Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo
Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
抄録
This paper proposes a simple econometric framework that can identify moral hazard and selection problems separately in insurance markets. Although our methodology requires behavioral assumptions on the consumer's optimization, we show that these assumptions are necessary for the separate identification of the two sources of information asymmetry. Our method is applied to the dental insurance market in the United States. In addition to standard moral hazard, we find advantageous selection, which is not detected by a conventional methodology.
内容記述
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
巻
CIRJE-F-849
発行年
2012-04
書誌レコードID
AA11450569
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
335
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
An Econometric Analysis of Insurance Markets with Separate Identification for Moral Hazard and Selection Problems
