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It Pays to Violate: How Effective are the Basel Accord Penalties?
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/32449
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/32449d1cf14cd-2801-432c-91f2-e9073edca4d4
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2013-05-31 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | It Pays to Violate: How Effective are the Basel Accord Penalties? | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Value-at-Risk (VaR) | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | GARCH | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | risk management | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | violations | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | forecasting | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | simulations | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Basel Accord penalties | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | JEL Classifications: G32, G11, G17, C53, C22. | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
da, Veiga Bernardo
× da, Veiga Bernardo× Chan, Felix× McAleer, Michael |
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著者所属 | ||||||
値 | School of Economics and Finance Curtin University of Technology | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
値 | Econometrics Institute Erasmus School of Economics Erasmus University Rotterdam | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
値 | Tinbergen Institute The Netherlands | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
値 | Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy (CIRJE) Faculty of Economics University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | The internal models amendment to the Basel Accord allows banks to use internal models to forecast Value-at-Risk (VaR) thresholds, which are used to calculate the required capital that banks must hold in reserve as a protection against negative changes in the value of their trading portfolios. As capital reserves lead to an opportunity cost to banks, it is likely that banks could be tempted to use models that underpredict risk, and hence lead to low capital charges. In order to avoid this problem the Basel Accord introduced a backtesting procedure, whereby banks using models that led to excessive violations are penalised through higher capital charges. This paper investigates the performance of five popular volatility models that can be used to forecast VaR thresholds under a variety of distributional assumptions. The results suggest that, within the current constraints and the penalty structure of the Basel Accord, the lowest capital charges arise when using models that lead to excessive violations, thereby suggesting the current penalty structure is not severe enough to control risk management. In addition, an alternative penalty structure is suggested to be more effective in aligning the interests of banks and regulators. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-683, 発行日 2009-10 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
主題 | 335 | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
値 | Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | |||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2009/2009cf683ab.html |