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Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/54926
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/54926fd773e2c-947a-4527-a6aa-ace25a8fe3a3
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2013-06-27 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Moral Hazard | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Managerial Replacement | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Stock-based Compensation | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Long-term Vested Options | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Short-term Vested Options | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Journal of Economic Literature Classi cations: D86, G32, G34, M12, M52. | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Sato, Meg
× Sato, Meg |
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著者所属 | ||||||
値 | Royal Melbourne Institute of Tech-nology University | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | It is well known that granting incentive pay, such as stock-based compensation, to an agent mitigates the agency problem created by the unobservability of the agent 's effort level. Using contract theory, this paper shows that stock options mitigate the moral hazard problem. However, they create another problem, namely, a misalignment of the interest between the principal and the firm. Speci cally, I consider an environment in which the principal can save her payments to the incumbent agent where the rational choice of the principal on whether to replace or retain the incumbent agent becomes an inefficient decision from the perspective of total fi rm value. The paper further examines both long- and short-term vested options may exhibit over-replacement of the incumbent agent, but only the short-term vested options may exhibit under-replacement, along the parametric range of control benefit. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-890, 発行日 2013-06 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
値 | Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | |||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2013/2013cf890ab.html |