{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:16.340891+00:00","id":42388,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"2c8cd9e9-ac8e-45f6-a42f-bc6183eb16b8"},"_deposit":{"id":"42388","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42388"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042388","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2002-12","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"2002-CF-185","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We investigate the collective decision problem with incomplete information and side payments. We show that for generic prior distributions, there exists a direct mechanism associated with the social choice function that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality. We consider the possibility of a risk-averse principal’s extracting the full surplus in agency problems with adverse selection. We also show that for generic prior distributions, there exists a modified direct mechanism associated with the virtual social choice function, which satisfies budget balancing and interim individual rationality, such that truth telling is the unique triple iteratively undominated message rule profile.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2002/2002cf185ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"330","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97590","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Incentive Compatibility","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Budget Balancing","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Interim Individual Rationality","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Iterative Dominance","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D44, D60, D71, D78, D82","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Mechanism Design with Side Payments : Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Mechanism Design with Side Payments : Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-06-03"},"publish_date":"2013-06-03","publish_status":"0","recid":"42388","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Mechanism Design with Side Payments : Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:35.259590+00:00"}