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Unions, Job Security, and Incentives of Workers
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2367
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/23675e2f0dab-6538-4d44-8569-c78b18ce18ef
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2012-01-13 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Unions, Job Security, and Incentives of Workers | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL classification Numbers: J51, J41 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Eguchi, Kyota
× Eguchi, Kyota |
|||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We consider why blue collar workers are more likely to organize unions than white collar workers by looking at commitment devices and imperfect signals on workers'actions. Under contractual incompleteness, firms cannot ex ante promise to keep employment levels high. However, if unions resist firms'dismissal policies by the request of high severance pay, unions can play a significant role as a commitment device for job security. Then, since firms can decrease wage and increase employment level, the profit of unionized firms can be more than that of non-union firms. Furthermore, we show that imperfect signals on workers'actions weakens the role of unions as a commitment device. This results in less union organizing by white collar workers since the efforts level of white collar workers is more difficult to observe than that of blue collar workers. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CF-91, 発行日 2000-09 |
|||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 330 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2000/2000cf91.pdf |