{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:02.657753+00:00","id":42189,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"44833563-d793-4a3e-8093-c1f3efa452d0"},"_deposit":{"id":"42189","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42189"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042189","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2011-04","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-795","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper experimentally examines infinitely repeated prisoners'dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring and random termination where the probability of termination is very low. Laboratory subjects make the cooperative action choices quite often, and make the cooperative action choice when monitoring is accurate more often than when it is inaccurate. Our experimental results, however, indicate that they make the cooperative action choice much less often than the game theory predicts. The subjects'naivete and social preferences concerning reciprocity prevent the device of regime shift between the reward and punishment phases from functioning in implicit collusion.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2011/2011cf795ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"335","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Department of Economics, University of Tokyo"},{"subitem_text_value":"Faculty of Engineering, Kogakuin University"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97110","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Toyama, Tomohisa"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97111","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Infinitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Imperfect Private Monitoring","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Experimental Economics","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Monitoring Accuracy","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Social Preference","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Generous Tit-for-Tat","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JEL Classification: C70, C71, C72, C73, D03","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring : Theory and Experiments","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring : Theory and Experiments"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-05-31"},"publish_date":"2013-05-31","publish_status":"0","recid":"42189","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring : Theory and Experiments"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:25.260079+00:00"}