{"created":"2021-03-01T06:34:35.209010+00:00","id":17275,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"eb759bf4-90f3-485d-b7f6-fa65337d7592"},"_deposit":{"id":"17275","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"17275"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00017275","sets":["55:864:972:976","9:504:867:974:977"]},"item_4_alternative_title_1":{"attribute_name":"その他のタイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_alternative_title":"The Theory of the Optimal Entry Auction"}]},"item_4_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2004-03-18","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"3-4","bibliographicPageEnd":"138","bibliographicPageStart":"121","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"55","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"社會科學研究"}]}]},"item_4_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_4_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"この論文では理想的な参入規制としてオークションを用いた全く新しい参入規制の方法を検討する.そしていくつかの仮定をおいた上で,政府が市場のことを何も知らなくてもある種のオークションを行うことで経済厚生上最も望ましい参入規制が実現できることを明らかにする.具体的な構成は以下の通り.1節「はじめに」 : 論文の目的及び内容についての簡単な解説 2節「過剰参入定理」 : 参入規制を正当化するための理論的考察 3節「オークションによる参入規制」 : 実際のオークションの設計 4節「モデルの拡張」 : より一般的な状況におけるオークションの設計 5節「まとめ」 : 論文の意義についてのコメント","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"},{"subitem_description":"The paper proposes a new type of licensing auction for entry regulation that does not require the regulator to have precise knowledge about the industry's demand structure and each firm's cost structure. Entry is licensed via an English auction which favors the entrant by subsidizing a pre-announcement fraction of the auction price if and only if entrant wins the license ; otherwise if incumbent wins, it must pay the full price but can deter its competitor's entry. It is shown that if the demand in the industry and the costs of firms are linear, the fractional subsidy that implements welfare-optimal entry depends neither on the demand function nor on each firm's costs.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_4_full_name_3":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"107914","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"Yasuda, Yosuke"}]}]},"item_4_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"東京大学社会科学研究所"}]},"item_4_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AN00108966","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_4_source_id_8":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"03873307","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_4_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"300","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_4_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo"}]},"item_4_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"プリンストン大学経済学部"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"安田, 洋祐"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"107913","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2017-06-26"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"KJ00004192020.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"891.5 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"KJ00004192020.pdf","url":"https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/record/17275/files/KJ00004192020.pdf"},"version_id":"0ad6ba99-f175-4494-8899-a9760e37654e"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"オークション","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"参入規制","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"過剰参入定理","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"寡占","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"最適参入オークション","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"オークションによる最適参入規制 : 最適参入オークションの理論","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"オークションによる最適参入規制 : 最適参入オークションの理論"}]},"item_type_id":"4","owner":"1","path":["976","977"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2008-09-19"},"publish_date":"2008-09-19","publish_status":"0","recid":"17275","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["オークションによる最適参入規制 : 最適参入オークションの理論"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T03:56:02.615827+00:00"}