Department of Economics, University of Tokyo
Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo
抄録
This paper examines the ultimatum game preceded by a single player's investment decision that is risky in that the business opportunity could fail to be discovered. The experiment's results show that the functioning of social preference connecting the baseline ultimatum game with the investment crucially depends on the model's specifications, such as whether the proposer or the responder is the investor or the riskiness of the investment. The noninvestor/proposer tends to act in consideration of the efficiency of the investment, but not its riskiness. Such tendencies of the noninvestor's/proposer's social preferences are diametrically opposite to that of the investor/proposer.
内容記述
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
巻
CIRJE-F-790
発行年
2011-03
書誌レコードID
AA11450569
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
335
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
Investment and Ultimatum Games : Experiments
