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  1. 117 経済学研究科・経済学部
  2. 70 日本経済国際共同センター
  3. Discussion Paper F series (in English)
  1. 0 資料タイプ別
  2. 60 レポート類
  3. 061 ディスカッションペーパー

The Role of the Merchant Coalition in Premodern Japanese Economic Development : An Historical Institutional Analysis

http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2392
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2392
80e899f5-4bff-4a86-8d87-99bdb2dbb636
Item type テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1)
公開日 2012-01-13
タイトル
タイトル The Role of the Merchant Coalition in Premodern Japanese Economic Development : An Historical Institutional Analysis
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh
タイプ technical report
アクセス権
アクセス権 metadata only access
アクセス権URI http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb
著者 Okazaki, Tetsuji

× Okazaki, Tetsuji

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Okazaki, Tetsuji

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著者所属
著者所属 University of Tokyo
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 This paper analyzes the role of the merchant coalition (kabu nakama) in Japan in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, from the standpoint of Historical Institutional Analysis (Greif[1997]). The quantitative economic history literature has made clear that sustainable economic growth based on a market economy started in Japan at the end of the eighteenth century. On the other hand, from time to time the central government (Bakufu) legislated ordinances prescribing that suits on pecuniary matters would not be accepted (Aitai Sumeshi Rei). The implication is that the public system for third-party contract enforcement was not working well. The activities of merchant coalitions substituted for public third-party enforcement in premodern Japan. Many of the merchant coalitions'codes prescribed that all of each coalition's members should suspend transaction with those who cheated any one of the members of the coalition. This was the multiple punishment strategy (MPS), as formulated by Greif[1993]. The MPS of the merchant coalition reduced incentives for the players in the market to cheat, which in turn promoted development of a market economy. It is remarkable that the Japanese merchant coalition applied the MPS not only to ordinary commodity trade, but also to the putting-out system and employment. We empirically tested the above hypothesis about the function of the coalition. In 1841, the Bakufu prohibited the coalition, intending to eliminate any monopoly. This event can be regarded as a natural experiment, suitable for an investigation into the role of the coalition. The above hypothesis implies that prohibition of the coalition lowered the performance of the market economy. This implication was examined using data on the money supply and commodity prices. As predicted by the hypothesis, we found that the growth rate of the real money supply contracted and that the efficiency of price arbitrage declined.
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 Revised as 2003-CF-284.
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
書誌情報 Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F

巻 CF-116, 発行日 2001-05
書誌レコードID
収録物識別子タイプ NCID
収録物識別子 AA11450569
フォーマット
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 application/pdf
日本十進分類法
主題Scheme NDC
主題 330
出版者
出版者 日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
関係URI
識別子タイプ URI
関連識別子 http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2001/2001cf116.pdf
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