{"created":"2021-03-01T07:01:59.816327+00:00","id":42147,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"284e9a06-7c76-4360-a4fb-ad3737d623d1"},"_deposit":{"id":"42147","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42147"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042147","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2010-03","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-720","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We investigate the finitely repeated prisoners'dilemma with explicit contractual devices. We show that full collusion can be achieved by incentivizing the players'final period of play with small fines. Our incentivizing modality is the penance contract, by which a player is penalized if (and only if) he deviates from the penance strategy in the final period. We show that using this contractual agreement brings the penance strategy profile into unique subgame perfect equilibrium and achieves full collusion without being overturned by renegotiation.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf726ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"335","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97008","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Finitely Repeated Prisoners’Dilemma","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Small Fines","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Penance Contracts","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Full Collusion","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Uniqueness","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Renegotiation-Proofness","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D74, L14.","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Finitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma with Small Fines : Penance Contract","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Finitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma with Small Fines : Penance Contract"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-05-31"},"publish_date":"2013-05-31","publish_status":"0","recid":"42147","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Finitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma with Small Fines : Penance Contract"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:23.700337+00:00"}