{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:46.737293+00:00","id":42837,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"735a5419-0795-4447-855d-8def55b1736e"},"_deposit":{"id":"42837","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42837"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042837","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2013-02","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-875","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We investigate an infinitely repeated prisoners'dilemma with imperfect monitoring and projects the possibility that the interlinkage of the players'distinct activities enhances implicit collusion. We show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of generous tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium, if it exists, is unique. This equilibrium achieves approximate efficiency when monitoring is almost perfect, where the discount factors are fixed.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"further revision will be forthcoming in Japanese Economic Review.","subitem_description_type":"Other"},{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2013/2013cf875ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_relation_28":{"attribute_name":"置換する","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type":"replaces","subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://hdl.handle.net/2261/7232","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"335","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Department of Economics, University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"98480","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Interlinkage","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Repeated Games","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Imperfect Monitoring","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Generous Tit-For-Tat","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Approximate Efficiency","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82, H41","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2017-01-17"},"publish_date":"2017-01-17","publish_status":"0","recid":"42837","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:18:00.418393+00:00"}