{"created":"2021-03-01T07:01:48.380413+00:00","id":41980,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"0ae9e54f-dd2a-4a50-9286-bc00b8227cd4"},"_deposit":{"id":"41980","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"41980"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00041980","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2001-06","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CF-118","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Hart & Moore (1999) construct a model to show that contracts perform poorly in complex environments when the state of the world is unverifiable and renegotiation cannot be ruled out. They implicitly assume one player can extort payment from another by threatening to take an inefficient action which hurts both of them. We show that without this assumption a simple \"buyer option\" contract can implement the first-best even as complexity becomes severe.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2001/2001cf118.pdf","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"330","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Indiana University"},{"subitem_text_value":"University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Lyon, Thomas P."}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"96596","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Eric, Rasmusen"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"96597","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"JEL Codes: L14, K12","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2012-01-13"},"publish_date":"2012-01-13","publish_status":"0","recid":"41980","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:19.947545+00:00"}