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Commitment, Deficit Ceiling, and Fiscal Privilege
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/55827
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/55827f09bf960-65e0-4b8a-b9ab-a6deeead4528
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2014-05-01 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Commitment, Deficit Ceiling, and Fiscal Privilege | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | deficit ceiling | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | fiscal privilege | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | soft budget | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | hard budget | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | commitment | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | JEL classification numbers: H42, H60, H62 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Ihori, Toshihiro
× Ihori, Toshihiro |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 値 | Department of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | This study analyzes how commitment to a deficit ceiling can affect private agents’ political efforts, as well as overall welfare, in a hard and a soft budget regime, using a two-period model simulating a present and a future generation and a government. In the hard budget regime, the government imposes the deficit ceiling before the present-generation’s interest group decides the quantity of personal fiscal privileges. Since in the soft budget regime the government cannot commit itself to the deficit ceiling ex ante, the present generation exerts intense political efforts for personal fiscal privileges. We explore the interesting possibility that the soft budget regime leads to an overall welfare reduction for both generations, and hence, the commitment to a deficit ceiling benefits even rent-seeking private agents. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-920, 発行日 2014-02 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| 値 | Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | |||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2014/2014cf920ab.html | |||||
