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Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2394
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/23947d4ffdc1-c56d-40e9-817e-e3cd9c7d9d0f
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2012-01-13 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Codes: L14, K12 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Lyon, Thomas P.
× Lyon, Thomas P.× Eric, Rasmusen |
|||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Indiana University | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Hart & Moore (1999) construct a model to show that contracts perform poorly in complex environments when the state of the world is unverifiable and renegotiation cannot be ruled out. They implicitly assume one player can extort payment from another by threatening to take an inefficient action which hurts both of them. We show that without this assumption a simple "buyer option" contract can implement the first-best even as complexity becomes severe. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CF-118, 発行日 2001-06 |
|||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 330 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2001/2001cf118.pdf |