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Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2694
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2694a00ceb56-bdbb-4e11-9da7-94138dbc0a4b
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2013-06-03 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Multitask Agency | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Moral Hazard | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Relative Performance Evaluation | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Unique Implementation | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Group Incentives | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Classification Numbers: D20, D80, J33, L23 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We investigate the moral hazard problem in which the principal delegates multiple tasks to two agents. She imperfectly monitors the action choices by observing the public signals that are correlated through the macro shock and that satisfy conditional independence. When the number of tasks is sufficiently high, relative performance evaluation functions effectively for unique implementation, where the desirable action choices are supported by an approximate Nash equilibrium, and any approximate Nash equilibrium virtually induces the first-best allocation. Thus, this is an extremely effective method through which the principal divides the workers into two groups and makes them compete with each other. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-419, 発行日 2006-04 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 330 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2006/2006cf419ab.html |