{"created":"2021-03-01T07:13:12.496646+00:00","id":51929,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"4fcb8796-f1a3-4700-82e4-f66d489dbf5a"},"_deposit":{"id":"51929","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"51929"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00051929","sets":["46:2942:8167","9:504:2944:8168"]},"item_4_alternative_title_1":{"attribute_name":"その他のタイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_alternative_title":"An Introduction to and a Preliminary Review of the Proceedings of the Israeli Cabinet Meetings at the Time of the Establishment of the State of Israel（5）, Part II : Domestic Politics and Diplomacy on the Eve of Bernadotte’s Peace Suggestions and the Debates over the Altalena Affair in The Proceedings of the Provisional Government Meetings Vols.3-4（20 June to 27 June 1948）"}]},"item_4_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2019-03-29","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"216","bibliographicPageStart":"67","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"175","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"東洋文化研究所紀要 = The memoirs of Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia"}]}]},"item_4_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Due to limited space, this study, An Introduction to and a Preliminary Review of the Proceedings of the Israeli Cabinet Meetings at the Time of the Establishment of the State of Israel（ 5）, is divided into two parts, Part I and Part II. This paper is Part II, which includes the latter half of Section 2, Section 3, and Conclusion.（Part I appeared in the previous journal.）\n This study as a whole gives an introduction to the latter half of Vol. 3 and the first part of Vol .4 of The Proceedings of the Provisional Government Meetings, which cover from 20 June to 27 June 1948, and gives a review of its main contents, the Arab question. As a follow-up to my previous papers published in this journal in March 2014, March 2015, March 2016, March 2017, and March 2018, it is also intended to be a preliminary step toward revisiting the formative years of Israel, this time focusing on the turbulent one week prior to the presentation of Bernadotte’s Peace Suggestions to the Arab and Jewish sides. During that week, which immediately followed the controversial cabinet meeting on 16 June 1948 when the Israeli Provisional Government seemed to incline toward a negative direction concerning the repatriation of Arab refugees, Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN Mediator, with his staffs at their headquarters at Rhodes, was intensively drafting the Peace Suggestions based on his negotiations during the preceding one month with both sides. In the same week there also occurred the Altalena affair, an incident in which an immigrant ship called Altalena, organized by Irgun（ a rightist military organization led by Menachem Begin） and bearing 900 Jewish immigrants and large quantities of weapons, arrived near Tel Aviv, despite the fact that the Truce Agreement strictly limited immigration and forbade the import of weapons during the truce. The Israeli government decided to take strong measures against this sectarian action by Irgun, which apparently ignored the authority of the newly born government as well as defied the United Nations by deliberately violating the Truce Agreement, which the Israeli government had accepted and promised to observe. During the stormy debates over the Altalena affair, which appear in the three cabinet meetings covered by this study, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Rabbi Fishman, resigned as a sign of protest against the government’s policy of using force, if necessary, against “fellow” Jews. On the domestic front, the already strained relationship between Ben-Gurion and the IDF generals was seriously exacerbated over the army reorganization, and this tension was to develop into a cabinet crisis in early July（ “Generals’ Revolt”）.\n Against this backdrop, and with the three assumptions presented in Part I in mind, this paper（ Part II） concludes as follows:\n First, this paper finds that Bernadotte’s too-close relationship with British and Arab officials may have affected his understanding of Shertok’s emphasis in their discussions on 17 June. Shertok, according to his report in the cabinet meeting on 20 June, made it clear to Bernadotte what the Israeli government could not compromise: the government would reject any peace proposal that denied the sovereignty of the State of Israel, and it would never relinquish the territory assigned to the Jewish state by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on 29 November 1947. Only on this basis, Shertok reported, did he offer a compromise concerning refugees and minor border issues. But ultimately Shertok’s non-negotiable conditions were entirely ignored in Bernadotte’s Peace Suggestions, which instead took into account primarily British and Transjordanian interests. Bernadotte’s evident pro-British and pro-Arab history, subsequently betrayed in his posthumously published memoirs, might well explain his neglect of Shertok’s account on 17 June.\n Second, this paper finds the Israeli government’s strong distrust of Britain revealed in the cabinet protocols, which seems to intensify in the latter half of May and June 1948, as the main underlying emotional factor for the rejection of Bernadotte’s Suggestions by the government. Bernadotte’s Suggestions were never considered to be “neutral” by the Israelis, given their striking affinity to the ideas advocated by Britain, whose hostile actions infuriated even moderate Israelis; British officers in the Arab Legion had continued to shell Jews in Jerusalem until the beginning of the truce as was vividly described by Gruenbaum in the cabinet meeting on 20 June, and British battleships often captured Jewish immigrant ships off the coast of Palestine. Another emotional factor behind the rejection of Bernadotte’s Suggestions, which can be extracted from the cabinet protocols, was the fresh memories of heavy Jewish bloodshed and numerous victims in the battles around Jerusalem. Because of these memories, it became extremely difficult for the government to accept suggestions demanding Israeli compromise, which would make the recent Jewish losses appear meaningless.\n Third, this paper finds that during the cabinet debates over the Altalena affair rightist militant philosophy itself appeared to be justified, and that this tendency of tacit tolerance and acquiescence within Zionist political circles toward rightist militant philosophy, which culminated in the cabinet decision on amnesty, may have derived from the Talmudic treatment of “Jewish robbers” as was implied by Ben-Gurion, who mentioned the term during the debate. This cabinet tendency of putting a higher priority on promoting Jewish internal logic than on respecting the logic of international society not only gave fundamental justification, or signaled leniency, to the extremists conducting terrorist activities, but also was visible in the course of the debates over Bernadotte’s Suggestions one week later, apparently becoming a contributing factor to the cabinet’s rejection of Bernadotte’s Suggestions.\n Bearing these three conclusions in mind, the following general conclusion can be drawn concerning the background factors of the rejection by the Israeli government of Bernadotte’s Suggestions in early July. According to the examination of the cabinet protocols, its rejection was not based on an abstract Zionist cause but on more concrete reasons; increasing distrust of the British, fresh memories of Jewish bloodshed, and awareness of public hostility toward the Arabs which dramatically increased in June through the Latrun fightings. At the same time, the debates over Bernadotte’s Suggestions brought to the surface a serious internal schism within the cabinet between activists led by Ben-Gurion and moderates led by Shertok. This schism also reflected a widening policy gap between the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry, which the two leaders supervised respectively, and an escalating clash of interests between Jerusalem, which suffered from the siege and desired its patriotic sacrifices to be recognized by the entire nation, and Tel Aviv, which was the virtual capital of the new-born state and open to more international, soberer logic and longer-term national interests.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_4_full_name_3":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"155304","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"MORI, Mariko"}]}]},"item_4_identifier_registration":{"attribute_name":"ID登録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_identifier_reg_text":"10.15083/00077047","subitem_identifier_reg_type":"JaLC"}]},"item_4_publisher_20":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"東京大学東洋文化研究所"}]},"item_4_select_14":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_select_item":"publisher"}]},"item_4_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AN00170926","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_4_source_id_8":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"05638089 ","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_4_text_21":{"attribute_name":"出版者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, The University of Tokyo"}]},"item_4_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"跡見学園女子大学文学部"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"森, まり子"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"155303","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2019-05-15"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"ioc175003.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"1.7 MB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"ioc175003.pdf","url":"https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/record/51929/files/ioc175003.pdf"},"version_id":"43cd1fe7-ae54-4fb4-aec7-dd218c43ddf4"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"建国期のイスラエル内閣閣議議事録史料紹介と予備的考察（五）＜後篇＞ : 『暫定政府会合議事録』第3 巻後半～第4 巻初（1948 年6 月20 日～6 月27 日）に見るベルナドット和平提案前夜の内政・外交とアルタレナ号事件をめぐる論議","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"建国期のイスラエル内閣閣議議事録史料紹介と予備的考察（五）＜後篇＞ : 『暫定政府会合議事録』第3 巻後半～第4 巻初（1948 年6 月20 日～6 月27 日）に見るベルナドット和平提案前夜の内政・外交とアルタレナ号事件をめぐる論議"}]},"item_type_id":"4","owner":"1","path":["8167","8168"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2019-05-15"},"publish_date":"2019-05-15","publish_status":"0","recid":"51929","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["建国期のイスラエル内閣閣議議事録史料紹介と予備的考察（五）＜後篇＞ : 『暫定政府会合議事録』第3 巻後半～第4 巻初（1948 年6 月20 日～6 月27 日）に見るベルナドット和平提案前夜の内政・外交とアルタレナ号事件をめぐる論議"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-19T04:28:01.239171+00:00"}