{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:50.339883+00:00","id":42890,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"314ecfc2-ffc2-4b14-ae16-dd37929e05bc"},"_deposit":{"id":"42890","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42890"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042890","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2010-10","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-769","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper considers a political contest model wherein self-interested politicians seek rents from the public budget, while general voters make political efforts to protest against politicians'rent seeking directly (for example, through voting in referendums such as the passage of Proposition 13) or indirectly (for example, through donating money to organized groups such as the National Taxpayer Union). We show that the political contest may ironically lead to the Laffer paradox; that is, rent-seeking politicians may intend to set the tax rate higher than the revenue-maximizing rate. For taming Leviathans, political protests may not be as effective as competition among governments.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_full_name_3":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"98625","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"井堀, 利宏"}]}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf769ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_relation_29":{"attribute_name":"異版あり","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type":"hasVersion","subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9737-z","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"335","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica"},{"subitem_text_value":"Department of Public Finance, National Chengchi University"},{"subitem_text_value":"Department of Public Finance, Feng Chia University"},{"subitem_text_value":"Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Ihori, Toshihiro"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"98623","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Yang, C.C."}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"98624","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"JEL classification: D72; F20; H41; H71","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Laffer paradox","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Leviathan","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Political contest","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Revenue-maximizing rate","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and Political Contest","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and Political Contest"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2017-01-17"},"publish_date":"2017-01-17","publish_status":"0","recid":"42890","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and Political Contest"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:18:01.891148+00:00"}