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  1. 117 経済学研究科・経済学部
  2. 10 経済理論専攻
  3. 1171020 博士論文(経済理論専攻)
  1. 0 資料タイプ別
  2. 20 学位論文
  3. 021 博士論文

Essays on Collective Choice of Locations of Public Facilities

https://doi.org/10.15083/00005488
https://doi.org/10.15083/00005488
d560d47d-b9b9-4fff-87b3-eb7df67da4fc
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
Thesis_yamaguchi.pdf Thesis_yamaguchi.pdf (339.6 kB)
Item type 学位論文 / Thesis or Dissertation(1)
公開日 2014-02-24
タイトル
タイトル Essays on Collective Choice of Locations of Public Facilities
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec
タイプ thesis
ID登録
ID登録 10.15083/00005488
ID登録タイプ JaLC
その他のタイトル
その他のタイトル 公共施設の立地の集団的選択に関する研究
著者 Yamaguchi, Kazuo

× Yamaguchi, Kazuo

WEKO 11451

Yamaguchi, Kazuo

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著者別名
識別子Scheme WEKO
識別子 11452
姓名 山口, 和男
著者所属
著者所属 東京大学大学院経済学研究科経済理論専攻
Abstract
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 This thesis comprises three essays on the collective choice of locations of public facilities. In the first essay, we investigate a model where, on a tree network, players collectively choose the location of a single public facility by noncooperative alternating-offer bargaining with the unanimity rule. We show the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and the characterization of stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that the equilibrium location converges to the Rawls location (the Rawlsian social welfare maximizer) as the discount factor tends to 1; however, it does not relate to the Weber location (the Benthamite social welfare maximizer). In the second essay, we examine a model where, on a line network, individuals collectively choose the location of an undesirable public facility through bargaining with the unanimity rule. We show the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and the characterization of stationary subgame perfect equilibria when the discount factor is sufficiently large. Furthermore, we show that as the discount factor tends to 1, the equilibrium location can converge to a location that is least desirable according to both the Benthamite and Rawlsian criteria. In the third essay, we consider the outcome of majority voting in multiple undesirable facility location problems where the locations of two facilities are planned, any individual is concerned about the location of the nearest facility but not about the location of the other facility, and any individual prefers that the location of the nearest facility be as far as possible from his/her location. We show that a Condorcet winner is a subset of the set of pendant vertices and the vertices adjacent to pendant vertices on a tree network with an odd number of individuals. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a set of locations to be a Condorcet winner on a line network with an odd number of individuals.
書誌情報 発行日 2012-03-22
日本十進分類法
主題Scheme NDC
主題 332
学位名
学位名 博士(経済学)
学位
値 doctoral
学位分野
Economics (経済学)
学位授与機関
学位授与機関名 University of Tokyo (東京大学)
研究科・専攻
Economic Theory, Graduate School of Ecoomics (経済学研究科経済理論専攻)
学位授与年月日
学位授与年月日 2012-03-22
学位授与番号
学位授与番号 甲第27710号
学位記番号
博経第306号
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