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Investment and Ultimatum Games : Experiments
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/50218
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/5021838b94347-3cea-4d55-9e2d-919849e48931
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2013-05-31 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Investment and Ultimatum Games : Experiments | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Ultimatum game | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Hold-up problem | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Social preference | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Investment efficiency | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Risky investment | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Investor’s privilege | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Libertarian doctrine | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Classification: C78, C91, D03 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi× Shima, Toshihiko |
|||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Department of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | This paper examines the ultimatum game preceded by a single player's investment decision that is risky in that the business opportunity could fail to be discovered. The experiment's results show that the functioning of social preference connecting the baseline ultimatum game with the investment crucially depends on the model's specifications, such as whether the proposer or the responder is the investor or the riskiness of the investment. The noninvestor/proposer tends to act in consideration of the efficiency of the investment, but not its riskiness. Such tendencies of the noninvestor's/proposer's social preferences are diametrically opposite to that of the investor/proposer. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-790, 発行日 2011-03 |
|||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 335 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2011/2011cf790ab.html |