{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:05.030706+00:00","id":42224,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"8a58502d-13b4-40cd-b789-b71c10b4c676"},"_deposit":{"id":"42224","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42224"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042224","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2013-03","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-879","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We examine repeated prisoners'dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and random termination where the termination probability is low. We run laboratory experiments and show subjects retaliate more severely when monitoring is more accurate. This experimental result contradicts the prediction of standard game theory. Instead of assuming full rationality and pure self-interest, we introduce naiveté and social preferences, i.e., reciprocal concerns, and develop a model that is consistent with, and uniquely predicts, the observed behavior in the experiments. Our behavioral model suggests there is a trade-off between naiveté and reciprocity. When people are concerned about reciprocity, they tend to make fewer random choices.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2013/2013cf879ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"335","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Department of Economics, University of Tokyo"},{"subitem_text_value":"Economic Development & Global Education, LLC"},{"subitem_text_value":"Faculty of Engineering, Kogakuin University"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97176","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Tanaka, Tomomi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97177","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Toyama, Tomohisa"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97178","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"JEL Classification Numbers: C70, C71, C72, C73, D03.","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Infinitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Imperfect Private Monitoring","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Experimental Economics","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Monitoring Accuracy","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Social Preference","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-05-31"},"publish_date":"2013-05-31","publish_status":"0","recid":"42224","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:25.479568+00:00"}