{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:29.656796+00:00","id":42585,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"9f95aa1b-10db-4b19-b7fa-4cb628f72464"},"_deposit":{"id":"42585","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42585"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042585","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2013-06","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-890","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"It is well known that granting incentive pay, such as stock-based compensation, to an agent mitigates the agency problem created by the unobservability of the agent 's effort level. Using contract theory, this paper shows that stock options mitigate the moral hazard problem. However, they create another problem, namely, a misalignment of the interest between the principal and the  firm. Speci cally, I consider an environment in which the principal can save her payments to the incumbent agent where the rational choice of the principal on whether to replace or retain the incumbent agent becomes an inefficient decision from the perspective of total fi rm value. The paper further examines both long- and short-term vested options may exhibit over-replacement of the incumbent agent, but only the short-term vested options may exhibit under-replacement, along the parametric range of control benefit.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2013/2013cf890ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Royal Melbourne Institute of Tech-nology University"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Sato, Meg"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"97952","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Moral Hazard","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Managerial Replacement","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Stock-based Compensation","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Long-term Vested Options","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Short-term Vested Options","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Journal of Economic Literature Classi cations: D86, G32, G34, M12, M52.","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-06-27"},"publish_date":"2013-06-27","publish_status":"0","recid":"42585","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":2},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:56:44.726848+00:00"}