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腐敗の経済分析 : 中国経済への適用
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2352
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2352a56d1c93-11c2-4453-b481-be244839b449
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2012-01-13 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | 腐敗の経済分析 : 中国経済への適用 | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | jpn | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
その他のタイトル | ||||||
その他のタイトル | An Economic Analysis of Corruption, with Special Application to the Chinese Economy | |||||
著者 |
鍾, 非
× 鍾, 非 |
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著者別名 | ||||||
識別子 | 96522 | |||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
姓名 | Zhong, Fei | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Using Baumal's theoretical approach, where corruption is regarded as an unavoidable result of the rent-seeking activities spurred by some form of government intervention interfering with the market mechanism, the nature of corruption in the Chinese economy is explored systematically. Indigenous and economic reasons are shown to explain why corruption spreads extensively after the 1978 reforms, notwithstanding the theoretical level of the rents available under central-planning economy is larger than that under transitional economy. The competitions among local governments under the control of a fragmented centralized system are quite similar to the worst case of Shleifer-Vishny's agency structures where a number of agencies(clientelists) each supply a right over a complementary input in order to maximize rents for itself. Anti-corruption analysis suggests that one way to reduce the bribe is to raise the penalty on the bribe-giver (illegal producer), while reducing the penalty on the bribe-taker(bureaucracy or agent) and setting a suitable reward rate for reporting the illegal production. Although it seems unrealistic now, only competition for governmental positions or among different political parties can reduce the amount of corruption forcing governments to introduce less discretionary forms of regulations. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-J 巻 CJ-29, 発行日 2000-07 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11451834 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 330 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2000/2000cj29.pdf |