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Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/35805
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/358058b0fa0e6-a570-4926-a5c5-8b0b7c09b352
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2017-01-17 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Multitask Agency | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Moral Hazard, Group Incentives | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Uniqueness | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Classification Numbers: D20, D80, J33, L23 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Department of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We investigate the moral hazard problem in which a principal delegates multiple tasks to multiple workers. The principal imperfectly monitors their action choices by observing the public signals that are correlated with each other through a macro shock. He divides the workers into two groups and makes them compete with each other. We show that when the number of tasks is sufficiently large, relative performance evaluation between the groups accompanied with absolute performance evaluation results in eliminating unwanted equilibria. In this case, any approximate Nash equilibrium nearly induces the first-best allocation. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | Accepted in Japanese Economic Review. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-727, 発行日 2010-03 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 335 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf727ab.html |