Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners'Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms'prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency program necessarily makes collusion more difficult. However, we also find that par-tial leniency programs - such as in the U.S.- can make collusion easier compared too offering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms.
内容記述
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
巻
CIRJE-F-358
発行年
2005-08
書誌レコードID
AA11450569
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
330
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path
