{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:27.364285+00:00","id":42551,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"f0a1e767-7116-448c-9f1b-a1ebd79b98b4"},"_deposit":{"id":"42551","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42551"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042551","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2002-03","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"2002-CF-148","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We investigate implementation of social choice functions as mappings from states to lotteries under complete information. We assume that for every agent, any pair of distinct states induces distinct preferences. A social choice function is called Condorcet-decisive if it always enforces the Condorcet winner among its range. We introduce plurality mechanisms, where each agent makes a single announcement and the lottery associated with the opinion announced by the largest number of agents is enforced. We show that a social choice function is virtually implementable via plurality mechanisms combined with constrained random dictatorship, if and only if it is Condorcet-decisive.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2002/2002cf148ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"330","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97883","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Plurality Mechanisms","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Constrained Random Dictatorship","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Domain Restrictions","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Virtual Implementation","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Condorcet-Decisiveness","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-06-03"},"publish_date":"2013-06-03","publish_status":"0","recid":"42551","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:42.461972+00:00"}