{"created":"2021-03-01T07:02:51.761358+00:00","id":42911,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"f2e2cfaf-5562-4673-9f0d-4f0a28b47b44"},"_deposit":{"id":"42911","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"42911"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042911","sets":["62:7433:7434","9:7435:7436"]},"item_8_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2011-11","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"CIRJE-F-825","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]},"item_8_description_13":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) proposed a multitask principal-agent model in which the principal's utility is determined by several tasks the agent engages in. Their results depend on externalities between tasks and several assumptions related to the agent's effort. In this paper, we override certain assumptions (such as, the agent's effort can be negative and disutility is a non-increasing function of the effort up to some level) and obtain the similar outcomes in deriving fixed wage contracts and e¤ort allocation problems. We further introduce timing, outputs that are unverifiable (such as leadership and collegial work), and firm-specific knowledge as observed in actual labor markets and practices. This restructure also allows us to develop a multitask model without externalities, allowing us to study an optimal wage profile and find the optimal timing to sign a contract. Our model predicts that in industries where unverifiable outputs are valued, the more frequently the wage contract is renewed.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Revised in January 2012.","subitem_description_type":"Other"},{"subitem_description":"本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"日本経済国際共同センター"}]},"item_8_relation_25":{"attribute_name":"関係URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2011/2011cf825ab.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_8_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11450569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_8_subject_15":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"335","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]},"item_8_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo"},{"subitem_text_value":"Crawford School of Economics & Government, The Australian National University"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Kamiya, Kazuya"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"98672","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Sato, Meg"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"98673","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Multitask","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"No Externality","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Unveri able Outputs","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Unveri able Investments","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"JEL Codes: D86, J41, J31","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"A Dynamic Multitask Model : Fixed Wage Contracts and Effort Allocation Problems","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"A Dynamic Multitask Model : Fixed Wage Contracts and Effort Allocation Problems"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"1","path":["7436","7434"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2017-01-17"},"publish_date":"2017-01-17","publish_status":"0","recid":"42911","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["A Dynamic Multitask Model : Fixed Wage Contracts and Effort Allocation Problems"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:17:02.900782+00:00"}