{"created":"2021-03-01T07:01:47.919186+00:00","id":41973,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"8d69d6de-2ed7-4531-80e8-60e0aca33500"},"_deposit":{"id":"41973","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"41973"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00041973","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2001-07","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CF-123","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is imperfect and private, and players'private signal structures satisfy the conditional independence. We require almost no conditions concerning the accuracy of private signals. We assume that there exist no public signals and no public randomization devices, and players cannot communicate and use only pure strategies. It is shown that the Folk Theorem holds in that every individually rational feasible payoff vector can be approximated by a sequential equilibrium payoff vector. Moreover, the Folk Theorem holds even if each player has no knowledge of her opponent's private signal structure.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper was accepted in Econometrica as a note. This paper was combined with Discussion Paper 2002-CF-154 and revised as Discussion Paper 2003-CF-242.","subitem_description_type":"Other"},{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2001/2001cf123.pdf","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"330","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"96588","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Repeated Prisoner-Dilemma Games","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Private Monitoring Conditional Independence","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Folk Theorem","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Limited Knowledge","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2012-01-13"},"publish_date":"2012-01-13","publish_status":"0","recid":"41973","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:18.390116+00:00"}