{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:47.417042+00:00","id":42847,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"5eaa0827-c84f-42e8-9ac2-35edda2d55db"},"_deposit":{"id":"42847","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42847"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042847","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2008-10","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-599","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Ordinary repeated games do not apply to real societies where one can cheat and run away from partners. We formulate a model of endogenous relationships which one can unilaterally end and start with a randomly-assigned new partner with no information flow. Focusing on two-person, two-action Prisoner's Dilemma, we show that the endogenous duration of partnerships gives rise to a significantly different evolutionary stability structure from ordinary random matching games. Monomorphic equilibria require initial trust-building, while a polymorphic equilibrium includes early cooperators than any strategy in monomorphic equilibria and is thus more efficient. This is due to nonlinearity of average payoffs.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"revised version subsequently published in The Review of Economic Studies, Vol.76, Issue 3 (July 2009), pp.993-1021","subitem_description_type":"Other"},{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2008/2008cf599ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_relation_28":{"attribute_name":"置換する","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type":"replaces","subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2690","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"335","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Keio University"},{"subitem_text_value":"University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Fujiwara-Greve, Takako"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"98504","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Masahiro, Okuno-Fujiwara"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"98505","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"voluntary separation","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"prisoner's dilemma","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"evolution","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"strategic diversity","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"efficiency","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JEL classification number: C 73","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2017-01-17"},"publish_date":"2017-01-17","publish_status":"0","recid":"42847","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:18:00.172535+00:00"}