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Payment Instruments and Collateral in the Interbank Payment System
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/60902
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/6090274371e71-c7fb-4d45-b870-72d8d1df5fce
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2016-09-20 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Payment Instruments and Collateral in the Interbank Payment System | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | bank reserves | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | large value payment system | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | interbank money market | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | clearing house | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | collateral | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | legal tender | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
著者 |
Tomura, Hajime
× Tomura, Hajime |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | This paper presents a three-period model to analyze the need for bank reserves in the presence of other liquid assets like Treasury securities. If a pair of banks settle bank transfers without bank reserves, they must prepare extra liquidity for interbank payments, because depositors'demand for timely payments causes a hold-up problem in the bilateral settlement of bank transfers. In light of this result, the interbank payment system provided by the central bank can be regarded as an implicit interbank settlement contract to save liquidity. The central bank is necessary for this contract as the custodian of collateral. Bank reserves can be characterized as the balances of liquid collateral submitted by banks to participate into this contract. This result explains the rate-of-return dominance puzzle and the need for substitution between bank reserves and other liquid assets simultaneously. The optimal contract is the floor system, not only because it pays interest on bank reserves, but also because it eliminates the over- the-counter interbank money market. The model indicates it is efficient if all banks share the same custodian of collateral, which justifies the current practice that a public institution provides the interbank payment system. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 2012~2016年度科学研究費補助金[基盤研究(S)]「長期デフレの解明」(研究代表者 東京大学経済学研究科・渡辺努, 課題番号:24223003) | |||||
書誌情報 |
JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S) Understanding Persistent Deflation in Japan Working Paper Series 巻 090, 発行日 2016-09 |
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出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | UTokyo Price Project | |||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.price.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/researchdata/ |