

## 論文の内容の要旨

論文題目      Territorialisation of Resources in Cambodia: The Politics of State Interventions in Forest, Land and Fisheries  
(カンボジアにおける天然資源の領域化－森林、土地、漁場に対する国家介入のポリティクス)

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This dissertation attempts to answer the questions “What determines the timing and nature of the Cambodian state interventions in natural resources?” Were those state interventions beneficial to the poor?” Precisely, the author examines why the Cambodian government intervened in some particular resources such as forest, land, and fisheries at a particular time, especially from the mid 1990s. The author applied the concept of territoriality and state motives to explain state interventions in Cambodia. Territoriality is explained as an attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area. State motive is defined as the motivation of the state to introduce any initiatives for certain purposes.

The author answers research questions by using the available data from the National Archives of Cambodia (NAC), reports and publications of non-governmental organizations and international organizations, ministries reports, published articles in the journals as well as fieldworks and interviews with 122 informants who have been involved with the issues of natural resource management, policy and politics. Among 122 informants, 40 of them are researchers, consultants, NGOs directors, grassroots NGOs staffs, and government officers. Since the main focus of this dissertation is the fisheries, the fieldwork was extensively conducted around the Tonle Sap Lake. The author visited two provinces in the Tonle Sap Lake (Siem Reap and Kampong Thom) to gather the general information during the first visit in 2011. Then, during the second and third visits in 2012 and 2013, the author visited four villages in two communes that have three community fisheries.

Answering what determines the timing and nature of state interventions and were the interventions good for the poor, this dissertation offers the following answers. The case studies of the state interventions in forest, land, and fisheries reveal that international pressure, the decentralization of natural resource governance, crop boom and resource speculation, and the electoral politics influenced state interventions in particular resources at a particular time. For example, from the mid 1990s, the international community’s pressure determined the state interventions in forestry sector. The international community urged the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) to take action against the large-scale logging and improve the forest management in exchange for aid. In response, the RGC introduced the forest concessions and the forest log export ban. The government designed more than 6 million hectares of forest concession areas and allocated them to more than 30 private companies. The government also issued the log export ban, especially the timber export to Thailand during this time.

The movement of decentralized governance of natural resource also determined timing of state interventions. In Cambodia, from the late 1990s, the trend towards the democratic decentralization began with the first commune council election in 2002. The main goal of decentralization was to transfer the power from the central level to the local level in term of decision-making and managing their resources. At the same time, the decentralized governance of natural resources appeared to be intensified, especially after the adoption of land law in 2001 and forestry law in 2002. Both laws allow the creation and recognition of community-based natural resources management which was already promoted by NGOs. That was why many community forestry and community fisheries were created across the country. Until 2014, there are almost 1000 community based natural resource managements in forest and fisheries.

Crop boom and land speculation are also believed to determine the state intervention in land from the mid 2000s. Granting of over two million hectares of land in Cambodia was often linked with the crop boom that encouraged large foreign corporation companies to seek land for large plantations. Looking at the timeline of granting ELCs in Cambodia, large areas of land was granted to corporate companies and individuals after the burst of crop boom spike from 2007. Companies from Korea, China, Malaysia, Vietnam and Arab states came in for land concession. Land speculation were also linked with the increase of land grabs and land conflicts which led to the interventions in land. In response to conflicts arise from land acquisition and the poor implementation of ELCs sub-decree, the RGC introduced Leopard Land Policy in 2009 and Land Title Distribution in 2012.

Interventions in forest, land, and fisheries have also explained as the electoral politics mechanism used by the ruling party. Based on the review publications on land indicates that many of interventions in land happened before the national elections in 2003, 2008, and 2013. Even though the intervention in land in 2012 through sending thousands student volunteers to distribute land titles in rural areas was the strategy used by the powerful politicians to gain political support from people in the frontier areas. This can be clarified after the silence of the activities of this group after the election. These kinds of interventions were linked to the rooted tradition of client-patron relation. The author, from his fieldwork, also discovered that major state interventions in fisheries in 2012 were linked to decentralization and electoral support. The interventions were used to please the majority of the fishermen through which the politicians often linked it to the upcoming election.

The nature, methods, and approaches of the interventions as well as the implementations on the grounds differed from one resource to another depending on the geographical, economic and political importance of the resources to the mass population and above all the politicians. For instance, the state interventions in forest and especially land occurred in the form of territorialisation where the state made the resource legible and transferred it among small group of people or to private owners so that it is easier to manage and extract the benefit. Geographically, large forest and land concessions located in the remote areas enables the state to choose territorialisation because it is easy to hide activities there from the public sights with low political cost. Economically, forest and land generated a lot of money for small group of people who have very good connection with the powerful politicians which could influence the state to use territorialisation with these resources.

In contrast, the state interventions in fisheries resource resulted in the allocation of large fishing areas to the poor fishermen. The author found out that the inventions in fisheries happened in the form of de-territorialisation. The commercial fishing lots, which used to be controlled and generated income by small groups of people, were previously under the firm control of state agent (Fisheries Administration). The interventions in fisheries, in general, favor the poor through the cancellation of commercial fishing lots and allocated them to the community. At the institutional level, the Cambodian state seems to use intervention in fisheries to transfer a resource from one state agency to another one. This can be seen from the deep and historical intervention in 2011 and 2012 in which the government gave authority to the Tonle Sap Authority and other agencies to lead the operations. Fisheries related operations should be led by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), in general, or particularly under the supervision of the FiA. However, the center of power seems to shift from this institution during the state major intervention in 2011 and 2012. At the local level, the fisheries intervention was used to transfer the resources from the fishing lot owners to the mass population: the fishermen around the Tonle Sap Lake. However, with weak governance, low salary of low-level bureaucrats, overlapped responsibilities of the government officials working on fisheries related issues, and the poor capacity of community fisheries, the state intervention in fisheries will be inevitably another policy failure.

What is new about these findings? There have been various studies on the relationship between politics and natural resources, yet most of these have focused on how a handful of elites have tried to promote personal gain by taking advantage of the limited exposure that is characteristic of most natural resources that produce high rents. The findings from the 2012 state interventions in land and the interventions in fisheries in Tonle Sap from 2011 complicate the common understanding further. Firstly, the issuance of the land tiles, especially the missions of more than five thousands students volunteers to rural areas was widely broadcasted on the media. Almost all the televisions in the country often broadcasted the activities of the student volunteers and even called those students heroes. In fisheries interventions, the reduction and then the closure of the fishing lots were highly visible events frequently covered by the media. The Prime Minister spent almost three hours to talk about the intervention which was broadcasted on all televisions. This is at odds with the perception that the state prefers to use natural resources as a 'less visible' option in order to avoid accountability in asset or income distribution (Ascher, 1999).

Secondly, cancellation of the lots was undeniably a popular move among most small-scale fishermen, achieved at the expense of wealthy lot owners. This was accompanied by the intervention in land in 2012 that many people in the frontier areas were happy with the policy of land title distribution. It moves away from the general scholarship of the elite capture of natural resources (Biddulph, 2014; Dwyer, 2013; Cock, 2011; Sokbunthoeun & Un, 2009). This dimension can easily escape scholarly investigation when attention is focused on the revenue from the resources rather than the shift in the nature of resource access. The withdrawal of the fishing lots from the wealthy lot owners and allocated to the communities clearly favoured the poor. Electoral support and decentralisation of resource are two main reasons for the inclusion of the poor to gain more access to the fisheries resource.

Thirdly, despite this apparent re-distribution of benefits, the exact control mechanism for the newly 'opened up' areas remains unclear, and one can interpret the dismantling of the lots system as only an effort to transfer the management rights of the lot owners and FiA to the community fisheries

and the Tonle Sap Authority. Similar situation existed with the policy of land title distribution. Some villagers who already received the land titles were not allowed to control the land or other people took their land on behalf of them.

Fourthly, the findings from the interventions in fisheries turn away from the general scholarship that old and long history agencies are more powerful than the newly created ones. For example, MAFF is responsible for the management of fisheries resources, especially the commercial fishing lots system, while the MoE focuses on conservation sites and biodiversity issues. The Ministry of Water Resource and Meteorology (MOWRAM), even though only recently established, seems to be the most powerful. The different perspectives and interests of the line ministries lead to competitiveness and power shifting. For example, the MOWRAM was granted power to suppress illegal fishing activities on the great lake through the Tonle Sap Authority, even though this authority should have been vested with the MAFF. The analysis of political battles over turf among the related ministries is one avenue for further investigation.