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The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2399
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2399311dcfef-b9d7-4086-abc6-fbb03da31e4f
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2012-01-13 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Repeated Prisoner-Dilemma Games | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Private Monitoring Conditional Independence | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Folk Theorem | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Limited Knowledge | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is imperfect and private, and players'private signal structures satisfy the conditional independence. We require almost no conditions concerning the accuracy of private signals. We assume that there exist no public signals and no public randomization devices, and players cannot communicate and use only pure strategies. It is shown that the Folk Theorem holds in that every individually rational feasible payoff vector can be approximated by a sequential equilibrium payoff vector. Moreover, the Folk Theorem holds even if each player has no knowledge of her opponent's private signal structure. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | This paper was accepted in Econometrica as a note. This paper was combined with Discussion Paper 2002-CF-154 and revised as Discussion Paper 2003-CF-242. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CF-123, 発行日 2001-07 |
|||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 330 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2001/2001cf123.pdf |