This thesis comprises three essays on the collective choice of locations of public facilities. In the first essay, we investigate a model where, on a tree network, players collectively choose the location of a single public facility by noncooperative alternating-offer bargaining with the unanimity rule. We show the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and the characterization of stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that the equilibrium location converges to the Rawls location (the Rawlsian social welfare maximizer) as the discount factor tends to 1; however, it does not relate to the Weber location (the Benthamite social welfare maximizer). In the second essay, we examine a model where, on a line network, individuals collectively choose the location of an undesirable public facility through bargaining with the unanimity rule. We show the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and the characterization of stationary subgame perfect equilibria when the discount factor is sufficiently large. Furthermore, we show that as the discount factor tends to 1, the equilibrium location can converge to a location that is least desirable according to both the Benthamite and Rawlsian criteria. In the third essay, we consider the outcome of majority voting in multiple undesirable facility location problems where the locations of two facilities are planned, any individual is concerned about the location of the nearest facility but not about the location of the other facility, and any individual prefers that the location of the nearest facility be as far as possible from his/her location. We show that a Condorcet winner is a subset of the set of pendant vertices and the vertices adjacent to pendant vertices on a tree network with an odd number of individuals. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a set of locations to be a Condorcet winner on a line network with an odd number of individuals.
発行年
2012-03-22
日本十進分類法
332
学位名
博士(経済学)
学位
doctoral
学位分野
Economics (経済学)
学位授与機関
University of Tokyo (東京大学)
研究科・専攻
Economic Theory, Graduate School of Ecoomics (経済学研究科経済理論専攻)
学位授与年月日
2012-03-22
学位授与番号
甲第27710号
学位記番号
博経第306号
アイテムへのリンクの際はタイトル右肩にある「Permalink」をご利用ください！
Please use "Permalink" at the top right of the title when linking to items!
Essays on Collective Choice of Locations of Public Facilities
Thesis_yamaguchi.pdf
(339.65KB)
