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The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2360
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/23601fa35114-ca82-47c6-9c95-6bb7a945f7ed
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2012-01-13 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Repeated Prisoner-Dilemma Games | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Private Monitoring Conditional Independence | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Folk Theorem | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Uniform Sustainability | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Zero Likelihood Ratio Condition | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Limited Knowledge | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is truly imperfect and truly private, there exist no public signals and no public randomization devices, and players cannot communicate and use only pure strategies. We show that implicit collusion can be sustained by Nash equilibria under a mild condition. We show that the Folk Theorem holds when players’ private signals are conditionally independent. These results are permissive, because we require no conditions concerning the accuracy of private signals such as the zero likelihood ratio condition. We also investigate the situation in which players play a Nash equilibrium of a machine game irrespective of their initial states, i.e., they play a uniform equilibrium. We show that there exists a unique payoff vector sustained by a uniform equilibrium, i.e., a unique uniformly sustainable payoff vector, which Pareto-dominates all other uniformly sustainable payoff vectors. We characterize this payoff vector by using the values of the minimum likelihood ratio. We show that this payoff vector is efficient if and only if the zero likelihood ratio condition is satisfied. These positive results hold even if each player has limited knowledge on her opponent’s private signal structure. Keywords: Repeated Prisoner-Dilemma Games, Private Monitoring, Conditional Independence, Folk Theorem, Uniform Sustainability, Zero Likelihood Ratio Condition, Limited Knowledge. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper was revised as Discussion Paper 2001-CF-123. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CF-84, 発行日 2000-07 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 330 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2000/2000cf84.pdf | |||||
