Global COE Program "Development and Systematization of Death and Life Studies," Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, The University of Tokyo
抄録
In this article, by examining moral judgments about the good from the viewpoint of Korsgaard's constructivism, I consider how constructivists explain the normativity of moral values, and how they present a possible means of resolving the controversy between realism and non-cognitivism concerning moral values. First, I specify what it is to be a constructivist (sec. 2). Second, by examining a constructivist criticism of realism (sec. 3-4) and the rationalist theory about the good which constructivism advocates (sec. 5), I show that an important feature of the constructivist account of the normativity of moral values lies in emphasizing the procedure of making moral judgments in the light of our multiple agency. Third, I define what it is to be a reason -- a concept which constructivism presupposes (sec. 6). Last, I reply to some objections to constructivism (sec. 7). In this article, I particularly consider G. E. Moore's realism and investigate constructivism's explanation of normativity in contrast to this.
内容記述
Section 2
雑誌名
Bulletin of death and life studies
巻
7
ページ
160 - 175
発行年
2011
ISBN
9784925210409
書誌レコードID
AA12131409
日本十進分類法
105
出版者
Global COE Program DALS, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, the University of Tokyo
Constructivism about Moral Values
bda007007.pdf
(572.02KB)
