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The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2633
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/26330d66827b-06ec-485f-b94a-3b092748f9be
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2013-06-03 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Chen, Joe
× Chen, Joe× Joseph, E. Harrington Jr. |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Johns Hopkins University | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners'Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms'prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency program necessarily makes collusion more difficult. However, we also find that par-tial leniency programs - such as in the U.S.- can make collusion easier compared too offering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-358, 発行日 2005-08 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 330 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2005/2005cf358ab.html |