{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:43.824534+00:00","id":42794,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"742e7d58-f221-41f9-bec0-aad43ef1bfab"},"_deposit":{"id":"42794","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42794"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042794","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2007-04","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-492","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We investigate infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. We focus on a class of games where the payoff functions are additively separable and the signal for monitoring a player's action does not depend on the other player's action. Tit-for-tat strategies function very well in this class, according to which each player's action in each period depends only on the signal for the opponent's action one period before. With almost perfect monitoring, we show that even if the discount factors are fixed low, efficiency is approximated by a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium payoff vector.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2007/2007cf492ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_relation_28":{"attribute_name":"置換する","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type":"replaces","subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://hdl.handle.net/2261/53262","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"330","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Depart"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"98399","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"JEL Classification: C72, C73, D82, H41","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Infinitely Repeated Games","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Private Monitoring","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Tit-For-Tat Strategoes","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Fixed Discount Factors","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Approximate Efficiency","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2017-01-17"},"publish_date":"2017-01-17","publish_status":"0","recid":"42794","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:59.282713+00:00"}