{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:49.053994+00:00","id":42871,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"8df85e1b-2082-4d2a-a17b-0bed0eef82e7"},"_deposit":{"id":"42871","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42871"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042871","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2010-03","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-727","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We investigate the moral hazard problem in which a principal delegates multiple tasks to multiple workers. The principal imperfectly monitors their action choices by observing the public signals that are correlated with each other through a macro shock. He divides the workers into two groups and makes them compete with each other. We show that when the number of tasks is sufficiently large, relative performance evaluation between the groups accompanied with absolute performance evaluation results in eliminating unwanted equilibria. In this case, any approximate Nash equilibrium nearly induces the first-best allocation.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Accepted in Japanese Economic Review.","subitem_description_type":"Other"},{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf727ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"335","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Department of Economics, University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Matsushima, Hitoshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"98570","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Multitask Agency","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Moral Hazard, Group Incentives","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Uniqueness","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JEL Classification Numbers: D20, D80, J33, L23","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2017-01-17"},"publish_date":"2017-01-17","publish_status":"0","recid":"42871","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:16:57.619369+00:00"}