jobs are available for people who know nothing of the language, but that emotional, psychological and social support can also be accessed through the ethnic community further disincentivizing the need to go out of the community to interact with native-born Japanese.

C. Interactive integration

Interactive integration refers to the inclusion or acceptance of foreign residents into the primary relations and various social networks in the society (Bosswick and Heckmann 2006). Bosswick and Heckmann (2006) note that these relations include friendships, partnerships and memberships in different organizations. Following this then, how I measured interactive integration is by looking at three levels of interactions: personal, meso-level and civic-political. By looking at these three levels we can see "the ways in which majority and minority groups negotiate the terms of membership and belonging in nationally defined polities" (Nagel and Staeheli 2008, p.416). What is underscored is the importance of interactions in establishing representation. Interactions can help revise and shape prejudices and stereotypes and slowly allow the creation of a collective that can represent the minority group in the host society to be able to negotiate better the terms of their membership.

Such interactions at different levels become important especially in cases when a foreign resident is not employed, not studying or not involved in any activity where he or she can meet people from different ethnic backgrounds and understand more about the host culture.

First what we see is that on the personal level, many of the respondents seem to go out of their ethnic community and establish friendships with native-born Japanese. Majority reported having a Japanese friend that they can rely on (82.79%). Results suggest that language plays an important role in establishing friendships with Japanese residents. About 67 percent of the respondents cited language as what stops them from having more Japanese friends, while 60 percent noted time and 25 percent pertained to the differences in culture (Table 7). Further, Facchini et al (2014) found out that "migrants with a German friend are more similar to natives than those without a local companion" and that "migrants with a local companion are less worried about xenophobic feelings, less concerned about their own economic situation and more interested in politics than their counterparts with no local connections" (p.10). In the case of the Filipino residents, creating friendships can impact and slowly change the way they view the host country and the way they are being viewed by the host country.

While this is interesting, results of the qualitative part of the study shows a contradictory response from the informants. Many of them said that they do not have really close Japanese friends, friends that come over to your house and go out with you to eat out or to shop. They have Japanese acquaintances that they say hello to every now and then, or that they meet and talk to in schools where their children study at. The main problem, one of my informants said, is that Japanese are "plastic", a term in Filipino which means that they are untrue. Literally,

because a plastic is a processed material, and what it connotes is that when interacting with Japanese they find their interactions with them unnatural.

Chart 7.29. Having Japanese friends, N=459



Many Japanese friend	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
No	79	17.21	20.13	10.64
Yes	380	82.79	79.87	89.36

As previously mentioned, the route by which many Filipinos have come to Japan may have created stereotypes that see them as low-skilled, or at worst, "*Japayuki-san*". We have earlier discussed the ramifications of this label and studies (see Chapter 5) have shown that regardless of the increase in the different types of Filipino migrants to Japan, the label "*Japayuki-san*" still exists. At this point let me share an anecdote about the experience on this stereotype of one Filipino friend who is studying in Japan for her doctorate degree. During a big conference held this June 2017 where the works of many laboratories from different universities in Japan are exhibited, she found herself being asked again and again by older Japanese men about certain Filipino colloquial words that are part of "*Japayuki* slang". While she was manning their laboratory's exhibit, she was approached on two occasions by some older Japanese men and asked her about the meaning of the word "*paru-paro*". In Filipino, this word means butterfly. I actually did not know the colloquial meaning of the word until I started working on a project on Filipino entertainers where I was told that "*paru-paro*" meant a cheating boyfriend or girlfriend and that the common phrase includes "paru-paro *dame yo*" which means "don't cheat on me", a phrase often heard in Philippine pubs. When I told my friend this she said that that was exactly the explanation of the Japanese men to her. And they kept on insisting that she should know the

term. She complained that they kept on badgering her until the next day and she finally told them that if they have no other questions on the exhibited experiments then they better go check out other experiments.

One of my informants also said that while many Filipinos have a general image of being hardworking, for those working in the Sakae Entertainment District which she jokingly called "artists", have this image of being "*mukhang pera"* or "after the yen" because they are always after tips. Even back in the home country, there is immediately a stereotype ascribed to someone travelling to Japan. People going to Japan are often called "*Japayuki*" albeit in joking terms if the person is not going to be engaged in entertainer work. Regardless what this means is that there is a negative connotation to the term "*Japayuki*". This stereotype I believe is very slowly being erased as fares to Japan are becoming cheaper and more and more Filipino tourists are able to afford travelling and visiting Japan.

It would seem that among the Filipino residents who reported having a Japanese friend, they met them at work most of the times, which suggests that where they work they are able to meet people from the host society, regardless if the job they are engaged in is considered low-skilled or not. What this can mean however is that if friends are meant in the same way as Japanese clients in the case of the entertainers, then there is still a possibility of this leading to more entrenched stereotypes rather than improving them. Further, regardless of earlier findings that many Filipinos live in areas where there are many Filipinos, there seems to be no evidence of housing segregation as majority of the respondents who reported having a Japanese friend met them in the same residential blocks where they live. Also, in response to what stops them from having Japanese friends, "time" and "language" seem to be the oft-cited reason.

Table 7.9. Where met Japanese friends, N=380

Where met Japanese friends	**Magnitude**	**Proportion**
Same residential block/complex	143	37.63
Work	357	93.95
Organization	24	6.32
Church	7	1.84
Common friend	4	1.05
School	7	1.84
Internet	1	0.26

Table 7.10. What stops from having more Japanese friend, N=79

Reason	Magnitude	Proportion
Culture	20	25.32
Time	47	59.49
Language	53	67.09
Nationality	9	11.39
Visa	17	21.52
Personality	1	1.27

Looking at group differences (see Charts 7.30-7.32), we see that while differences are little they are still worth noting. A bigger proportion of males and older respondents reported having Japanese friends as compared to females and younger respondents. In terms of civil status, single never-married individuals and widowed respondents reported establishing friendships with native-born Japanese more than other statuses.

In terms of individual trajectories, we see that as with age, respondents who have stayed longer in Japan and have spent a bigger proportion of their lives in Japan reported having friends than those who have spent less time in Japan (Chart 7.33). Findings for language proficiency earlier suggest that language and establishing networks among native-born population have a circular relationship. Having some skill in the language allows foreign residents to make contact and communicate with Japanese locals and continued interaction can help improve their language skills.

Further while previous work experience from the home country does not really impact having Japanese friends or not, we see that higher-educated respondents reported having more Japanese friends (Chart 7.35). And that interestingly, those who came to Japan for family reunification reasons tend to have more Japanese friends when compared to those who came for more economic reasons (Chart 7.37). Surprisingly however, those who came to marry have the least proportion of respondents who reported having Japanese friends. The difference I argue is that those who came to be with relatives have a better settling in experience than those who came to marry. Essentially those who travelled to be with relatives do not really travel to a completely foreign land, their relatives are there who can help them connect to people and places. On the other hand, those who travelled to marry, more often than not, travel alone into a completely different environment with no single familiar face to help them settle in. One of my key informants told me that when she agreed to marry her now Japanese husband, she did not really anticipate the overhauling of her life—that she would have to live somewhere far from her

parents, that she would have to live somewhere totally different with a language foreign to her ears, eat different food and see and meet different people. She said that in the beginning, even going to the convenience store or to the supermarket to buy something to eat was difficult, so difficult that her husband would have to accompany her and teach her what is what every time.

On the other hand, those who are engaged with transnational practices equally between Japan and the Philippines report more personal relationships with Japanese people (Chart 7.38-8.40). A higher proportion of those who have savings in both Japan and the Philippines, those who remit regularly and those who travel back to the Philippines regularly but not too frequently report having Japanese friends. And finally, as expected those who have an intention to stay are more likely to have Japanese friends than those who do not intend to stay permanently (Chart 7.42).

The second type of interactions I looked at involved engagement with meso-level organizations such as migrant organizations, voluntary organizations and religious or church-related associations among others. In the literature participation and membership in such organizations whether it be ethnic-based or more multiculturally-based can facilitate the growth of a community (Brettel 2005). As essential to communities, organizations, according to Brettel (2005) put forward the centrality of questions such as "how people work toward effecting the continued existence of community (as a place-making process) in a deterritorialized world of movement and how community is related to both social networks and identity politics" (p.854), in short, representation. Central to the idea of a community is interactions.

In terms of civic participation, according to the survey, majority of the respondents reported being involved in some form of organization (40.31%, see Chart 7.29). Many Filipino residents acknowledge the benefits of joining and being active in organizations and the most oft-cited advantage is that it makes them feel part of a community, which follows Brettel's (2005) argument.

Chart 7.30. Membership in organizations

	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Non-member	274	59.69	66.04	45.39
Member	185	40.31	33.96	54.61

A substantial proportion also noted that organizations can give them better access to information, work and opportunities (see Table 7.11). However, even among those who are members of organizations, active participation is low. Time seems to hinder most of the respondents from joining and actively participating in organizations.

Table 7.11. Selected variables, N=185

Variables	Magnitude	Proportion
Why join		
Feels part of a community	137	74.05
Better access to information	109	58.92
Better access to work and opportunities	58	31.35
Help with homesickness	5	2.70
Emotional support	3	1.62
Frequency of participation in organization events		
Always	7	3.78
Sometimes	44	23.78
Neither sometimes neither seldom	81	43.78
Seldom	51	27.57
Often	2	1.08

Table 7.12. What stops from joining organizations, N=274

What stops from joining organization	Magnitude	Proportion
Lack information	102	37.23
Time	217	79.20
Visa	11	4.01
Language	30	10.95
Personal reason	1	0.36

In terms of type of organization, we see that majority are involved in church or religious organizations (Table 7.13). For many researchers looking at the role of church and religious spaces and organizations in the lives of the migrants, they see this as "means and the outcome as well as the medium of social and cultural activity" (Knott 2005, cited in Fresnoza-Flot 2010). What Fresnoza-Flot (2010) argues is that religious belonging help migrants adjust and confront to the new lives they are living in the host society. For many, the Church especially for Catholic migrants have been a place where they can meet other Filipinos. In the absence of emotional and psychological support that migrants get from their families, the Church becomes this place where they can rest and feel that someone is caring for them. This is summed up by Fresnoza-Flot (2010) by saying that the Church becomes "a space of expression in which to confront their social marginality". It comes with no surprise then that most Filipinos are engaged in some form of religious organization. On the other hand, membership in Filipino migrant organizations and voluntary organizations are also markedly high.

Table 7.13. Membership in organizations, N=4185

Organization	Magnitude	Proportion
Church/Religious	67	36.22
Filipino migrant organizations	40	21.62
International associations	1	0.54
Neighborhood organizations	14	7.57
Organizations organized by the local government	1	0.54
Voluntary organizations	62	33.51

Membership in religious groups provide a contrasting image to that of the "bad girl" image stemming from many of the Filipinos' involvement with entertainer work. I argue that apart from being able to get a sort of substitute source of emotional and physical support, the Filipino residents also actively join religious organizations to slowly curb and tame the negative image

being ascribed to them by their involvement in entertainer work. Churches, as mentioned by Knott (2005) act as markers in the process of place-making by the Filipino residents. Economic reasons drove them to migrate to Japan and work in such jobs and regardless whether they engaged in prostitution work or not, many of them find comfort and a confirmation and justification of their migration to Japan in religious places.

Looking at group differences, we see that males and those in higher age groups tend to be engaged with organizations (Chart 7.30-8.31). While males are more engaged in voluntary associations (41.56%), females tend to join religious organizations (40.74%). While middle-aged groups tend to be more involved in religious groups, younger and older groups tend to join voluntary associations.

In terms of individual trajectories, we see that people who have stayed longer and have spent about half of their lives in Japan tend to be more active in joining organizations (Chart 7.33). It would seem that as the length of stay in Japan increases the likelier it becomes for a Filipino resident to be a member of a religious organization than of a voluntary association. Further, we see that in terms of educational attainment (See Chart 7.35), higher-educated individuals tend to be more active as well as those with previous work experiences from the Philippines. There is however no difference in the choice of the organization which members of different educational levels join.

Chart 7.31. Interactive integration variables by sex, in percentage



Chart 7.33. Interactive integration variables by civil status, in percentage



Chart 7.32. Interactive integration variables by age, in percentage



Chart 7.34. Interactive integration variables by length of stay, in percentage



Chart 7.35. Interactive integration variables by proportion of life spent, in percentage



Chart 7.36. Interactive integration variables by educational attainment, in percentage



Chart 7.37. Interactive integration variables by work experience, in percentage



Chart 7.38. Interactive integration variables by reason for migration, in percentage



Chart 7.39. Interactive integration variables by having savings, in percentage



Chart 7.40. Interactive integration variables by remitting practice, in percentage



Chart 7.41. Interactive integration variables by travel to home country, in percentage



Chart 7.42. Interactive integration variables ethnic social ties, in percentage



Chart 7.43. Interactive integration variables by intent to stay permanently, in percentage



Interestingly, more respondents who migrated to Japan to train or to study are active in organizations (Chart 7.37). Those who came to work or to find work are less inclined to join organizations. It is quite intuitive since those people who came to work or to look for work would most probably have less time to be active in organizations. On the other hand, it would seem that respondents who engage in transnational practices more regularly but not too often are more likely to be active in organizations (Charts 7.38-7.40). Respondents who have access to only weak ties or to a combination of weak and strong ethnic ties tend to be more active in organizations (Chart 7.41). And as expected, more respondents who expressed intent to stay are more likely to be engaging in an association than those who do not intend to stay permanently (Chart 7.42).

We see that in terms of policies on organizing, the City does not hinder foreign residents from organizing. Nagoya City hosts a number of foreign resident and migrant associations as was discussed in Chapter 6. It provides financial sponsorship as well as legitimacy to many of the groups that are active in the locality. And at the same time, the City also taps into these organizations for assistance on various foreign resident-related issues.

The last interaction variable that I analyzed is the respondents' participation in events and activities that are organized by local governments. These activities range from the simplest and least politically-charged such as emergency drills, to the most politically-charged events such as seminars soliciting foreign resident views on what programs should be implemented to improve their outcomes. Given the limited political rights afforded to foreign residents in Japan, I aim to understand the degree to which foreign residents become involve and in which programs they become engaged in. I argue that participation in local government-led events and organizations is of conventional political participation that "take[s] place within a previously structured set of political institutions" (Martiniello 2005, p.3) which allows for individual participation and allows for individual participants an opportunity to connect with the collective.

In terms of participation in events and programs conducted by the local government, there is a much lower participation rate (see Table 10). Time, lack of information and language are the most oft-cited reasons for non-participation. Among programs that have been implemented by the local government, take-up is high for language classes than among other programs. While many respondents note that participation in local government-led events and programs can help them feel more at home in the community, some still reported having no idea how such involvement can help them.

Chart 7.44. Frequency of participation in local government events, N=459



Frequency of participation	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Never	196	42.70	46.86	33.33
Seldom	194	42.27	39.62	48.23
Neither seldom nor often	60	13.07	11.64	16.31
Often	8	1.74	1.89	1.42
Always	1	0.22	0.00	0.71

Table 7.14. What stops from joining events, N=459

What stops from joining	Magnitude	Proportion
Lack information	169	36.82
Time	360	78.43
Visa	23	5.01
Language	61	13.29
No interest	1	0.22

Table 7.15. Local government programs participated in, N=459

Local government program	Magnitude	Proportion
Language classes	111	24.18
Translation services	44	9.59
Visa assistance	40	8.71
Multicultural programs	57	12.42
Job fairs	42	9.15
Housing	54	11.76
Earthquake and emergency drills	78	16.99
Windows for foreign resident opinion	33	7.19

In terms of group differences, we see that males and older respondents tend to participate more in local government-led activities (Chart 7.30). While participation is all around low in terms of civil status, we see that married and widowed respondents generally participate more often than other groups. In terms of individual trajectories on the other hand, we see that respondents who have stayed more in Japan and have spent a bigger proportion of their lives in Japan participate more. Further, while there is no significant difference in terms of work experience, we see that those who have better educational levels tend to be more active in participating (Chart 7.35). Interestingly, looking at the reasons for migration, we see that respondents who migrated to train or study tend to be more active (Chart 7.37). One possible reason is that most of those who came to train or to study came under government-hosted programs such as the Trainee System or the *Monbukagakusho* Scholarship or Japanese Government Scholarship. Thus, we can surmise that they are more connected and are able to access more information about certain activities and programs.

In terms of transnational practices, there is no discernible pattern (Charts 8.38-8.40). While those who have savings only in the Philippines tend to participate less, those who do not remit participate more. We see the most distinct difference in terms of ethnic social ties. Those who have access to only weak ties tend to participate more than those who have only strong ties (Chart 7.41). And lastly in terms of intent to stay, the difference in the frequency of participation of those who intend to stay and those who do not are markedly different. It would seem that those who intend to stay permanently tend to be more active in participating in government-led events.

Participation overall is low and this is not without surprise; many programs can be categorized as

3Fs multiculturalism and hark back to *kokusaika*. If following earlier described importance of participation in local government-led events as a way to interact with other people of both Japanese and other ethnicities and as a way to represent themselves, we see that services and events which call for participation among foreign residents are limited (see Chapter 6). The City government, along with neighborhood associations, has supported parades and festivals showcasing the various cultures of the foreign residents such as the Philippine Festival and the Brazilian Day. While this is not entirely bad, Carruthers (2004) and Flowers (2012) warn us of the peril of the so-called 3Fs multiculturalism which essentializes the "food, festival and fashion" of a culture thereby failing to recognize the subjectivity of the migrant.

It would seem that while programs are acceptable, the approach is not appropriate. Following the rhetoric at the national level, foreign residents are treated more as a problem rather than as a possible asset. By approaching foreign residents as problems needing to be solved, there is a tendency to lump all foreign residents into one outsider group, disregarding their differences and the issues particular to their historical relations with Japan.

This was noticeable during the Nagoya Regional Seminar held in February 5-6, 2016. The seminar was held to discuss how to revise the current multicultural plan as it is expiring in 2017. Japanese experts from various universities discussed the 1.5 generation issue, which was the decided theme of the new plan, and while this is indeed an urgent issue as I mentioned, the format largely ignored the aim of the program which is: "an opportunity for Japanese and non-Japanese residents to think about the future of a Nagoya City rich in diversity". The issues raised by foreign residents during the panel discussion at the end of the program, such as the loneliness of foreign wives raised by a Chinese foreign resident, business opportunities raised by an American foreign resident or lack of funds for migrant-run schools as raised by a Filipino resident, were seemingly put to the side because of the issues that were already highlighted by the City since the beginning of the event.

Among the most important programs held by Nagoya City to improve the representation of foreign residents and to address the diversity in the City is the Foreign Resident Discussion Meetings as was previously discussed. The potential of such a program in improving the integration process of the foreign residents is substantial, as including them in discussions that are needed to address their specific concerns can greatly improve their sense of belongingness. However, participation in the meeting is made difficult by a number of factors. First, the discussion meetings are conducted in Japanese. Residents who cannot speak Japanese and who would want to attend are required to bring their own interpreters. Second, the format

suggests that themes are already decided by the local government beforehand. Meetings are held thrice a year, which is sparse considering the purpose of the discussion meeting.

However, one noticeable contradiction is that while from the qualitative aspect of the data I get the impression that Filipinos want to negotiate better terms for themselves and want to actually be more active in the society. While from the quantitative part of the study we see that they do not really try to engage beyond personal relationships.

In the literature, foreign resident non-engagement with the host society has been a chicken and egg kind of question (Penninx 2005). Whether it is caused by foreign residents not wanting to engage or whether it is the lack of government responses, the literature could not really seem to say definitively. What we see in this case however is a largely inactive group of foreign residents whose inactivity is being addressed by inappropriate approaches.

In short, interactions measured in terms of personal relationships are high while the proportion of respondents engaging in organizations and with the local government are low. On the one hand, at the individual level the respondents seem to interact and establish personal ties with other Japanese individuals, and they seem to acknowledge the importance of being involved in meso-level organizations, though reasons for participating are more for personal benefits than for pushing for acceptance in their locality. At the organizational level on the other hand, many still do not see the need to push for representation. And further, we see a local government whose approach on diversity has the tendency to consume other cultures where the center of this multicultural exchange is the host society and migrant subjectivities ignored.

D. Identificational integration

Central to the concept of identificational integration is belongingness. It refers to identification with a certain social structure, whether it be with the host society, or the ethnic community or other ethnic communities. In terms of immigrant integration however, the focus is on the perception of belongingness or the degree to which the migrant identifies with the dominant culture. Hence identificational integration is crucial in identity formation, and its role in interacting with gains and losses in associated with integrating into the host society (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Developing identificational integration then is seen as an investment, an investment resulting from the weighing of gains and losses of the individual when he or she makes the choice to either integrate or not. The concept of identificational integration becomes doubly

important when it comes to oppositional cultures. Talking about cultural identity, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) note that there are two concepts lying at the heart of oppositional cultures: social exclusion and lack of economic opportunities. Beginning from the well-argued sociological fact that majority cultures define themselves by differentiating and excluding others, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) note that it is within this that minority cultures try to make their way in without betraying their own culture and belief systems. However complete opposition to the majority culture may result in lack and loss of economic opportunities. This is what Parreñas (2001) calls the 'contradictory class mobility', mentioned previously. How this devaluation of migrants' skills due to their position in the host society as a minority impact their identificational integration and identity formation is discussed by a number of ethnographic studies (Wilson 1996, Liebow 1967, cited in Algan et al 2012). According to many of these studies, the inability of many migrants to get a decent-paying job "lead them towards the adoption of identities which severely inhibit the value of any labor market skill they may possess, in an attempt to avoid suffering the guilt of failing to provide for themselves and their families" (Algan et al 2012).

What we see in the data seems to hint at this. The data show that majority of the respondents have high educational attainment but are mostly employed in low-skilled jobs, mostly because these are the jobs that they can find and because these jobs still pay much better when compared to the money that they will probably earn in the Philippines. Further, in many cases migrating abroad is an investment for the family as well. Often, to be able to afford sending a household member abroad, families have to loan assets and sell properties. These investments pressure migrants into adopting various identities that may contradict their own culture, and that may devalue skills and human capital they may have. This is seen most saliently in the case of the entertainers, as "dutiful daughters" they are bestowed on their departure from the home country an identity that clashes with the identity they are soon to assume upon landing on the host country, that of the "bad girl" entertainer. This is not to say however that they are victims, as was mentioned previously, migration is a choice made by individuals, forcefully or not, to be able to better their outcomes. This also does not mean that they are helpless—studies such as Suzuki (2011) have shown that many former entertainers engage in transgressive acts. By being active in the community and in the Church, they try to subvert negative images brought about by their previous engagement with entertainer work.

We look at identificational integration in terms of three factors: fit, involvement and contentment (Berry 2011). From Table 11, we see in terms of perceptions of belongingness more respondents have responded positively in terms of being contented, feeling welcomed and able to succeed though more moderately than expected. A minimum-wage earner in Japan still earns

considerably more than a minimum-wage earner in the Philippines and following the discussions in the previous sections showing that majority of the migrants travelled to Japan for economic reasons, it would be instinctive to expect responses showing higher levels of contentment. Levels of contentment and perceptions of being welcomed seemed to be more moderate as compared to perceptions of being able to succeed. Responses for contentment and being welcomed seem to cluster around “welcomed to unwelcome” in contrast to responses for perceptions of being able to succeed which clustered around “able to very able”.

Chart 7.45. Levels of contentment in life in Japan, N=459



Contentment in life in Japan	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Very content	105	23.09	24.53	19.86
Content	209	45.53	41.51	54.61
Discontent	135	29.41	32.08	23.40
Very discontented	9	1.96	1.89	2.13

Chart 7.46. Perception of being welcomed in Japan, N=459



Feelings of being welcomed	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Very welcomed	100	21.79	22.33	20.57
Welcomed	228	49.67	49.06	51.06
Unwelcomed	127	27.67	27.67	27.66
Very unwelcomed	4	0.87	0.94	0.71

Chart 7.47. Perception of being able to succeed, N=459



Feelings of being able to succeed	Magnitude	Proportion	Female (%)	Male (%)
Very able	190	41.39	39.94	44.68
Able	212	46.19	48.74	40.43
Unable	56	12.2	11.01	14.89
Very unable	1	0.22	0.31	0.00

While fit and content are relational variables, meaning they try to assess the perceived position of the Filipino resident in comparison to others around him or her, involvement is more inward-looking as it assesses how given his or her skills and position, he or she thinks he or she can succeed in the host society. That I argue is the main reason why we see for the two relational variables lower scores as when compared to the involvement variable. While respondents seem to be uncertain about their relational positions in the host society, they are fairly certain of what they can do.

In terms of group differences, we first look at demographic differences (Chart 7.47-7.49). We see that in terms of fit and contentment, males seem to be having better outcomes while in terms of perceived ability to succeed, women have higher scores. This goes back to what has been said regarding the position of entertainers and those who came as wives. We have said again and again that majority of the women in the dataset are either working currently as entertainers or have worked as entertainers at least once in their lives. This has somewhat created for them a precarious position in the host society in that while engagement with entertainer work does indeed improve economic resources, it inhibits other skills and human capital that they may have that could have helped them get in positions associated with being highly-skilled.

In terms of age on the other hand, we see that outcomes are better for older respondents than for younger ones. Looking at civil status, we see that respondents with partners (married and cohabiting) tend to have better perceptions overall than those who are single or widowed or divorced. Single/never married respondents performed the least overall, perhaps because of the lack of emotional and psychological support felt among those who are living alone which in most cases include mostly single/never married individuals.

Looking at individual trajectories, we see that length of stay and proportion of life spent in Japan mimics the impact of age on belongingness variables (Charts 7.50 and 7.51). Longer length of stay is associated with better identiificational integration outcomes. We further see that among those who spent less than a year in Japan, they have the lowest scores for fit and welcome. I argue that this is related to language skills as we have seen from previous discussions in Chapter 7.

We see the opposite when we look at educational attainment and work experience (Charts 7.52 and 7.53). Those with higher education and work experience from the home country reported lower perceptions of being welcomed, able to succeed and contentment. This is interesting in that it hints at what has been previously mentioned regarding oppositional cultures. We see this affirmed here in that qualifications and skills that were brought from the home country are being devalued and we can see this frustration in the low identificational integration scores of those that can be considered higher-skilled. In terms of reasons for migration, we see that while those who came for more economic reasons tend to have lower scores than those who came for more familial reasons. Specifically, those who came to study or to train actually almost feel discontented and unwelcomed (Chart 7.53).

In terms of transnational practices on the other hand, we see that those whose transnational practices are more moderate tend to have better identificational integration scores, in that those who keep savings in both Japan and the Philippines, those who remit but do so irregularly, and those who do travel to the home country but in relatively less frequency perform better overall than those who regularly do any of these practices and those who do not (Charts 7.55-7.57). Looking at ethnic social ties, we can say that those who generally feel more welcomed, feel that they can succeed and feel content are those that have access to weak ties (Chart 7.58). As we have earlier argued, access to looser ties have been shown to positively affect an individual's economic opportunities. And finally, in terms of intent to stay permanently, those who have intention to stay generally have better scores in terms of fit, involvement, and contentment (Chart 7.59).

Overall, interestingly, based on the data, identificational integration in terms of contentment and fit are moderate while involvement is moderate to high. It would seem that while involvement or the perception of being able to succeed is an inward assessment of the their own' skills, contentment and perception of being welcomed are assessed more on in terms of their position as a Filipino in Japan. The relatively lower levels of perception of fit and contentment are possibly affected by the conflation of the approach of the local government which values language competency and high-skilled participants in the labor market (see Chapter 6), as well as the stereotype of the Filipino in Japan resulting from their taking up positions in the society that can benefit them economically which is the main purpose of their migration activity but has severely impacted their mobility. There are two things that we can glean from this. One the one hand, the policies and preferences of the government, while aiming to reward those with high-skills, also have a tendency to limit their mobility and impact their positions in the host society by having no encompassing integration strategy. On the other hand, it remains indifferent to the concerns of those in low-skilled jobs and this indifference actually punishes them by devaluing any skills they bring with them and any skills they eventually develop as they become involved in the labor market. This leads them to continuously assume positions that maybe oppositional to their culture and maybe detrimental to their position in Japan in order to continuously earn money to be able to stay in the host country and to be able to continue sending remittances to the home country.

Chart 7.48. Identificational integration variables by sex, in percentage



Chart 7.50. Identificational integration variables by civil status, in percentage



Chart 7.49. Identificational integration variables by age, in percentage



Chart 7.51. Identificational integration variables by length of stay, in percentage



Chart 7.52. Identificational integration variables by proportion of life spent, in percentage



Chart 7.54. Identificational integration variables by work experience, in percentage

Chart 7.53. Identificational integration variables by educational attainment, in percentage



Chart 7.55. Identificational integration variables by reasons for migration, in percentage



Chart 7.56. Identificational integration variables by savings in the home country, in percentage



Chart 7.57. Identificational integration variables by remittance practice, in percentage



Chart 7.58. Identificational integration variables by travel to the home country, in percentage



Chart 7.59. Identificational integration variables by ethnic ties, in percentage



Chart 7.60. Identificational integration variables by intent to stay, in percentage



As an externality, what it does is entrench the already prevalent image of the Filipino woman migrant as a "bad girl" and as "marrying for the yen" (Suzuki 2005). For instance, the migrant organization called CPFA (introduced in Chapter 5) argues that this image still exists in Nagoya City and have made it a goal to erase the "bad girl" image by holding events in considerably more upscale places such as the Hilton Nagoya and opening these cultural events to both Japanese and foreign expats.

Even at the individual level, one of my key informants was quick to differentiate herself from other Filipino women who, even if they were married to Japanese men, still engage in entertainer work. She pointed to their brightly colored hair and very fair skin and said that even if she does not look as good as them, she can proudly say that she did not work as an entertainer. Another problem that relates to this "bad girl" image is the usage of some Filipino women of fake names when they were working as entertainers. One informants, who explains that she does not count her years as entertainer and that she only considers her stay in Japan to have started when she married her husband, said that the reason why was because she did not use her name when she was working as an entertainer. She then switched to her real name she got married and she got away with it because at that time, biometrics were still not yet collected when applying for the passport. She said that there were other Filipinos who did the same but got caught when the biometric system was introduced and many are still here unable to go back to the Philippines.

Involvement in unskilled labor can put one at a disadvantage in the Japanese society especially when it comes to economic equality and demand for fair treatment. And the local government approach to multicultural co-existence runs the risk of entrenching such negative images. Even among women working as entertainers there is a separation. It was already mentioned that in Nagoya the Sakae entertainment district is where most of the Philippine pubs and other pubs where many Filipino entertainers work. On the other side of Sakae district is Nishiki district, another entertainment district which according to Mr. Puno of FMC is a higher-end entertainment district. Pubs in Nishiki district only employ Japanese and some Korean entertainers and rates are much higher. This clearly separates Filipinos working as entertainers from the majority culture as those in oppositional culture.

Even among migrant organizations, there is a general separation of those organizations that "oppose" and demand for better representation and attention to illegal migrants who are in dangerous situations, and those organizations whose goal is to promote multicultural coexistence and "agree" with the local government policies as was discussed in Chapter 5. We actually see that in a way "agreeing" can be advantageous in that those organizations that are

supporting and agreeing with the local government get better funding and access to government facilities than those that "oppose". I am not saying that it is better to agree than to oppose, both strategies can have merits. Simply agreeing will not allow the minority culture ability to negotiate better the terms of their membership and position in the home country. But "opposing" too much can be seen as asking for too much and might have the unintended consequence of being shut off and discriminated against. Based on my interviews there is a bit of a rift among the leaders and members of the two groups of organizations, as the more conformist groups claim that the other group has the tendency to be envious of the resources they are able access, often labelling them as detached from the actual experiences of the Filipino residents in the community. While the more activist groups claim that the other groups are hoarding all resources and have the tendency to limit and block their participation in some of the local government events. Their strategies in addressing the negative stereotype of Filipinos in Nagoya are also different. While the more affluent group, as mentioned earlier, holds events in more posh places to show a different side of Filipinos, the other group aim to bring into light the harsh realities of many of the illegal Filipinos in Japan who are often trapped in debts and are forced to work for Japanese gangs to show that while they do become illegal it is the system that exploit their illegality and force them further down.

What actually this does is making organizing and mobilizing too "political" in the negative sense of the word. And for many Filipinos whose concerns are more basic (finding employment, money, food and shelter and being able to send some money back to the Philippines) this can put them off joining and being active in organizations to be able to slowly fashion and image and an identity that will help them negotiate their positions in being members of the society. What we saw is that a number of factors impact belongingness: one, the individual characteristics of the migrants play an important role in determining their levels of fit, involvement and contentment. It would seem that better educated and higher-skilled individuals feel the frustration of economic immobility and this translates to low levels of contentment and fit. Second, the division among the migrant groups who somehow become representatives of Filipino residents in the local government and in the Japanese society can also impact discontent and fit, as not properly addressing stereotypes and addressing stereotypes in different ways can work against them, entrenching the very stereotype they try to erase. And finally, the local government who rewards both high-skilled individuals and low-skilled individuals with better economic resources but does not give them economic mobility and the chance to negotiate better their membership in the host society because of a lack of a comprehensive integration strategy also impact identificational integration in certain ways.

Chapter conclusion

In this chapter, we discussed the integration outcomes of the Filipino residents from the data in terms of the dimensions of integration. We have assessed different these integration outcomes vis-à-vis different individual factors such as demographic characteristics, individual trajectories, transnational practice, ethnic social ties and intents for the future. What we found in this chapter is that understanding integration requires a nuanced understanding of the underlying factors that may impact integration. In general, we see an uneven integration in that while integration outcomes in terms of structural integration are high, we see rather low outcomes for the other three dimensions. I argued in this chapter that this is a result of the confluence of both contextual factors such as policies and programs, histories, and individual factors such as reasons for migration and engagements with ethnic community and the home country through transnational practices.

In terms of structural integration, we see that while the respondents are able to access jobs and other public services, they are experiencing entrapment in that they are unable to access jobs that go outside the 3D categories. Language and qualifications seem to be the biggest hurdle, entrenching them into jobs that are considered 3D and are often short-term. Immobility seems to arise from this interplay between policies and the specific context of the Filipino residents in terms of structural integration. We have previously seen that there are policies being implemented relating to public service delivery and access to jobs as compared to other types of policies. The thrust towards municipality revitalization through *tabunka kyousei* creates a space where foreign residents are welcome to contribute to their society economically. But only in certain areas. Areas that are outside the 3D areas are hard to access and regardless of high educational attainment and work experience from the Philippines, many still feel trapped. The need to send remittances keep many of them accepting jobs that further trap them in such industries.

On the other hand, in terms of cultural integration many respondents do have some knowledge of the language but they are not proficient. There are two conclusions that can be made: first, what is stipulated here is that the average to below average levels of proficiency point to the fact that many Filipino residents only invest in learning the language up to a certain extent, and that is when certain goals have been met. We see from earlier discussions that there is very little difference in terms of language proficiency among men and women, or among younger and older respondents, or even among high-skilled and low-skilled individuals. What this implies is that incentives are not too high, at least in the perspective of many of the respondents. As mentioned, jobs are easy to access, many jobs do not require knowing or speaking Japanese

language at all, while some jobs require only a basic knowledge of Japanese. What this leads to is disincentivizing learning the language especially for foreign residents who do not think of staying permanently in the country. And second, the increase in the number of Filipino coming to Japan suggests the possibility of the Filipino community becoming thicker and tighter as mentioned in Chapter 7 in which we see that many of the Filipinos tend to live together. As mentioned in the opening of this section, Yalgan et al (2012) notes the extent to which cultural integration can happen is going to be wider and deeper if the minority culture is more dispersed. What is implied therefore is language learning is disincentivized not just because jobs are available for people who know nothing of the language, but that emotional, psychological and social support can also be accessed through the ethnic community further disincentivizing the need to go out of the community to interact with native-born Japanese.

In terms of interactive integration, outcomes are much lower. Interactions measured in terms of personal relationships are high while the proportion of respondents engaging in organizations and with the local government are low. On the one hand, at the individual level the respondents seem to interact and establish personal ties with other Japanese individuals, and they seem to acknowledge the importance of being involved in meso-level organizations, though reasons for participating are more for personal benefits than for pushing for acceptance in their locality. At the organizational level on the other hand, many still do not see the need to push for representation. And further, we see a local government whose approach on diversity has the tendency to consume other cultures where the center of this multicultural exchange is the host society and migrant subjectivities ignored. We see that these individual factors compound the effects at the organizational level and result to a group of people that are more inward-looking than expected.

Finally, what we saw is that a number of factors impact belongingness: one, the individual characteristics of the migrants play an important role in determining their levels of fit, involvement and contentment. It would seem that better educated and higher-skilled individuals feel the frustration of economic immobility and this translates to low levels of contentment and fit. Second, at the structural level, the division among the migrant groups who somehow become representatives of Filipino residents in the local government and in the Japanese society can also impact discontent and fit, as not properly addressing stereotypes and addressing stereotypes in different ways can work against them, entrenching the very stereotype they try to erase. And finally, the local government who rewards both high-skilled individuals and low-skilled individuals with better economic resources but does not give them economic mobility and the chance to negotiate better their membership in the host society because of a lack of a

comprehensive integration strategy also impact identificational integration in certain ways.

Chapter 8: Dimensions and Patterns of Integration

In this section, I will discuss the dimensions and patterns of integration that I found using the data. In the first section, using the integration outcome indicators discussed in Chapter 7 I aimed to construct composite indicators for the dimensions of integration discussed in the literature review (see Chapter 1) and discussed in-depth in Chapters 6 and 7. In the next section, I assess how every individual respondent scored in terms of the four dimensions and discuss the combinations and extent of their integration as a whole. Finally, I discuss and characterize the patterns found and perform multiple logistic regression analyses to understand how the foreign residents' individual characteristics impact their overall integration.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how integration can be measured to be able to objectively assess extent and outcomes and shed light onto how, the foreign residents, given their individual circumstances, integrate into the host society. This section, given the nature of its focus, will mostly present data from the quantitative part of the study.

A. Constructing the composite indicators for the four dimensions of integration

Based on the review of the literature and the current policies being implemented and directions being undertaken by the local government, I conducted a survey that aims to collect data on integration using quantifiable measures. The purpose of the survey was to collect information on various aspects of the integration experiences of the Filipino residents and be able to construct synthetic composite indicators that can measure integration extent.

There are four steps necessary to this approach. First, concepts were defined. To be able to do this I reviewed the literature (see Chapter 1) and concluded based on the literature that integration has four dimensions. These dimensions are then discussed in detail, information coming from both the global literature and the local experiences in the Japanese context. Possible indicators measuring and capturing information on these four indicators were then looked at and assessed and the explanatory power of these indicators were discussed vis-à-vis the specific context of Japan and more importantly Nagoya City (see Chapter 8). This was done because according to the literature, while some generally accepted measures had already been defined, these measures should always be localized to capture the actual integration process at the local level, taking into account both contextual and individual factors.

Second, the dimensions were then generally defined (see Chapter 8) and each indicator was assessed. Those discussions provided the background for selecting which indicators to include for every dimension in the context of the Filipino residents in Japan. From the literature, we have defined integration as composed of four dimensions: structural, cultural, interactive and identificational. These four dimensions address the inclusion or exclusion from social subsystems of the migrants as was previously defined. Understanding the social inclusion and exclusion of foreign residents into social subsystems can inform us of social inequality, a central dimension of social structure along with social differentiation.

Locating these concepts into the local context of the Filipino residents in Nagoya City, we found that structural integration is mostly defined by being involved in the labor market. As discussed in the previous sections, the initial drive that brought Filipinos to Japan has been to fill in positions in the labor market that were created because of the boom in the economy. Their foreign residents' positions in Japan were defined by their activity, i.e., as entertainer, as trainee or as laborers among others. What this gives participation in the labor market is a heavier weight in understanding structural integration when compared to other indicators. Access to health insurance and housing structures were considered not powerful enough to explain the variations within the respondent population as in the case of Japan, access to health and housing are reliant on residency permits. As mentioned before, health insurance is mandated by law and are accessible to both local and foreign residents residing in Japan for more than three months. And considering this is the filter I utilized in my sampling, access then to health insurance loses its explanatory power.

Third, given that there is already a definition of integration and its dimensions that was based on the literature, I conducted a multivariate analysis to check the underlying structure of the individual indicators. Conducting this for instance statistically proved the unsuitability of including access to health and housing in the composite indicator as previously hypothesized. Conducting this informed me of what indicators to include and the structure of the individual indicators. However following argument that the position in Japan is a function of their activity in Japan, I also considered inclusion into the educational structure.

Structural integration is measured by the question "Did you have an income-generating activity in the past two weeks?". This was asked to measure whether respondent has a job that provides them a source of income or not in the past two weeks. Answerable by yes or no, Yes answers were coded as 1 and No answers were coded as 0. A follow up question "Did you look for a job", again coded as Yes = 1 and No = 0 was used to distinguish the currently unemployed. Among

those who did not look for job, I asked, “Why did you not look for job?” which can be answered by choosing from a list of pre-determined answers: 1 = Waiting for rehire, 2 = Too old/too young, 3 = Studying, 4 = Stay at home. While traditional measures determining the labor force do not include those that answer too old or too young, studying and stay at home, the only group that I excluded are those that are studying, as following what has been discussed earlier that the position in the society is a function of their position in the society. Therefore, those that have not look for job because of the following reasons: too old/too young, and stay at home have been included as not currently engaged in any economic activity.

On the other hand, the composite indicator for cultural integration is measured using language proficiency as proxy. Language proficiency is a self-rated level of proficiency, ranging from 1 to 5. This reflects the levels in JLPT which has levels from N1 as the highest to N5 as the lowest. Answers were later recoded as 0-4. Not all respondents have taken the JLPT and so were asked to rate their own language proficiency (see results from Chapter 7)

On the other hand, the composite indicator for interactive integration is a summation of responses to three questions. Interactive integration refers to memberships in various groups, both formal and informal, in the host society. Therefore, I looked at three possible memberships: friendships with native-born Japanese, membership in formal and voluntary organizations and participation in local government-organized activities and events. Having a Japanese friend is measured using a subjective question, “Do you think you have friends that are Japanese that you can consider close friends?” Yes answers were coded as 1 and No answers were coded as 0.

Membership in an organization measures involvement in any organization both formal and informal, registered and unregistered organizations. It was asked as: “Are you currently a member of any organization?” This question does not distinguish between active and non-active members, as both active and non-active members can receive information from organizations, based on my interviews with leaders of some organizations in Nagoya City. This question is answerable by Yes or No, codes as 1 and 0, respectively.

Frequency of participation in local government events was asked as “In a scale of 1-5, with 1 being Never and 4 being Always, how often do you participate in local government events?” This question pertains to Answers were later recoded as 0-3. This is a self-reported subjective question measuring how much respondents think they participate in the formal society.

Finally, the composite of indicator of identificational integration is a summation of three indicators

that measure fit, involvement and contentment as was discussed in the previous chapter. Perception of being welcomed is a subjective question asked as, “In a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being Very Unwelcomed to 4 being Very Welcomed, how welcomed do you feel in Japan?” This question is later recoded as 0-3.

The other aspect of belongingness, that is perceived valued involvement, is measured using perception of being able to succeed in Japan asked as, “In a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being Very Unable to 4 being Very Able, how able are Filipinos to succeed in Japan?” The question is later recoded as 0-3.

Finally, to measure the level of contentment of the respondents in their lives in Japan, the question: “In a scale of 1 to 4, how content are you in your life in Japan?”

Table below shows distribution of respondents in every indicator.

Table 8.1. Index variables, N=459

Variable	Magnitude	Proportion
Has no job	38	8.28
Has job	421	91.72
Language proficiency		
Level 1	33	7.19
Level 2	184	40.09
Level 3	176	38.34
Level 4	59	12.85
Level 5	7	1.53
Has no Japanese friend	79	17.21
Has at least one Japanese friend	380	82.79
Is not a member in any organization	274	59.69
Is a member of at least one organization	185	40.31
Frequency of participation in local government events		
Never	196	42.7
Seldom	194	42.27
Neither seldom nor often	60	13.07
Often	8	1.74
Always	1	0.22
Perception of being welcomed		

Very Unwelcomed	4	0.87
Unwelcomed	127	27.67
Welcomed	228	49.67
Very welcomed	100	21.79
Perception of being able to succeed		
Very Unable	1	0.22
Unable	56	12.2
Able	212	46.19
Very Able	190	41.39
Levels of contentment		
Very discontented	9	1.96
Discontented	135	29.41
Content	209	45.53
Contented	106	23.09

The fourth step to making composite indicators for the four dimensions include a simple normalization all dimensions to be able to be comparable. Every dimension composite indicator has a range of zero to one. From the discussion above, we can now look at the mean scores for every dimension for all the respondents. Mean scores for every dimension is shown in the table below.

Table 8.2. Mean scores for dimension indicators

Dimension	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Structural	459	0.92	0.27	0.00	0.25
Cultural	459	0.40	0.21	0.00	0.25
Interactive	459	0.60	0.33	0.00	0.25
Identification	459	0.59	0.27	0.06	0.25

We can plot the mean scores as follows:

Chart 8.1. Radial chart showing mean scores for dimensions of integration



We can see from the shape of the graph that mean scores for cultural and interactive integration are almost flat and straight. While mean scores for structural and identificational integration are relatively pointed. This can be expected given the findings from Table 8.1 above, which shows distribution of respondents for every indicator that make up the dimension scores.

What this finding suggests is that while many of the respondents are economically integrated and have moderate levels of being able to succeed, being welcomed and being content in their lives in Japan, interaction with the society through having Japanese friends, being active in organizations and in local government events are lacking, while cultural integration in terms of language proficiency remains low. This is reflected in previous discussions in Chapter 7 where descriptive statistics as well as anecdotes from key informants showed that there is an uneven integration. Owing perhaps to the economic reason behind most of the respondents' migration to Japan, we see that the levels of their structural integration is high. However, performance in terms of other dimensions is relatively low.

These findings complement what has been previously discussed in earlier chapters. To reiterate, the fairly expansive policies of the local government in terms of involving foreign residents into the economic sphere has resulted in high structural integration. While occupational diversity is relatively low as most of the respondents are still employed in very specific areas such as entertainer work and factory work, the relative ease with which respondents find jobs and get them contribute to high levels of structural integration.

However, the rather incomplete and ad hoc policies pertaining to the other dimensions are also reflected in the chart above. On average, mean score for cultural integration is at 0.40, suggesting that most of the respondents have lower than average handle of the Japanese language. Language, as we have seen from previous discussions, is a key element in better economic mobility, better acculturation and an important factor in creating bonds and n investing in relationships in the host society. We see the impact of language in the lack of occupation diversity, in the entrapment of Filipino residents in specific areas of work and in the hard-to-erase image of the “bad girl” entertainer or *hanayome* who is only after the yen.

This is further reflected in the lack of interactions among foreign residents and local residents. We see that issues such as 1.5 generation, and the continued involvement of many Filipino women and men in the entertainment industry can entrench existing images about the Filipino migrant in Japan. The data shows that average mean score for interactive integration is 0.60, suggesting that on the average respondents are above average when it comes to having interactions with Japanese people, in organizations and in local government events. These three categories represent three levels of organizations, one at the intimate level, next one at the meso-level and the third one represents a more formal engagement with the governing body in the host society. While the integration scores are relatively high it is worth noting that the indicator for having a Japanese friend influenced it much more than the other two indicators, suggesting that at the individual level Filipino residents interact with other Japanese individuals and even form friendships. However, at the more organizational level, at the level where stereotypes could be better approached and possibly rectified, interaction seems lacking. What this suggests is that, if we categorize problems as either an issue about “quantity of life” or as about “quality of life”, we can say that based on the results of the survey most Filipinos are still concerned about the “quantity of life” issues, issues that include putting food on the table, being able to send children to school, being able to find jobs, among others.

This again is reflected in the relatively low mean score for identificational integration. Respondents on average have a score of 0.59, suggesting that in terms of fit, involvement and contentment, in average respondents are in the middle. They are relatively content, relatively feel welcome and relatively feel that they can succeed in the host country.

Looking at the scores in terms of various groupings, we see that in terms of demographic characteristics there is not much variation in the scores. However, we see that overall males have higher scores than females in all the dimensions. There is also a certain trend when it comes to age. As age increases, economic activity decreases but scores in other dimensions

increase. This is in contrast to younger age groups where scores for structural integration are really high but scores in particular for cultural and interactive dimensions are extremely low. This complements perfectly findings discussed in Chapter 8. In terms of civil status, the differences are less salient though it can be said that respondents who are single or never married and those that are cohabiting tend to have lower cultural and interactive integration scores while those that are married, divorced or widowed have better outcomes in those dimensions but lower scores for structural integration.

We see from the dataset, and as was previously discussed that majority of the single and never married respondents have been in Japan for a fairly shorter length of time as compared to those who are married, or widowed or divorced. Further, many of the single and never married respondents are engaged in entertainment and factory work and following our earlier discussions, it becomes intuitive why they would have better structural integration outcomes and lower scores for cultural and interactive integration.

In terms of individual migrant trajectories and human capital, we see higher variance. Overall, scores of those with college-level education are higher in all dimensions than those who are high school graduates or technical vocational diploma holders. On the other hand, there are more interesting findings when we look at reason for migration. Those who migrated to Japan because of economic reasons such as working (to look for work) or to study or to undergo training have better structural integration outcomes, which is understandable and expected considering that the reason behind their migration is actually to work. This reason is the reason majority of the respondents expressed as the main driving force behind their migration to Japan. This complements the discussion on the Philippine migration to Japan which started as an economic endeavor—on the one hand there is a demand created in Japan because of the economic boom, and on the other, there is a supply of able-bodied individuals whose want nothing else but to help and improve their lives back home following the “culture of migration” rhetoric.

However, comparing those who came to Japan to work with those who came to undergo training or to study, those in the latter groups have better outcomes in all four dimensions. One possible reason is that during their training or education period, many of the respondents had a chance and had ample time to adjust and learn the language which could help them find jobs easier, and find jobs that would fit their qualifications, especially since they have qualifications that they have earned in Japan during their training and education period.

While those who came for family reunification purposes have relatively similar outcomes except

for scores in terms of cultural integration. We see that those who came to be with relatives have better cultural integration outcomes than those who came to marry or be with their spouses. One of my key informants came as a spouse and she recalled not having any idea as to what the Japanese language is. She said that the way she learned is very informal and that even now she cannot claim knowing the language entirely even after she had stayed for many years.

One really interesting finding is the integration outcomes for those who came as tourists. Their structural integration scores are really high, reflecting still the economic nature of their migration. Their scores for interactive integration is also high, while their scores for cultural and identificational remain low. This mix of scores is very interesting in that supposedly cultural and interactive integration usually come after the other. What is noted here is that this mix of scores is a product of their particular condition in Japan. Coming in as tourists, they were not given the right to work, though their actual purpose was to find a job to earn money. Further their lack of rights in many areas such as access to housing or access to insurance have made it necessary to access certain services offered by different groups and organizations. For instance, participation in local government-led events among those who came as tourists are really high, since local governments offer free services such as language schools, free check-ups and drills that can be accessed some of the times without showing any resident card or any other documents. Further, many of those who came to Japan as tourists, without proper access to many social subsystems would have to rely on their social capital which includes Japanese friends and migrant organizations. It also becomes intuitive why those who do not have proper identification papers would be active especially in organizations that are more activist and are working towards recognition of illegal migrants.

In terms of length of stay and proportion of life spent in Japan we see the same pattern as what we saw in terms of age. As the individual spends more time in Japan their structural integration scores decrease while scores in other dimensions of integration increase. This is true except for those individuals who have stayed more than ten years but less than ten years who consistently engage in economic activities.

There are also significant differences in terms of their current visas. Permanent and long-term residents consistently have good and somehow even integration outcomes in all four dimensions while trainees and entertainers have high structural integration scores and low scores in the other three dimensions. Spouse visa holder on the other hand have relatively low outcomes for most of the integration dimensions except for interactive and identificational outcomes. Students on the other hand have high scores on structural, cultural and interactive but low on

identificational. Since their visa status reflects their activities in the host country, this somehow reflects what Luthra et al (2014) noted that for instance while students may be engaged culturally, they do not really feel that they belong to their host society since their main purpose is to study, and studies suggest that while many students are preferring to stay in the host society after graduation, many still think of their time in the host society as temporary, a temporary stay that will only last until they finish their education.

In terms of ethnic social ties, we see that those who have a combination of strong and weak ties fare better than those who have exclusively just one type of social tie. But that those who only have weak ties did better than those who only have strong ties, especially in terms of structural integration. What this affirms is what has been discussed in the literature. We have extensively discussed this in Chapter 1 and Chapter 7. Interestingly however, while those who have a combination of strong and weak ties and those who have only weak ties have moderate perceptions on their identificational integration, those who have only strong ethnic social ties have a really high mean score on identificational integration. What this implied is that, while performing less better than the other groups in structural, cultural and interactive integration dimensions, they are able to feel like they belong in Japan most likely because of the existence of their strong ties. Remember that strong ties are differentiated from the weak ties by the capability of strong ties to provide emotional support (see Chapter 1).

Interestingly, outcomes for those who engage regularly in transnational practices seem to be better except for those who regularly travel back to the home country. The data shows that respondents who send remittances regularly are more likely to have better structural, cultural, interactive and identificational outcomes than those who send remittances irregularly and especially than those who do not send any remittances at all. Further, those who send remittances even if at irregular frequencies still fare better than those who do not send. We see the same patterns for those who have savings in the Philippines. However, we see the best integration outcomes overall for those who save in both Japan and the Philippines. Contrastingly however, in terms of travelling to the home country, while respondents who travel to the home country tend to have better integration scores overall, those who travel more frequently than once a year tend to have lower scores in cultural, interactive and identificational integration. This is quite intuitive as regularly and more frequently travelling back to the home country involves some uprooting both from the home country and from the host country. The foreign resident does not stay long enough to be rooted, or to start the acculturation process. These decline in scores is evident among those who travel to the home country every six months. Looking at the occupational descriptions of these “circular” migrants, we see that most of them are entertainers.

This is because that most entertainers, especially those that come to Japan on entertainer visas to differentiate them from permanent and long-term residents who work as entertainers, usually get six-month contracts that they have to renew every time. This requires them to go back to the home country and be deployed again to Japan and stay there for six months. Parrenas (2010) call them circular migrants and as Luthra et al (2014) noted circular migrants have specific consequences that can affect their integration levels. Since their circularity stems from the economic drive behind their migration coupled with the relatively low-skills that they have that forces them to be on short-term contracts, Luthra et al (2014) suggest that structural integration can be expected to be high while other forms, those that require time to be developed would be rather low.

Having looked at the differences in terms of integration scores among different groups, in the next section we determine the combinations and extent of integration in every dimension of every individual foreign residents to have a better understanding of the extent of their integration. Next, upon classifying the foreign residents based on their scores in the four dimensions of integration, I will discuss what determines this classification, and what specific characteristics and trajectories migrants have that can impact the classification.

B. Determining the patterns of integration and what impacts pattern membership

Understanding underlying patterns/clusters

In the previous section we assessed the integration scores in every dimension to be able to understand social inclusion or exclusion into social subsystems, understanding of which can further our understanding of social inequality. We have previously discussed how understanding integration levels can also inform us of social differentiation, which refer to "different patterns of social relations along socially relevant lines" (see Chapter 1). Classifying the respondents based on their scores on the four dimensions can inform us of social differentiation and provide us a better understanding of how and to what extent they integrate. In this section, I first classify the respondents into groups based on their dimension scores to be able to understand the various patterns of integration. In the next section, I will aim to understand what can determine and impact membership into these patterns of integration.

The data was tested and four underlying clusters or groups corresponding to patterns of integration using cluster analysis were found. Cluster analysis, along with factor analysis,

discriminant analysis and others, is a multivariate method which aims to classify or group observations. Factor analysis, principal component analysis and exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses are often used to understand the underlying structure of the variables, to understand which variables explain similar concepts and are very useful in cutting down variables for analysis. On the other hand, discriminant analysis, also focused on variables, "identifies an optimal subset of variables that is capable of distinguishing among discrete predetermined groups (Gore Jr 2009). However, cluster analysis on the other hand aims to understand the homogeneity among individual subjects or observations and not variables while maximizing heterogeneity among groups. Simply, what it means is that the cluster analysis groups observations in such a way that observations inside a cluster would share more similar characteristics with each other rather than with observations in other clusters (Gore Jr 2009). According to Kaufmann and Rousseeuw (1990) cluster analysis "is the art of finding groups in data". Cluster analysis is often used to uncover groups or cluster in a largely exploratory data. This is in particular useful for this project as one aim of the project is make sense of how individuals are groups in relation to the integration outcomes they have in the four dimensions. What this provides us is a clearer image of where and how every individual members' integration processes and extents are.

Cluster analysis has been utilized in the social science. Largely absent in cluster analysis is "p-value" which tells one the significance of their results. This is so because cluster analysis is exploratory and thus is very useful for studies in the social sciences where the environment cannot be largely controlled and are variable to many change in factors. Though this lack of "p-value" is among the criticisms often noted in cluster analysis, cluster analysis remains useful in the social sciences. Gore Jr (2009) notes that cluster analysis has a wide range of uses—from data exploration to hypothesis testing and confirmation. For instance, in the social sciences, cluster analysis has been used in many studies in psychology, political science.

The first stage for classification is theory formulation (Gore Jr 2009). We have laid out the theoretical foundations for this project in Chapter 1. This is an important stage as it means that cluster analysis is grounded in theory. We have defined based on the theoretical underpinnings of this research the important variables with which we will classify the observations or the respondents. We have generated, as seen in the earlier section, scores for all four dimensions.

Statistical tests using hierarchical cluster analysis suggests testing for clusters using single linkage, average linkage and complete linkage. Dendrograms generated using average land complete linkages suggest distinct clustering for four to five clusters. Hart-Duda tests suggest

keeping four clusters. From there we can choose to classify our groups on different dis/similarity measures. Figueiredo Filho et al (2014) note that "the similarity or dissimilarity between objects is a measure of correspondence or distance between the objects to be grouped" (p.2410). According to Figueiredo Filho et al (2014) the three methods most usual in cluster analysis include correlational measures, distance measures and association measures. While correlational measures, referring to the correlation of profiles of the objects, is not the most used in cluster analysis, association measures are often used with non-quantitative variable, often matching observation whether they have or do not have an attribute. That leaves us with distance measures which measure the distance or proximity of the observations based on given variables of interest. Clustering based on distance measures can be done three ways: hierarchical, non-hierarchical or a combination of both. According to Hesketh and Everitt (2004) the "most commonly used class of clustering methods contains those methods that lead to a series of nested or hierarchical classifications of the observations, beginning at the stage where each observation is regarded as forming a single-member 'cluster' and ending at the stage where all the observations are in a single group".

The usefulness of the hierarchical clustering comes when there is no prior knowledge of how many clusters should be formed. It is generally up to the researcher to determine how many clusters to be formed, with the help of stopping rules, usefulness for explanation and the literature and framework. The three most common hierarchical clustering techniques include single linkage, average linkage and complete linkage clustering techniques. As their name implies, single linkage measures the distance between the closest pair and treats the first pair as members of their own individual clusters, average linkage averages the distance between all pairs where one member of the pair is in one cluster and the other in the second cluster, and complete linkage measures the distance between the farthest pair, with one member of the pair in one cluster and the other in another cluster.

After testing for different hierarchical clustering techniques, I decided to cluster the dataset using average linkage as the two other methods show problems of chaining, or that which incorporates observations already classified into a cluster into another cluster instead of creating new ones. Using Stata computing package, I utilized the cluster analysis package. To determine the number of clusters I analyzed the dendrogram shown below and the two stopping rules provided by Stata.

Chart 8.2. Dendrogram for average linkage cluster analysis using the four dimensions of integration



As mentioned knowing what number of clusters should be defined cannot simply be known. Hence table below shows the results of the stopping rules. The two stopping rules provided by Stata are the Calinski-Harabasz pseudo F-statistic and the Duda and Hart index.

Table 8.3. Duda and Hart index

Number of clusters	Je (2)/ Je (1)	Pseudo T-squared
1	0.7586	145.5
2	0.5318	29.1
3	0.6183	260.5
4	0.5957	11.5
5	0.7351	79.6
6	0.9007	21.2
7	0.5899	138.4
8	0.9656	6.6
9	0.7268	5.3
10	0.6963	4.8
11	0.5618	3.9
12	0.8383	35.3
13	0.5233	51.9
14	0.2783	10.4
15	0.5693	9.8

Table 8.4. Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F

Number of clusters	Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F
2	145.5
3	86.0
4	175.9
5	136.3
6	138.2
7	122.1
8	152.5
9	135.9
10	123.0
11	112.2
12	102.7
13	103.8
14	105.4

15	98.6

While there are no clear rules of choosing cluster analysis, the Calinski and Harabasz pseudo F-statistic and the Duda and Hart index stopping rules can inform up to where distinct clustering happens. For both these rules, larger values show distinct clustering. Interpreting Calinski and Harabasz pseudo F-statistic is fairly straightforward. We look for the largest value and see that it suggests that the data based on the four dimensions of integration scores have four distinct clusters. The Duda and Hart index on the other hand does not simply look at the largest values. In general, high Je(1)/Je(2) should also correspond to low Pseudo T-squared values. And not just any low value, this low value should be in between two extremely big values. Following this, we see that like Calinski and Harabasz pseudo F-statistic, Duda and Hart index also suggests there are four distinct clusters in the data.

Thus, we generate the cluster based on this. The four clusters or groups are shown below vis-à-vis their mean average scores for the four dimensions of integration. Chart 8.3 below plots the average scores shown in Table 8.4 in a radial chart.

Chart 8.3. Radial chart for mean scores for the four dimensions of integration, by group



Table 8.4. Typology by mean scores in four dimensions

	Structural	Cultural	Interactive	Identificational	Number of observations
Group1	0.0	0.30	0.19	0.56	19
Group 2	0.0	0.64	0.79	0.76	16
Group 3	1.0	0.32	0.38	0.46	223
Group 4	1.0	0.49	0.87	0.72	201

The first group makes up about four percent of the total number of respondents. This group is identified by low scores for all four dimensions overall. We see that it actually has zero for structural integration suggesting that members of this group are not economically integrated. Further, we see that cultural integration scores are low suggesting that the self-rated language proficiency of members of this group are below average. Interactive scores are extremely low implying very low rates of interaction with the host society and slightly low score for identificational integration suggesting that the respondents in this group relatively do not feel welcomed, able to succeed or contented in their lives in Japan (see Table 8.5).

On the other hand, the second group makes up about three percent of the members of the population. Compared to the first group, members of this group scored high in almost all integration dimensions except for structural integration. Structural integration scores are zero, suggesting economic non-integration while scores for cultural, interactive and identificational integration dimensions are high. What this implies is that while members are not employed nor studying, members here have intermediate proficiency of the Japanese language, interacts with the host society in all three levels of interactions that we have measured and has high perceptions of belonging to the host society (Table 8.5).

The third cluster makes up the most of the respondents. About 49 percent of the respondents are in this cluster. Compared to the two groups already mentioned, members falling in this category have high structural integration. Everyone in this group is either employed or studying. However, while structurally integrated we see that scores for the three other dimensions of integrated are fairly average. Though members of this group seem to be more active in terms interacting with the host society in the three levels of interactions, their scores overall in the remaining three dimensions are generally average to below average (see Table 8.5).

Lastly, the fourth cluster makes up about 44 percent of the respondents. This group is characterized by high scores overall. Members of this group are structurally integrated, has high

self-rated language proficiency, is actively interacting with the host society and has high levels of perceived belongingness to the host society (see Table 8.5).

In the next section, we discuss what impacts membership in the groups, in that what makes respondents, given their integration scores, be classified into where they are.

Table 8.5. Distribution of respondents by groups by variable, N=459

Variable	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Has no job	100.0	100.0	0.5	1.0
Has job	0.0	0.0	99.5	99.0
Language proficiency				
Level 1	15.8	0.0	13.0	0.5
Level 2	52.6	6.3	52.0	28.4
Level 3	26.3	43.8	29.6	48.8
Level 4	5.3	37.5	4.5	20.9
Level 5	0.0	12.5	0.9	1.5
Has no Japanese friend	63.2	0.0	25.6	5.0
Has at least one Japanese friend	36.8	100.0	74.4	95.0
Is not a member in any organization	100.0	56.3	88.8	23.9
Is a member of at least one organization	0.0	43.8	11.2	76.1
Frequency of participation in local government events				
Never	79.0	6.3	72.7	9.0
Seldom	21.1	75.0	23.8	62.2
Neither seldom nor often	0.0	12.5	2.7	25.9
Often	0.0	6.3	0.9	2.5
Always	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
Perception of being welcomed				
Very Unwelcomed	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.5
Unwelcomed	31.6	12.5	38.1	16.9
Welcomed	47.4	37.5	53.8	46.3
Very welcomed	21.1	50.0	6.7	36.3
Perception of being able to succeed				
Very Unable	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0
Unable	26.3	0.0	18.4	5.0
Able	42.1	37.5	58.3	33.8
Very Able	31.6	62.5	22.9	61.2

Levels of contentment				
Very discontented	0.0	0.0	4.0	0.0
Discontented	31.6	12.5	46.2	11.9
Content	42.1	43.8	44.4	47.3
Contented	26.3	43.8	5.4	40.8

To summarize we can rank the groups as such: Groups 1 and 3 are considered low integration outcome groups and Groups 2 and 4 are high integration outcome groups. Structural integration scores create the distinction between the bigger groupings, as Groups 1 and 2 are economically inactive and Groups 3 and 4 are economically integrated.

What impacts pattern membership

To test for what demographic variables can predict which respondent is more likely to fall into which category, I utilize multinomial logistic regression. This technique compares likelihood of being in one cluster as compared to another. In this regression equation, I utilized four groups of variables. The first group refers to demographic variables such as age, sex, civil status, educational attainment, number of years of stay in Japan and proportion of life spent in Japan. The second group of variables tests hypothesis on how migrant agency can impact the integration and as such includes variables pertaining to migrant agencies such as reason for migration and intents for the future. The third and fourth group of variables tests our initial hypothesis that engaging with other “cores” such as ethnic community in the host country and home country can impact the integration outcomes of the respondents. The third group of variables includes ethnic social ties measures and the fourth group of variables includes variables such as sending remittances, regularly travelling to the home country and sending savings.

I tested these variables in five multinomial regression models: one model that only regresses demographic variables, a second model adding individual trajectory variables, a third model adding ethnic social ties variables, a fourth model adding transnational practices variables into the mix and a fifth model adding variable for intent for the future. All five regression models give a prob>chi2 of 0.000 suggesting that the models have a better fit than an empty model. The descriptive statistics for all four groups of variables are discussed in depth in Chapter 8. They are also presented Table 8.5.

Let us look at the five models one by one. Multinomial logistics compare the relative risk of being

in one group than in another in terms of a given variable. Since we have four groups or patterns in the context of the integration process, we use the last group or that group which has high scores overall as a base group. What this means is that relative risk ratios will refer to the risk of being in one group as compared to being in Group 4 in terms of a given variable. The relative risk ratios for all models are given in Table 8.6.

As was mentioned, there are five models tested in this chapter. Let us look at the first model. The first model only regresses demographic variables which include sex, age, civil status and current visa status. Using Group 4, the "high integration group" as the base group, we find that sex and current visa status may be significant in determining group or pattern membership, but only in specific groups. Specifically, being males reduces the relative risk of being in Group 1 than being in Group 4. What it means is that if we compare pattern membership between Group 1 and Group 4, then males are almost 100 percent more likely to be in Group 4 than in Group 1.

On the other hand, current visa status seems significant in predicting membership in groups considered to have lower integration scores overall. We see for instance that respondents with entertainer (RRR=33.37), trainee (RRR=4.78), working (RRR=3.39) and overstay (RRR=22.32) visas are more likely than permanent residents (base category) to be in Group 3, the group which is economically active but have lower scores for more socio-cultural dimensions of integration, than in Group 4 when all other variables are held constant. Entertainers and trainees are more likely to be in Group 3 than Group 1 than permanent residents at $p<0.001$. Further, we see that entertainers are more likely to be in Group 1 than Group 4 though this particular observation is not statistically significant.

While not statistically significant, we see that married respondents have a tendency to be in groups with lower integration scores, while divorced (RRR=4.43) and widowed (RRR=2.01) are more likely to be in Group 2 than Group 4 compared to single or never married individuals (base category). Group 2 while having high integration scores overall have very low scores in economic participation. What this means is that this is probably correlated with age and length of stay, as divorced and widowed respondents have better language proficiency, interaction and belongingness scores but they may be economically inactive because of their more advanced age.

The next model adds into the mix variables pertaining to individual trajectories. As mentioned individual trajectories include variables such as reasons for migration, educational attainment, work experience from the home country, length of stay in Japan and proportion of life spent in the

host country. These group of variables pertain more to the human capital of the respondent. Looking at results from Table 8.6, we see that all variables are significant in varying significance level when we try to predict membership in groups as compared to membership in Group 4. Length of stay (RRR=2.26) is significant at p<0.01 when predicting membership in Group 2 as opposed to Group 4. As mentioned before, both Groups 2 and 4 are groups considered as groups with high integration outcomes, the difference lie in the economic inactivity of those in Group 2. Given that distinction, it becomes intuitive why a one-unit increase in length of stay in Japan means respondents are 2.26 times as likely to be in Group 2 than Group 4. What this means is that as the respondents spend more time in Japan and grow older, their economic participation decreases though their scores for other integration increases hence their movement from Group 4 to Group 2. On the other hand, proportion of life spent in Japan which is calculated as the respondents' length of stay divided by his or her age seems to be a protective factor, in that a unit increase in proportion of life spent in Japan means that the respondent is 19 times as likely to be in Group 2 than Group 4.

Looking now at educational attainment, it would seem that education is a protective factor. What the results suggest is that higher educational attainment can predict membership in groups or integration patterns considered high outcome groups. In comparison to those having high school level education (base category), having a college level education makes a respondent 0.24 times the risk to be in Group 1 than Group 4 at p<0.05, and 0.39 times the risk to be in Group 1 than Group 3 at p<0.01. What this means is that with all factors remaining constant, respondents having college education as compared to high school education have 75 percent to 60 percent less risk of being in higher integration groups than in lower integration groups. Further we see that having technical vocational level of education makes a respondent 0.88 times the risk to be in Group 1 than Group 4 and Group 3 than Group 4 compared to those with high school education though p values suggest that this is not statistically significant.

In terms of reasons for migration, we see that more family-related reasons tend to be protective factors. Comparing Group 4 and Group 2, respondents migrating to be with spouse is 3.81 times as likely to be in Group 2 and 2.92 times as likely to be in Group 1 than in Group 4 compared to those who migrate for work (base category). It is intuitive why those migrating to be with spouses will be more likely to be in Group 2 than Group 4 because of their economic inactivity, and further, as discussed in previous chapters many of those who migrate to be with spouses have lower language levels and lower interaction rates than those who travel for other reasons so we can expect that when we compare probabilities of membership between Group 4 and Group 1, they are more likely to be in Group 1. We see the same pattern for those migrating to be with relatives.

They are 5.29 times as likely to be in Group 2, a group characterized by high integration outcomes but low economic activity than Group 4, the group with high scores overall.

On the other hand, we see that work experience is significant in predicting membership between Groups 4 and 2. As expected, having previous work experience from the home country makes a respondent 0.11 times the risk to be in Group 2 than Group 4 at $p<0.01$ as compared to those without prior experience. This means that those having work experience as compared to having no experience (base category) have 88 percent less risk to be in Group 2 than Group 4.

Interestingly also, we see that previously non-significant variables became significant when we added individual trajectory variables in the regression equation. While being males (RRR=0.11) compared to females (base category) remains significant at $p<0.05$ in predicting membership in Group 4 over Group 1, age and civil status became significant. We see now, as predicted earlier, that older respondents tend to be in Group 2 than 4, owing to the relative economic inactivity as the age advances. And interestingly, divorced respondents are 6.56 times as likely to be in Group 3 than Group 4 when compared to single or never married respondents (base category) at $p<0.05$.

Again, current visa status remains significant in predicting membership in high integration outcome Group 4. We see that being an entertainer makes a respondent 11.88 times as likely to be in Group 3 than Group 4 at $p<0.001$ than permanent residents. What this means is that entertainers are more likely to have high economic and structural integration while having low cultural, interactive and identificational integration outcomes. On the other hand, we see that long-term residents are 9.07 times as likely to be in Group 2 than Group 4 at $p<0.05$ when all other variables are held constant. I see this again as connected to length of stay hence why being long-term residents suddenly became statistically significant when we added individual trajectory variables.

Model 3 regresses the two groups of variables included in Model 2 and add another variable measuring combination of access to two types of social capital. As we discussed in previous chapters, we see that majority of the respondents have access to ethnic social ties. Most of the respondents have a combination of strong and weak ties, while there are respondents who have access to only one of either of the types of ties. We see that access to both strong and weak ties predict membership in Group 4 when we compare Group 4 with other groups when all other variables are held constant. This means that having both types of ethnic social ties is beneficial for integration as respondents who reported having access to both types of ties have better

integration outcomes overall. Members with access to both types of ties have 0.05 times and 0.28 times the risk of being in Group 1 than Group 4 or Group 2 than Group 4 compared to those with access to only one type of tie (base category) at $p<0.001$ and $p<0.05$. Interestingly also, we see that respondents with access to only weak ties are more likely to be in higher integration groups than in low integration groups when we compare them to members with only access to weak ties. These findings are interesting, as the literature has been in argument as to how ethnic ties impact integration. Theories such as ethnic entrapment have argued that keeping inside the ethnic community may be detrimental to integration (see Chapter 1). While others have argued the opposite, even suggesting that ethnic ties can help contribute to keeping afloat an ethnic economy. By taking another step further, which is to separate types of ethnic ties, we saw better how specific types impact integration outcomes.

In this model, we also see that previously significant variables remain significant. Age remains significant in predicting membership in Group 4 over Group 2, widowed members are still more likely to be in Group 3 than Group 4 than single or never married members, entertainers are more likely to be in Group 3 and long-term residents in Group 2 than Group 4 when compared to permanent residents. Education, work experience and length of stay remain significant in predicting membership to higher integration groups than low integration groups.

Model 4 includes in the regression equation variables relating to transnational practices. We included remittance practices, keeping savings in the home country, and travel to home country. The remittance variable has three levels: not sending remittance, sending remittances but irregularly, and sending remittances regularly. The savings variable also has three levels: not keeping any saving in the home country, having savings in both host and home countries and having savings only in the home country. Finally, travel to home country has five levels: does not travel to the home country, travels but irregularly, travels every two years, travels every year and travels every six months. We see that responses are mixed though in general engaging in any transnational practices can predict membership in better integration groups such as Group 2, 3 or 4 when compared to Group 1, but that engagement in transnational practices can predict membership in lower integration groups Group 2 and 3 when compared to Group 4. The results are pronounced for sending remittances. Members who send remittances irregularly are about 4 times as likely to be in Group 3 than Group 4 than those who do not send remittances at all (base category). But this becomes a protective variable when we look at membership in Group 4 over Group 2. As expected, a member sending remittances are more likely to be in economically active groups such as Groups 3 and 4 than economically inactive groups such as Groups 1 and 2. We see however the greatest impact in terms of visits to home country. Members who visit

with high frequencies are more likely to be in Groups 1 and 2 than in Group 4.

Finally, we regress in Model 5 intention to permanently stay in Japan. We see that interestingly, having an intention to stay permanently is a protective factor meaning that members who expressed intention to stay permanently in Japan are more likely to be in groups considered high integration outcome groups than in groups considered low integration outcome groups than those who expressed no intent to stay (base category). Variables such as current visa, length of stay, reasons for migrating, work experience from home country, ethnic social ties and remittance sending practices remain significant.

In the next section based on the findings from the multinomial logistic regression done in this section, I will describe the four patterns of integration and stipulate how such patterns emerge given the characteristics of the Filipino residents in Japan.

C. Patterns of integration

Knowing how various characteristics determine group or pattern membership, in this section we summarize and describe each pattern of integration. I discuss four groups and given their characteristics label them. Because we have discussed integration as a process and as such we see groupings as temporary, as outcomes may change improve or disintegrate in the future. Therefore, we call these groups as patterns and are subject to changes. We call them patterns because they describe specific paths to integration. Groups 1 and 3 fall in the lower integration outcome groups and as such are labelled as follows: Group 1 as Non-integrated and Group 3 as Parallel. While Groups 2 and 4 are considered higher-integration groups and are labelled as follows: Group 2 as Economically inactive and Group 4 as Straight-line. Let us look at each of them in turn.

Non-integrated

Members falling in this pattern or group are characterized by low integration scores overall. Members of this group are economically inactive, have low self-rated language proficiency and do not have high interaction levels with the host society in personal, organizational and civic terms. Also, members of this group do not generally feel welcomed, unable to succeed and content in their lives in Japan. We call this group non-integrated as their scores in the four dimensions that have been measured are low.

Members of this group tend to be females who came as entertainers, are aged 35 years old and below, and have stayed on average less than 10 years in Japan. The most salient distinction between the Non-integrated pattern is that members of this group in general have at most high school level education. However, most of the members in this groups have work experience from the home country. Majority of the respondents in this group are stay-at-home household members who have children that are mostly in preschool and this deters them from being active in their community. We have previously discussed how being active in the community can help improve language proficiency and perceptions of belongingness as it increases contact and communication with the local society.

Further we see that this group is characterized by high access to only strong ethnic ties. As was earlier discussed, strong ethnic ties may have both positive and negative impacts. While strong ethnic ties can act as source of emotional and psychological support, we see that in this case it can be detrimental to better integration outcomes. Members of this group live with their relatives and this informs us the possibility of being able to access most needs from their ethnic social ties. What is being seen here is that in the case of Filipino residents, high reliance on ethnic ties coupled with low interactions with the host society can result to non-integration.

Further we see that members of this group travel to the home country quite frequently but sending remittances is not as common. We previously established that in the absence of the actual migrant, in the context of the Filipino migration, remittances can act as "proxy". And that we see from the data that remittances provide drive to be economically active. Not sending remittances then and then being able to access most needs from their ethnic social ties, it becomes intuitive why this pattern is described by economic inactivity.

Economically inactive

This pattern is characterized by high levels of integration outcomes for cultural, interactive and identificational dimensions but we see that members of this group are economically inactive. We see in fact that members of this group have better integration outcomes in terms of the last three dimensions when compared to that of the overall integrated group.

We see that members with this pattern of integration are long-term residents that are mostly females, married or widowed. Members from this group have arrived to Japan as dependents and understandably most of them explained that their reason for moving to Japan is to be with relatives. Further, we see that members from having this pattern of integration tend to be older

who have stayed longer in Japan and have spent on average half of their lives in Japan. Knowing this, we can understand why members of this group are inactive economically. Many of the respondents in this pattern, like the previous category, are with children and are full-time housekeepers. However, the distinction between the first pattern and this pattern is that majority have high educational attainment.

On the other hand, we see that this pattern is characterized by high levels of interaction at the individual, organizational and civic levels, acknowledging that being active in organizations and local government events contributes to making them feel like they are part of a community, as well as by providing them information to access better opportunities.

In terms of having ethnic social ties, compared to the Non-integrated pattern we see that members of this pattern tend to have access to a combination of strong and weak ties that provide them on the one hand, emotional and psychological support and on the other hand, economic and social support. The previously discussed pattern is described as more inward-looking while this pattern seems to be more established and rooted in their position in Japan. This is also reflected in their high belongingness scores.

In terms of transnational practices, we see that this pattern tends to be not involved as much in transnational activities. While they do in some cases, their engagement is irregular at best. What this implies is that, at least in this group, less engagement with the home country can predict better integration outcomes, except for being economically and structurally active.

Parallel

This pattern is characterized by high structural integration scores coupled with average cultural, interactive and identificational scores. What this means is that while economically active, members of this pattern have relatively average language proficiency, relatively average engagement with the host society in personal, organizational and civic terms, and have relatively average perceptions of belongingness in terms of feeling being welcomed, being able to succeed and contentment in life in Japan. They make up majority of the respondents at about more than 50 percent.

We see that members of this pattern, as compared to the previously discussed patterns tend to be younger, in more temporary residency status such as various designated activities including entertainers and trainees. Further, we see that many of the members of this pattern have stayed

in Japan for quite a shorter time than other groups. Majority of the members of this pattern have stayed in Japan for less than three years and majority have spent about one-fifths of their lives in Japan. Also, members of this group are more economically driven than other groups if we look at the reasons for their migration.

Interestingly we see that the respondents in this pattern have access to a combination of strong and weak ties and in cases where they access only one tie, they only access strong ties. This ties with the other characteristics of this group, in that they are younger, economically active and are economically drive. Weak ties, as compared to strong ties, are associated with economic opportunities.

We see the result of their economic activity and economic-oriented migration in their transnational practices. Members of this group tend to be more transnationally active than other groups, as they remit more regularly, keep savings only in the home country and travels to the home country with more regularity and higher frequencies. We also see that in terms of purpose of remittance, respondents in this pattern send money for the daily expenses of their families back in the home country suggesting that they, while in Japan, remain to be the main breadwinners in their families since their families still consider their remittances as the main source of income of the household. This pattern is labelled Parallel because of this, since we see that their integration outcomes are generally good — they can speak the language and interacts with the host society in one way or another, but they continuously engage with the home country, therefore they experience a parallel integration.

Finally, we also see that respondents in this group, compared to the other groups do not have any intention to stay permanently in Japan and intends to stay for about three to five years, clearly noting that their stay in Japan is temporary. This is highly connected to their economic reasons for migration which is reflected in their transnational practices. In ways more than one, members of this group reflect traditional labor migration assumptions, that people migrate because of economic reasons but stay only in the host society temporary, or they intend to, until they have reached their economic goals.

Straight-line

Members of this pattern make up about 44 percent of the respondents. Compared to other groups, this pattern shows above average scores in all four dimensions, in that they are economically active, has above average language perception, has high levels of interaction with

the host society at all levels, and has high levels of contentment, perceptions of being welcomed and being able to succeed. Compared to the second pattern, labeled as Economically inactive, they have relatively lower integration scores in terms of the last three dimensions but they have relatively high scores overall, suggesting a well-rounded integration performance. Based on their performance, this group was labelled Straight-line as they reflect classical straight-line assimilation patterns.

Interestingly there are more males in this group than in any other groups. Compared to the members of the first and second pattern who tend to be older, and members of the third pattern who tend to be younger, members of this group tend to be middle-aged, mostly in working-age groups. We also see that respondents who follow this pattern of integration have lived in Japan for more than five years but less than ten years and have spent almost half of their lives in Japan. We also see that contrary to the members of the first and second pattern and similar to members in the third pattern, members in this pattern tend to have migrated for more economically-driven reasons and they tend to go through the designated activities residency route meaning they entered Japan through categories considered as more economically-driven such as entertainers and trainees.

We see that like members following the third pattern of integration, members in this group tend to have combination of ethnic social ties, and in cases when they do access only one type, they access only weak ties. As mentioned, weak ties are associated with better economic opportunities, as compared to strong ties which can provide emotional and psychological support.

The main difference between the Parallel pattern and this pattern is the members' transnational practices. It has been said that members of the third pattern engage highly in transnational practices in terms of regularity and in frequency. While in this group, we see that members do engage in transnational practice but in limited frequencies. Members of this group tend to send remittances irregularly for items considered to be more investment-related reasons such as for education of younger household members and not for daily consumption which is the main reason why members of the third group send remittances. Further, we see that most importantly, individuals in this group keep savings in both Japan and the Philippines suggesting that members of this group invests in their lives in both home and host country. They also very rarely travel to home country. Irregular remittance frequencies and rare travel to home countries suggest that, following earlier discussions about the culture of migration in the Philippines and the importance of remittances as "proxy" for the migrant, members in this group tend to "exist"

and live their lives more in Japan than in the Philippines. However, we see that respondents in this group do not intend to permanently live in Japan but intend to stay for more than ten years more.

Chapter conclusion

In this chapter, I constructed composite indicators for the four dimensions of integration we have discussed in previous chapters. Using these composite indicators, I was able to understand four underlying patterns of integration that we have previously argued arise specifically because of the particular contextual and individual factors present in the case of the Filipino residents in Nagoya City.

After clustering underlying groups, I looked at what could possibly predict group membership and I found out that certain variables such as age, length of stay, sending money to the home country, frequent visits to the home country and over reliance on close-knit ethnic ties may impact membership. Understanding this, I was able to, using multinomial logistic regression understand better the four underlying patterns which include non-integrated, economically immobile, parallel and straight-line patterns.

What the results however do not show however is whether the patterns are changeable. I would argue that a foreign resident initially classified in one pattern may change his or her pattern membership if his or her outcomes change. What this means is that patterns are fluid and are dependent on many factors, both structural and agential. There are two things that I argue have been demonstrated in this chapter: first, that it is possible to empirically understand patterns and processes of integration and that by doing so it presents a huge potential for policymaking. What it shows is how we can prioritize targets for interventions if there would be interventions. And second, as an empirical exercise, what this showed is the applicability of the methodology into specific contexts. I argue that if the context and factors were different, there would be other such patterns that can arise.

In the next chapter, I will present my conclusions. First, I will provide a brief summation of what this research project was about, of what it aimed to do and what it achieved. Next, I will provide certain policy implications by focusing on key issues that arose and try to provide recommendations and suggest further discussion on how different stakeholders can help facilitate better integration of foreign residents.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

In this research I aimed to address the question: how integrated are Filipino residents in Nagoya City to the Japanese society? To be able to answer this question, I broke this question into more specific questions: How do we measure integration as both an outcome and a process that takes account of the interplay between individual and contextual factors? What are the foreign residents' integration outcomes and how do structural and individual factors impact these? And finally, what patterns of integration arise and how do the structural and individual factors impact pattern membership?

To be able to answer the first question, I reviewed the literature in Chapter 1 and provided a definition that will be employed in this project. First, I located where integration is in the literature of migration and examined gaps in the literature. While previously, migration has looked at concepts such as assimilation and multiculturalism and variations of those concepts, the changing nature of migration has called into question the applicability of these concepts in the present times. The inapplicability of these concepts has led many migration theorists to rethink what they know of the integration process. The shift from assimilation to multiculturalism has also shifted the way the integration of migrants is understood—for one, from economic-focused outcomes to more human-centered outcomes and processes. What the literature on integration agree on is that integration is a both an outcome and a process that involves both the host society and migrants. In this definition, it is assumed that the very process of migration is conducted by individuals who wanted to better their outcomes (Esser 2004) and that for individual migrants, integration is seen as an investment. As an outcome, integration is multi-dimensional, seen in terms of structural, cultural, interactive and identificational dimensions. Outcomes in these dimensions provide information on the specific patterns of integration that may arise.

I employed a mixed-methods approach. The literature of mixed-methods approach acknowledges four broad rationales why researchers undertake this approach that combines quantitative and qualitative methodologies: to improve the accuracy of their data, to produce a more complete picture by combining information from complementary kinds of data or sources, to compensate specific strengths and weaknesses associated with either quantitative or qualitative methods, and to develop the analysis and build upon initial findings.

This mixed-method study involved three stages. The first stage is identified as the qualitative stage. The qualitative stage provided the baseline information needed in preparing the survey

questionnaire. I conducted extensive archival research; I also interviewed representatives from local government multicultural offices, representatives from migrant organizations and Filipino residents who are active in their communities. I also attended and participated in some of the events held by migrant organizations and by the local government for foreign residents. The second and third stages, which are identified as the quantitative stages involved preparation, pre-test and implementation of survey. The survey was composed of eight sections: demographic, pre-migration and settling-experience, employment and labor, housing and health, language proficiency, civic participation, transnational practices and ethnic ties, and intentions for the future. A total of 459 Filipino residents responded completely to the survey. I have provided more details on the methodology in Chapter 2.

I argued that contextual factors and individual factors impact the outcomes and the patterns or processes of integration of Filipino residents. Hence in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I endeavored to illustrate and describe the context whereby the Filipino residents integrate. At the heart of this is the argument that contexts are frames where individuals exercise their agencies. Knowing how Japan as the host society receives migrants and how Philippines as the migrant-sending country constitute the frames whereby Filipino residents live their day-to-day lives provide for a richer, more holistic understanding of integration. I argue that the contextual factors, along with the individual factors of the migrants have big roles to play in determining the outcome and process of integration. This rather historical approach has been important in understanding why certain groups of foreign residents are associated with certain sectors in the host society, why certain groups of foreign residents are ascribed certain images. These images, I argue impact the way they are being perceived, affecting in turn the stance the host society takes towards them.

I began this dive into the contextual factors with an exploration as to how Japan has approached immigration. Japan has often been seen as “new” to the immigration of foreign people. However, people have moved in and out of Japan even before the economic boom in the 1980s. The foreign population is generally categorized into two: old comers and new comers. Old comers pertain to entrants before the industrialization and economic booms of the 1980s. Newcomers began coming in the 1980s, as the Japanese government started accepting foreign workers. Initially, the government has seen the entrants as temporary guest workers, but as has been shown in Chapter 3, many foreigners stayed longer than expected, which led to an increase in the foreign resident population from the 1980s up to the present.

However, given Japan’s perception of the temporariness of its foreign residents, the concerns had mostly been centered on the inflows and outflows of people and not so much on the

corresponding issues related to settlement, rootedness, householding and livability. What this led to is the passing off the responsibility to local governments whose jurisdiction and legal powers may not be enough to address the livability issues of foreign residents.

We have traced in Chapter 3 the evolution of policies relating to assimilation, multiculturalism and integration. And that regardless of the increase in the country's foreign population, Japan has never had an immigrant policy. What we see is that in the absence of policies aimed to address livability issues of foreign residents at the national government, local governments are trying to fill in this role to facilitate a more harmonious co-existence between foreign and local residents. However, to create a lasting harmonious co-existence, simply delivering services may not be enough. We see from the development of the approaches to foreign-related issues that immigration is something that if can be avoided should be avoided. Issues therefore ran much deeper than simply providing services. As the initial applause for *tabunka kyousei* begins to die down, speculations as to how lasting such an arrangement could be start sprouting. While some local governments want a more progressive integration policy its limitations prove that at the end of the day what is needed is an integration policy from the central government.

On the other hand, we see that a conflation of factors has contributed to the particular migration of Filipinos to Japan. I argued in Chapter 4 that the compounding and meeting of the demand and supply sides of migration have allowed the stocks of Filipino residents in Japan to increase. On the one hand, on the supply side, the institutionalization of the "Culture of Migration" brought about by the labor export policy of the 1970s have seen massive migration of Filipinos to countries such as the USA, Japan and to the countries in the Middle East. A big bulk of Filipinos aspired to migrate and became available and willing to take up occupations that other Japanese people would not. While on the other hand, on the demand side, the economic boom in the 1980s have opened up doors for the Filipino labor export supply and the succeeding concerns with age and depopulation have continued to create a market for Filipino labor. The labor and reproductive demands of Japan in the 1980s saw a supply of Filipino migrants that are mostly unskilled and females. However, I note that the relationship is never equal and that the occupations allowed to Filipinos is a reflection of the different needs of the demand side. Coupled with restrictions and ambivalence of the national government to accept and recognize the many foreign bodies coming into the country, this created a very particular context to integrate into for Filipinos who stayed and became residents.

This we see in the microcosm of Nagoya City as have been discussed in Chapter 5. As has been outlined previously the most number of Filipinos in Japan can be found in Nagoya City.

According to Penninx (2005), urban cities are where the friction and tension between native-born and foreign residents are mostly felt because it is urban areas that become the entry point for many foreigners. Nagoya City, one of the most important port cities in Japan, with its increasing foreign resident population, as well as the host to majority of the Filipino residents in Japan, is in the middle of this friction and tension. As with many other cities and prefectures in Japan there is no overarching integration plan. This is most of all because there is no such integration plan at the national level.

The city implements policies on integration based on three policy directions which coincide with the dimensions of integration we have previously introduced. The goal of the City to structurally integrate the foreign residents can be seen in one of its policy directions which is livelihood support. In terms of this policy direction, the Nagoya City government's main thrust is providing support for finding information on employment, housing, the education system, the improvement of the working conditions of foreign residents and information on health care. Summing it up what we see is a very comprehensive list of programs that facilitate structural integration that are available not just to native-born residents but to foreign residents as well. What this implies are two things: first, that having such a comprehensive and developed approach to structural approach can positively impact the structural integration outcomes of the foreign residents, and in the case of this study, of the Filipino residents. Second, what this implies is that the efficiency and comprehensiveness that we see is because of the fact that these services are already in place since these services are the same services offered to native-born residents and that delivery is simply extended to the foreign residents. Except for making some counseling services available in various other foreign languages and the medical interpretation services, most of these services are nothing new. I argue that the efficiency and comprehensiveness stem from two things: first, rationally, foreign residents need to be structurally integrated to be able to contribute to the society. Second, the provision of services to integration foreign residents structurally are in line with the MIAC's platform on *tabunka kyousei*, that is, as a tool to revitalize local municipalities.

On the other hand, the City also aims to integrate foreign residents culturally and interactively as can be seen from its policy direction of providing communication support. The plan highlights the importance of making information multilingual and providing Japanese language support. The foci of the programs implemented to facilitate cultural and interactive integration dimensions are twofold: first, to promote communication by language support; and second, to facilitate interaction by providing venues and opportunities for interactions between foreign and native-born residents. What we see here is that regardless of the strong indication to provide

communication support, we see that the programs are not enough. On the other hand, the interaction that we see is mostly unequal.

Finally, identification integration is being facilitated by the policy directions pertaining to promoting and creating a multicultural communal society. Participation in the planning of policies and programs is key in creating perceptions of belongingness which is what identificational integration stresses. It puts focus on representation and how representation is important in creating an identity as a member of a community. There are three trends in how the City government tries to facilitate this: first through internationalization seminars and holding of multicultural events such as festivals; second, through inviting foreign residents to participate in events that will give them voice in relation to planning and crafting policies and programs and; third, tapping foreign resident associations in disseminating information and in holding events. Through these programs we see a step-by-step method of facilitating identificational integration. Programs aimed at promoting multiculturalism and awareness of having different cultural groups existing in the City is the first step. In here, native-born residents and foreign residents are made to acknowledge each other's presence in the City. Through festival and internationalization seminars, residents, both foreign and native-born, are made to acknowledge that their cultures are different and that respect is necessary to be able to create a multicultural communal society. This is the very basic approach to multiculturalism. But this runs the risk of essentializing a culture into simply a sum of its festival, food or fashion, or what we call 3Fs multiculturalism. The second and third steps show us a more inclusive approach, an approach that is supposed to go beyond the 3Fs. By providing venues where foreign residents can express their opinions and concerns and by involving foreign resident organizations, the City somehow aims to go beyond the 3Fs and address actual issues that foreign residents are experiencing. However, we see two issues come up: first, the relationship is unequal and second, the migrant organizations themselves are somehow divided.

Understanding now the contexts whereby Filipino residents integrate, I proceeded to conduct a survey to understand the integration outcomes of Filipino residents. Following the assumptions of the framework I employ in this research that migrants migrate to improve their outcomes, with improvements being defined against the shared meanings of success in the host society, I anchored outcome measures on policy directions and issuances. In Chapter 7 I provided findings on the demographic characteristics of the respondents. As was previously discussed, I presented the findings from both qualitative and quantitative data collection jointly side by side. All statistical data that has been presented came from the quantitative element of the project while anecdotes came from the qualitative aspect of the design. This I did to sort of evaluate the

results of both methods and provide explanations and nuances as to how possibly such data from the qualitative and quantitative aspects arose. Further, I did this to show inconsistencies within the two types of data that I gathered. By jointly displaying the data side by side I showed that what may be depicted in numbers and that suggest a particular interpretation can be understood differently when we look at the anecdotes of the foreign residents themselves. And in general, the characteristics of the respondents reflect what has been discussed in Chapter 4 on the Filipino migration to Japan. Majority of the respondents are permanent residents who mostly came to Japan as entertainers or trainees. Many of them came during the late 1990s and have been living in Japan for almost 20 years.

Knowing these I proceeded to analyze the integration outcomes of the Filipino residents in Chapter 7. As has been discussed, many of the arguments in Chapter 5 found their way in Chapter 8 as the foreign residents' outcomes, which I argue are reflective of the approach of the local government. This was further compounded by the context by which Filipinos came to Japan as we have seen in Chapter 4 and as we have previously summarized. As I also mentioned, the findings suggest that the Filipino residents are experiencing an uneven integration, uneven in the sense that their outcomes vary in terms of the dimensions of integration. Let us look at these dimensions in turn.

Structural integration refers to the access to the core institutions of the host society. It would seem from the results of the survey that access to the basic social structures was made easier by a combination of factors. On the one hand, the policies and programs of the City facilitate a situation where foreign resident engagement in such social structures is generally accepted. The thrust towards the participation of foreign residents in the labor market complements the goal of *tabunka kyousei* as the tool to revitalize local municipalities in light of depopulation, aging and local public finance crises. The migrant population has the potential to bring in income in the form of taxes and businesses. Further, service provision for foreign residents, if seen as an extension of service provision for local residents, is considered efficient. Structural integration policies involve the same services provided to Japanese citizens and are simply extended to foreign residents. Of course, there are some instances when new policies and programs are introduced that are specifically tailored to foreign residents' needs such as the use of medical interpreters or translation of notices. But it is in such instances when specific policies are required that we saw from the data that foreign residents experienced more difficulties.

What complicates the scenario however is the specific context of the Filipino residents. As we saw from the data, majority of the respondents are in low-skilled jobs. Jobs found through

personal connections seem to be more concentrated in low-skilled sectors than jobs found through job advertisements, local government and migrant organization fairs. Most of the respondents who found jobs through personal connections are in jobs that run the risk of entrenching such negative images of the Filipino resident as low-skilled or "bad-girl". Many permanent residents still engage in entertainment work arguing that the job is a lucrative source of income since a permanent residency allows them more movement in terms of choosing a *mise* (pub) where pay and working conditions are better. What we see here corresponds to what has been called ethnic mobility entrapment which impacts can be much more detrimental in the long run because in a way what it does is inhibit the value of any skill they have which somehow puts them at a disadvantage when they negotiate the terms of their position and membership in the society.

Respondents in low-skilled and in high-skilled jobs both experience immobility. For low-skilled respondents, regardless of how long they have been in Japan, it seems that breaking into different sectors is difficult. Language and qualifications seem to be the biggest hurdle, entrenching them into jobs that are considered 3D and are often short-term. On the other hand, for high-skilled respondents, visa and temporary contracts are the biggest issue which hinders their mobility. Immobility seems to arise from this interplay between policies and the specific context of the Filipino residents in terms of structural integration. This devaluation of their qualifications contributes to their immobility.

Cultural integration, on the other hand represents changes in mindset and behavior towards the host society. Language is key in changing mindset and behavior and hence integration scholars have put emphasis on how language can facilitate integration. What we see here is that in terms of cultural integration, many respondents do have some knowledge of the language but they are not proficient. There are two conclusions that can be made: first, what is stipulated here is that the average to below average levels of proficiency point to the fact that many Filipino residents only invest in learning the language up to a certain extent, and that is when certain goals have been met which are mostly economic in nature. As mentioned in the previous section, jobs are easy to access, many jobs do not require knowing or speaking Japanese language at all, some jobs require only a basic knowledge of Japanese. What this leads to is disincentivizing learning the language especially for foreign residents who do not think of staying permanently in the country. And second, the increase in the number of Filipino coming to Japan suggests the possibility of the Filipino community becoming thicker and tighter as mentioned in Chapter 7 in which we see that many of the Filipinos tend to live together. As mentioned in the opening of this section, the extent to which cultural integration can happen is going to be wider and deeper if the

minority culture is more dispersed. What is implied therefore is language learning is disincentivized not just because jobs are available for people who know nothing of the language, but that emotional, psychological and social support can also be accessed through the ethnic community further disincentivizing the need to go out of the community to interact with native-born Japanese.

Interactive integration refers to the inclusion or acceptance of foreign residents into the primary relations and various social networks in the society. These relations include friendships, partnerships and memberships in different organizations. From the data, we see that participation overall is low and this is not without surprise; many programs can be categorized as 3Fs multiculturalism and hark back to *kokusaika*. If following earlier described importance of participation in local government-led events as a way to interact with other people of both Japanese and other ethnicities and as a way to represent themselves, we see that services and events which call for participation among foreign residents are limited as we have discussed in Chapter 5. The City government, along with neighborhood associations, has supported parades and festivals showcasing the various cultures of the foreign residents such as the Philippine Festival and the Brazilian Day. While this is not entirely bad, researchers warn us of the peril of the so-called 3Fs multiculturalism which essentializes the “food, festival and fashion” of a culture thereby failing to recognize the subjectivity of the migrant. While it seems that while programs are acceptable, the approach is not appropriate. Following the rhetoric at the national level, foreign residents are treated more as a problem rather than as a possible asset. By approaching foreign residents as problems needing to be solved, there is a tendency to lump all foreign residents into one outsider group, disregarding their differences and the issues particular to their historical relations with Japan. In the literature, foreign resident non-engagement with the host society has been a chicken and egg kind of question. Whether it is caused by foreign residents not wanting to engage or whether it is the lack of government responses, the literature could not really seem to say definitively. What we see in this case however is a largely inactive group of foreign residents whose inactivity is being addressed by inappropriate approaches.

In short, interactions measured in terms of personal relationships are high while the proportion of respondents engaging in organizations and with the local government are low. On the one hand, at the individual level the respondents seem to interact and establish personal ties with other Japanese individuals, and they seem to acknowledge the importance of being involved in meso-level organizations, though reasons for participating are more for personal benefits than for pushing for acceptance in their locality. At the organizational level on the other hand, many still do not see the need to push for representation. And further, we see a local government

whose approach on diversity has the tendency to consume other cultures where the center of this multicultural exchange is the host society and migrant subjectivities ignored.

Finally, we looked at identificational integration. Central to the concept of identificational integration is belongingness. It refers to identification with a certain social structure, whether it be with the host society, or the ethnic community or other ethnic communities. In terms of immigrant integration however, the focus is on the perception of belongingness or the degree to which the migrant identifies with the dominant culture. Overall, interestingly, based on the data, identificational integration in terms of contentment and fit are moderate while involvement is moderate to high. It would seem that while involvement or the perception of being able to succeed is an inward assessment of the their own' skills, contentment and perception of being welcomed are assessed more on in terms of their position as a Filipino in Japan. The relatively lower levels of perception of fit and contentment are possibly affected by the conflation of the approach of the local government which values language competency and high-skilled participants in the labor market (see Chapter 5), as well as the stereotype of the Filipino in Japan resulting from their taking up positions in the society that can benefit them economically, which is the main purpose of their migration activity but has severely impacted their mobility. There are two things that we can glean from this. One the one hand, the policies and preferences of the government, while aiming to reward those with high-skills, also have a tendency to limit their mobility and impact their positions in the host society by having no encompassing integration strategy. On the other hand, it remains indifferent to the concerns of those in low-skilled jobs and this indifference actually punishes them by devaluing any skills they bring with them and any skills they eventually develop as they become involved in the labor market. This leads them to continuously assume positions that maybe oppositional to their culture and maybe detrimental to their position in Japan in order to continuously earn money to be able to stay in the host country and to be able to continue sending remittances to the home country. What we saw is that a number of factors impact belongingness: one, the individual characteristics of the migrants play an important role in determining their levels of fit, involvement and contentment. It would seem that better educated and higher-skilled individuals feel the frustration of economic immobility and this translates to low levels of contentment and fit. Second, the division among the migrant groups who somehow become representatives of Filipino residents in the local government and in the Japanese society can also impact discontent and fit, as not properly addressing stereotypes and addressing stereotypes in different ways can work against them, entrenching the very stereotype they try to erase. And finally, the local government who rewards both high-skilled individuals and low-skilled individuals with better economic resources but does not give them economic mobility and the chance to negotiate better their membership in the host

society because of a lack of a comprehensive integration strategy also impact identificational integration in certain ways.

What the discussions on the Filipino residents' integration outcomes tell us is that there is no simple measure of saying a migrant is integrated or not. What we saw is a conflation of factors that influence the way they integrated in terms of different dimensions. Further, as there is no one integration outcome, the findings also showed that there is no one path to integration. The respondents based on their outcomes fall into four distinct patterns of integration that I labelled as straight-line, parallel, economically inactive and non-integrated. The respondents who were categorized as having a straight-line integration pattern show high outcomes in all four dimensions of integration. The parallel integration group is characterized by high structural integration scores coupled with average cultural, interactive and identificational scores. The economically inactive pattern is characterized by high levels of integration outcomes for cultural, interactive and identificational dimensions but we see that members of this group are economically inactive. And finally, members falling in the non-integrated pattern are characterized by low integration scores overall. Members of this group are economically inactive, have low self-rated language proficiency and do not have high interaction levels with the host society in personal, organizational and civic terms.

Finally, understanding the contextual and individual factors and the integration outcomes that arose as a result of these factors become I have come to a conclusion that the patterns of integration are diverse and are affected by both individual and contextual factors. Contextual factors can impact the outcomes as we have seen and individual factors such as length of stay, reasons for migrating, work experience from home country, ethnic social ties and remittance sending practices can impact how the foreign residents integrate.

In general, I conclude that the Filipino residents are unevenly integrated. Specifically, their outcomes, meaning their inclusion or exclusion into social subsystems vary, as well as the process of integration, or the patterns of integration that they follow. These were highly affected by, on the one hand, contextual factors such as the host society's approach to their immigration which sees multicultural co-existence as a way to revitalize local municipalities, municipalities which face problems of aging, depopulation and public finance. Also, the lack of an overall integration plan at the national level, the ad hoc approach of the local government which prioritizes structural integration and confuses non-conflict with harmonious co-existence that does not promote substantial engagement between the native-born and the foreign-born residents. As well as the entrapment of many Filipino residents into unskilled jobs and into

certain stereotypes, stereotypes that cannot be removed without engaging the host society. On the other hand, individual factors such as the Filipino residents' reasons for migration which were mostly economic, their intents for the future which does not usually involve a permanent life in Japan, their high engagement with their ethnic community which can sometimes disincentivize engaging with the host society since they get most of what they need from their ethnic community and their engagement with their home country through transnational practices have also contributed to creating an integration that can be characterized as being uneven.

Understanding all these, I argue that there are three intertwined issues that need to be underscored. First is language. The lack of a comprehensive immigrant policy in Japan leads to a lack of necessity of having a mandatory education of the Japanese language. What has been implied from the study is that permanently settling in Japan has not been in the minds of the foreign residents before they decided to move to Japan. Most of them travelling on entertainer visas when they first arrived in Japan have intended to stay for a short time until their economic goals had been achieved. This is unlike the experiences in many Filipino immigrants to countries such as Canada and the United States where permanent settlement is most often the goal upon moving. Not knowing whether they will end up in Japan for a long time or not, there really was no requirement to learn the language. What we have seen from the data is a group of foreign residents who, on average, have stayed for a substantial length of time in Japan without really being able to say that they are proficient in the language.

This uncertainty about their stay in Japan was also reflective in their responses regarding whether they intend to stay permanently or not. While many do have permanent resident visas, we saw that still most of them do not look to Japan as a place where they want to settle. Who can actually say whether they are going to settle forever or not? They might end up in Japan permanently in the future, but what this lack of intention brings us to is the lack of creating an incentive to learn the language more proficiently. We saw from the data that those who expressed intent to stay actually have better proficiency, and one can argue that if one's mindset is to stay, then he or she will most likely invest in learning the language. This leads us to the second issue which is skills.

According to Mr. Manuel Imson of the International Labor Organization, who was among those who contributed to the institutionalization of the Philippine labor export policy said in a lecture that the best protection a migrant can have is skills. In Japan where high skills are valued, it is definitely applicable. Many entertainers who travelled in the 1980s to the 1990s did undergo trainings as cultural dancers and singers but their trainings did not include language courses. If

one was to think about it, it was expected given that their migration was considered to be temporary. Fast forward to the time many of them decided to get married to Japanese men and live in Japan. The lack of language skills among many previous entertainers and other unskilled workers had been raised in the literature and has been argued to have contributed to their entrapment. Having permanent resident visas, many still work in the entertainment industry as it is still highly lucrative, especially since a permanent resident visa affords them mobility in terms of moving from one *omise* to the next. Not being able to develop skills beyond skills they have developed working in the entertainment industry, they find it hard to change jobs. Again, skills are a migrant's best protection, and in the case of not having skills, what then is their protection?

Third, being unskilled and lacking language capabilities can also discourage one from participating more in the community. We see in the responses of the respondents that their interaction with their host society is low and that in general many of them do not feel welcomed. In twos surveys conducted by the Nagoya City Government in last five years, they found out that many foreign residents felt that their native-born neighbors would not want to talk to them, most likely because of the language difference. In the same results, the City also found out that this is the same perception that native-born residents have. What we can glean from this is that the hesitation to interact comes from both the foreign and the native-born residents and that perhaps the reason behind their lack of interaction is the language barrier. Further, many programs that can be classified as possible venues where these interactions can happen are limited.

From the data presented throughout this research project we can look at different stakeholders and assess their roles in terms of the entire integration experience. At the last part of this chapter, we also offer key policy areas where intervention may be beneficial for foreign resident integration.

Stakeholders and target groups

Foreign residents

Essentially the integration of the foreign residents, based on the findings of this research begins on language. Foreign residents should be encouraged to learn the language to have access to better opportunities and to be able to understand better the things that are happening around them. Further, there is one strength of the Filipino residents that can be utilized, their proficiency in English. The discussion in an earlier chapter has shown that many Filipino residents in Japan are slowly changing jobs and with the JET program being not limited to Americans and British teachers anymore, there are better opportunities that can be accessed. Further, we also saw from previous discussions that many Filipino residents who previously worked as entertainers

have undergone trainings as caregivers and as such have shifted to the care industry, an industry that is growing larger due to the rapid aging happening in many places in Japan.

Migrant organizations

We have previously shown that there are a number of Filipino migrant organizations in Nagoya City but that there tends to be a divide. This division I argue stems from the scarce resources and support from the local government. Many of these organizations still rely on donations and voluntary work and hence in some cases responses to problems being faced by many foreign residents is inadequate and slow. One big problem that many migrant organizations experience is being unable to be registered. Being unsure of where to get their financial resources many work on a voluntary basis and as such are unable to gather enough leverage and bargaining power which are important in negotiating representation for the foreign residents.

Service delivery agents/facilities

Currently, a number of service delivery systems and public facilities are being shared by the local government with various non-profit organizations. The Nagoya International Center is one such instance. As was mentioned the NIC is being run jointly by the local government and by an NPO. This partnership is one of the many recent partnerships being done between NPOs and various local governments to improve public service delivery under the Designated Manager System. This is in light of the public finance crises that is being experienced by a number of local municipalities. Such partnerships can provide better and improved service delivery mechanisms.

JFC with focus on the 1.5 Generation

The literature has talked about how the integration of the first generation can impact the integration of the next generations. We have seen that typologies predicting the future integration of succeeding generations take into consideration the integration or non-integration of their parents. In the case of the Filipinos, this becomes a more serious consideration as many of the Japanese-Filipino children still face problems of being recognized by their Japanese parents. While being recognized is one problem, it is but the tip of the iceberg. Much of the problems being cited by NPOs and NGOs such as the Lawyer's Association for Japanese-Filipino Children working to help JFCs is their lack of roots which could impact their development.

This becomes much more complicated when, upon being recognized, they come to Japan and are immediately thrown into a society that they are expected to understand. The so-called 1.5 Generation, those who have already begun their socialization process in the Philippines and were suddenly brought to Japan, face particular integration problems. Because of a variety of

reasons, some of them selfish, many Filipino mothers suddenly uproot their kids from this very important process of development and bring them into a society that is utterly foreign to them. Especially for the 1.5 Generation who is suddenly expected to be able to go to a Japanese school even without understanding the language, this goes beyond culture shock.

Therefore, special care and attention has to be given to the JFC and other children born from intercultural partnerships. As was demonstrated during the "Philippines-Japan Law Conference 2017: Family Law Issues in Filipino-Japanese Cases" held in the Philippines on November 17, 2017, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines through the Japan-Philippines Law Project has already begun discussions on how to improve addressing issues related to interpretation and enforcement of laws and adjudication such as in cases related to divorce between Filipino and Japanese nationals and in cases relating to recognizing Japanese-Filipino children. With such efforts, paths are being forged that can, while this may be far in the future, facilitate better the movement of Japanese Filipino children to Japan. In such scenarios then, Japan as the receiving country needs to be better equipped in addressing certain issues regarding the children. We see this in how the Nagoya City responded: the Nagoya City 2018 multicultural plan is being set to address the issue of the 1.5 Generation as they continue to increase in number.

Local governments

Currently, in the context of Japan, it is still the local government who remains to be the main actor when it comes to facilitating integration of foreign residents. Municipalities in different parts of Japan have taken to calling foreign residents "local citizens" suggesting a more welcoming stance to foreign residents. In light of what has been discussed regarding local public finance crises, aging and depopulation, many municipalities acknowledge the positive impacts integrating foreign residents into the society can bring. And at the same time, it is localities and municipalities which will experience the most the negative impacts of an uncontrolled influx of foreign population. Local governments are at the forefront of this issue. It is local governments which become the interface and the guide of many foreign residents in Japan.

However, many criticisms regarding how local governments approach foreign resident integration exist. For one, in the case of Nagoya, the City government itself do not call them immigrants, following the rhetoric coming from the national level. By not acknowledging foreign residents as immigrants, many fail to understand that these foreigners are not temporary stayers anymore regardless of whether they actually stay permanently or not. Many of the respondents in the data stayed on average for about ten years. And ten years is I think more than enough

length of time for the society to feel the impacts of having a foreign population. Another criticism to local governments is their blanket and ad-hoc approach to issues surrounding foreign residents. Foreign resident groups vary and their needs and their possible contributions also can vary.

National government

At the end of the day it is the support of the national government that can significantly improve integration policies and programs. Much has changed since the 1980s and the ICRRA has been amended a number of times. The Alien Registration Law has also been somewhat relaxed. With the issuance of resident cards or *zairyuu kaado*, travelling back to the home country and coming back in Japan has been much easier. Further, the inclusion of the foreign residents in the "My Number" system has also made it easier to use health services, file taxes and tax returns among other things. To say then that there are no improvements is wrong.

However, we have seen that really progressive programs such as the Nakagawa immigration plan of 2008 did not come to fruition. While his plan has been criticized as a political strategy to gain support in his bid for the prime minister's office, still it cannot be denied that the 2008 immigration plan is something that would utterly change the immigration system in Japan. Much has to be done especially in light of the possibility of Japan importing more foreign labor in preparation for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics.

Key policy recommendations

Development of language and technical skills

As we have seen from the results of the study, the biggest issue is the lack of language proficiency among the Filipino residents. Learning the language is an investment in itself, and by investing in learning the language, one also begins investing in his or her integration process. Due to the nature of the jobs and contracts that many Filipinos entered when they first came to Japan, language training has not been included in their pre-departure trainings. Language training has not been included in the entertainer qualifications and trainings that many would-be entertainers then underwent. For those coming to work in jobs considered highly-skilled and for those who came as graduate students, they were often provided some months of language training by their companies or by their universities, and though this may not be enough, it creates a world of difference. Many former entertainers and those who came to do unskilled labor, whose Japanese was learned colloquially tend to use Japanese that may not be so useful in more formal settings such as job hunting.

While some would argue that suggesting having language classes is a given, it is something that is often not enforced adequately. It is important to note at this point certain example from other immigrant-receiving country. Countries such as Italy and France as well as the French-speaking areas in Canada have been enforcing rules on language acquisition. Italy and France enforce integration contracts that migrants have to sign. For instance, in Italy, stipulated in the integration contracts migrants sign upon disembarkation is earning a certain number of credits to maintain their residency. Credits can be earned through attending language and civic culture classes, attending vocational and professional training and attending courses on Italian history among others. Further funding for such classes are provided and secured through the European Integration Fund. Apart from this, Italy has established bilateral agreements with migrant-sending countries such as Morocco, Mauritius, Albania and Sri Lanka to provide pre-departure trainings that include language trainings as well as civic courses (Caneva 2014). This is similar to the case of France where migrants also sign an integration contract. According to (Escafre-Dublet 2014) around 60 million Euros go to such language classes and that the budget is dispersed through different actors including non-government organizations, and semi-public organizations to develop language and civic integration programs. Initiation classes and reception classes both for migrants and migrants' children are provided and funded by the Ministry of Education. Apart from this, the Office for Integration, Reception and Citizenship also helps migrants to gain recognition for qualifications gained abroad. In Canada, language classes receive the largest proportion of funding for integration and multiculturalism initiatives and services are available without fees and charges for immigrants and refugees for as long as they meet basic eligibility requirements (Griffith 2017).

Local governments in Japan currently offers a variety of language classes, some free but most are paid. The challenge I think lies more in the encouraging foreign residents to avail of these classes. The problem, according to the survey is time and as many foreign residents had to do more than one job to be able to afford living in Japan and as such has not enough time to be able to attend language classes. Another oft-cited problem is information and as such one important intervention would be to go down to the *chounaikai* level and even to the *danchi* level to begin offering classes. I remember when I was still living in the dormitory, there were classes offered there by Japanese volunteers. That is actually very convenient considering that many students do not have ample time to get to their ward offices to attend classes especially since many of them work in their laboratories from morning to night.

One other possible way to improve language acquisition is through utilization of developments in ICTs. The Japanese Government have ben engaging in the development of such applications as

VoiceTra, an online interpretation app. While these developments are welcome and provide potential, the importance of language acquisition to be able to communicate seamlessly should be first highlighted. While interpreters can help, language learning should be viewed as not just a mere translation of words, rather language learning carries with it changes in behavior and way of thinking and these are things that perhaps an online translation application cannot facilitate. While such applications can be useful mostly for tourists and for new foreign residents, the goal should be to learn the language to be able to communicate seamlessly, and to be able to participate in both personal and civic interactions.

On the other hand, I argue that skills training can benefit so many foreign residents. Though there are technical trainee programs that are currently being implemented by the national government for those coming from abroad, what I am arguing for is simple skills trainings for those that are already here that are important to develop capabilities to move to different industries if they want to. Such trainings may include trainings on how to write a professional *rirekisho* or curriculum vitae or a resume. One of my informants told me that when she decided to look for a different job she had to write a *rirekisho* and one of the things that almost hindered her from moving forward was her not knowing how to do it. When I reminded her that she told me that she had worked before back in the Philippines she said she did not need to write a resume then, her parents knew some friends and that was how she had been able to get jobs before.

Further, trainings to develop skills to work in fields such as carework and English teaching do exist, but many do not how and where to go to be able to access such trainings. In the literature, there were stories of former entertainers who now work as caregivers or careworkers after they underwent some trainings. Information on where and how to access such trainings could be really helpful especially to those who want to change jobs.

Another skill that can be developed is entrepreneurship. From a personal observation, compared to other foreign resident groups, Filipino residents do not engage much in entrepreneurial activities. In Tokyo area, Filipino restaurants are few and hard to come by unlike say Indian, Nepalese, Thai and Vietnamese restaurants. Skills focusing on developing entrepreneurial capacities as well as improving financial literacy may be a good way to improve the economic mobility of the Filipino residents.

Increased partnership between local governments and non-profit organizations including migrant organizations

Public private partnerships may be the way to go in light of issues of local public finance and

depopulation. The government has already begun this under the Designated Manager System. This was as a result of reduced national government subsidies to local governments under the Trinity Reform. Though this may mean lesser budgets for different public service delivery systems, it may also mean more possible venues where public and private can partner in. As I have mentioned the NIC is one such partnership and the local government of Nagoya City can benefit from increasing such partnerships with other registered NPOs to facilitate service delivery and management of facilities. While it frees up some resources for the government, it also widens the population that is involved in addressing various issues, such as the increasing foreign resident population.

Through such partnerships, the local government may become better equipped not just with resources and facilities but with a better and more human approach. Many local governments had been engaging in the so-called frame of new public management where stakeholders and constituents are being treated as clients and while it does public service delivery more efficiently, it also removes the more human aspect of public service. By bringing in NPOs and other voluntary associations, it can create a more grassroots and communal approach to public service delivery, involving more people in the process and providing actual individual faces to the Japanese so-called host society.

Increased opportunities for interaction

Connected to the previous point as following what has been discussed in the findings, venues for interaction are limited. Though Nagoya City is a dense city and though there are no concrete findings showing that there is housing segregation, we can still say that more foreign residents still tend to stay within their co-ethnic circle. Again, one reason for this is language. Though the findings did show that many foreign residents do form personal relationships with Japanese friends and acquaintances, we see that these interactions do not go beyond from the private into the public. And it is this public interaction that will actually help negotiate their positions in the society.

The local government do implement some programs that serve as venues where native-born and foreign residents do interact but these are limited and often revolve around events considered as 3Fs. Though this is good in promoting the foreign culture, it may be problematic if this is the only thing that is being done. Interaction I argue should be in stages. After the introduction of the culture should come a more substantial interaction that can help people get to know each other better and help either confirm or disprove certain stereotypes. At this point, perhaps because this was the first multicultural plan that the City launched, the stage being addressed in terms of

increasing interaction is still the first stage.

I think that making public service delivery a partnership between public and private entities can increase these interactions as I have previously mentioned. This coupled with multicultural education will be key in improving the way how we see and understand other people, especially those who look different from us.

Multicultural education

Multicultural education I argue should be the cornerstone of any integration plan. Multicultural co-existence is more of a mindset and a way of life more than a policy pronouncement. Really good policies may exist, as in the West, but it cannot just change people's stereotypes and biases against the foreign other overnight. Hence, we see such increasing conflicts regarding diversity in many parts of the world recently.

Multicultural education can be included in school curriculum, with the increasing presence of foreign-born and foreign-looking children in public schools in Japan, perhaps slowly introducing multicultural co-existence in the curricula can slowly change mindsets and behavioral patterns among both native-born and foreign-born children.

This will especially be beneficial for those children who had to suffer to be able to be recognized as having Japanese ancestry and hence create avenues where people being left off because of their inability to cope with the system can be pulled back in. This has been the problem that plagued Germany and Britain where foreign residents, because of the confusion between non-conflict and indifference, were left and now constitutes majority of the poorest households.

Japan has been highlighting the economic nature of the movement of people and as such it has a lot to gain from properly integrating foreign residents. Multicultural education is the first step in facilitating this integration.

Ways forward

There are still ways to go to be able to understand fully the integration extent of foreign residents. All throughout this project I pointed out to very striking contradictories that I found between the results of the qualitative and the quantitative data. One very important distinction is what stakeholders argue that they think Filipino residents think and what regular Filipino residents think that they need and are alright with. While many migrant organizations want to demand better representation to improve their image, we see from the data that it seems that many

Filipino residents, while recognizing this, do not really want to meddle into such "political" activities. The question then is what do they really want? This is important to know to provide areas where further research can come in that will help enrich the literature and that can provide better understanding of how to address such an issue. This issue can benefit from more empirical research on the different foreign resident groups in different cities and localities. As discussed earlier, such research can help improve policymaking and targeting of program recipients.

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Annex I: Regression Tables

Table 8.6. Regression models

Variables	Model 1						Model 2					
	Group 1		Group 2		Group 3		Group 1		Group 2		Group 3	
	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|
Female	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Male	0.07	0.02	0.20	0.07	0.76	0.34	0.11	0.05	0.20	0.18	0.75	0.33
Age	0.95	0.21	1.00	0.99	0.96	0.07	1.00	0.98	0.71	0.05	0.99	0.72
Single/Never married	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Married	2.05	0.37	1.59	0.63	1.28	0.48	1.12	0.91	6.94	0.16	1.29	0.50
Divorced	0.00	1.00	4.43	0.24	2.91	0.14	0.00	1.00	5.02	0.34	6.56	0.02
Widowed	0.00	1.00	2.01	0.67	2.72	0.22	0.00	0.99	0.00	0.91	5.39	0.07
Cohabitation/Live-in	0.00	1.00	1.85	0.65	1.77	0.39	0.00	1.00	7.57	0.32	1.32	0.69
Permanent	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Spouse	5.26	0.26	0.00	1.00	4.85	0.21	0.84	0.92	0.00	1.00	6.44	0.17
Entertainer	1.09	0.94	0.00	0.99	33.37	0.00	0.46	0.62	0.00	0.99	11.88	0.00
Long-term	2.69	0.11	2.54	0.18	2.01	0.06	1.07	0.94	9.07	0.04	1.26	0.58
Trainee	0.83	0.88	0.00	0.99	4.78	0.00	0.42	0.57	0.00	0.99	1.47	0.52
Working	0.00	0.99	0.00	1.00	3.39	0.02	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.37	0.64
Student	0.00	0.99	0.00	1.00	1.32	0.66	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.40	0.27
Citizen	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.99	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
Overstay	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	22.32	0.01	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	9.34	0.06
Length of stay in Japan (in years)							0.92	0.74	2.26	0.01	0.85	0.10
Proportion of life spent in Japan (%)							0.97	0.79	0.81	0.03	1.02	0.63
High school							0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Tech Voc							0.88	0.86	1.12	0.93	0.89	0.78
College							0.24	0.05	3.42	0.19	0.39	0.01

To work/look for work				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
To train/study				0.00	0.99	0.00	0.99	1.37	0.51
To marry/be with spouse				2.92	0.16	3.81	0.23	0.13	0.01
To be with relatives				2.20	0.37	5.29	0.10	0.41	0.11
Tour				0.06	1.00	0.10	1.00	0.00	1.00
No work experience				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
With work experience				4.55	0.22	0.11	0.01	1.35	0.47

Table 8.6. Regression models continuation

Variables	Model 3						Model 4					
	Group 1		Group 2		Group 3		Group 1		Group 2		Group 3	
	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|
Female	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Male	0.16	0.13	0.22	0.21	0.74	0.33	0.10	0.13	0.01	0.15	0.68	0.28
Age	0.98	0.86	0.72	0.04	0.99	0.77	1.03	0.86	0.40	0.06	1.03	0.51
Single/Never married	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Married	1.63	0.66	8.00	0.14	1.33	0.46	3.87	0.49	5399.79	0.14	1.47	0.40
Divorced	0.00	1.00	6.34	0.28	6.91	0.02	0.00	1.00	942.18	0.30	6.20	0.06
Widowed	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.90	5.03	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.34	0.14
Cohabitation/Live-in	0.00	1.00	9.62	0.27	1.34	0.67	0.00	1.00	3.E+07	0.04	0.95	0.95
Permanent	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Spouse	0.49	0.70	0.00	1.00	6.43	0.17	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	6.52	0.25
Entertainer	0.65	0.78	0.00	0.99	11.61	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.99	13.57	0.00
Long-term	0.63	0.60	9.51	0.04	1.17	0.71	0.18	0.16	44.35	0.19	1.11	0.84
Trainee	0.31	0.46	0.00	0.99	1.40	0.59	1.61	0.88	0.00	1.00	1.13	0.87
Working	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.32	0.69	0.00	1.00	0.05	1.00	1.21	0.81
Student	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.37	0.24	0.00	1.00	0.01	1.00	0.57	0.64
Citizen	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
Overstay	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	8.60	0.07	0.00	1.00	1.27	1.00	3.75	0.33
Length of stay in Japan (in years)	0.97	0.91	2.25	0.01	0.85	0.09	0.87	0.72	8.19	0.02	0.75	0.02
Proportion of life spent in Japan (%)	0.97	0.69	0.80	0.02	1.02	0.62	1.00	0.98	0.64	0.09	1.07	0.13
High school	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Tech Voc	0.92	0.92	1.21	0.88	0.86	0.72	0.30	0.28	0.00	0.06	1.06	0.91

College	0.17	0.03	2.94	0.26	0.37	0.00	0.33	0.27	876.56	0.07	0.47	0.05
To work/look for work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
To train/study	0.00	0.99	0.00	1.00	1.37	0.51	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.45	0.23
To marry/be with spouse	1.48	0.64	2.30	0.51	0.11	0.01	0.59	0.66	0.00	1.00	0.05	0.00
To be with relatives	3.43	0.20	4.46	0.15	0.38	0.08	1.83	0.74	0.06	0.54	0.57	0.41
Tour	0.06	1.00	0.09	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.04	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
No work experience	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
With work experience	22.35	0.06	0.12	0.01	1.37	0.45	7.69	0.28	0.00	0.03	2.62	0.07
Only strong ties	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Only weak ties	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.24	0.22	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.17	0.15
Combination	0.05	0.00	0.28	0.26	0.69	0.45	0.02	0.00	0.28	0.80	0.65	0.50
Has no savings in home country							0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Has savings in home and host countries							13.88	0.16	287.84	0.27	0.52	0.36
Has savings only in home country							4.60	0.40	0.00	0.24	1.28	0.73
Does not send remittance							0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sends remittance irregularly							0.09	0.21	0.00	0.05	4.40	0.05
Sends remittances regularly							0.03	0.08	0.00	0.07	1.67	0.49
Does not travel to home country							0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Irregularly travels							1.11	0.95	19.52	0.46	0.41	0.06

Every 2 years				10.29	0.31	200.57	0.22	0.91	0.88
Every 1 year				10.22	0.31	0.04	1.00	0.40	0.17
Every 6 months				0.00	1.00	1993.51	1.00	1.52	0.53

Table 9.6. Regression models continuation

Variables	Model 5					
	Group 1		Group 2		Group 3	
	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|	RRR	P>|z|
Female	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Male	0.10	0.14	0.01	0.15	0.70	0.31
Age	1.03	0.85	0.40	0.07	1.04	0.43
Single/Never married	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Married	3.81	0.50	4175.13	0.20	1.40	0.47
Divorced	0.00	1.00	808.55	0.34	5.70	0.08
Widowed	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.14	0.15
Cohabitation/Live-in	0.00	1.00	3.E+07	0.04	0.86	0.86
Permanent	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Spouse	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.65	0.29
Entertainer	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.99	12.52	0.00
Long-term	0.17	0.15	42.49	0.20	1.02	0.96
Trainee	1.61	0.89	0.00	1.00	1.01	0.99
Working	0.00	1.00	0.04	1.00	1.07	0.93
Student	0.00	1.00	0.01	1.00	0.51	0.57
Citizen	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
Overstay	0.00	1.00	1.21	1.00	3.32	0.38
Length of stay in Japan (in years)	0.86	0.71	8.03	0.03	0.74	0.01
Proportion of life spent in Japan (%)	1.01	0.97	0.65	0.12	1.07	0.12
High school	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Tech Voc	0.31	0.30	0.00	0.08	1.10	0.85
College	0.33	0.28	827.71	0.08	0.50	0.08
To work/look for work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
To train/study	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.44	0.21

To marry/be with spouse	0.57	0.65	0.00	1.00	0.04	0.00
To be with relatives	1.87	0.74	0.05	0.54	0.64	0.52
Tour	0.04	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
No work experience	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
With work experience	7.95	0.27	0.00	0.04	2.66	0.07
Only strong ties	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Only weak ties	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.15	0.13
Combination	0.02	0.00	0.29	0.82	0.62	0.46
Has no savings in home country	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Has savings in home and host countries	13.28	0.17	300.37	0.27	0.50	0.34
Has savings only in home country	4.48	0.41	0.00	0.28	1.24	0.76
Does not send remittance	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sends remittance irregularly	0.09	0.21	0.00	0.05	4.10	0.06
Sends remittances regularly	0.03	0.09	0.00	0.07	1.57	0.55
Does not travel to home country	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Irregularly travels	1.13	0.95	20.99	0.46	0.40	0.06
Every 2 years	10.12	0.34	219.81	0.23	0.87	0.82
Every 1 year	10.22	0.35	0.04	1.00	0.39	0.16
Every 6 months	0.00	1.00	3217.33	1.00	1.52	0.53
Plan to stay permanently	0.90	0.93	1.27	0.95	0.63	0.37

Annex II: Some anecdotes from some key informants

Mr. A (Interview conducted on September 23, 2016)

Mr. A came to Japan as a dependent. He is in his 50s. His relatives were already in Japan and since that time in the Philippines jobs were hard to come by he decided to give it a go and came as a dependent. He started doing work on his own, working in many construction sites. He now holds a permanent resident visa and has since sponsored the arrival of his children. He likes living in Japan but he did say that the country is not for him. He speaks average Japanese but he said he could not really speak formal Japanese as it is hard. Like many others, he finds it hard to read *kanji*. He is doing many short-term contractual jobs in construction and is currently very active in organizations that try to help improve the plight of Filipinos. He plans to eventually retire to the Philippines since he already had a house built there.

Mr. B (Interview conducted on September 24, 2016)

Mr. B came to Japan as a student under the *Monbukagakusho* Japanese Government scholarship in his late 20s. He finished his graduate studies and is now working as a lecturer in one of the universities in Nagoya City. He had to go back to the Philippines after graduating as finding a job in Japan was tough. Eventually he found his current job in Nagoya City while looking for jobs online. The place where he currently works helped him secure his working visa. He is active in voluntary associations for Filipino migrants. He said the pay is good where he works but he plans to find other opportunities in some other country in the future. Even though he is a professional and considered high-skilled, he claims to not be able to speak a word of Japanese and does not plan to study the language anytime soon.

Ms. C. (Interview conducted November 5, 2016)

Ms. C came as a professional. She has been in Japan for almost 20 years. She is now in her 40s. She started working in Japan after she graduated from the Philippines and secured a degree in Engineering. She decided to accept the job offer that she came across while job hunting and decided to move to Nagoya City. Since then her family has also moved to Japan and she is currently very active in many organizations that are trying to help address the hardships that come with being a foreigner. She would like to go back to the Philippines one day and help her family.

Ms. D (Interview conducted September 24, 2016)

Ms. D came as a spouse of a Japanese National. Right after finishing university, she secured a

job as a company staff. But before she began working she decided to travel to Japan to marry her current spouse. Her reason, according to her, was very personal. She had a Filipino boyfriend before she left for Japan, however she found out that her boyfriend has been cheating on her. After breaking up with her boyfriend, she was introduced by a friend to her current husband. Thinking that she would want to get back at her boyfriend for cheating on her by marrying a Japanese, she agreed to the proposal and flew to Japan. She currently has one daughter with her husband. She still lives with her husband even though she did say their relationship is not in the best circumstances and that she has already found a boyfriend who lives in Manila and plans to also migrate to Japan. When asked what led to the demise of their relationship, she said that there really was no such thing as love from the very beginning and little disagreements related to housekeeping and raising their child started to accumulate. One example that she cited was their disagreement on using baby powder for their daughter when she was still a baby, a practice so common in the Philippines that her husband did not like.

Ms. E (Interview conducted during September 24, 2016)

Ms. E came as an entertainer during the first waves of entertainers coming into Japan. She has been in Japan for almost 20 years. She is currently married and is a housewife to a Japanese National. She said that when she first came as an entertainer things were very hard and very strict. She used to live in a dormitory that is assigned to them and the only times that she can go out of the dormitory is when she has to work in the club or when she needs to buy something from the convenience store. She said that compared to many entertainers now and compared to permanent residents working as entertainers they had a hard time trying to adjust, to move to different clubs which provide better salaries and just to live in general. She used to move back and forth from the Philippines to Japan every six months because of the nature of her contract. But then she met her husband and decided to get married and settle in Nagoya City.

Mrs. F (Interview conducted during September 24, 2016)

Mrs. F is a a retiree living in Nagoya City. She first came to Japan because she was petitioned by some relatives. She is so old she can barely hear my questions and she could not remember clearly the jobs she did when she was younger though she did say she did a number of odd jobs. She likes living in Japan as her pension is good and she does not need to pay anything. She did say she would not want to go back to the Philippines as she considers Japan her current home.

Ms. G (Interview conducted February 2, 2017)

Ms. G applied as a talent in promoting agency and came to Japan as an entertainer. She found it easy to adjust in Japan because she came to Japan in a group of ten people. She has also received help from other Filipinos who had been here already for a long time. She is currently busy with work, with her elementary school-age child and feel contented in Japan. She does not really experience any problems except for things related to her child's schooling. She had to attend meetings and that was tough because there were many things that she could not read. She wanted to live permanently in Japan if ever but is hesitant that when she grows old she will not have enough money to survive. Her *nenkin* or pension she would use for the Philippines. She says many Japanese are "plastic", a Filipino term which means they are untrue. She has many acquaintances but she does not have any close Japanese friends. She could not say whether she has felt discriminated because she does not really care. She just felt sometimes that she is being looked at differently. She says that one of the images of the Filipinos is "*mukhang pera"* or after the yen, and this is especially true for those working in Sakae. But in general, the image of Filipinos in Japan is hardworking.

Mrs. H (Interview conducted February 5, 2016)

Mrs. H is one of the few entrepreneurial Filipinos that I met. She is in her mid-40s. She owns a restaurant along the Sakae Entertainment District. She said she came to Japan to work and then she met her Japanese husband. After a couple of years, they decided to open up the restaurant where her husband works as a cashier and she the cook. The restaurant is a *carinderia*-type of restaurant where you get one serving of rice and two types of viands that you can point to among the pots and pans displayed on the counter. She said the restaurant serves as a place where Filipinos meet and many Filipinos working in the pubs along Sakae come by to have dinner before starting their shifts.

Ms. I (Interview conducted February 2, 2017)

Ms. I is currently working as an entertainer in Japan. She is in her mid-40s. She was previously working as a sales lady in one of the department stores in Manila when her cousins encouraged her to go to Japan to find work and to find a Japanese husband. She said she liked it in Japan and if given a chance she would want to live her permanently if she finds a Japanese husband, otherwise she will go back to the Philippines and go to her hometown in Cavite, a province in the Greater Manila area. She said that the key to living a good life in Japan is just to follow rules. She

pays taxes, sees the result of her taxes in good public transportation systems, good public services delivery and so she has no reason to complain. The only problem is homesickness. But she says she has lots of Filipino friends, especially where she works since the *Mama-san* or the head mistress of the club is also a Filipino.

Ms. J (Interview conducted February 2, 2017)

Ms. J is currently married to a Japanese friend. She first came to Japan as an entertainer but she keeps this as a secret because when she was working as a talent, she used her youngest sister's name. And when she got married she used her real name and she tells people that she met her husband through "*shoukai*" or introduction. Including her previous experience as an entertainer she has spent 17 years in Japan, but she does not want to include that so she declares that she has been here 14 years, removing the time she has been here as an entertainer. Her main reason for coming to Japan was to get married. She had a hard time adjusting in Japan because of language, the way of life. She said that as of now she does not experience big problems in interacting with Japanese. She actually experiences problems in interacting with other Filipinos. She said that she plans to spend her entire life in Japan because she does not have anyone back in the Philippines. She finds it hard and sad but her family is in Japan so she does not really want to go back in the Philippines. She also looks forward to getting her *nenkin* or pension. She actually feels more at home with Japanese than with other Filipinos. She said she has more Japanese friends than Filipino friends and if she has big problems she feels like she will run to her Japanese friends more than her Filipino friends. She said the reason is because if she tells her problems to a Filipino it will immediately spread as gossip in the Filipino community. She also does not want to go back to the Philippines because she does not have any more family there. And she said that her remaining relatives in the Philippines are only nice to her when she has money.

Ms. K (Interview conducted February 3, 2017)

Ms. K is one seven siblings who decided to move to Manila to work to be able to help her family. As with most of the interviewees, she is in her early 40s. In Manila, she met her promoter who helped her move to Japan. She said that her main purpose of moving to Japan is earn more money to be able to support her family and to be able to find a foreign husband. According to her living in Japan is easy—she gets jobs easily though the jobs are for short-time. She is currently working in a factory packing *bentou*. She said that the many problems she encounters in Japan is sadness and longing for her family. She said that while Japanese people are nice, she still

finds it easier to communicate with Filipinos and has more Filipino friends than Japanese. Even if she has already married a Japanese man and has started a life in Japan, she still hopes one day to be able to retire in the Philippines as Japan is a very sad place because she feels so far apart from her family and relatives.

Appendix: The Survey Instrument

Survey Tungkol Sa Karanasan Ng Mga Filipino Sa Nagoya City (Survey on the Experiences of Filipino Residents in Nagoya City)

Magandang Araw! Ako po si Erica Paula Sioson, isang estudyante mula sa University of Tokyo. Ako po ay nagsasaliksik tungkol sa integrasyon ng mga Filipino sa Nagoya City. Bilang parte ng aking pag-aaral, inaalam ko po ang mga karanasan at mga motibasyon sa pangingibang bansa ng mga Filipino.

Aabutin po ang survey na ito ng 15 hanggang 30 minuto. Ang mga impormasyon pong inyong ibibigay ay mananatiling confidential. Ang pagsagot po sa survey na ito ay boluntaryo.

Maraming salamat po sa inyong kooperasyon!

(Good day!) I am Erica Paula Sioson, a student from the University of Tokyo. I am conducting a research on the integration extent of Filipino foreign residents in Nagoya City. As a component of my study, I am trying to understand the experiences and motivations of migration of the Filipinos.

This survey will take up about 15 to 30 minutes. All the information that you will provide will remain confidential. Completing this survey is also voluntary.

Thank you for your cooperation!)

* Required

Confirmation

1. **Nais mo bang ipagpatuloy ang survey? (Do you want to continue the survey?)**
   Mark only one oval.

   - Oo (Yes)
   - Hindi (No) *Stop filling out this form.*

A. Demograpiya

2. **Ano ang iyong edad? (What is your age in years?)** *

   ____

3. **Ano ang iyong kasarian? (What is your sex?)** *
   Mark only one oval.

   - Lalaki (Male)
   - Babae (Female)
   - Other: ________________

4. **Ikaw ba ay... (Are you...)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Single/Never married
- Married
- Cohabitation/Live-in
- Widowed
- Divorced

5. **Ano ang iyong pinakamataas na natapos? (What is the highest educational attainment that you have?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Elementarya, hindi natapos (Elementary, non-graduate)
- Elementarya natapos (Elementary graduate)
- High school, hindi natapos (High school, non-graduate)
- High school natapos (High school graduate)
- Technical/Vocational, hindi natapos (Technical/Vocational, unfinished
- Technical/Vocation natapos (Technical/Vocational graduate)
- College, hindi natapos (College non-graduate)
- College natapos (College graduate)
- Graduate school

6. **Saang probinsiya ka ipinanganak? (In which province in the Philippines where you born?)** *

____

7. **Nakapagtrabaho ka ba sa Pilipinas bago ka manirahan sa Japan? (Have you experienced working in the Philippines before moving to Japan?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)
- Hindi (No)

8. **May kakilala ka ba noong lumipat ka sa Japan? (Did you know anyone when you moved to Japan?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)
- Wala (No) *Skip to question 10.*

A.1. Kakilala Sa Japan (Connections in Japan)

9. **Sino ang kakilala mo noong dumating ka? (Who do you know in Japan when you arrived?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Kamag-anak (Relatives)
- Kaibigan (Friends)
- Dating katrabaho (Former workmates)
- Other: ____________

A.2. Paninirahan sa Japan (Living in Japan)

10. **Gaano ka na katagal naninirahan sa Japan? (bilang ng taon o buwan) (How long have you lived in Japan, in years and months)** *

____

11. **Ano ang iyong kasalukuyang visa status? (What is your current visa status)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Short-term resident
- Long-term resident
- Permanent resident
- Other: ____________

A.3. Paninirahan sa Japan (Living in Japan)

12. **Saang ward ka sa kasalukuyan nakatira? (In which ward do you currently live?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Atsuta-ku
- Chikusa-ku
- Higashi-ku
- Kita-ku
- Meito-ku
- Midori-ku
- Minami-ku
- Minato-ku
- Mizuho-ku
- Moriyama-ku
- Naka-ku
- Nakagawa-ku
- Nakamura-ku
- Nishi-ku
- Showa-ku
- Tempaku-ku
- Other: ____________ *Skip to question 77.*

A.3. Anak (Children)

13. **Ikaw ba ay may anak/mga anak? (Do you have children?)** *
Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)
- Wala (No) *Skip to question 18.*

A.3.1. Edukasyon (Education)

14. **Ilan ang iyong anak? (How many children do you have?)** *

15. **Nag-aaral ba ang iyong anak/mga anak? (Are your children attending school?)** *
Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 16.*
- Hindi (No) *Skip to question 18.*

A.4. Edukasyon (Education)

16. **Anong antas na ang iyong anak/mga anak ngayon? (Panganay na anak kung higit sa isa) (In which grade is your child/children now? Pertain to the eldest if more than one child)** *
Mark only one oval.

- Preschool/Day Care
- Elementary education
- Middle school/Junior high school
- High school
- Technical/Vocational
- College
- Masters/PhD

17. **Ano ang mga problemang kinakaharap mo sa pag-eenrol ng iyong anak/mga anak? (What problems did you encounter when you were enrolling your child/children to school?)** *
Check all that apply.

- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Pera (Money)
- [ ] Kakulangan sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
- [ ] Mga problema sa mga dokumento at pagrehistro (Document and registration related problems)
- [ ] Other:

B. Pagdating sa Japan (Arrival in Japan)

18. **Ano ang iyong visa status sa unang pagdating mo sa Japan? (Upon your very first arrival in Japan, what visa status did you have?)**

Mark only one oval.

- Tourist
- Student
- Entertainer
- Dependent
- Trainee
- Other: ____________

19. **Sino ang pangunahing tumulong sa iyo sa unang pagdating mo sa Japan? (Who was the main person who helped you when you first arrived in Japan?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Wala (None) *Skip to question 21.*
- Mga kaibigang nasa Japan na (Friends who were already in Japan)
- Mga kamag-anak na nasa Japan na (Relatives who were already in Japan)
- Simbahan/Church group (Church)
- Mga Filipino migrant organization/Filipino volunteer organization (Various Filipino migrant organizations)
- International association
- Local government/ward office
- Other: ____________

B.1. Suporta (Support)

20. **Anong klaseng tulong ang binigay nila sa'yo? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (What kind of support were you give? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Monetary support
- [ ] Information on daily life
- [ ] Housing information
- [ ] Job information
- [ ] Psychological and emotional support
- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Other: ____________

B.2. Pagdating sa Japan (Arrival in Japan)

21. **Anu-anong mga problema ang hinarap mo pagdating mo sa Japan? (Piliin lahat ng kailangan) (What kinds of problems have you experienced when you first arrived in Japan? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Lenggwahe (Language)
- [ ] Paghahanap ng matitirhan (Finding a place to stay)
- [ ] Paghahanap ng trabaho (Finding a job)
- [ ] Paghahanap ng kaibigan (Finding friends)
- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Other: ____________

C. Lenggwahe (Language)

22. **Sa Japanese language, ano sa tingin mo ang iyong lebel? (In your own perception, what is your level of Japanese proficiency?)** *

Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Fluent	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Poor

23. **Kasalukuyan ka bang nag-aaral ng lenggwahe? (Are you currently learning the language?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 24.*
- ◯ Hindi (No) *Skip to question 26.*

C.1. Lenggwahe (Language)

24. **Kung oo, saan ka nagaaral? (If yes, where are you studying?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Private institution/University
- ◯ Mga klaseng pinoprovide ng lokal na pamahalaan (Classes held by local government)
- ◯ Mga klaseng pinoprovide ng mga Filipino migrant organization (Classes held by Filipino migrant organziations)
- ◯ Other: ____________

25. **Ano ang mga problemang kinakaharap mo sa pag-aaral ng lenggwahe? (Pilliin lahat ng kailangan) (What are the problems that you experienced in studying the language? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Motivation
- [ ] Oras (Time)
- [ ] Impormasyon (Information)
- [ ] Pera (Money)
- [ ] Other: ____________

D. Trabaho (Job)

26. **May trabaho ka ba nitong nakaraang tatlong buwan? (Do you have a job during the last three months?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 27.*
- Wala (No) *Skip to question 33.*

D.1. Trabaho (Job)

27. **Ano ang iyong pangunahing trabaho nitong nakaraang tatlong buwan? (What was your main job during the last three months?)** *

____

28. **Ikaw ba ay nagtratrabaho sa? (Are you employed in?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Permanenteng trabaho/business (Permanent job/business)
- Short-term/seasonal na trabaho/business (Short-term job/business)
- Gumagawa ng iba't ibang trabaho araw-araw o lingo linggo" (Does different jobs everyday or every week)

29. **Paano mo nahanap ang iyong kasalukuyang trabaho (pangunahing trabaho kung maraming trabaho)? (How did you find your current job? Primary job if working on many jobs)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Kaibigan/kamag-anak/personal na koneksyon (Friend/relatives/personal connections)
- Job advertisements (dyaryo, tv at online) (newspapers, tv and online)
- Sa tulong ng lokal na pamahalaan/ward office (With the help of the local government
- Sa tulong ng mga migrant organization (With the help of migrant organizations)
- Other: ____________________

30. **Pareho ba ang iyong kinikita kada buwan? (Do you earn the same every month?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)
- Hindi (No)

31. **Sa iyong palagay, sapat ba iyong buwanang kita para sa lahat ng iyong pangangailangan at gastos? (In your own opinion, do you think your monthly earning are enough for needs and expenses?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)
- Hindi (No)

32. **Sa iyong palagay, match ba ang kasalukuyan mong trabaho sa iyong kakayahan? (In your own opinion, do you think your skills match your current job?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)
- Hindi (No)

Skip to question 35.

D.2. Trabaho (Job)

33. **Kung wala, naghanap ka ba ng trabaho o nagsimula ng business nitong nakaraang tatlong buwan? (If none, have you looked for a job or started a business in the last three months?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 35.*
- Hindi (No) *Skip to question 34.*

D.2.1. Trabaho (Job)

34. **Kung hindi, bakit hindi ka naghanap ng trabaho nitong nakaraang tatlong buwan (If not, why didn't you look for a job in the last three months)**

Mark only one oval.

- Naniniwalang walang trabahong makukuha (Believes no job is available)
- Naghihintay ng resulta ng inaplayang trabaho (Waiting for results in a previous job application)
- May karamdaman/kapansanan/masyadon bata o matanda (Is Sick, disabled, too young or too old)
- Naghihintay na matanggap (rehire) muli sa dating pinapasukan (Waiting for rehire)
- Tao sa bahay (Stay at home, tends the house)
- Nag-aaral (Studying)
- Other: ____________________

D.3. Trabaho (Job)

35. **Anu-anong mga problema ang hinarap/hinaharap mo sa paghahanap ng trabaho? (Piliin lahat ng kailangan) (What problems have you experienced when you were looking for a job? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Lenggwahe (Language)
- [ ] Temporary Contract
- [ ] Qualification
- [ ] Discrimination
- [ ] Walang legal na trabaho (No legal jobs)
- [ ] Personal Constraints
- [ ] Limitadong karapatan na makapagtrabaho (Limited rights to work)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

36. **Paano ka naghahanap ng trabaho? (Pillin ang lahat ng kailangan) (How do you look for jobs, mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Kaibigan/kamag-anaka/personal na koneksyon (Friends/relatives/personal connections)
- [ ] Job advertisements (newspaper, tv and online)
- [ ] Sa tulong ng lokal na pamahalaan/ward office/employment bureau (With the help of local government)
- [ ] Sa tulong ng mga migrant organization (With the help of migrant organizations)
- [ ] Other: ______________________

E. Pinansyal (Financial

37. **Mayroon ka bang ipon/investment? (cash, stock, business, bahay at lupa, sasakyan) (Do you have any savings/investments such as cash, stocks, business, house and lot, vehicles etc)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 38.*
- ( ) Wala (No) *Skip to question 39.*

E.1. Pinansyal (Financial)

38. **Kung oo, saan mo ito/ang mga ito inilagak? (If yes where do you keep your savings?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Japan
- ( ) Philippines
- ( ) Sa parehong Japan at Philippines (Both Japan and the Philippines)
- ( ) Sa ibang lugar (Other countries)

F. Koneksyon sa Pilipinas (Connections in the Philippines)

39. **Nagpapadala ka ba ng pera/remittance sa Pilipinas? (Do you send remittance to the Philippines?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes)
- ( ) Hindi (No) *Skip to question 42.*

F.1. Remittance

40. **Kung oo, gaano kadalas? (If yes, how frequent?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) 1-3 linggo (1-3 weeks)
- ( ) Buwan-buwan (Monthly)
- ( ) Kada kalahating taon (Every half a year)
- ( ) Taun-taon (Yearly)
- ( ) Hindi regular/kung kailangan lang (Irregular/when needed)

41. **Para saan ang ang pinapadala mong pera? (Piliin ang lahat ng maari) (What is the purpose of your remittance? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Panggastos sa pangaraw-araw (Everyday expenses, consumption)
- [ ] Edukasyon (Education)
- [ ] Pambayad sa biniling bahay/lupa (Payments for land, house bought)
- [ ] Pambayad sa utang (Debt payments)
- [ ] Ipon (Savings)
- [ ] Pangregalo sa birthday/piyesta/handaan (Gifts, special occasions such as festivals)
- [ ] Other: ______________________

F.2. Pag-uwi Sa Pilipinas (Travelling to the Philippines)

42. **Regular ka bang umuuwi sa Pilipinas? (Do you regularly travel to the Philippines)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Hindi regular (Not regularly)
- ( ) Buwan-buwan (Monthly)
- ( ) Kada 6 na buwan (Every 6 months)
- ( ) Taun-taon (Yearly)
- ( ) Kada 2 taon (Every 2 years)
- ( ) Hindi (No)

43. **Kailan ka huling umuwi sa Pilipinas? (When did you last travel to the Philippines?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Sa loob ng nakaraang 6 buwan (In the last 6 months)
- ( ) Sa loob ng 1 taon (In the last year)
- ( ) Sa loob ng 3 taon (In the last 3 years)
- ( ) Sa loob ng 5 taon (In the last 5 years)
- ( ) Sa loob ng 10 taon (In the last 10 years)
- ( ) Sa loob ng 20 taon (In the last 20 years)
- ( ) Hindi ako umuuwi sa Pilipinas (I don't travel to the Philippines)

G. Kalusugan (Health)

44. **Mayroon ka bang National Health Insurance? (Do you have a National Health Insurance?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 46.*
- ( ) Hindi (No)

G. Insurance

45. **Kung wala, bakit? (If none, why?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Hindi eligible, short-term visa (3 months and shorter) (Not eligible)
- May ibang insurance, galing sa trabaho (Has insurance from employment)
- Dependents
- Nakakatanggap ng public financial assistance para sa pangaraw-araw na pamumuhay (Receives government financial assistance)
- Ibang insurance para sa Older Senior Citizen (Other insurance for Older Senior Citizens)

G.2. Ospital (Hospital)

46. **Nagkaroon na ba ng pagkakataon na kinailangan mong pumunta sa ospital/clinic para sa iyong sarili o para sa miyembro ng iyong pamilya? (Has it ever happened that you needed to go to the hospital/clinic for yourself or for other members of your family?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 47.*
- Hindi (No) *Skip to question 48.*

G.2.2. Ospital (Hospital)

47. **Anu-anong mga problema ang iyong naranasan? (Piliin ang lahat ng maari) (What problems did you experience? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Lenggwahe (Language)
- [ ] Pera/Pambayad sa gamot/treatment/konsulta (Money to pay medicine, consultation)
- [ ] Discrimination
- [ ] Kakulangan sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
- [ ] Mga problemang may kinalaman sa dokumento (Document-related problems)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

H. Motibasyon (Motivation)

48. **Bakit ka nagpunta sa Japan? (Pangunahing dahilan) (Why did you come to Japan? Primary reason only)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Nakakuha ng trabaho (Found a job)
- Nakakuha ng scholarship/training scholarship (Got a scholaship)
- Hindi makahanap ng trabaho sa Pilipinas, para makahanap ng trabaho (Couldn't find job in the Philippines)
- Para magpakasal (To get married)
- Hindi sapat ang kinikita sa Pilipinas (Earnings in the Philippines not enough)
- Nasa Japan na ang mga kamag-anak (Relatives are already in Japan)
- Other: ____________________

I. Organisasyon, Lokal na Pamahalaan (Organization, Local Government)

49. **Miyembro ka ba ng kahit anong organisasyon? (Are you a member of any organization?)** *
Mark only one oval.

- Wala akong organisasyon (I am not a member of any organization) *Skip to question 54.*
- Church/Religious
- Neighborhood organizations
- Filipino migrant organizations
- International associations
- Voluntary organizations
- Organizations na inorganisa ng lokal na pamahalaan (Organizations organized by the local government)
- Other: ____________________

I.1. Organisasyon (Organizations)

50. **Kung may organisasyon, paano ka natutulungan nito? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (If you have an organization, how do you think it will help you? Mark all that apply)** *
Check all that apply.

- [ ] Pakiramdam ko ay parte ng isang komunidad (I will feel part of a community)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa trabaho at oportunidad (Better access to jobs and opportunities)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa impormasyon (Better access to information)
- [ ] Walang naitutulong (Does not help at all)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

51. **Gaano ka kadalas na nagpaparticipate sa mga aktibidades/event ng iyong organisasyon? (How often do you participate in activities/events held by your organization?)** *
Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Palagi (Often)	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Hindi kailanman (Never)

52. **Gaano ka kadalas na nagpaparticipate sa mga aktibidades/event ng iyong lokal na pamahalaan/ward office? (How often do you participate in activities/events held by your local government)** *
Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Palagi (Often)	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Hindi kailanman (Never)

I.1.1. Organisasyon (Organization)

53. **Sa iyong palagay ano ang pumipigil sa isang tao para magparticipate sa mga aktibidades ng lokal na pamahalaan/ward office? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (In your own opinion, what stops a person from participating in events held by their local government/ward office?)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Lenggwahe (Language)
- [ ] Kakulangan sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
- [ ] Visa status
- [ ] Oras (Time)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

Skip to question 55.

I.2. Walang Organisasyon (No Organization)

54. **Ano ang pumipigil sayo para sumali sa isang organisasyon? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (What stops you from joining an organization? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Lenggwahe (Language)
- [ ] Kakulangan sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
- [ ] Visa status
- [ ] Oras (Time)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

1.3. Organisasyon (Organization)

55. **(Para sa lahat) Sa kabuuan, sa palagay mo sa paanong paraan ka matutulungan ng pagiging miyembro ng isang organisasyon? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (How do you think being a member of an organization helps you? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Pakiramdam ko ay parte ng isang komunidad (Feels part of a community)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa trabaho at oportunidad (Better access to jobs and opportunities)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa impormasyon (Better access to information)
- [ ] Walang maitutulong (Does not help at all)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

56. **Sa kabuuan, sa palagay mo sa paanong paraan ka matutulungan ng pagiging aktibo sa mga aktibidades ng iyong lokal na pamahalaan, lalo na sa mga event na para sa mga foreign resident? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (In your own opinion, how do you think being active in local government can help foreign residents?)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Pakiramdam ko ay parte ng isang komunidad (Feels part of a community)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa trabaho at oportunidad (Better access to jobs and opportunities)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa impormasyon (Better access to information)
- [ ] Walang maitutulong (Does not help at all)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

57. **Anu-ano sa mga nakalistang programa ng lokal na pamahalaan ang mga nasubukan mo nang salihan/samahan? (Among the listed events/activities, what have you availed/joined?)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Language classes
- [ ] Labor consultation service
- [ ] Visa consultation service
- [ ] Housing services
- [ ] Multicultural activities
- [ ] Foreign resident discussion meetings
- [ ] Earthquake/Fire drills
- [ ] Translation services (medical, others)
- [ ] Day care services
- [ ] Survey
- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

J. Kaibigan

58. **Paano mo nakilala ang iyong mga kaibigan/kakilala/contact na Pilipino? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (How did you meet your Filipino friends/acquaintances/contacts? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Nakatira sa parehong building/complex/apartments (Lives in same building/complex/apartments)
- [ ] Nakilala sa trabaho (Met at work)
- [ ] Nasa parehong simbahan (Same church)
- [ ] Nasa parehong organisasyon (Same organization)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

59. **Sa palagay mo ba marami kang kaibigang Japanese? (Do you think you have many Japanese friends?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 60.*
- ( ) Hindi (No) *Skip to question 61.*

J.1. Kaibigang Japanese (Japanese friends)

60. **Kung mayroong mga kaibigan/kakilalang Japanese, saan mo sila nakilala? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (Where did you meet your Japanese friends? Mark all that apply)** *
Check all that apply.

- [ ] Nakatira sa parehong building/complex/apartments (Lives in same building/complex/apartment)
- [ ] Nakilala sa trabaho (Met at work)
- [ ] Nasa parehong simbahan (Same church)
- [ ] Nasa parehong organisasyon (Same organization)
- [ ] Other: ______________________

Skip to question 62.

J.2. Kaibigang Japanese (Japanese Friends)

61. **Kung hindi, ano ang pumipigil sayong magkaroon ng mas marami pang kaibigan at kakilalang Japanese? (Piliin ang lahat ng maari) (What do you think stops you from making more Japanese friends? Mark all that apply)** *
Check all that apply.

- [ ] Lenggwahe (Language)
- [ ] Kultura (Culture)
- [ ] Nationality
- [ ] Visa status
- [ ] Oras (Time)
- [ ] Other: ______________________

K. Diskriminasyon (Discrimination)

62. **Nakaranas ka na bang pahintuin ng pulis para i-check ang iyong residence/alien card? (Have you ever experienced being stopped by the police to check your residence/alien card?)** *
Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes)
- ( ) Hindi (No)

63. **Kuntento ka ba sa iyong buhay sa Japan sa kasulukuyan? (Are you contented with your life in Japan currently?)**
Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Very Satisfied	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	Very unsatisfied

64. **Pakiramdam mo ba ay at home ka sa Japan? (Do you feel at home in Japan?)** *
Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes)
- ( ) Hindi (No)

K.1. Diskriminasyon (Discrimination)

Isulat kung sang-ayon ka o hindi sa mga sumusunod na pahayag: (Answer whether you agree or disagree with the following statements)

65. **a. Sa kabuuan, hospitable at welcoming na bansa para sa mga Filipino ang Japan. (In general Japan is a hospitable and welcoming country for Filipinos)** *
Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly Agree	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Strongly Disagree

66. **b. Sa kabuuan, kayang kaya ng mga Filipino na umunlad sa Japan kung magtatrabaho sila ng maigi. (In general, Filipinos can succeed in Japan if they work hard enough)** *
Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly Agree	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Strongly Disagree

L. Housing

67. **Marami bang Filipinong nakatira sa lugar kung saan ka nakatira? (Are there many Filipino living where you live?)** *
Mark only one oval.

◯ Oo (Yes)
◯ Hindi (No)

68. **Paano mo nahanap ang iyong kasalukuyang tinitirhan? (How did you find your current housing?)** *
Mark only one oval.

◯ Sarili ko (By myself)
◯ Kaibigan/kamag-anak/personal na koneksyon (Friends/relatives/personal connection)
◯ Sa tulong ng lokal na pamahalaan (With the help of local government)
◯ Sa tulong ng mga migrant organization (With the help of migrant organizations)
◯ Nakikitira sa bahay ng mga kamag-anak/asawa/partner (Lives with my relatives/spouse/partner)
◯ Other: ____________________

69. **Anu-anong mga problema ang hinarap mo sa paghahanap ng matitirhan? (Piliin lahat ng kailangan) (What problems have you experienced in looking for a place to stay?)** *
Check all that apply.

☐ Lenggwahe (Language)
☐ Pera (Money)
☐ Bawal ang mga foreigner (Foreigners not allowed)
☐ Problema sa visa/Legal status/Documentation (Visa problems, legal status, documentation)
☐ Kulang sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
☐ Wala (None)
☐ Other: ____________________

70. **Gaano ka ka-kuntento sa iyong tinitirhan sa kasalukuyan? (How content are you with your current housing?)** *

Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Very Satisfied	○	○	○	○	○	Very Unsatisfied

M. Permanent Residency

71. **May plano ka bang permanenteng manirahan sa Japan? (Do you have plans to live permanently in Japan?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ○ Oo (Yes)
- ○ Wala (None) *Skip to question 76.*

M.1. Permanent Residency

72. **Kung oo, nag-apply ka na ba para makakuha ng Japanese citizenship? (If yes, have you already applied to get Japanese citizenship?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ○ Oo (Yes)
- ○ Hindi (No) *Skip to question 74.*

M.1.1. Permanent Residency

73. **Anu-anong mga problema ang hinarap mo sa pag-apply? (Piliin lahat ng kailangan) (What problems have you experienced in applying? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- ☐ Mahirap na test (Difficult test)
- ☐ Pera (Money)
- ☐ Dokumento (Documents)
- ☐ Oras (Time)
- ☐ Kulang sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
- ☐ Wala (None)
- ☐ Other: ____________________

Skip to question 77.

M.1.2. Citizenship

74. **Kung hindi ka pa nag-apply, nagpaplano ka bang mag-apply ng citizenship? (If you haven't applied yet, do you plan to apply?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ○ Oo (Yes) *Stop filling out this form.*
- ○ Hindi (No)

Skip to question 75.

M.1.3. Citizenship

75. **Kung hindi, bakit hindi mo gustong mag-apply ng citizenship? (If not, why don't you want to apply for citizenship?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Kakailanganin kong i-give up ang Filipino citizenship (I would need to give up my Filipino citizenship)
- Masyadong mahirap ang proseso (Process is too difficult)
- Masyadong mahal ang proseso (Process is so expensive)
- Hindi ako habambuhay maninirahan sa Japan (I don' plan to stay in Japan forever)
- Wala namang kaibahan sa kasalukuyan kong (visa) status (Has no different with my current visa status)
- Other: ____________________

Skip to question 77.

M.2. Panandaliang Paninirahan (Non-Permanent Stay)

76. **Kung walang planong manirahan ng permanente sa Japan, sa iyong palagay gaano katagal ka pang maninirahan sa Japan? (If you don't have any plans of living in Japan permanently, how long do you you will stay?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Kulang isang taon (Less than a year)
- Higit sa isang taon ngunit kulang sa 3 taon (More than a year but less than 3 years)
- Higit sa 3 taon ngunit kulang sa 5 taon (More than 3 years but less than 5 years)
- Higit sa 5 taon ngunit kulang sa 10 taon (More than 5 years but less than 10 years)
- Higit sa 10 taon (More than 10 years)

Skip to question 77.

Maraming Salamat! (Thank you very much!)

77. **I-submit na ang form? (Submit the form?)**

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)

Stop filling out this form.

Maraming Salamat po!

Powered by

Survey Tungkol Sa Karanasan Ng Mga Filipino Sa Nagoya City (Survey on the Experiences of Filipino Residents in Nagoya City)

Magandang Araw! Ako po si Erica Paula Sioson, isang estudyante mula sa University of Tokyo. Ako po ay nagsasaliksik tungkol sa integrasyon ng mga Filipino sa Nagoya City. Bilang parte ng aking pag-aaral, inaalam ko po ang mga karanasan at mga motibasyon sa pangingibang bansa ng mga Filipino.

Aabutin po ang survey na ito ng 15 hanggang 30 minuto. Ang mga impormasyon pong inyong ibibigay ay mananatiling confidential. Ang pagsagot po sa survey na ito ay boluntaryo.

Maraming salamat po sa inyong kooperasyon!

(Good day!) I am Erica Paula Sioson, a student from the University of Tokyo. I am conducting a research on the integration extent of Filipino foreign residents in Nagoya City. As a component of my study, I am trying to understand the experiences and motivations of migration of the Filipinos.

This survey will take up about 15 to 30 minutes. All the information that you will provide will remain confidential. Completing this survey is also voluntary.

Thank you for your cooperation!)

* Required

Confirmation

1. **Nais mo bang ipagpatuloy ang survey? (Do you want to continue the survey?)**
   Mark only one oval.

   - Oo (Yes)
   - Hindi (No) *Stop filling out this form.*

A. Demograpiya

2. **Ano ang iyong edad? (What is your age in years?)** *

   ____

3. **Ano ang iyong kasarian? (What is your sex?)** *
   Mark only one oval.

   - Lalaki (Male)
   - Babae (Female)
   - Other: ______________________

4. **Ikaw ba ay... (Are you...)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Single/Never married
- Married
- Cohabitation/Live-in
- Widowed
- Divorced

5. **Ano ang iyong pinakamataas na natapos? (What is the highest educational attainment that you have?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Elementarya, hindi natapos (Elementary, non-graduate)
- Elementarya natapos (Elementary graduate)
- High school, hindi natapos (High school, non-graduate)
- High school natapos (High school graduate)
- Technical/Vocational, hindi natapos (Technical/Vocational, unfinished
- Technical/Vocation natapos (Technical/Vocational graduate)
- College, hindi natapos (College non-graduate)
- College natapos (College graduate)
- Graduate school

6. **Saang probinsiya ka ipinanganak? (In which province in the Philippines where you born?)** *

7. **Nakapagtrabaho ka ba sa Pilipinas bago ka manirahan sa Japan? (Have you experienced working in the Philippines before moving to Japan?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)
- Hindi (No)

8. **May kakilala ka ba noong lumipat ka sa Japan? (Did you know anyone when you moved to Japan?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)
- Wala (No) *Skip to question 10.*

A.1. Kakilala Sa Japan (Connections in Japan)

9. **Sino ang kakilala mo noong dumating ka? (Who do you know in Japan when you arrived?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Kamag-anak (Relatives)
- Kaibigan (Friends)
- Dating katrabaho (Former workmates)
- Other: ____________

A.2. Paninirahan sa Japan (Living in Japan)

10. **Gaano ka na katagal naninirahan sa Japan? (bilang ng taon o buwan) (How long have you lived in Japan, in years and months)** *

____

11. **Ano ang iyong kasalukuyang visa status? (What is your current visa status)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Short-term resident
- Long-term resident
- Permanent resident
- Other: ____________

A.3. Paninirahan sa Japan (Living in Japan)

12. **Saang ward ka sa kasalukuyan nakatira? (In which ward do you currently live?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Atsuta-ku
- Chikusa-ku
- Higashi-ku
- Kita-ku
- Meito-ku
- Midori-ku
- Minami-ku
- Minato-ku
- Mizuho-ku
- Moriyama-ku
- Naka-ku
- Nakagawa-ku
- Nakamura-ku
- Nishi-ku
- Showa-ku
- Tempaku-ku
- Other: ____________ *Skip to question 77.*

A.3. Anak (Children)

13. **Ikaw ba ay may anak/mga anak? (Do you have children?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes)
- ( ) Wala (No) *Skip to question 18.*

A.3.1. Edukasyon (Education)

14. **Ilan ang iyong anak? (How many children do you have?)** *

____

15. **Nag-aaral ba ang iyong anak/mga anak? (Are your children attending school?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 16.*
- ( ) Hindi (No) *Skip to question 18.*

A.4. Edukasyon (Education)

16. **Anong antas na ang iyong anak/mga anak ngayon? (Panganay na anak kung higit sa isa) (In which grade is your child/children now? Pertain to the eldest if more than one child)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Preschool/Day Care
- ( ) Elementary education
- ( ) Middle school/Junior high school
- ( ) High school
- ( ) Technical/Vocational
- ( ) College
- ( ) Masters/PhD

17. **Ano ang mga problemang kinakaharap mo sa pag-eenrol ng iyong anak/mga anak? (What problems did you encounter when you were enrolling your child/children to school?)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Pera (Money)
- [ ] Kakulangan sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
- [ ] Mga problema sa mga dokumento at pagrehistro (Document and registration related problems)
- [ ] Other: _______________________

B. Pagdating sa Japan (Arrival in Japan)

18. **Ano ang iyong visa status sa unang pagdating mo sa Japan? (Upon your very first arrival in Japan, what visa status did you have?)**

Mark only one oval.

- Tourist
- Student
- Entertainer
- Dependent
- Trainee
- Other: ____________

19. **Sino ang pangunahing tumulong sa iyo sa unang pagdating mo sa Japan? (Who was the main person who helped you when you first arrived in Japan?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Wala (None) *Skip to question 21.*
- Mga kaibigang nasa Japan na (Friends who were already in Japan)
- Mga kamag-anak na nasa Japan na (Relatives who were already in Japan)
- Simbahan/Church group (Church)
- Mga Filipino migrant organization/Filipino volunteer organization (Various Filipino migrant organizations)
- International association
- Local government/ward office
- Other: ____________

B.1. Suporta (Support)

20. **Anong klaseng tulong ang binigay nila sa'yo? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (What kind of support were you give? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Monetary support
- [ ] Information on daily life
- [ ] Housing information
- [ ] Job information
- [ ] Psychological and emotional support
- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Other: ____________

B.2. Pagdating sa Japan (Arrival in Japan)

21. **Anu-anong mga problema ang hinarap mo pagdating mo sa Japan? (Piliin lahat ng kailangan) (What kinds of problems have you experienced when you first arrived in Japan? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Lenggwahe (Language)
- [ ] Paghahanap ng matitirhan (Finding a place to stay)
- [ ] Paghahanap ng trabaho (Finding a job)
- [ ] Paghahanap ng kaibigan (Finding friends)
- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Other: ______________________

C. Lenggwahe (Language)

22. **Sa Japanese language, ano sa tingin mo ang iyong lebel? (In your own perception, what is your level of Japanese proficiency?)** *

Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Fluent	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Poor

23. **Kasalukuyan ka bang nag-aaral ng lenggwahe? (Are you currently learning the language?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 24.*
- ◯ Hindi (No) *Skip to question 26.*

C.1. Lenggwahe (Language)

24. **Kung oo, saan ka nagaaral? (If yes, where are you studying?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Private institution/University
- ◯ Mga klaseng pinoprovide ng lokal na pamahalaan (Classes held by local government)
- ◯ Mga klaseng pinoprovide ng mga Filipino migrant organization (Classes held by Filipino migrant organziations)
- ◯ Other: ______________________

25. **Ano ang mga problemang kinakaharap mo sa pag-aaral ng lenggwahe? (Pilliin lahat ng kailangan) (What are the problems that you experienced in studying the language? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Motivation
- [ ] Oras (Time)
- [ ] Impormasyon (Information)
- [ ] Pera (Money)
- [ ] Other: ______________________

D. Trabaho (Job)

26. **May trabaho ka ba nitong nakaraang tatlong buwan? (Do you have a job during the last three months?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 27.*
- ( ) Wala (No) *Skip to question 33.*

D.1. Trabaho (Job)

27. **Ano ang iyong pangunahing trabaho nitong nakaraang tatlong buwan? (What was your main job during the last three months?)** *

____

28. **Ikaw ba ay nagtratrabaho sa? (Are you employed in?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Permanenteng trabaho/business (Permanent job/business)
- ( ) Short-term/seasonal na trabaho/business (Short-term job/business)
- ( ) Gumagawa ng iba't ibang trabaho araw-araw o lingo linggo'' (Does different jobs everyday or every week)

29. **Paano mo nahanap ang iyong kasalukuyang trabaho (pangunahing trabaho kung maraming trabaho)? (How did you find your current job? Primary job if working on many jobs)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Kaibigan/kamag-anak/personal na koneksyon (Friend/relatives/personal connections)
- ( ) Job advertisements (dyaryo, tv at online) (newspapers, tv and online)
- ( ) Sa tulong ng lokal na pamahalaan/ward office (With the help of the local government
- ( ) Sa tulong ng mga migrant organization (With the help of migrant organizations)
- ( ) Other: _______________________________

30. **Pareho ba ang iyong kinikita kada buwan? (Do you earn the same every month?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes)
- ( ) Hindi (No)

31. **Sa iyong palagay, sapat ba iyong buwanang kita para sa lahat ng iyong pangangailangan at gastos? (In your own opinion, do you think your monthly earning are enough for needs and expenses?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes)
- ( ) Hindi (No)

32. **Sa iyong palagay, match ba ang kasalukuyan mong trabaho sa iyong kakayahan? (In your own opinion, do you think your skills match your current job?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)
- Hindi (No)

Skip to question 35.

D.2. Trabaho (Job)

33. **Kung wala, naghanap ka ba ng trabaho o nagsimula ng business nitong nakaraang tatlong buwan? (If none, have you looked for a job or started a business in the last three months?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 35.*
- Hindi (No) *Skip to question 34.*

D.2.1. Trabaho (Job)

34. **Kung hindi, bakit hindi ka naghanap ng trabaho nitong nakaraang tatlong buwan (If not, why didn't you look for a job in the last three months)**

Mark only one oval.

- Naniniwalang walang trabahong makukuha (Believes no job is available)
- Naghihintay ng resulta ng inaplayang trabaho (Waiting for results in a previous job application)
- May karamdaman/kapansanan/masyadon bata o matanda (Is Sick, disabled, too young or too old)
- Naghihintay na matanggap (rehire) muli sa dating pinapasukan (Waiting for rehire)
- Tao sa bahay (Stay at home, tends the house)
- Nag-aaral (Studying)
- Other: ____________________

D.3. Trabaho (Job)

35. **Anu-anong mga problema ang hinarap/hinaharap mo sa paghahanap ng trabaho? (Piliin lahat ng kailangan) (What problems have you experienced when you were looking for a job? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- Wala (None)
- Lenggwahe (Language)
- Temporary Contract
- Qualification
- Discrimination
- Walang legal na trabaho (No legal jobs)
- Personal Constraints
- Limitadong karapatan na makapagtrabaho (Limited rights to work)
- Other: ____________________

36. **Paano ka naghahanap ng trabaho? (Pillin ang lahat ng kailangan) (How do you look for jobs, mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Kaibigan/kamag-anaka/personal na koneksyon (Friends/relatives/personal connections)
- [ ] Job advertisements (newspaper, tv and online)
- [ ] Sa tulong ng lokal na pamahalaan/ward office/employment bureau (With the help of local government)
- [ ] Sa tulong ng mga migrant organization (With the help of migrant organizations)
- [ ] Other: ______

E. Pinansyal (Financial

37. **Mayroon ka bang ipon/investment? (cash, stock, business, bahay at lupa, sasakyan) (Do you have any savings/investments such as cash, stocks, business, house and lot, vehicles etc)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 38.*
- ( ) Wala (No) *Skip to question 39.*

E.1. Pinansyal (Financial)

38. **Kung oo, saan mo ito/ang mga ito inilagak? (If yes where do you keep your savings?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Japan
- ( ) Philippines
- ( ) Sa parehong Japan at Philippines (Both Japan and the Philippines)
- ( ) Sa ibang lugar (Other countries)

F. Koneksyon sa Pilipinas (Connections in the Philippines)

39. **Nagpapadala ka ba ng pera/remittance sa Pilipinas? (Do you send remittance to the Philippines?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes)
- ( ) Hindi (No) *Skip to question 42.*

F.1. Remittance

40. **Kung oo, gaano kadalas? (If yes, how frequent?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) 1-3 linggo (1-3 weeks)
- ( ) Buwan-buwan (Monthly)
- ( ) Kada kalahating taon (Every half a year)
- ( ) Taun-taon (Yearly)
- ( ) Hindi regular/kung kailangan lang (Irregular/when needed)

41. **Para saan ang ang pinapadala mong pera? (Piliin ang lahat ng maari) (What is the purpose of your remittance? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Panggastos sa pangaraw-araw (Everyday expenses, consumption)
- [ ] Edukasyon (Education)
- [ ] Pambayad sa biniling bahay/lupa (Payments for land, house bought)
- [ ] Pambayad sa utang (Debt payments)
- [ ] Ipon (Savings)
- [ ] Pangregalo sa birthday/piyesta/handaan (Gifts, special occasions such as festivals)
- [ ] Other: ______________________

F.2. Pag-uwi Sa Pilipinas (Travelling to the Philippines)

42. **Regular ka bang umuuwi sa Pilipinas? (Do you regularly travel to the Philippines)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Hindi regular (Not regularly)
- ◯ Buwan-buwan (Monthly)
- ◯ Kada 6 na buwan (Every 6 months)
- ◯ Taun-taon (Yearly)
- ◯ Kada 2 taon (Every 2 years)
- ◯ Hindi (No)

43. **Kailan ka huling umuwi sa Pilipinas? (When did you last travel to the Philippines?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Sa loob ng nakaraang 6 buwan (In the last 6 months)
- ◯ Sa loob ng 1 taon (In the last year)
- ◯ Sa loob ng 3 taon (In the last 3 years)
- ◯ Sa loob ng 5 taon (In the last 5 years)
- ◯ Sa loob ng 10 taon (In the last 10 years)
- ◯ Sa loob ng 20 taon (In the last 20 years)
- ◯ Hindi ako umuuwi sa Pilipinas (I don't travel to the Philippines)

G. Kalusugan (Health)

44. **Mayroon ka bang National Health Insurance? (Do you have a National Health Insurance?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 46.*
- ◯ Hindi (No)

G. Insurance

45. **Kung wala, bakit? (If none, why?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Hindi eligible, short-term visa (3 months and shorter) (Not eligible)
- May ibang insurance, galing sa trabaho (Has insurance from employment)
- Dependents
- Nakakatanggap ng public financial assistance para sa pangaraw-araw na pamumuhay (Receives government financial assistance)
- Ibang insurance para sa Older Senior Citizen (Other insurance for Older Senior Citizens)

G.2. Ospital (Hospital)

46. **Nagkaroon na ba ng pagkakataon na kinailangan mong pumunta sa ospital/clinic para sa iyong sarili o para sa miyembro ng iyong pamilya? (Has it ever happened that you needed to go to the hospital/clinic for yourself or for other members of your family?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 47.*
- Hindi (No) *Skip to question 48.*

G.2.2. Ospital (Hospital)

47. **Anu-anong mga problema ang iyong naranasan? (Piliin ang lahat ng maari) (What problems did you experience? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- Wala (None)
- Lenggwahe (Language)
- Pera/Pambayad sa gamot/treatment/konsulta (Money to pay medicine, consultation)
- Discrimination
- Kakulangan sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
- Mga problemang may kinalaman sa dokumento (Document-related problems)
- Other: ______________________

H. Motibasyon (Motivation)

48. **Bakit ka nagpunta sa Japan? (Pangunahing dahilan) (Why did you come to Japan? Primary reason only)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Nakakuha ng trabaho (Found a job)
- Nakakuha ng scholarship/training scholarship (Got a scholaship)
- Hindi makahanap ng trabaho sa Pilipinas, para makahanap ng trabaho (Couldn't find job in the Philippines)
- Para magpakasal (To get married)
- Hindi sapat ang kinikita sa Pilipinas (Earnings in the Philippines not enough)
- Nasa Japan na ang mga kamag-anak (Relatives are already in Japan)
- Other: ______________________

I. Organisasyon, Lokal na Pamahalaan (Organization, Local Government)

49. **Miyembro ka ba ng kahit anong organisasyon? (Are you a member of any organization?)** *
Mark only one oval.

- Wala akong organisasyon (I am not a member of any organization) *Skip to question 54.*
- Church/Religious
- Neighborhood organizations
- Filipino migrant organizations
- International associations
- Voluntary organizations
- Organizations na inorganisa ng lokal na pamahalaan (Organizations organized by the local government)
- Other: ______________________

I.1. Organisasyon (Organizations)

50. **Kung may organisasyon, paano ka natutulungan nito? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (If you have an organization, how do you think it will help you? Mark all that apply)** *
Check all that apply.

- [ ] Pakiramdam ko ay parte ng isang komunidad (I will feel part of a community)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa trabaho at oportunidad (Better access to jobs and opportunities)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa impormasyon (Better access to information)
- [ ] Walang naitutulong (Does not help at all)
- [ ] Other: ______________________

51. **Gaano ka kadalas na nagpaparticipate sa mga aktibidades/event ng iyong organisasyon? (How often do you participate in activities/events held by your organization?)** *
Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Palagi (Often)	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Hindi kailanman (Never)

52. **Gaano ka kadalas na nagpaparticipate sa mga aktibidades/event ng iyong lokal na pamahalaan/ward office? (How often do you participate in activities/events held by your local government)** *
Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Palagi (Often)	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Hindi kailanman (Never)

I.1.1. Organisasyon (Organization)

53. **Sa iyong palagay ano ang pumipigil sa isang tao para magparticipate sa mga aktibidades ng lokal na pamahalaan/ward office? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (In your own opinion, what stops a person from participating in events held by their local government/ward office?)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Lenggwahe (Language)
- [ ] Kakulangan sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
- [ ] Visa status
- [ ] Oras (Time)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

Skip to question 55.

I.2. Walang Organisasyon (No Organization)

54. **Ano ang pumipigil sayo para sumali sa isang organisasyon? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (What stops you from joining an organization? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Lenggwahe (Language)
- [ ] Kakulangan sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
- [ ] Visa status
- [ ] Oras (Time)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

1.3. Organisasyon (Organization)

55. **(Para sa lahat) Sa kabuuan, sa palagay mo sa paanong paraan ka matutulungan ng pagiging miyembro ng isang organisasyon? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (How do you think being a member of an organization helps you? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Pakiramdam ko ay parte ng isang komunidad (Feels part of a community)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa trabaho at oportunidad (Better access to jobs and opportunities)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa impormasyon (Better access to information)
- [ ] Walang maitutulong (Does not help at all)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

56. **Sa kabuuan, sa palagay mo sa paanong paraan ka matutulungan ng pagiging aktibo sa mga aktibidades ng iyong lokal na pamahalaan, lalo na sa mga event na para sa mga foreign resident? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (In your own opinion, how do you think being active in local government can help foreign residents?)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Pakiramdam ko ay parte ng isang komunidad (Feels part of a community)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa trabaho at oportunidad (Better access to jobs and opportunities)
- [ ] Mas magandang access sa impormasyon (Better access to information)
- [ ] Walang maitutulong (Does not help at all)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

57. **Anu-ano sa mga nakalistang programa ng lokal na pamahalaan ang mga nasubukan mo nang salihan/samahan? (Among the listed events/activities, what have you availed/joined?)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Language classes
- [ ] Labor consultation service
- [ ] Visa consultation service
- [ ] Housing services
- [ ] Multicultural activities
- [ ] Foreign resident discussion meetings
- [ ] Earthquake/Fire drills
- [ ] Translation services (medical, others)
- [ ] Day care services
- [ ] Survey
- [ ] Wala (None)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

J. Kaibigan

58. **Paano mo nakilala ang iyong mga kaibigan/kakilala/contact na Pilipino? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (How did you meet your Filipino friends/acquaintances/contacts? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Nakatira sa parehong building/complex/apartments (Lives in same building/complex/apartments)
- [ ] Nakilala sa trabaho (Met at work)
- [ ] Nasa parehong simbahan (Same church)
- [ ] Nasa parehong organisasyon (Same organization)
- [ ] Other: ____________________

59. **Sa palagay mo ba marami kang kaibigang Japanese? (Do you think you have many Japanese friends?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes) *Skip to question 60.*
- ( ) Hindi (No) *Skip to question 61.*

J.1. Kaibigang Japanese (Japanese friends)

60. **Kung mayroong mga kaibigan/kakilalang Japanese, saan mo sila nakilala? (Maaring pumili ng higit sa isa) (Where did you meet your Japanese friends? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Nakatira sa parehong building/complex/apartments (Lives in same building/complex/apartment)
- [ ] Nakilala sa trabaho (Met at work)
- [ ] Nasa parehong simbahan (Same church)
- [ ] Nasa parehong organisasyon (Same organization)
- [ ] Other: ____________

Skip to question 62.

J.2. Kaibigang Japanese (Japanese Friends)

61. **Kung hindi, ano ang pumipigil sayong magkaroon ng mas marami pang kaibigan at kakilalang Japanese? (Piliin ang lahat ng maari) (What do you think stops you from making more Japanese friends? Mark all that apply)** *

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Lenggwahe (Language)
- [ ] Kultura (Culture)
- [ ] Nationality
- [ ] Visa status
- [ ] Oras (Time)
- [ ] Other: ____________

K. Diskriminasyon (Discrimination)

62. **Nakaranas ka na bang pahintuin ng pulis para i-check ang iyong residence/alien card? (Have you ever experienced being stopped by the police to check your residence/alien card?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes)
- ( ) Hindi (No)

63. **Kuntento ka ba sa iyong buhay sa Japan sa kasulukuyan? (Are you contented with your life in Japan currently?)**

Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Very Satisfied	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	Very unsatisfied

64. **Pakiramdam mo ba ay at home ka sa Japan? (Do you feel at home in Japan?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Oo (Yes)
- ( ) Hindi (No)

K.1. Diskriminasyon (Discrimination)

Isulat kung sang-ayon ka o hindi sa mga sumusunod na pahayag: (Answer whether you agree or disagree with the following statements)

65. **a. Sa kabuuan, hospitable at welcoming na bansa para sa mga Filipino ang Japan. (In general Japan is a hospitable and welcoming country for Filipinos)** *
Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly Agree	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Strongly Disagree

66. **b. Sa kabuuan, kayang kaya ng mga Filipino na umunlad sa Japan kung magtatrabaho sila ng maigi. (In general, Filipinos can succeed in Japan if they work hard enough)** *
Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly Agree	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Strongly Disagree

L. Housing

67. **Marami bang Filipinong nakatira sa lugar kung saan ka nakatira? (Are there many Filipino living where you live?)** *
Mark only one oval.

◯ Oo (Yes)
◯ Hindi (No)

68. **Paano mo nahanap ang iyong kasalukuyang tinitirhan? (How did you find your current housing?)** *
Mark only one oval.

◯ Sarili ko (By myself)
◯ Kaibigan/kamag-anak/personal na koneksyon (Friends/relatives/personal connection)
◯ Sa tulong ng lokal na pamahalaan (With the help of local government)
◯ Sa tulong ng mga migrant organization (With the help of migrant organizations)
◯ Nakikitira sa bahay ng mga kamag-anak/asawa/partner (Lives with my relatives/spouse/partner)
◯ Other: ____________________

69. **Anu-anong mga problema ang hinarap mo sa paghahanap ng matitirhan? (Piliin lahat ng kailangan) (What problems have you experienced in looking for a place to stay?)** *
Check all that apply.

☐ Lenggwahe (Language)
☐ Pera (Money)
☐ Bawal ang mga foreigner (Foreigners not allowed)
☐ Problema sa visa/Legal status/Documentation (Visa problems, legal status, documentation)
☐ Kulang sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
☐ Wala (None)
☐ Other: ____________________

70. **Gaano ka ka-kuntento sa iyong tinitirhan sa kasalukuyan? (How content are you with your current housing?)** *
Mark only one oval.

	1	2	3	4	5	
Very Satisfied	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	Very Unsatisfied

M. Permanent Residency

71. **May plano ka bang permanenteng manirahan sa Japan? (Do you have plans to live permanently in Japan?)** *
Mark only one oval.

◯ Oo (Yes)
◯ Wala (None) *Skip to question 76.*

M.1. Permanent Residency

72. **Kung oo, nag-apply ka na ba para makakuha ng Japanese citizenship? (If yes, have you already applied to get Japanese citizenship?)** *
Mark only one oval.

◯ Oo (Yes)
◯ Hindi (No) *Skip to question 74.*

M.1.1. Permanent Residency

73. **Anu-anong mga problema ang hinarap mo sa pag-apply? (Piliin lahat ng kailangan) (What problems have you experienced in applying? Mark all that apply)** *
Check all that apply.

☐ Mahirap na test (Difficult test)
☐ Pera (Money)
☐ Dokumento (Documents)
☐ Oras (Time)
☐ Kulang sa impormasyon (Lack of information)
☐ Wala (None)
☐ Other: ______________________

Skip to question 77.

M.1.2. Citizenship

74. **Kung hindi ka pa nag-apply, nagpaplano ka bang mag-apply ng citizenship? (If you haven't applied yet, do you plan to apply?)** *
Mark only one oval.

◯ Oo (Yes) *Stop filling out this form.*
◯ Hindi (No)

Skip to question 75.

M.1.3. Citizenship

75. **Kung hindi, bakit hindi mo gustong mag-apply ng citizenship? (If not, why don't you want to apply for citizenship?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Kakailanganin kong i-give up ang Filipino citizenship (I would need to give up my Filipino citizenship)
- Masyadong mahirap ang proseso (Process is too difficult)
- Masyadong mahal ang proseso (Process is so expensive)
- Hindi ako habambuhay maninirahan sa Japan (I don' plan to stay in Japan forever)
- Wala namang kaibahan sa kasalukuyan kong (visa) status (Has no different with my current visa status)
- Other: ____________________

Skip to question 77.

M.2. Panandaliang Paninirahan (Non-Permanent Stay)

76. **Kung walang planong manirahan ng permanente sa Japan, sa iyong palagay gaano katagal ka pang maninirahan sa Japan? (If you don't have any plans of living in Japan permanently, how long do you you will stay?)** *

Mark only one oval.

- Kulang isang taon (Less than a year)
- Higit sa isang taon ngunit kulang sa 3 taon (More than a year but less than 3 years)
- Higit sa 3 taon ngunit kulang sa 5 taon (More than 3 years but less than 5 years)
- Higit sa 5 taon ngunit kulang sa 10 taon (More than 5 years but less than 10 years)
- Higit sa 10 taon (More than 10 years)

Skip to question 77.

Maraming Salamat! (Thank you very much!)

77. **I-submit na ang form? (Submit the form?)**

Mark only one oval.

- Oo (Yes)

Stop filling out this form.

Maraming Salamat po!

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