To Commit, Not to Commit, or to Commit to Not Committing

Review Article of Nayuta MIKI (2019) *Psychological and Public Aspects of Speaker Meaning: Toward a Philosophy of Communication*, Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 285pp, in Japanese.

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Abstract

We will review Miki's (2019) analysis of speaker meaning, focusing on her alleged sweeping argument against intention-based semantics launched by Grice, as well as on the notion of (joint) commitment to which she appeals in providing an alternative framework called jointness-based semantics. Intention-based semantics assumes that speaker meaning is determined by speaker intention. This conception is known to trigger the infinite regress of intentions, failing to secure the transparency and publicness of speaker meaning. Miki attempts to prove that the regress necessarily stems from the representationalist view of speaker meaning, proposing instead to postulate publicness as its primitive character. Miki's alleged proof rests on the failure to acknowledge that when p entails q, the utterer of p is not always as much committed to q as to p. This failure also plagues Miki's formulation of speaker meaning, according to which S means p by uttering x iff S's utterance x is an open declaration of S's readiness to form the collective belief that S believes that p. The notion of collective belief is defined in terms of joint commitment, meant to cover both what is asserted and what is implicated, the latter including implicature and presupposition. In the interpretation of implicature, however, the relation between speaker and hearer may be fundamentally asymmetric. As for presupposition, there is a sense in which the speaker makes no fully public commitment to meaning what she presupposes. Finally, when we understand what is asserted, our recognition of the speaker's commitment to his/her (collective) belief is often not primary nor essential. Ambitious and intriguing as it is, Miki's analysis might be committed too much to the notion of commitment.

1. Background: Intention-Based Semantics

Since Grice's pioneering work (Grice 1957/1989), it has generally been assumed that speaker meaning should be, and can be, analyzed in terms of speaker intention. It seems obvious that, when you

utter a sentence, say, "It's raining today", you intend to tell the hearer(s) that it is raining today[1]. It also seems no less obvious that the meaning of your utterance is based on your intention, which the hearer must understand if the communication is to succeed[2]. Obviousness does not guarantee success, however. To elaborate this apparently obvious idea, the following two questions must be answered: (i) what exactly does the relation 'based on' consist in?, and (ii) what content does 'your intention' have? Very roughly speaking, the predominant framework in philosophy of language, inspired by Grice (1957/1989) and commonly called intention-based semantics, answers the question in (i) by saying that "what a speaker means is determined by the speaker's intentions" (Davis 2005: Sec. 8). Intuitively, the speaker meaning is nothing but the intended meaning. (ii) is a far more complicated question than it might appear at first blush, and much debate in intention-based semantics has been centered around this issue.

What complicates the matter is the apparent tension between the two questions just given. Let us begin with (ii). Whatever content the speaker's intentions may have, it seems indisputable that the speaker's intentions are first and foremost something private or subjective, in that they are internally represented in the speaker's mind. To be sure, we can express our intentions with public words, but it is always possible for us to keep our real intentions unrevealed. The essentially private nature of the speaker's intentions is potentially at odds with the answer which intention-based semantics gives to the first question. As said above, the Gricean framework assumes that what a speaker means is determined by the speaker's intentions. No matter how the notion of meaning may be construed, it seems undeniable that meaning is first and foremost something public or objective[3]. If meaning were essentially private or subjective, the hearer could

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[1] An utterance can be addressed to one or several hearers. When there is more than one hearer, all of them do not have to be present in the context of utterance. Suppose that John wonders whether Mary and Bill will come to the party he organizes. In this situation, John can say to Mary, "Will you come to the party?", where the pronoun 'you' refers to Bill as well as Mary, even if Bill is not present at the place where the conversation takes place, namely, even if he is not a hearer or addressee in the strict sense of the terms. To cover cases of this sort, Clark and Carlson (1982) propose to distinguish 'addressee' and 'target', both of which constitute the "participants" in the conversation. In the case at hand, Bill is not a hearer/addressee but a target of John's interrogative act. Following the book under review (Miki 2019), however, we will ignore this issue, exclusively using the singular '(the) hearer' henceforth.

[2] Two remarks about the terminology should be made here. First, as is well known, Grice (1957/1989) draws a distinction between natural meaning and nonnatural meaning. Roughly, natural meaning rests on causal relations, as in 'Those spots mean measles', while nonnatural meaning is based on conventions, as in 'Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full'. As human communication is largely a matter of nonnatural meaning, Grice's (1957/1989) major interest naturally lies in nonnatural meaning (Miki, p. 34). Following the program set out by Grice, subsequent researchers including Miki pursue the characterization of nonnatural meaning. In this paper, accordingly, we will set aside natural meaning. Second, in the Gricean framework discussed below, the terms 'utter' and 'utterance' are used "in an artificially extended way, to apply to any act or performance which is or might be a candidate for nonnatural meaning" (Grice 1969: 151/1989: 92). Accordingly, the terms 'speaker' and 'hearer' should also be interpreted in a broader sense than usual (Miki, pp. 8, 35-36). This extension enables one to treat both linguistic and nonlinguistic communication in a unified manner.

[3] In cognitive linguistics, a relatively new framework in theoretical linguistics, meaning is identified with conceptualization", where "[c]onceptualization is broadly defined to encompass any fact of mental experience" (Langacker 2008: 30). This might give the impression that, in this theory, meaning is viewed as purely subjective. Indeed, the term 'cognitive' tends to foster the impression. This interpretation is mistaken, however. Langacker (2008: 38) claims that "[m]eanings (like other linguistic structures) are recognized as part of a language only to the extent that they are (i) entrenched in the minds of individual speakers and (ii) conventional for members of a speech community", where clauses (i) and (ii) contain the

never grasp the meaning of the speaker's utterance. As Dummett (1973: 85) puts it, "[m]eaning, under any theory whatsoever, cannot be *in principle* subjective, because meaning is a matter of what is *conveyed* by language". It follows that if, as intention-based semantics assumes, the speaker's intentions determine the speaker's meaning, then it must be the case that something private or subjective can determine something public or objective. This *per se* is not a contradiction, but one can nonetheless see that the relation between speaker intention and speaker meaning is not so straightforward as one might think. Indeed, the very formulation of the answer given to the first question betrays the difficulties we may face in advocating intention-based semantics. As seen above, "what a speaker means is determined, the Gricean view assumes, by the speaker's intentions" (Davis 2005: Sec. 8), where the last noun is put in the plural. To fully answer the first question, then, we must decide how many and which intentions determine the speaker's meaning. When you intend, by uttering "It's raining today", to tell the hearer that it is raining today, how many and which intentions do you (need to) form? How do those intentions determine what you mean? The problems thus formulated are philosophical enough to make the general reader shy away from delving into the detailed discussion of the matter. Such is, however, the very starting point of Miki (2019), the book under review here.

2. The Goals of the Book Under Review

The book under review has two ambitious goals. The first is to completely demolish the Gricean program for speaker meaning. The second is to launch a radically different alternative called jointness-based semantics. The major difference between the two approaches is rather easy to articulate; intention-based semantics starts from what Miki calls "the psychological aspect of speaker meaning", whereas jointness-based semantics reverses the order of explanation, construing what Miki calls "the public aspect of speaker meaning" as more basic (pp. 21-22). Being both psychological and public is, Miki claims, what characterizes speaker meaning, and any theory of semantics must give a proper account of both aspects (pp. 13, 19-20).

The fact that speaker meaning is psychological is closely related to, but not identical with, the fact that, as said in Section 1, speaker intention is something private or subjective. When a speaker says, "It is raining today", she forms the intention to tell the hearer that it is raining today, and this intention is represented in the speaker's mind. Now, how are we to account for the fact that the intention to convey that it is raining today is represented in the speaker's mind? A natural explanation that comes to mind would be that the speaker believes that it is raining today. In general, we intend to tell the hearer that *p* partly because, in normal contexts, we believe that *p*. If we do not believe that *p*, there will hardly be any reason why we say that *p*. As Austin (1962: 48) says, "[m]y saying that 'the cat is on the mat' implies that it is", and "[w]e cannot say 'the cat is on the mat but I do not believe it is'" (cf. Ducrot 1972: 47, Searle 1975: 347)[4]. This suggests that the meaning of an utterance allows the hearer, unless there is evidence to the

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words 'entrenched' and 'conventional', respectively. When a meaning is entrenched, it can be activated repeatedly (as opposed to only once), and when a meaning is conventional, several people (as opposed to only one person) can put it in use in a regular manner. This view is hardly compatible with the idea that meaning is in principle subjective.

[4] This puzzle is first noted by G. E. Moore and is called 'Moore's paradox'. The sentence 'the cat is on the mat but I do not believe it is' is paradoxical because it sounds decisively odd while it contains no obvious

subproblems, to each of which any theory of semantics must find a solution: realization problem and connection problem (pp. 50-52, 130-131). The realization problem consists in specifying the type of situation which obtains when a speaker means something and the hearer understands what the speaker means, i.e., specifying what Miki calls 'the realized situation' (p. 50). Since making an utterance is, in most cases, an intentional act, the realized situation corresponds to the type of situation that the speaker aims to bring about. This characterization of the realized situation gives rise to what Miki calls the connection problem, consisting in identifying the way the speaker aims to connect her utterance to the realized situation. The proposed decomposition of what constitutes the problem of speaker meaning, a bit perplexing at first sight, will nevertheless help better compare intention-based semantics with the alternative Miki defends. The transparency and publicness of speaker meaning presented in the previous paragraph can now be construed as a constraint on the answer given to the realization problem, or, equivalently, on the characterization of the realized situation (pp. 132-133). On this conception, when a speaker means something and the hearer understands what the speaker means, the fact that the speaker means what she says must be manifest and public. No situation that fails to fulfil this constraint counts as a legitimate realized situation, which implies that, in making an utterance, the speaker must aim to bring about a situation in which the transparency and publicness of speaker meaning hold. This constraint on the realized situation is, and must be, acknowledged by all approaches to speaker meaning (p. 134), making the exploration of the problem of speaker meaning a teleological enterprise (p. 50).

A genuine divergence arises when we look into how to solve the connection problem, which consists in identifying the way the speaker aims to connect her utterance to the realized situation. As seen in Section 1 above, intention-based semantics holds that what a speaker means is determined by the speaker's intentions. Since the speaker's intentions are represented in her mind, and the speaker intends to bring about the realized situation, this claim amounts to saying that the realized situation corresponds to the representation the speaker entertains in making the utterance in question. This conception, implied by intention-based semantics, constitutes what Miki (p. 130, 133) calls the representationalist view of speaker meaning. Since, as discussed in the preceding two paragraphs, what a speaker means must become transparent and pubic in the realized situation, it follows from the Gricean conception that the speaker aims, in making an utterance, to bring about a situation in which what she represents in her mind is manifest and public. This is the answer that intention-based semantics gives to the connection problem (p. 143). At the beginning of this paper, we have said that, when you utter "It's raining today", you intend to tell the hearer that it is raining today. We can now formulate what you intend more precisely: when you utter "It's raining today", you intend to bring about a situation in which your mental representation corresponding to that utterance is manifest and public. This is what is meant by the statement that what a speaker means is determined by the speaker's intentions. The new formulation, however, still does not tell us what exactly 'your mental representation corresponding to that utterance' is. This issue will be addressed shorty, along with the comparison of the solutions which intention-based semantics and jointness-based semantics bring to the connection problem. As Miki herself emphasizes (pp. 52-53), it is Miki's own insight to characterize the problem of speaker meaning in terms with such notions as teleological explanation, realized situation, realization problem, and connection problem. This insight enables one to better understand what is at issue

in the debate about speaker meaning, and, as will be discussed in the next section, what exactly is wrong with intention-based semantics.

3. An Alleged Sweeping Argument Against Intention-based Semantics

As we have seen in Section 2, intention-based semantics, the most influential theory of speaker meaning, makes the claim that when you utter a sentence "It's raining today", you intend to bring about a situation in which your mental representation corresponding to that utterance is manifest and public. We have also noted that this formulation still does not tell us what 'your mental representation corresponding to that utterance' comes down to. This insufficiency has to do with the problems raised in Section 1: when you intend, by uttering "It's raining today", to tell the hearer that it is raining today, how many and which intentions do you (need to) form? Grice's original proposal runs as follows:

> *A* must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience, and he must also intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended. But these intentions are not independent; the recognition is intended by *A* to play its part in inducing the belief, and if it does not do so something will have gone wrong with the fulfillment of *A*'s intentions. Moreover, *A*'s intending that the recognition should play this part implies, I think, that he assumes that there is some chance that it will in fact play this part, that he does not regard it as a foregone conclusion that the belief will be induced in the audience whether or not the intention behind the utterance is recognized. Shortly, perhaps, we may say that "*A* meant$_{NN}$ something by x" is roughly equivalent to "*A* uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention." (Grice 1957: 383-384/1989: 219)[7]

In this dense passage, Grice talks about three intentions which define speaker meaning as in (1).

(1)   [= Miki's (1.9), p. 45]
       Speaker *S* means *p* by uttering 'x' if and only if S intends that:[8]
       1. Hearer *A* believes that *p*.
       2. *A* recognizes that *S* has the intention stated in 1.
       3. *A*'s recognition that *S* has the intention stated in 1 is part of the reason why *A* comes to believe that *p*.

As Strawson (1964) says, this apparently complex analysis is intended to be an analysis of what it is like for a person to communicate with another.

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[7] 'Mean$_{NN}$' abbreviates 'mean nonnaturally'. Since, as said in footnote 2 of the present paper, we focus on nonnatural meaning, 'mean$_{NN}$' can safely be understood as 'mean' *tout court*. It may also be noted that Grice deals only with informative utterances. In fact, Grice attempts, in subsequent passage, to modify the formulation to cover other types of utterances. However, utterances other than assertions do not concern us here.

[8] Miki writes just 'if', but, as she notes (p. 45), the clauses following 'if' are in fact meant to lay down necessary and sufficient conditions for speaker meaning.

Grice's analysis of his concept is fairly complex. But I think a little reflection shows that it is not quite complex enough for his purpose. Grice's analysis is undoubtedly offered as an analysis of a situation in which one person is trying, in a sense of the word "communicate" fundamental to any theory of meaning, to communicate with another. (Strawson 1964: 446, partially quoted in Miki, p. 40)

It is thus important to understand that the three intentions given in (1) are all germane to human communication. In order to show that the condition in (1-1) is not sufficient for communication to succeed, Grice (1957: 381-382/1989: 217) considers a case in which S leaves B's handkerchief near the scene of a murder in order to induce the detective to believe that B is the murderer, while it is S who committed the crime. In this case, it would not be possible for the detective to say, "S told me that B was the murderer". There is no communication here, in the normal sense of the term, between S and the detective. What is missing here is S's intention to make his intention known to the detective. S intends the detective to come to believe that B is the murderer, but S does not intend the detective to recognize this intention; otherwise S would never succeed in misleading the detective. This suggests that the clause in (1-2) is necessary for S to communicate, in the normal sense of the term, that *p*. What completes the picture is the clause in (1-3), which is needed to distinguish cases in which S communicates that *p* from cases in which the hearer happens to understand that *p*, irrespective of his recognition of S's intention. Suppose that, in order to let A know that B is the murderer, S shows A a photograph displaying B's handkerchief left on the scene of the crime (cf. Grice 1957: 382/1989: 218). In this case, A may come to believe that B is the murderer as the result of the recognition of S's intention. But, as Grice (1957: 383/1989: 218) points out, the same effect would have been produced simply by A's seeing the photograph which S had left in his room by accident. This suggests that, when S shows A a photograph, A's recognition of S's intention is not essential for A to come to believe what S wants A to believe. Since the act of showing a photograph does not fulfil the condition in (1-3), it is not a good example of speaker meaning. The condition is fulfilled, by contrast, when S draws a picture of B committing a crime, or S explicitly says, "B is the murderer". In this case, A's belief that B is the murderer hinges upon A's recognition of S's intention to let A know. These considerations lead Grice to postulate (1) as the necessary and sufficient conditions for speaker meaning.

The formulation given in (1) is still not sufficient, however, as Strawson points out:

But it is possible to imagine a situation in which Grice's three conditions would be satisfied by a person *S* and yet, in this important sense of "communicate," it would not be the case that *S* could be said to be trying to communicate by means of his production of x with the person *A* in whom he was trying to produce the response *r*. I proceed to describe such a situation. (Strawson 1964: 446)

Instead of describing the type of situation which Strawson considers to be threatening to the conditions in (1), a rather complicated but common type of situation, we will point to a notorious problem which plagues intention-based semantics as formulated in (1). Underlying Strawson's argument, which we will not present here, is the simple fact that one's intentions are part of one's mental representations. As said in Section 2, when you utter a sentence "It's raining today", you intend to bring about a situation in which your mental

representation corresponding to that utterance is manifest and public. Now, since the intention in question is part of your mental representations, you must also internally represent the fact that you intend to bring about a situation in which your mental representation corresponding to that utterance is manifest and public. Then, you must intend the representation which represents this fact to be manifest and public as well. It may be seen that this leads to a further regress. In general, when you intend your mental representation corresponding to a representation, r_1, to be manifest and public, you must also intend your mental representation, r_2, corresponding to your intention to make r_1 manifest and public, to be manifest and public, and *ad infinitum*. Applied to (1), *S* must intend not only that, as stated in (1-2), *A* recognizes that *S* has the intention stated in 1, but also that *A* recognizes that *S* has the intention stated in 2, and so on (Schiffer 1972/1988).

To cope with the infinite regress just sketched, several researchers have proposed to revise the formulation of intention-based semantics. The amendments these authors bring to intention-based semantics, summarized in Miki (pp. 128-129), are all overwhelming in their technicality. Miki's review of these revisions is even more overwhelming in its quantity and quality. Harman's original paper (Harman 1974), for instance, has only six pages, while Miki spends more than fifty pages to scrutinizing, and finally rejecting, Harman's proposal (pp. 91-144). We do not think, therefore, that it is the most advisable to review, at this moment, Miki's review of the amendments that have been made to intention-based semantics. Reproducing the technical details of Miki's argument here is not only reader-unfriendly, but also superfluous, because, in Chapter 4 of her book, Miki presents an alleged sweeping argument against intention-based semantics, according to which the breakdown of that framework is not due to its technical problems, but necessarily stems from its fundamental architecture. No matter how one may refine its techniques, intention-based semantics, though intuitively appealing, is destined to fail (pp. ii, 135-136, 142, 144, 149). It is one thing to admit that an infinite regress arises under certain circumstances, and it is another to claim that the regress necessarily arises irrespective of the assumptions adopted. Miki commits herself to the second, much stronger claim. It must be noted, however, that Miki's claim is not that speaker intention plays no role in speaker meaning. Miki rather endorses what is called the minimum-intention view (pp. 155, 178-179, 183, 211-212), which consists in legitimating (2-1) below while dismissing (2-2) and (2-3) as ungrounded.

(2) [= Miki's 4.1-4.3, p. 152]
1. To mean something is to intentionally make an utterance.
2. The content of the speaker's meaning corresponds to the content of the speaker's intentions accompanying the utterance in question.
3. The content of the speaker's meaning is determined by the content of the speaker's intentions accompanying the utterance in question.

What defines the intention-based approach is not (2-1), but (2-2) and (2-3). The last two clauses embody the representationalist conception of speaker meaning, according to which, as we have seen in Section 2, the realized situation corresponds to the representation the speaker entertains in making the utterance in question. What Miki attempts to show in Chapter 3 of her book is that representationalism is incompatible

with the transparency of speaker meaning, or, equivalently, that assuming both the representationalism and transparency of speaker meaning necessarily ends up with an infinite regress (pp. 130, 140-141, 144, 185, 248-249). As seen in Section 1, intention-based semantics holds that something private or subjective (= speaker intention) determines something public or objective (= speaker meaning). Miki's argument purports to falsify this hypothesis altogether (pp. 108-109).

As a first step, Miki adds an assumption which she qualifies as inoffensive (p. 140), namely the assumption that, in general, if q is a necessary condition for p, then one must hold the same propositional attitude toward both p and q (pp. 137-138). Suppose that (3b) is a necessary condition for (3a) (p. 137).

(3)　a. Fred wins the first prize in the race.
　　　b. Fred finishes in first place in the race.

Anyone who accepts this supposition, Miki says, must hold the same attitude toward (3a) and (3b). Thus, if (4a) is true, then (4b) must also be true; otherwise, Mary would be regarded as an irrational person, or as ignorant of the meaning of (3a) and/or (3b).

(4)　a. Mary believes that Fred will win the first prize in the race.
　　　b. Mary believes that Fred will finish in first place in the race.

Similarly, if (5a)/(6a) is true, then (5b)/(6b) must also be true[9].

(5)　a. Fred wants to win the first prize in the race.
　　　b. Fred wants to finish in first place in the race.
(6)　a. Fred intends to win the first prize in the race.
　　　b. Fred intends to finish in first place in the race.

Now, on the representational view of speaker meaning, the realized situation is represented in the speaker's intentions. This amounts to saying that (7a) entails (7b).

(7)　a. S means p.
　　　b. S intends that situation r should be realized. (r = realized situation)

As discussed in Section 2, the transparency of speaker meaning dictates that, in the realized situation, both what the speaker means and that the speaker means what she means be manifest, so that there may be

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[9] (5a) and (5b) can be analyzed, at least from a semantic perspective, to have biclausal structures illustrated in (i) and (ii), respectively.
(i)　[S_1 Fred$_i$ wants [S_2 PRO$_i$ to win the first prize in the race]]
(ii)　[S_3 Fred$_i$ wants [S_4 PRO$_i$ to finish in first place in the race]]
S_2 and S_3 in (i-ii) represent the same propositions as (3a) and (3b) in the text, respectively. Thus, (5a) and (5b) represent states of affairs in which Fred holds a propositional attitude expressed by 'want' toward the propositions expressed by (3a) and (3b), respectively. The same holds for (6).

nothing that the speaker knows but the hearer does not know concerning the former's act of saying what she says. This amounts to saying that if (8a) is true, then (8b) must also be true.

> (8) a. Situation r is realized. (r = realized situation)
>
> b. The fact that S means p is manifest.

By putting together (7b) and (8), we obtain (9).

> (9) S intends that the fact that S means p should be manifest.

It should be noticed here that (9 = 10b) is a necessary condition for (8a = 10a). For if (10b) were false, situation r in (10a) would not count as a legitimate realized situation.

> (10) a. Situation r is realized. (r = realized situation)   [= (8a)]
>
> b. S intends that the fact that S means p should be manifest. (9)

Then, (11a) must entail (11b), just as (6a) entails (6b).

> (11) a. S intends that situation r should be realized. (r = realized situation)   [=(7b)]
>
> b. S intends that S should intend that the fact that S means p should be manifest.

Now, since (7b) is a necessary condition for (7a), (11b) entails (12), where the underlined part substitutes 'S means p' in (11b).

> (12) S intends that S should intend that the fact that <u>S intends that situation r should be realized</u> should be manifest.

Again, since (10b) is a necessary condition for (10a), (12) entails (13), where the underlined part substitutes 'situation r is realized' in (12).

> (13) S intends that S should intend that the fact that S intends that <u>S should intend that the fact that S means p should be manifest</u> should be manifest.

Again, since (7b) is a necessary condition for (7a), 'S means p' in (13) must be replaced by 'S intends that situation r is realized', as in (14).

> (14) S intends that S should intend that the fact that S intends that S should intend that the fact that <u>S intends that situation r should be realized</u> should be manifest should be manifest.

One may notice that the substitution process will never reach an end, making it impossible for intention-

based semantics to even get off the ground. This argument is valid, Miki (p. 136) points out, whatever verb expressing a propositional attitude may be used in place of 'intend'. It follows that it is not possible to determine the content of propositional attitudes, including intentions, which the speaker must have in order to mean p. Or equivalently, no matter what mental representation one may have, the transparency of speaker meaning will never be achieved.

We are now left with two options. We may discard either the representationalist view of speaker meaning, or the assumption of its transparency (pp. 141-142). Miki chooses the first option, since, as said in Section 2, the transparency and publicness of speaker meaning constitutes a constraint on the answer given to the realization problem (pp. 132-133). What must be thrown away is the representationalist answer which intention-based semantics gives to the connection problem, namely the answer that the speaker intends, in making an utterance, to bring about a situation in which what she represents in her mind is manifest and public. Miki concludes that, insofar as we consider transparency and publicness to be the fundamental properties of speaker meaning, the Gricean approach should be given up.

We do not find Miki's argument compelling, however, because it seems to rest on a mistaken assumption. As a matter of fact, we are confronted with three options here, instead of two. One may, as Miki suggests, discard the representationalist view of speaker meaning, or the assumption of its transparency. One may, however, equally be skeptical about the auxiliary assumption which Miki considers to be innocuous. Miki's proof against representationalism hinges upon the assumption that (5a) and (6a) entail (5b) and (6b), respectively, or, more generally, upon the assumption that, if q is a necessary condition for p, then one must hold the same propositional attitude toward both p and q. As it turns out, this auxiliary assumption is not immaculate. The assumption certainly works for (5-6), but, as Ruwet (1991: 19) reminds us, "one swallow (or two) does not a summer make"[10]. Thus, even though (15a) entails (15b), (16a) does not entail (16b). This is a classical Frege case (Frege 1892: 32/1997: 156).

(15) a. The Morning Star is a body illuminated by the Sun.

b. The Evening Star is a body illuminated by the Sun.

(16) a. Fred believes that the Morning Star is a body illuminated by the Sun.

b. Fred believes that the Evening Star is a body illuminated by the Sun.

One may object here that the relation between (15a) and (15b) is not logical, but metaphysical. Then, what should we make of the cases of (17-18), which are obviously linguistic in nature?

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[10] Ruwet, a high-profile generative grammarian in France, gradually distanced himself from the Chomskyan framework, which, for him, falls prey to what he calls "the One Swallow Does a Summer Make Fallacy", or simply "the Swallow Fallacy", a fallacy to which he himself admits having occasionally succumbed. Ruwet (1991: xviii) says that "it is obvious what this is", thus continuing:

The Swallow Fallacy consists of finding an example sentence – a single example sentence – and drawing a sweeping syntactic generalization, based on the conviction (drawn before any further swallows have been spotted) that what makes that example sentence Good and Bad will hold across a large range of formally similar structures. In practice, what this has come down to frequently is the constant use of the same example in paper after paper […]. (Ruwet 1991: xviii)

(17) a. John has exactly 1,234 books and Mary has exactly eight times as many books as John does.

   b. Mary has exactly 9,872 books.

(18) a. Fred believes that John has exactly 1,234 books and that Mary has exactly eight times as many books as John does.

   b. Fred believes that Mary has exactly 9,872 books.

Even if (18a) is true, (18b) does not have to be true. As Dinsmore (1991: 78) says, "if P is satisfied in a belief space in sp_1 then it is not necessarily the case that every consequence of P is satisfied in sp_1". The situation is worse with propositional attitudes like 'hope' or 'want' which correspond to speech acts with the world-to-word/mind direction of fit like 'order' or 'beg', as opposed to propositional attitudes like 'believe' which correspond to speech acts with the word/mind-to-world direction of fit like 'state' or 'assert' (cf. Searle 1975: 346-348)[11]. As Dinsmore (1991: 81) observes, although (19a) entails (19b), (20a) does not entail (20b).

(19) a. Fred's white cat wins the first prize.

   b. Fred's cat is white.

(20) a. Fred hopes that his white cat wins the first prize.

   b. Fred hopes that his cat is white.

By the same token, even though the truth of (21b) is necessary for the truth of (21a), (22a) can be true without (22b) also being true.

(21) a. John will stop smoking.

   b. John used to smoke.

(22) a. Fred hopes that John will stop smoking.

   b. Fred hopes that John used to smoke.

Crucially, just like 'hope', 'intend' is, as Miki (p. 133) recognizes, a propositional attitude corresponding to speech acts with the world-to-word/mind direction of fit such as 'promise' or 'threaten' (Searle 1975: 347)[12]. Consequently, even if the truth of (23a) requires that of (23b), (24a) does not entail (24b).

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[11] Hanks (2015: Ch. 9) advances the view that interrogative utterances have the word-to-word or representation-to-representation direction of fit, on the ground that "[a]n act of asking is answered when the subject is provided with the appropriate representation, regardless of where that representation comes from" (Hanks 2015: 188). Additionally, Hanks (2015: 200-201) rejects Searle's idea that "[d]eclarations are a very special category of speech acts" (Searle 1975: 360) in that they have both word-to-world and world-to-word direction of fit, claiming instead that declarations have neither direction of fit, because they "do not have propositional contents" (Hanks 2015: 201).

[12] For Austin (1962: 157-158), intending belongs to the group of illocutionary acts called 'commissives', along with promising or swearing. As Searle (1975: 352) points out, however, 'intend' is not an illocutionary verb, because "[s]aying "I intend" is not intending". Searle (1975: 347) views intention rather as a psychological state collecting such illocutionary acts as promises, vows, threats, and pledges.

(23) a. John will stop smoking before February 22, 2022.

   b. John will smoke before February 21, 2022.

(24) a. Fred intends that John should stop smoking before February 22, 2022.

   b. Fred intends that John should smoke before February 21, 2022.

This shows that, in general, accepting (25a) does not force us to accept (25b) as well.

(25) a. If *p*, then *q*. (= *q* is a necessary condition for *p*.)

   b. If S {hopes/intends/…} that *p*, then S {hopes/intends/…} that *q*.

The entailment illustrated in (25b) is in fact not innocuous, contrary to what Miki assumes. What Miki fails to notice is that, when *p* entails *q*, it is not necessarily the case that the utterer of *p* is as much committed to the truth of *q* as to that of *p*. In a simplistic picture, for any proposition *p*, a speaker either means *p* or does not mean *p* at all (cf. Ducrot 1972: 5). It seems that Miki is in the grip of this picture. As textbooks on semantics and/or pragmatics tell us, (21b) is not asserted, but presupposed, in the utterance of (21a) (cf. Ducrot 1968: 38). We will return to this issue in Section 4.

4. Jointness-Based Semantics

   Miki's argument so far (Chs. 1-4) has established, or so she believes, that intention-based semantics necessarily fails to secure the transparency of speaker meaning. This can be taken to suggest that the intension-based framework falls short of providing any feasible solution to the connection problem raised in Section 2, consisting in identifying the way the speaker aims to connect her utterance to the realized situation. In the representationalist picture depicted by that framework, the speaker intends, in making an utterance, to bring about a situation in which what she represents in her mind is manifest and public. The content of such intentions, however, can never be defined without circularity. Since the transparency of speaker meaning is a precondition of its publicness, the Gricean framework would never enable us to account for the public aspect of speaker meaning, an essential property of human communication. If the foregoing argument is correct, the publicness of speaker meaning can hardly be reduced to the psychological state of an individual speaker. These considerations lead Miki to set forth a radically different alternative called jointness-based semantics (Chs. 5-6), which views the publicness of speaker meaning as more basic, or even primitive. To substantiate the idea that what a speaker means is largely orthogonal to the psychological state of the speaker, Miki attempts to show, on the one hand, that the mere transparency of speaker meaning does not secure its public character (pp. 185, 190-191), and, on the other hand, that for a speaker to mean *p* does not generally allow us to attribute the belief that *p* to the speaker, even when the speaker is serious; meaning is orthogonal not only to intention, but equally to belief (pp. 231-232).

   The first point to which Miki (pp. 195-199) draws our attention is that 'communicating with each other' bears a striking resemblance to 'walking together', which, for Gilbert (1990: 2), embodies "a paradigm of social phenomena in general". The fact that Jack and Sue are walking together is not reducible to their physical proximity nor to their common knowledge that each has the same goal (ibid.: 2-3). What characterizes the activity in question is rather normative notions such as obligation and entitlement. If Jack

and Sue are really walking together, Jack has an obligation to perform accordingly, and Sue is entitled to rebuke him if he has drawn ahead without noticing, and vice versa (ibid.: 3, 6). In order to go for a walk together, each of the two "must express willingness to constitute with the other a *plural subject of the goal*" (ibid.: 7), i.e., Jack and Sue "are to act as members of a single body, the body comprising the two of them" (ibid.: 8). Of particular importance here is that the goal at which the plural subject aims is not reduced to the goal of individual members; "going for a walk involves 'our goal' as opposed to two or more 'my goals'" (ibid.: 9). Gilbert (1990: 9) conjectures that "there are many activities of this kind, which may be referred to as 'shared', 'joint', or 'collective' action". Her conjecture is confirmed by Taylor (1980), among others, who observes for communication what Gilbert observes for walking together. Communication is not, Taylor (1980: 293) claims, reducible to the physical movements nor to the psychological states of individual speakers; "what we recognize as full communication always has this feature of our coming together in that something is made an object for *us*, where this is something stronger than its being just an object severally for me and for you, and my knowing that you know, and your knowing that I know, and my knowing that you know that I know, etc., up to any level that we can cope with". The transparency of speaker meaning, whatever it may be, is not sufficient for the construction of 'an object for us', because "there is that threshold, which has nothing to do with certainty, or with how much I know that you know, etc." (ibid.: 294).

> […] human communication doesn't just transmit information. It doesn't just produce, e.g., some belief in the hearer. It brings about the acknowledgement that some matter is *entre nous*. And this involves a reflective stance towards the matter that has no animal analogues. For to grasp that something is *entre nous* involves more than grasping that thing; it involves seeing that it is present to us in a certain way, that is, in public space; or to take it from a different angle, that the subject(s) to whom this is present is the two of us together, and no longer just you and I individually. (Taylor 1980: 295, cited in Miki, p. 190)

Taylor's notion of '*entre nous*', or 'a matter between us' (ibid.: 293), may naturally be taken to correspond to the public nature of speaker meaning as discussed by Miki (pp. 185-186, 194). What is lacking in the Gricean model of communication is normative notions such as obligation and entitlement. If Jack and Sue are really communicating with each other, Jack has an obligation to perform accordingly, and Sue is entitled to rebuke him if his behavior is not consistent with what he means, and vice versa. Normativity comes into play only when Jack and Sue constitute what Gilbert calls a plural subject. Miki (p. 193) concludes that the notion of commitment is essential to communication, thus attempting to integrate it into the very definition of speaker meaning.

At first blush, this move may appear to be at odds with the fact that, as seen in Section 2 above, when a speaker means *p*, the hearer can ascribe the belief that *p* to the speaker, which enables the former to explain and predict the latter's behavior. It is important to notice, however, that the speaker's individual belief as such has no direct bearing upon what the speaker means, to the extent that, as Gilbert (1990: 10) says, "[p]lural subjecthood […] extends not only to goals but also, at least, to beliefs and principles of action". What the speaker believes as an individual has nothing to do with obligation or entitlement (Miki, pp. 208-209); the speaker can believe what she wants to believe. Exactly the opposite is true of what the

speaker means, which creates an obligation on the part of the speaker, and grants the hearer the right to rebuke the speaker, if her behavior is inconsistent with what she means. To accommodate the disjunction between personal belief and speaker meaning, Miki proposes to characterize speaker meaning in terms of what Gilbert (2004) calls collective cognitive states, whose importance was, in Gilbert's (2004: 96, 99, 102) view, earlier emphasized by Durkheim (1895/1967/1982). Gilbert (2004: 95) discusses statements illustrated in (26).

(26) a. The union believes that management is being unreasonable.
b. In the opinion of the court, this law is unconstitutional.
c. Our discussion group thought it was a great novel.
d. Our family believes in ghosts.
e. Bill and Jane have concluded that it would be wrong.
f. We knew we had to stop.

Each of the statements in (26) ascribes a collective cognitive state to a 'population' (ibid.: 96). A collective cognitive state can plausibly be characterized as a social fact, in that it is largely external to the cognitive states of individual members that constitute the population in question, and that it is "endued with a compelling and coercive power" (Durkheim 1895/1967/1982: 51)[13]. "Once a group belief is established, Gilbert (2004: 99) says, the parties understand that any members who bluntly express the opposite belief lay themselves open to rebuke by other members". To secure its normative nature, Gilbert defines collective belief as in (27).

(27) *A population, P, believes that p* if and only if the members of P are jointly committed to believe as a body that p. (Gilbert 2004: 100, cited in Miki, p. 202)

The phrase "as a body" figuring in (27) is not hard to understand; "[t]hose who are jointly committed to X as a body constitute, by definition, the plural subject of X-ing" (Gilbert 2004: 101). Joint commitment "is not something composite, a conjunction of the personal commitment of one party with the commitment(s) of the other(s)", but "the creation of all the parties to it, rescindable only with the concurrence of all" (ibid.: 100). The notion of commitment, endued with normativity by definition, is precisely what Miki wants in order to give a proper definition of speaker meaning.

(28) [= Miki's (5.4), p. 205, see also p. 206] Miki's solution to the realization problem:
Speaker S and hearer H have the collective belief that S believes that *p*.
= S and H are jointly committed to believe as a body that S believes that *p*.
(29) [= Miki's (5.5), p. 210] Miki's solution to the connection problem:

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[13] « Non seulement ces types de conduite ou de pensée sont extérieurs à l'individu, mais ils sont doués d'une puissance impérative et coercitive en vertu de laquelle ils s'imposent à lui, qu'il le veuille ou non. » (Durkheim 1895/1967: 36)

> S means *p* by uttering x iff S's utterance x is an open declaration of S's readiness to jointly believe that S believes that *p*, i.e. to form the collective belief that S believes that *p*.

What (28) says is that in the realized situation, both the speaker and the hearer are expected to perform in conformity to the collective belief that the speaker believes that *p*, which secures the publicness of speaker meaning, which, as seen in Section 2, dictates that the speaker be committed to what she says, namely, that the speaker must undertake the full responsibility for meaning what she says. Worth noting here is that what is at issue in (28) is not the personal belief of the speaker, but the higher-order collective belief that the speaker believes that *p* (Miki, pp. 205, 236-241). Since collective beliefs are largely orthogonal to the cognitive states of individual members that constitute the population, this implies that the speaker does not have to personally believe that (she believes that) *p*. It is a common experience that what you say as a teacher is contradictory to what you say as a friend, that what you say as a husband is contradictory to what you say as a politician, that what you say as an individual is contradictory to what you say as a job applicant, and so on and so forth (cf. Miki, p. 235). You are not expected to say at job interviews all and only what you really believe as an individual or as a student. There is a sense in which anyone is dishonest; honesty does not pay. That you often make contradictory remarks does not imply, however, that you are an irrational person, indicating only that, as Miki (pp. 218, 238-242) underlines, you are embedded in several communities at the same time. The utterance "This position allows me to communicate with customers and further develop my skillset", for instance, may be presented as an utterance which a job applicant addresses to the interviewers, while the utterance "I just want to be rich" may be presented as an utterance which a student addresses to a friend of his. These utterances present the reason why the person applies to the position under two different modes of presentation. Just as it is not necessarily irrational, as Frege (1892: 32/1997: 156) suggests, to endorse the thought that the Morning Star is a body illuminated by the Sun, while simultaneously rejecting the thought that the Evening Star is a body illuminated by the Sun, so it is by no means outrageous to make incompatible remarks on distinct occasions; on the contrary, you might run the risk of being stigmatized as irrational if you told the interviewers that you just wanted to be rich. The foregoing picture goes against the idea, put forward by Dinsmore (1991: 64) among others, that a belief context like 'Bif believes that __' is unique. For Dinsmore, it is not appropriate to divide Bif's belief into two separate beliefs, because Bif's belief system is "a single model of a possible "reality"". In sharp contrast with the belief context is, Dinsmore says, a context like 'it is possible __', "because of the existence of multiple, mutually inconsistent possibilities". Miki's communitarianism reminds us that one's beliefs are, like possibilities, multifaceted, which may result in a conflict of interest.

Miki's proposal in (29) draws on Gilbert's (2004: 100) idea that "it is both necessary and sufficient for members of a population, P, collectively to believe something that the members of P have openly expressed their readiness to let the belief in question be established as the belief of P". This proposal presupposes that there are communal practices with respect to which a given act performed by a member of the population counts as an open declaration of her readiness to jointly believe that she believes that *p* (Miki, p. 217). Supporting this idea is the fact that utterances have social functions, as Miki (pp. 162, 167, 173, 215) emphasizes, in that the meaning of an utterance hinges more on existing communal practices than on the speaker's intentions; without such practices, the meaning aimed at cannot be realized, whatever

intentions the speaker, as an individual, may have. This conception contrasts with Strawson's (1964: 456ff) simplistic view, according to which one can draw a distinction between illocutionary acts which are not essentially conventional and illocutionary acts which are wholly convention-governed. On his view, acts of the first type (e.g. "The ice over there is very thin") are successfully performed if uptake is secured, that is, the speaker's intention is recognized by the hearer. For acts of the second type (e.g. "Out" uttered in a baseball game), on the other hand, the securing of uptake is not sufficient, and the reference to accepted conventions of procedure assumes a greater importance. Statements or assertions are generally considered to be of the first type (cf. Sakai 2019: 268). Miki's solution to the connection problem in (29) urges us to discard this simplistic view of statements or assertions. Making a statement is more an institutional act than an individualistic act. The speaker's intentions may play a part, but are not decisive, in determining what she means. What a speaker means is not always transparent to the speaker herself. This conception enables one, Miki (p. 214) claims, to do away with representationalism, a view which, if Miki's argument is along the right lines, triggers the regress problem seen in Section 2.

As we understand it, Miki's thesis on speaker meaning articulated in (28-29) is a version of social externalism, according to which "features of the individual's social environment play a part in the determination of meaning and mental content" (Wikforss 2008: 164, cf. Miki, p. 167). Burge (1979: 95/1982: 124) invites us to think about a patient who has had arthritis in her ankle and wrists for some time, and now believes and fears that her arthritis is spreading and that she has got arthritis in her thigh. In her community, however, the term 'arthritis' applies only to rheumatoid diseases of the joints. How should one interpret her use of 'arthritis' in her uttering or thinking, "My arthritis is spreading and I've got arthritis in my thigh'? One may be inclined to say that this patient misunderstands the meaning of 'arthritis', which, for her, means inflammations of all kinds. On this interpretation, what the patient really means by her utterance or thought "I have got arthritis in my thigh" would be that she has got what she believes to be 'arthritis' in her thigh, where the use of quotation marks is mandatory. Burge rejects this view, however, on the ground that the patient's utterance or thought is obviously false (cf. Wikforss 2008: 163-164). The proposition that she has got what she believes to be 'arthritis' in her thigh is true, but this does not make her utterance/thought "I have got arthritis in my thigh" true. This suggests that "the term as used by her must nevertheless be said to have its standard extension and express the standard concept" (Wikforss 2008: 164). As Burge (1979: 85/1982: 113) contends, "[w]e have to take account of a person's community in interpreting his words and describing his attitudes". In a similar vein, but drawing on different cases, Miki contends that what a speaker means does not hinge upon what the speaker personally believes or intends her utterance to mean (p. 171), considerations of external criteria being indispensable to secure the adequacy of the speaker's intentions (p. 167). This claim should not be confused with the claim that we need to share a public language such as English or Japanese to communicate with each other (p. 218). We all know that we can communicate, albeit to a lesser extent, without sharing any public language. Miki's claim is that we must share some communal practice to start to communicate (pp. 250, 259n. 4), public languages constituting only one of those practices that help us communicate (pp. 162, 217). This leads Miki (p. 222) to espouse what she calls the multimodality of utterances. On this view, each of the various acts accompanying an utterance such as gazing, hand movement, pointing, facial expression, prosody etc. is associated with a specific joint commitment, and the combination or interaction of the relevant

commitments determine the meaning of the utterance.

A question naturally arises here as to how the very first commitment, or the very first communal practice on which the first commitment is based, is established among the members of the population. As discussed in Section 3, intention-based semantics falls short of securing the transparency and, *a fortiori*, publicness of speaker meaning. To settle the issue, Miki incorporates the notion of publicness into the very definition of speaker meaning, as in (28-29). Miki (pp. 207-208) fully recognizes that her proposal does not solve, but only dissolves, the infinite regress puzzle which plagues the intention-based approach. To establish the superiority of her jointness-based approach, Miki must, among other things, show that the solution to the connection problem in (29) does not yield an infinite regress in the other direction (p. 215). Just as 'intend to intend' is the trigger of a regress, 'commit to commit' may be the trigger of another regress. Miki (pp. 215-216) proposes to handle this problem by considering that we are endowed with instincts enabling us to interpret certain cooperative signals as establishing a primitive commitment, no further regress being required. However, appeal to instinct may constitute, as Husserl puts it, "a refuge of phenomenological ignorance"[14]. Indeed, one could, in principle, save intention-based semantics if one were allowed to say that, for example, we were primitively endowed with instincts which enable us to interpret the speaker's intentions to communicate *p* as manifest and public. It remains to be seen whether instincts can really stop the regress of commitments, but not that of intentions.

In addition to the problem just raised, there seem to be three problems with Miki's jointness-based approach, all of which derive from her endorsement of Gilbert's (2004) notion of 'openly expressed', a notion indispensable for Miki's theory to secure the transparency and publicness of speaker meaning.

A joint commitment is created only when each of the parties has, in effect, openly expressed his or her personal readiness to be party to it. That these expressions have been made openly must be common knowledge in the relevant population. (Gilbert 2004: 100, cited in Miki, pp. 209-210)

In modern pragmatics, it is generally agreed that what is communicated or meant consists at least of what is said or asserted, on the one hand, and what is implicated, on the other (Grice 1975/1989). Accordingly, Miki's proposal given in (28-29) is meant to cover both types of speaker meaning. What is implicated, however, does not appear to be 'openly expressed' in the normal sense of the term. Miki (pp. 223-225) attempts to respond to this problem by appeal to the bold idea, put forth by Lepore and Stone (2015), that there is no theoretical use for the notion of conversational implicature (cf. Mena 2017: 133) and, as against the accepted wisdom, that alleged implicatures are nothing but interpretations openly expressed in accordance with some existing communal practices. The conventional nature of implicatures is best illustrated by differences in interpretation we can observe for a pair of sentences whose literal or grammatical meanings are identical. Thus, the English sentence in (30) can hardly be interpreted as a request, whereas its literal translation into Japanese is commonly taken to be one.

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[14] This phrase employed by Husserl was brought to our attention by Konosuke MINEO (Waseda University, p.c.). The original text runs as follows: „Die „unerklärlichen Instinkte" sind phänomenologisch ein Refugium der phänomenologischen Ignoranz […]" (Husserl 1973: 24).

(30) Can you do us the favor of having us listen? (Lepore and Stone 2015: 102 and Miki, p. 224 , cf. Horvat 2000: 115-117)

The interpretation of (30) is more a matter of convention than of calculation. Although Lepore and Stone (2015: 102) think that data of this sort "constitute a knock-down argument against the Gricean view", we must recall that one swallow (or two) does not a summer make (Ruwet 1991: xviii, 19), for it is not obvious whether a similar account applies, say, to the utterance in (31) discussed by Grice (1975/1989).

(31) a. [Uttered in a message sent back by the British General who captured the province of Sind]
        Peccavi. (Grice 1975: 54-55/1989: 36)
      b. I have Sind.
      c. I have sinned.

In the context envisaged, (31a) may naturally be interpreted as conveying (31b) and, in addition, possibly (31c). In Miki's terminology, the interlocutors are expected to be jointly committed more to (31b) than to (31c) here[15]. As Grice says, however, the straightforward or literal interpretation of (31a) would be (31c), not (31b), because 'peccavi' is the first-person singular perfect active indicative of the Latin verb 'peccare' which means 'sin' or 'transgress'. This correspondence between Latin and English enables us to translate (31a) into (31c). But how can we proceed from (31c) to (31b)? To be sure, the two sentences are interrelated by their phonological identity, a grammatical fact of English. However, the necessity to appeal to this particular grammatical fact in this particular context is not stated in any existing conventions; actuality does not imply necessity. Now, a conventional procedure is repeatable by definition. As Mena (2017: 135) says following Lewis (1969), "a convention is a regularity of a certain kind", and "in the community there is a mutual expectation that everyone solves the problem in that way". There would then be no point in claiming that the interpretation in (31b) was openly expressed in accordance with some communal practices. It might perhaps be possible to say, following what Miki (p. 250) says in a different context, that the General and the hearer have jointly constructed a novel practice to which they will be committed thereafter. But this still would not justify claiming that (31a) conveys (31b) merely in virtue of conventions, the General's intentions or propositional attitude playing no essential role in determining what he means by (31a).

Our objection here is surely as tentative as Miki's suggestion is; it would be unfair and premature to categorically argue against a vague suggestion which one might be able to develop in a substantial manner. We still worry that Miki's reasoning is liable to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Everyone knows that metaphor is culture-dependent. Thus, it is difficult to literally translate (32) into Japanese.

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[15] What is crucial here is that the General wants to convey a specific bit of information. As Mena (2017: 138) says, Lepore and Stone (2015) endorse the view that speaker meaning is "understood either in terms of knowledge of conventions or in terms of open-ended invitations to use our imagination in some way", the latter case including figures of speech like metaphor and irony (Lepore and Stone 2015: 153ff). The message conveyed by (31a) is understood neither in terms of knowledge of conventions, nor in terms of open-ended invitations to use our imagination in some way, thus arguing against the conventionalist view advocated by Lepore and Stone. Mena (2017: Sec. 2) makes a similar point.

(32)　You disagree? Okay, *shoot*! (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 4)

Yet, few linguists would accept the conclusion that metaphor is just a matter of convention, denying Lakoff's and Johnson's (1980: 5) claim that the essence of metaphor, dead or novel, lies in "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another". Likewise, as Keenan (1976: 68) points out, unlike logical entailment, conversational implicatures are culture-dependent. However, this by itself can hardly be taken to be evidence of the non-existence of general conversational mechanisms in virtue of which the hearer calculates the implicatures the speaker intends to communicate. We totally agree with Mena (2017: 138) that "[i]t is not clear […] that Lepore and Stone have ruled out the possibility of there being conversational implicatures". Simplifying pragmatics by complicating semantics does not suffice to deny the existence of the former. In this connection, Ducrot (1984: 45) says that the speaker often presents her utterance as a puzzle to which the hearer must find the solution, i.e. implicatures. On this view, the relation between the interlocutors is essentially asymmetric, and joint commitment, if any, can be established only after the hearer has found the solution intended by the speaker. Just as metaphor can be dead or novel, so the puzzle which the speaker presents to the hearer may be sometimes very easy, as is the case with the Japanese version of (30), and sometimes very difficult, as is the case with (31a). In either case, the puzzle is not presented openly, and in the latter case, the hearer may even have difficulty in finding out that there is a puzzle to solve there. It is unclear how Miki's approach can deal with Ducrot's conception of implicatures, which we find intuitively appealing.

The second issue we would like to address in relation to Miki's jointness-based approach concerns what Ducrot (1972) construes as another type of implicit meaning, namely, presuppositions as opposed to assertions. At the end of Section 3, we have suggested that, when p entails q, it is not necessarily the case that the utterer of p is as much committed to the truth of q as to that of p. To be more precise, the utterer of p is not so much committed to what is presupposed in p, namely q, as to what is asserted in p. Consider (33), in which (33a = 21a) presupposes (33b=21b) and asserts (33c).

(33)　a. John will stop smoking. (= (21a))
　　　b. John used to smoke. (= (21b))
　　　c. John will not smoke.

It is well known that presuppositions are inert to negation (Frege 1892: 39-40/1997: 162) and interrogation (Collingwood 1940: 25-26, cf., Ducrot 1968: 38, 46-47, 1972: 22-23, 1984: 18-19, 35-36). (34a) and (34b) presuppose (33b) just like (33a).

(34)　a. It is not the case that John will stop smoking.
　　　b. Did John stop smoking?

This can be taken to suggest that the presupposition is in the periphery of what the speaker wants to convey to the hearer. Collingwood says, "When I ask 'What is that thing for?' I need not be aware that I am presupposing that it is 'for' something" (Collingwood 1940: 26). In the same vein, Ducrot (1972: 81, 1984:

18-19, 40-41) identifies another important characteristic of presuppositions, dubbed the law of sequence (loi d'enchaînement): presuppositions are inert to subordination. Thus, the sequence of the main clause and the subordinate clause in (35a) is inherited by (35c) but not by (35b).

    (35) a. John is in good health because he stopped smoking.

           b. John is in good health because he used to smoke.

           c. John is in good health because he does not smoke.

By combining the law of sequence with Dinsmore's (1991: 81) idea that "[w]hat we might call a "hope space" is actually a conditional space embedded in a belief space, there being no "hope space" as such"[16], we can offer an account of the fact that (36a) does not entail (36b).

    (36) a. Fred hopes that John will stop smoking. (= (22a))

           b. Fred hopes that John used to smoke. (= (22b))

On Dinsmore's view, 'S hopes that P' is equivalent to 'S believes that if P, then it is favorable'. Since, as the law of sequence dictates, the presupposition in P is inert to the subordination with 'if', this should be understood rather as meaning that 'S hopes that P' is equivalent to 'S believes that if p, then it is favorable', where p is the assertion in P. The oddity of the inference from (36a) to (36b) is then analogous to that of the inference from (37a) to (37b).

    (37) a. Fred believes that if John does not smoke, it is favorable.

           b. Fred believes that if John used to smoke, it is favorable.

How are we to understand the peculiarities of presuppositions just sketched? After repudiating the view that a presupposition fundamentally constitutes a condition of use imposed upon the sentence or utterance in question[17], a view suggested in various forms by Frege (1892: 39-40/1997: 162), Strawson (1952: 175) and Austin (1962: 50-51) among others, Ducrot advances the view that presupposing is a special kind of illocutionary act. While the traditional view considers presuppositions to be external to the meaning of the utterance in question, Ducrot construes presuppositions as deeply inscribed in the conventional use of the sentence. As regards illocutionary acts in general, Ducrot assumes that we must "take it as a fundamental and irreducible fact that certain utterances are socially dedicated to the performance of certain acts" (Ducrot 1972: 73[18], translated by Recanati 1987: 94). For Ducrot, illocutionary acts are essentially social, irreducible to purely individualistic notions. Indeed, unlike Recanati (1987, 2002), Ducrot talks rarely about

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[16] Similarly, "[w]hat we might call a "wish space" is actually a counterfactual space embedded in a belief space, there being no "wish space" as such" (Dinsmore 1991: 81).

[17] The use of the word 'fundamentally' is essential here (Ducrot 1972: 25-26, 1984: 35). Ducrot fully acknowledges that the satisfaction of presuppositions is often required for the proper use of a sentence. What he denies is that this defines the notion of presupposition.

[18] « Prendre pour fait premier et irréductible que certains énoncés sont socialement consacrés à l'accomplissement de certaines actions […] » (Ducrot 1972: 73)

intention. This attitude is explained by the fact that, at an early stage of his career, Ducrot was, Recanati (2002: 269-270) says in retrospect, one of the few French scholars who were more inspired by Austin's (1962) conventionalism than by Grice's (1957) intention-based approach[19]. Ducrot has much in common with Miki, one might say. It is characteristic of Ducrot (1972: 5-6, cf. 1984: 45), however, to claim that certain juridical acts are, in virtue of social conventions, designed to be performed only implicitly, this being inscribed in the very structure of human language. In presupposing that q, the speaker performs the juridical act of implicitly constructing an incontestable frame, or what Taylor (1980) might call '*entre nous*', in which the hearer has no right to question the truth of q (Ducrot 1968: 40, 1984: 20, 45). The hearer can be a hearer only insofar as she makes utterances within the limit implicitly set by the speaker; refusing q would be equivalent to refusing the whole dialogue launched by the speaker (Ducrot 1972: 92, 1984: 30). Thus, even though Strawson (1952: 175) says that the speaker "commits himself to" the truth of the presupposition, there is a sense in which the speaker makes no fully public commitment to meaning what he presupposes. Or, if there is commitment to the presupposition, it is not the speaker's own commitment. This is the reason why, as seen above, presuppositions resist negation, interrogation and subordination. For Ducrot (1984: 20, 231-232), the assertion is undertaken by the speaker, the implicature is left to the hearer, and the presupposition belongs to the collective voice, or people including the speaker and the hearer. To presuppose that q is to present q as if it were known to be true, and as if the hearer as well as the speaker had no choice but to accept it. Note that presupposing that q is not the same as asserting the obviousness of q (Ducrot 1968: 40, 1972: 94, cf. Ducrot 1972: 66).

(38) a. John knows that Mary will come.
      b. It is obvious that Mary will come, and John thinks so.

In a sense, the utterers of (38a) and (38b) are both committed to the truth of the proposition that Mary will come. But the commitment is explicit in (38b) but not in (38a). By presupposing that Mary will come, the utterer of (38a) is only 'implicitly committed' to Mary's coming. Even though, unlike implicatures, this commitment is encoded in the linguistic meaning of the verb 'know', hence transparent, there is nevertheless a sense in which the commitment is not as public as in (38b). In presupposing that q, Ducrot (1984: 233) claims, the speaker undertakes the responsibility for the content of q, but not for the assertion of that content. As Miki claims, transparency does not entail '*entre nous*'. As Miki fails to claim, '*entre nous*' still does not entail publicness, or even commitment in the strict sense of the term. It is not clear how Miki's theory, essentially couched in terms of commitment, can accommodate the characteristics of presuppositions as observed by Ducrot. It would be absurd, or otherwise insufficient, to say that, in presupposing that q, the speaker commits to not committing to meaning that q.

So far we have seen that Miki's jointness-based approach may have difficulty accounting for implicature and presupposition, both of which belong to what is implicated in a broad sense. We would like, finally, to point out that Miki's theory as formulated in (28-29) cannot fully accommodate even what

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[19] This does not mean that Ducrot is anti-Gricean in all respects. Thus, his "law of exhaustivity" (loi d'exhaustivité) (Ducrot 1972: 134, 170, 1984: 100), though conceived independently of the Gricean framework, works in essentially the same way as Grice's (1975/1989) "maxim of quantity".

is said or asserted. The problem stems, again, from her extensive use of the notion of commitment. This notion is certainly useful for the analysis of non-assertive utterances. To utter "I promise to come", for instance, creates an obligation on the part of the speaker (Ducrot 1972: 78). To order you to shut the door is not just to express the speaker's desire for you to shut the door. It is a conventional act which affects your juridical status; what you do or do not do will thereafter count either as obedience or as disobedience (Ducrot 1972: 79). Likewise, to ask you if you are a student is not just to express the speaker's ignorance of your profession. It is rather a juridical act which imposes on you the obligation to answer, or, if you cannot answer, the obligation to say "I don't know" or the like (Ducrot 1972: 79, 1984: 36-37). Moreover, as Hanks (2015) observes, the satisfaction conditions of imperative but not interrogative utterances include conditions on the person(s) who must react to the utterance in question.

> There are important differences between the satisfaction conditions for questions and requests. A request is fulfilled only if the audience for the request carries out the relevant action. A question is answered if the subject comes to have the relevant information, however that information is required. (Hanks 2015: 187)

Unlike these utterances, however, assertive utterances seem to place the speaker or the addressee under no obvious commitment, as Pagin (2004) observes:

> What makes assertion different from other types of act is not that assertions don't have social effects. Of course, assertions have, and are intended to. After having made an assertion the speaker is e.g. responsible for backing up her claim if challenged[20], and the audience is e.g. known to have received some particular message. The difference is that such effects, whether intended or not, are *not* part of what is communicated. What is communicated in an assertion is whatever is stated in the utterance, e.g. *that* there is a traffic jam on the Brooklyn Bridge, and there are no limitations to what can be stated in an utterance save the expressive limitations of the language. An assertion can, but, unlike orders, greetings, expresses of whishes [sic.], threats etc., *need not* communicate anything about speaker or audience. (Pagin 2004: 835-836)

When we understand the utterance "I promise you to come", we learn something about the juridical status of the utterer; she is bound to come. When we understand the utterance "Shut the door", we learn something about the juridical status of the hearer; she is bound to choose between obedience and disobedience. When we understand the utterance "Are you a student?", we learn something about the juridical status of the hearer; she is bound to answer. If we do not grasp these facts, we are not considered to have properly understood the utterances. The same does not hold for assertive utterances. To be sure, when we understand

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[20] Ducrot (1972: 52) observes that, in many linguistic communities, it is not allowed to assert abruptly what clearly conflicts with the hearer's established convictions, without adding any hedges like 'If I'm not mistaken' or 'Maybe you don't know but'. This shows that there surely are communal practices governing assertive utterances. What matters here is that such practices are irrelevant to what is communicated by the assertion.

the utterance "It is raining today", we usually suspect that the speaker believes that it is raining today. However, the speaker's belief has no bearing upon her juridical status. Moreover, our recognition of the speaker's belief, or of the speaker's commitment to the collective belief, is neither primary nor essential for the understanding of the utterance. When we understand the assertive utterances in (39), what matters most is that we learn something about the outer world, rather than about the speaker.

> (39) a. It is raining today.
>   b. I assert that it is raining today.

In sharp contrast with (39) is the commisive utterance in (40), in which it is primary and essential to understand how the speaker's juridical status is affected.

> (40) I hereby commit myself to {jointly believe/the collective belief} that I believe that it is raining today.

It remains unclear how Miki's jointness-based framework implements measures whereby the fundamental difference between (39) and (40) is secured. As we understand it, Miki's theory would grant both types of utterances exactly the same juridical character.

5. Concluding Remarks

Ambitious as it is, Miki's book is rather modest in one respect: it only explores assertive utterances, leaving it for future research to extend the proposed analysis to other types of utterances (p. 7). The notion of commitment to which Miki turns to define the speaker meaning involved in assertive utterances might be more apt to characterize imperative and interrogative utterances as well as illocutionary acts like promising or naming. The central problem with Miki's view, it seems to us, is that it is committed too much to the notion of commitment. When someone asserts, "It is raining today", the first thing we will learn is today's weather, not the fact that the speaker believes that it is raining today, nor the fact that the speaker and we are jointly committed to the collective belief that the speaker believes that it is raining today. Even more problematic is the account which Miki's theory would give of what is implicated or presupposed by utterances. Although Miki's proposal on speaker meaning makes no distinction between what is said and what is implicated, the utterer is, intuitively, less committed to the latter than to the former. As Ducrot (1984: 22, 45) says, in implicating or presupposing that q, the speaker does not undertake the full responsibility of meaning that q. In the case of implicatures, Ducrot (1984: 45) even claims that it is the hearer who undertakes the responsibility of solving the puzzle set by the speaker. Presumably, the two authors' contrasting perspectives on implicatures result from the difference of the attitudes they take toward human beings and the languages of which they make use. In the preface to the third edition of Ducrot (1972), published in 1991, Ducrot goes so far as to say that he would have liked to speak a language different from the uncomfortable one which his theory makes him observe. The language that Ducrot believes he speaks, tinged with pessimism, provides various mechanisms whereby people say things of which they evade the responsibility; communication is full of deception. The language that Miki believes

she speaks, by contrast, builds on various joint commitments, in conformity with which speakers undertake the full responsibility even for what they implicitly communicate, and, conversely, the audience places great confidence in the speakers; communication is a synonym of commitment.

This contrast in attitude between Ducrot and Miki leads to another apparent divergence concerning the treatment of presuppositions. Ducrot devotes a whole book to dismissing the Fregean analysis of presupposition in favor of an institutional approach, in which presupposition is viewed as a special kind of illocutionary act. For Ducrot (1972), presupposition is another type of implicit meaning which, nevertheless, is encoded in the structure of language. Miki devotes a whole book to discrediting the Gricean analysis of speaker meaning in favor of an institutional approach, in which meaning is construed as a special kind of joint commitment. As, on Ducrot's (1972: 26) view, the act of presupposing is an act of meaning on a par with the act of asserting, one might naturally expect Miki's theory of meaning to incorporate Ducrot's theory of presupposition. An apparent obstacle to the incorporation lies, again, in the extensive use Miki makes of the notion of commitment. On Ducrot's view, the fact that meaning is a juridical act does not entail that it is publicly performed in every respect. In presupposing that q, the speaker performs a juridical act of imposing on the hearer a framework in which the truth of q is incontestable, without committing to the fullest degree to do so. Further complicating the issue is that, on Ducrot's (1984: 19-20, 31, 43-44, 91-92) view, this evasiveness is inscribed, under a special mode of presentation, in the very core of public languages. In Miki's terminology, Ducrot might be taken to set forth the view that what a speaker means can be transparent, or even '*entre nous*', without thereby being fully public. For Miki, the transparency of speaker meaning is a precondition for its publicness, and not vice versa. If such is the case, there would be no prima facie obstacle to claiming that presupposition is transparent but not public. The difficulty lies in the fact that Miki's theory cannot make room for speaker meaning which is '*entre nous*' but not fully public. The theory seems to be in need of further refinement. The point just made might ultimately be a matter of terminology, however; there may be more or less strict notions of publicness. Then, it remains to be seen whether or not the two frameworks are substantially compatible, and if it turns out that they are in fact not, which is more on the right track. As we have said elsewhere (Sakai 2019: 275), Ducrot's insight into speaker meaning is now largely forgotten, mostly, we think, because it is all written in French. Miki's book would offer a good opportunity to confront that forgotten framework with the doctrines embraced by the mainstream analytic philosophers, be they proponents of intention-based semantics or of jointness-based semantics. Lepore and Stone (2015: 245) say that "interlocutors are normally coordinating on a process of inquiry, through which they commit to make their meanings public". Now, how far does this 'normally' go?

Last but not least, then, we must add that what we find most regrettable about Miki's remarkable book is that it is written in Japanese, albeit in a perspicuous style. This intriguing and illuminating book is to be recommended especially to living authors cited in it, most of whom read and write exclusively in English. Many of them would genuinely be impressed, if not convinced, by the crystalline clarity of Miki's argument, and some might even respond to the challenges set by Miki's book, if only they read in Japanese or Miki wrote in English. What we have said in this paper, including the final remark addressed above all to those who prefer to publish in Japanese, should be taken both psychologically and publicly; we mean what we say, and we are publicly committed to meaning what we say.

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「コミットすること」、「コミットしないこと」、

または「コミットしないことにコミットすること」

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要旨

　本論文では三木 (2019) による話し手の意味の分析の検討を行う。検討にあたっては特に、グライスが創始した意図基盤意味論を決定的に退けようとする議論、およびその代案としての共同性基盤意味論を提示する際に三木が依拠する (共同) コミットメントの概念に焦点をあてる。意図基盤意味論では、話し手の意味は話し手の意図によって決定されると想定される。この考え方は意図の無限後退を引き起こし、話し手の意味の透明性と公共性を確保することが困難になることが知られている。三木は、この困難が意図基盤意味論の採用する表象主義から必然的に生じることを証明し、意図基盤意味論とは反対に、話し手の意味の公共性を出発点に据える理論を提案する。しかし、この証明は、p が q を論理的に含意するとき、p の発話者がつねに p と q に同程度にコミットするという誤った図式に基づいている。この誤りは三木による話し手の意味の定式化にも波及する。三木の定式化によると、「S が x を発話することで p を意味すること」は「S の発話 x が「S が p を信じている」という集合的信念を形成することへの S の準備の表立った表明であること」に等しい。ここにおいて、集合的信念は共同コミットメントによって定義され、p が伝達する断定と言外の意味 (= 含み+前提) の両方に適用される。しかし、含みの伝達において、話し手はしばしば聞き手に対して主導的な立場を占める。また、前提の伝達において、話し手は自らが意味したことに公的にコミットしていないと考えるべき理由がある。さらに、多くの場合、断定の理解に際して「話し手が話し手の (集合的) 信念にコミットしていること」の理解は本質的でない。以上のことから、三木の野心的な理論は、洞察に富みつつも、コミットメントという考え方にコミットしすぎている可能性がある。

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