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  1. 117 経済学研究科・経済学部
  2. 經濟學論集
  3. 79
  4. 1
  1. 0 資料タイプ別
  2. 30 紀要・部局刊行物
  3. 經濟學論集
  4. 79
  5. 1

複数種財取引のオークションについての経済学実験 : 逐次一位価格入札,時計入札,VCG メカニズムの比較分析

https://doi.org/10.15083/00016789
f37278d6-35b8-40f1-a712-186236663217
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
econ0790103.pdf econ0790103.pdf (877.3 kB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2014-10-30
タイトル
タイトル 複数種財取引のオークションについての経済学実験 : 逐次一位価格入札,時計入札,VCG メカニズムの比較分析
言語
言語 jpn
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
タイプ departmental bulletin paper
ID登録
ID登録 10.15083/00016789
ID登録タイプ JaLC
その他のタイトル
その他のタイトル Experiments of Multiobject Auctions : Sequential First Price Auction, Clock Auction, and VCG Mechanism
著者 松島, 斉

× 松島, 斉

WEKO 26680

松島, 斉

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照山, 博司

× 照山, 博司

WEKO 26681

照山, 博司

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著者別名
識別子
識別子 26682
識別子Scheme WEKO
姓名
姓名 Matsushima, Hitoshi
著者別名
識別子
識別子 26683
識別子Scheme WEKO
姓名
姓名 Teruyama, Hiroshi
著者所属
著者所属 東京大学大学院経済学研究科
著者所属
著者所属 京都大学経済研究所
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 複数種財をオークションによって売却する状況について実験をおこなった結果を,効率性,売り手収入,入札者利益などの観点から説明する.2財を2入札者によって競う取引状況を,逐次一位価格入札,時計入札,VCGメカニズムについて比較し,アンケート調査もおこなった.各入札者は,相手の金銭的利得構造を知らないことを仮定して,代替的評価と補完的評価の様々な組み合わせについて実験した.アンケートによる意識調査とは対称的に,実験においては,VCGメカニズムはおおむね好結果であるが,時計入札はExposure Problemの弊害が顕著であることを示した.
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 This paper shows the experimental results for multi-object auctions in terms of efficiency, revenue, and bidders’ payoffs. We assume that there are two heterogeneous objects and two bidders, and that each bidder does not know the other bidder’s material payoff structure. We conducted the laboratory experiments for eight payoff structures associated with complements and substitutes. We compare three types of auction formats, i.e., sequential first price auction, clock auction, and VCG mechanism. We also research questionnaires concerning the subjects’ impressions about the performance of these formats. The experimental results imply that the VCG mechanisms generally function very well, while the performance of the clock auctions is pretty bad in some cases. These observations are in contrast with the results of the questionnaires.
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 論文/Article
書誌情報 經濟學論集

巻 79, 号 1, p. 17-49, 発行日 2013-04
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 0022-9768
書誌レコードID
収録物識別子タイプ NCID
収録物識別子 AN00070411
出版者
出版者 東京大学経済学会
出版者別名
The Society of Economics, The University of Tokyo
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