{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:17.768651+00:00","id":42409,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"16687080-7e72-4c71-b4bb-12b9b4094258"},"_deposit":{"id":"42409","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42409"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042409","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2006-03","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-402","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We provide an analysis of odds-improving self-protection for when it yields collective benefits to groups, such as alliances of nations, for whom risks of loss are public bads and prevention of loss is a public good. Our analysis of common risk reduction shows how diminishing returns in risk improvement can be folded into income effects. These income effects then imply that whether protection is inferior or normal depends on the risk aversion characteristics of underlying utility functions, and on the interaction between these, the level of risk, and marginal effectiveness of risk abatement. We demonstrate how public good inferiority is highly likely when the good is \"group risk reduction.\" In fact, we discover a natural or endogenous limit on the size of a group and of the amount of risk controlling outlay it will provide under Nash behavior. We call this limit an \"Inferior Goods Barrier\" to voluntary risk reduction. For the paradigm case of declining risk aversion, increases in group size/wealth will cause provision of more safety to change from a normal to an inferior good thereby creating such a barrier.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2006/2006cf402ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"330","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"University of Tokyo"},{"subitem_text_value":"University of California, Irvine"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Ihori, Toshihiro"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97622","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Martin, C. McGuire"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97623","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Risk Control","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Collective Action","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Public Goods","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Voluntary Provision","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"International Security","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JEL Classificaion Numbers: D74, D8, G11, H41, H56, H87","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Collective Risk Control And Group Security : The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Collective Risk Control And Group Security : The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-06-03"},"publish_date":"2013-06-03","publish_status":"0","recid":"42409","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Collective Risk Control And Group Security : The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:36.192766+00:00"}