{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:28.171430+00:00","id":42563,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"361331e4-b57b-4736-837e-040f8c174f54"},"_deposit":{"id":"42563","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42563"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042563","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2002-10","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"2002-CF-179","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper investigates repeated games with perfect monitoring, where the number of repetition is finite, and the discount factor is far less than unity. Players can make a side payment contract, but their liability is severely limited. The history of play may not necessarily be verifiable. With positive interest rate of the contractible asset, we show that, in spite of limited liability and verifiability, efficiency is sustainable in that there exist a contract and an efficient perfect equilibrium in its associated game, and that efficiency is even uniquely sustainable if there exists the unique one-shot Nash equilibrium. In partnership games, efficiency is uniquely and approximately sustainable, even if the interest rate equals zero. In partnership games with two players and positive interest rate, efficient sustainability is robust to renegotiation-proofness on the terms of explicit contracting as well as implicit agreements.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2002/2002cf179ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"330","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97903","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Finitely Repeated Games","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Discounting","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Side Payment Contracts","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Limited Liability","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Uniqueness","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-06-03"},"publish_date":"2013-06-03","publish_status":"0","recid":"42563","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:42.193092+00:00"}