{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:26.189253+00:00","id":42534,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"c5229f17-45cf-47f1-9da1-3347bbe5134b"},"_deposit":{"id":"42534","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42534"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042534","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2004-10","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"2004-CF-304","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We investigate implementation of social choice functions where the central planner has no knowledge about the detail of model specifications, and only a few individuals participate in the mechanism. In contrast with the standard model of implementation, each agent has non-consequential moral preference in that she prefers truth-telling to lying whenever the resulting consequence is unchanged. We show that with complete information, there exists a single, detail-free mechanism that can implement any social choice function whenever agents regard its value as being socially desirable. This result holds even if psychological cost for lying is close to zero. Non-consequential moral preferences play a very powerful role in eliminating unwanted equilibria in detail-free mechanism design with representative systems. We extend this result to incomplete information.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Revised as 2006-CF-405.","subitem_description_type":"Other"},{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2004/2004cf304ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"330","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97849","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Unique Implementation","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Non-consequential Moral Preferences","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Detail-free Mechanism Design","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Representative Systems","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D71, D78, H41","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Non-Consequetial Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Non-Consequetial Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-06-03"},"publish_date":"2013-06-03","publish_status":"0","recid":"42534","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Non-Consequetial Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:41.891528+00:00"}