{"created":"2021-03-01T07:01:59.949994+00:00","id":42149,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"a62d4b90-dcff-44e8-894b-f67f4e6937ef"},"_deposit":{"id":"42149","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42149"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042149","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2010-02","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-715","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We extend the voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009) to continuous actions. We show that there is a (constrained) efficient bimorphic equilibrium which is robust under evolutionary pressure. It consists of a cooperative strategy and a myopic defection strategy so that our model provides a foundation to incomplete information models as well.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf715ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"335","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Keio University Dept. of Economics"},{"subitem_text_value":"University of Tokyo Graduate School of Economics"},{"subitem_text_value":"Komazawa University Faculty of Economics"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Fujiwara-Greve, Takako"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97010","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97011","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Suzuki, Nobue"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97012","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"social norm","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"evolution","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"voluntary separation","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"repeated game","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JLE classification: C 73.","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-05-31"},"publish_date":"2013-05-31","publish_status":"0","recid":"42149","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:23.675367+00:00"}