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Social Inefficiency of Entry under Imperfect Competition : A Consistent Explanation
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/15398
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/153984c9d4fe0-f827-4e93-b4d3-b03d1c48f7d3
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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KJ00004192017.pdf (635.5 kB)
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2008-09-19 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Social Inefficiency of Entry under Imperfect Competition : A Consistent Explanation | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
著者 |
Ohkawa, Takao
× Ohkawa, Takao× Okamura, Makoto |
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著者別名 | ||||||
識別子 | 107907 | |||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
姓名 | 大川, 隆夫 | |||||
著者別名 | ||||||
識別子 | 107908 | |||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
姓名 | 岡村, 誠 | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | 立命館大学経済学部 | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | 広島大学経済学部 | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We consistently explain the excess entry theorem from the standpoint of the difference between the social planner's objective and each firm's one under standard oligopoly model. We introduce industry cost function which is derived from fitting-in function, and establish as follows : (1) Under second-best regulation, the real objective discrepancy results in the social inefficiency of entry from the first-best viewpoint. (2) Under no intervention the fictitious objective discrepancy generates entry bias from the second-best viewpoint, and both discrepancies generate this bias from the first-best one. | |||||
書誌情報 |
社會科學研究 巻 55, 号 3-4, p. 55-64, 発行日 2004-03-18 |
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ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 03873307 | |||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AN00108966 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 300 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 東京大学社会科学研究所 | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo |