{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:16.821015+00:00","id":42395,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"bd42c36b-e82d-4361-8496-2b1641dc233a"},"_deposit":{"id":"42395","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42395"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042395","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2005-06","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-346","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper introduces a new concept of market mechanism design into general economic environments with finite but many traders, where multiple objects are traded and any combination of complements and substitutes is permitted. The auctioneer randomly divides traders into multiple groups. Within each group, trades occur at the market-clearing price vector of another group. With private values, any undominated strategy profile mimics price-taking behavior, enforcing perfect competition. With interdependent values, any twice iteratively undominated strategy profile mimics the rational expectations equilibrium, enforcing ex post efficiency. Our mechanisms are detail-free, i.e., they do not depend on the details of model specification.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2005/2005cf346ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"330","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97602","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Price-Taking Behavior","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Detail-Free Mechanism Design","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Random Grouping","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Twice Iterative Dominance","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Ex Post Efficiency","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D02, D41, D44, D82","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Large Market Design in Dominance","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Large Market Design in Dominance"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-06-03"},"publish_date":"2013-06-03","publish_status":"0","recid":"42395","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Large Market Design in Dominance"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:14:34.465427+00:00"}