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Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/53262
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/5326286ce78f5-6871-474d-8742-3b928d976881
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2017-01-17 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Interlinkage | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Repeated Games | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Imperfect Monitoring | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Generous Tit-For-Tat | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Approximate Efficiency | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82, H41 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Department of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We investigate an infinitely repeated prisoners'dilemma with imperfect monitoring and projects the possibility that the interlinkage of the players'distinct activities enhances implicit collusion. We show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of generous tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium, if it exists, is unique. This equilibrium achieves approximate efficiency when monitoring is almost perfect, where the discount factors are fixed. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | further revision will be forthcoming in Japanese Economic Review. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-875, 発行日 2013-02 |
|||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 335 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2013/2013cf875ab.html | |||||
置換する | ||||||
関連タイプ | replaces | |||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://hdl.handle.net/2261/7232 |