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Overlapping Tax Revenue, Local Debt Control and Soft-Budget Constraint
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/18431
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/18431bd847fb4-b276-4b5c-89b4-f58a67b17b2d
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2013-05-31 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Overlapping Tax Revenue, Local Debt Control and Soft-Budget Constraint | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | JEL classification: E6, H5 | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Soft budget constraint | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | local investment | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | rent-seeking activities | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | local debt control | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Ihori, Toshihiro
× Ihori, Toshihiro |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 値 | University of Tokyo | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper investigates how the soft budget constraint with grants from the central government to local governments tends to internalize the vertical externality by stimulating insufficient local expenditure when both the central and local governments impose taxes on the same economic activities from public investment. The theoretical model incorporates local governments'rent-seeking activities in a multi-government setting with and without central controls on local borrowing. Two channels through debt issuance and public investment cause the soft budget outcome. In the unrestricted scheme of local debt issuance we have the positive effect on public investment and debt issuance although it would also stimulate wasteful rent seeking activities. In the restricted scheme of local debt issuance the soft budget case may not stimulate public investment since its effect through debt issuance is absent. In either case the soft budget constraint is welfare improving if the marginal valuation of central public goods is relatively small and/or the tax share of local government is relatively small. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-552, 発行日 2008-04 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 335 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| 値 | Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | |||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2008/2008cf552ab.html | |||||
